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ABSTRACT 
 
BENJAMIN CARL PEARSON: Faith and Democracy: Political Transformations at the 
German Protestant Kirchentag, 1949-1969 
(Under the direction of Konrad H. Jarausch) 
 
In the decades following World War II, German Protestants worked to transform 
their religious tradition.  While this tradition had been previously characterized by rigidly 
hierarchical institutional structures, strong nationalist leanings, and authoritarian political 
tendencies, the experiences of dictatorship and defeat caused many Protestants to 
question their earlier beliefs.  Motivated by the desire to overcome the burden of the Nazi 
past and by the opportunity to play a major role in postwar rebuilding efforts, several 
groups within the churches worked to reform Protestant social and political attitudes.  As 
a result of their efforts, the churches came to play an important role in the ultimate 
success and stability of West German democracy. 
This study examines this transformation at the meetings of the German Protestant 
Kirchentag, one of the largest and most diverse postwar gatherings of Protestant laity.  
After situating the Kirchentag within the theological and political debates of the 
immediate postwar years, it focuses on changing understandings of the role of the church 
in society, the pluralization of Protestant political attitudes, and the shift from national to 
international self-understandings within the churches.  It closes with the challenges posed 
to this new consensus by the youth revolt and the rise of New Left politics in the late 
1960s. 
 iii
By examining the important role of the Kirchentag and of the Protestant churches 
in the democratization and political transformation of West Germany, this study asserts 
the continued relevance of religious categories of analysis in the Federal Republic.  
Focusing on the churches’ landmark contributions—including the promotion of 
democratic political activity, work toward East-West reconciliation, and the peace 
movement—it also argues for a broader, more complex conceptualization of postwar 
political transformations.  In particular, rather than focusing on the work of any one 
faction or movement within the churches, it highlights the constructive roles played by 
different groups with different priorities and motivations.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In July 1951 the city of Berlin was transformed into a massive celebration of 
Christian faith and Christian “brotherhood.”   As many as 200,000 Protestants—from 
both sides of the divided German nation—gathered in the city for the third annual 
German Protestant Kirchentag.  Defying Cold War division with the motto “We are still 
brothers!” they raised the cross above stadiums, parks, and playing fields on both sides of 
Berlin.  Tens of thousands of people assembled in hundreds of churches, while 
loudspeakers broadcast speeches and sermons to overflowing crowds in the streets 
outside.  In an unprecedented development, the resources of the communist youth 
movement, the Free German Youth (FDJ), were put at the temporary disposal of the 
churches.  And, looking anxious and uncomfortable, even important communist leaders 
like Wilhelm Pieck attended the meeting’s major religious services.  Leaving the meeting 
halls at night, groups of teenagers dispersed throughout the city, singing loudly as they 
went.  In the train stations and on the commuter trains one cluster would begin with the 
first verse of “Now Thank We All Our God” or “Praise the Lord” and another would pick 
up the words until it seemed that the whole city had been united in song.1 
Eighteen years later, German Protestants continued to gather for the Kirchentag.  
Meeting in Stuttgart in 1969 they could not match the massive crowds of 1951.  But their 
numbers were still substantial, and the atmosphere was just as lively.  Student protesters 
                                                 
1 K. W. “Das Kreuz in Ost- und Westberlin,” Die Zeit, 19 July 1951; Reinhard Henkys, “Das 
Ereignis Kirchentag,” in Zwanzig Jahre Kirchentag, ed. Carola Wolf (Stuttgart: Kreuz-Verlag, 1969), 36. 
mobbed the meeting halls carrying red flags and signs with revolutionary slogans.  
Forums debated the meaning of democracy and the urgent need for further 
democratization in West German society.  Young Marxists condemned the church as a 
tool of the capitalist system, while other equally earnest young Marxists professed their 
hope that the church would lead the coming revolution.  Progressive and traditional 
theologians engaged in heated arguments on the bible and the historical Jesus.  And 
politicians from every major party tried to present their programs over the shouts, 
catcalls, and rhythmic clapping of unruly crowds.  In one session, the radical 
psychoanalyst Alexander Mitscherlich denounced the “guilt culture” of the Christian 
West.  And in another, student activists voted to disband the session altogether, 
dispensing with the planned program in favor of a political protest at the North-Rhine 
Westphalian Landtag.  After one particularly tumultuous session on the historical Jesus, a 
small crowd of two-hundred older church members gathered in the center of the hall, 
singing “Jesus Lives” in an act of persistent, even defiant faith.  The rest of the session’s 
attendees paid them little notice as they filed out of the room.2 
In many ways the Kirchentag meetings of 1951 and 1969 could hardly have been 
more different from one another.  Separated by nearly two decades, they expressed 
widely divergent cultural, political, and religious values.  Each strongly reflected the 
assumptions and ideals, crises and controversies of its own time.  But each of these 
meetings was also a response to many of the same underlying questions.  What did 
Christian faith and the German Protestant tradition have to offer the German people after 
                                                 
2 Rolf Zundel, “Der Gott der Alten und Jungen,” Die Zeit, 29 July 1969; see also Ottmar Hall, 
“Gehversuche am Saalmikrofon: Schwierigkeiten beim Sagen der Wahrheit,” Deutsches Allgemeines 
Sonntagsblatt, 27 July 1969; and Martin Bernstorf, “Durst nach Geschäftsordnung,” Christ und Welt, 25 
July 1969. 
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two devastating world wars?  How were Germans to make sense of the unspeakable 
atrocities that their own people had carried out?  How were postwar Germans, as a people 
who had been led astray by dangerous political and national illusions, ever to overcome 
the burden of their past?  And what contributions could they make to construction of a 
new, more durable political system in the democratic Federal Republic? 
Before 1945, the German Protestant churches had been characterized by a rigidly 
hierarchical—even authoritarian—organizational structure. The heirs of a longstanding 
alliance between church and state, they had preached almost-unquestioning obedience to 
state authority.  Deeply conservative in their political values, they had rejected the 
democratic system of the Weimar Republic as a foreign imposition, working to 
undermine its legitimacy.  And, taking a reactionary stance against social and political 
change, they had thrown in their lot with authoritarian leaders like Adolf Hitler, who 
promised to bring back the traditional social order.  Caught up in the nationalist frenzy of 
the two world wars, they had also embraced virulently nationalist theological and 
political positions, proclaiming a unique God-given mission for the German nation.  And 
they had used this National Protestant tradition to justify both foreign policy aggression 
and domestic racial discrimination and terror.  Only during the Second World War did 
these pillars of Protestant thought begin to crumble.  Protestants began to realize that 
Church hierarchies could be used by Nazis and other radical movements to steer the 
church away from the historical Christian faith.  In the hands of a man like Hitler, the 
state could act unlawfully and with impunity, persecuting the churches themselves and 
committing horrible crimes and atrocities.  And nationalist hopes and dreams, when 
shattered, could give way to the trauma of national defeat and national division. 
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In the decades after World War II, German Protestants struggled to make sense of 
these lessons, beginning the long, slow process of rethinking their traditional religious, 
national, and political assumptions.  As the events at the Kirchentag gatherings of 1951 
and 1969 clearly demonstrate, they succeeded to a great extent in transforming their 
attitudes, ideas, and values.  The Protestant churches had been bastions of social and 
political reaction in the late German Empire.  In the 1920s their teachings had helped to 
delegitimize the democratic Weimar Republic, contributing to its collapse.  But after 
1945, the churches not only came to embrace the new, democratic system of the Federal 
Republic, they became an importrant force for political and cultural change.  This was not 
a direct one-sided process, however, or a simple immediate reversal.  The German 
Protestant churches did not become proponents of democratization and political change 
overnight.  Instead, their transformation involved a great deal of soul searching and self-
criticism.  At forums like the Kirchentag, postwar Protestants worked to re-interpret their 
tradition.  They debated the meaning and the relevance of Christian faith to their present-
day circumstances and to the conditions of modern life.  And, in the process, they came 
to quite divergent conclusions.  The story of the postwar transformation of West German 
Protestantism is not a straightforward triumphalistic narrative.  It is the story of real 
people working together—and sometimes working against each other—to take their 
religious faith seriously, to apply its teachings to their lives, and to make a difference in 
the world. 
Recent studies of the postwar modernization, liberalization, and democratization 
of West German culture offer some insights into how to make sense of this process.  
Since the early 1990s, these studies have shifted their emphasis away from the mechanics 
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of West German social and political life, beginning to look at the transformation of 
political and cultural values more broadly.  Recent studies by Axel Schildt, Anselm 
Doering-Manteuffel, Ulrich Herbert, and Konrad Jarausch, in particular, offer useful 
multi-level models for thinking about the postwar transformation of West Germany.  
Schildt has focused on the interplay of broad social and economic developments (which 
he characterizes as modernization), changes in everyday life (such as the gradual passive 
acceptance of democracy by ordinary Germans and the integration of former Nazis into 
democratic society), and more ideological and intellectual transformations.3  Doering-
Manteuffel has emphasized the development of a “western orientation” among political 
and cultural elites, focusing on their acceptance of “Western” and “American” values in 
the 1950s.  And he has looked at Germany’s subsequent participation alongside other 
western nations in the social upheaval and student protests of the later 1960s.4  Herbert 
has looked at intellectual engagement with the German past, the challenges posed by 
personal continuities with the Nazi period and the need to reintegrate former Nazis into 
society, the changing structures of West German politics (patterns of political 
participation, communication, etc.), and the broad transformation of mentalities and 
culture.5  Finally, Jarausch has looked broadly at the process of “re-civilizing” the 
Germans.   Emphasizing key moments in this process, he has focused on the gradual 
                                                 
3 Axel Schildt, Ankunft im Westen: Ein Essay zur Erfolgsgeschichte der Bundesrepublik (Frankfurt 
a/M: Fischer, 1999); see also Axel Schildt and Arnold Sywottek, eds., Modernisierung und Wiederaufbau. 
Die Westdeutsche Gesellschaft der 50er Jahren (Bonn: Dietz, 1998) and Axel Schildt, Detlef Siegfried, and 
Karl Christian, eds., Dynamische Zeite. Die 60er Jahre in den beiden deutschen Gesellschaften (Hamburg: 
Hans Christian, 2001). 
 
4 Anselm Doering-Manteuffel, Wie westlich sind die Deutschen? Amerikanisierung und 
Westernisierung im 20. Jahrhundert (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1999). 
 
5 Ulrich Herbert, ed. Wandlungsprozesse in Westdeutschland. Belastung, Integration, 
Liberalisierung, 1945-1980 (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2002) 
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break with the Nazi past accepted by most Germans in the immediate postwar years, the 
cultural challenges posed by the New Left in the late 1960s, and the debates that 
surrounded reunification after 1989/90.6 
These studies all suggest the need for complex interpretations of West Germany’s 
postwar transformation.  Changes in the attitudes of individuals were gradual, supported 
by increasing material prosperity, the prospects of renewed sovereignty within a more 
united Western European and Atlantic framework, and by the fear of communism. They 
progressed in part through the painful process of confronting the Nazi past and through 
increasingly explicit debates about the nature of democratic society.  In many ways, these 
changes came to head in the generational conflicts of the late 1960s and early 1970s.  
Nevertheless, they were still being worked out as late as the 1990s as German grappled 
with the legacy of East German communism.  
In comparison to these sophisticated arguments, studies of the churches in 
postwar West Germany have lagged behind.  Contemporary Church history in Germany 
has been dominated by studies of the Protestant churches under National Socialism and, 
more recently, under the communist dictatorship of the German Democratic Republic.  
While some of this work has extended into the early postwar period in West Germany, 
little goes much beyond the first years of the 1950s.  Most work on West German 
Protestantism—especially in the late 1950s and 1960s—has consisted of popular 
accounts by participants or examinations of the development of particular theological 
                                                 
6 Konrad H. Jarausch, After Hitler: Recivilizing the Germans (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2006); see also the German original, Die Umkehr. Deutsche Wandlungen 1945-1995 (Munich: Deutsche 
Verlags-Anstalt, 2004). 
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schools.7  These accounts have tended to either adopt a hagiographic tone, celebrating the 
churches’ supposed resistance to Nazism and their heroic role in postwar reconstruction, 
or, more recently, to emphasize the “restorative” tendencies that supposedly dominated 
the Protestant churches in the 1950s and 1960s, only giving way in the late 1960s and 
1970s to new progressive, self-critical movements.  Until quite recently, the immediate 
postwar era has been viewed primarily as a lost opportunity in which the goals of 
reformist minorities, such as the circle surrounding Martin Niemöller were thwarted by 
the conservatism and defensiveness of those with a stake in the churches’ institutional 
power.   
Only in the last several years have scholars begun to seriously challenge this 
perspective.  As Martin Greschat has compellingly argued, the situation in the 1950s was 
really much more complex than conventional narratives have suggested, “neither a new 
beginning, nor a restoration.”8  Within the Protestant churches, both “conservatives” and 
“progressives” struggled to find homes in the new postwar constellation of German 
society.  As Matthew Hockenos has recently reminded, groups rooted in the radical 
                                                 
7 For an overview of the historiography on the  Protestant churches in West Germany, see Thomas 
Sauer, “Die geschichte der evangelischen Kirchen in der Bundesrepublik – Schwerpunkte und Perspektiven 
der Forschung” in Evangelische Kirche im geteilten Deutschland (1945-1989/90), ed. Claudia Lepp and 
Kurt Nowak (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 2001), 295-309; also see the introduction to Thomas 
Sauer, Westorientierung im deutschen Protestantismus?  Vorstellungen und Tätigkeit des Kronberger 
Kreises (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1999); for examples of these historiographic tendencies, see Werner 
Jochmann, “Evangelische Kirche und Politische Neuorientierung in Deutschland 1945,” in Deutschland in 
der Weltpolitik des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts.  Fritz Fischer zum 65. Geburtstag, ed. Imanuel Geis and 
Bernd Jürgen Wendt (Düsseldorf: Bertelsman Universitätsverlag, 1973), and more recently, Wolfgang 
Huber, “Protestantismus und Demokratie” in Protestanten in der Demokratie.  Positionen und Profile im 
Nachkriegsdeutschland, ed. Wolfgang Huber (Munich: Kaiser, 1990) and Karl Herbert, Kirche zwischen 
Aufbruch und Tradition.  Entscheidungsjahre nach 1945 (Stuttgart: Radius Verlag, 1989). 
 
8 Martin Greschat, “Weder Neuanfang noch Restauration” in Protestanten in der Zeit, ed. Jochen-
Christoph Kaiser (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1994); see also Martin Greschat, Die evangelische 
Christenheit und die deutsche Geschichte nack 1945.  Weichenstellungen in der Nachkriegszeit (Stuttgart: 
W. Kohlhammer, 2002). 
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“Dahlemite,” or Barthian, faction of the Confessing Church, including such well-known 
figures as Martin Niemöller, Gustav Heinemann, and Helmut Gollwitzer, were at the 
vanguard in grappling with the church’s own guilt for the crimes of the Third Reich.9  
This focus led them to emphasize the defects within the German Protestant tradition and 
to desire a radical break with the past.  But more traditional, conservative groups also 
underwent changes, as Thomas Sauer has shown in his perceptive study of the influence 
of American and Western European ideas of democracy on the thought of the Kronberg 
Circle of conservative Protestant intellectuals.10  Indeed, given the influence of the latter 
group in the churches and in West German political life, it would be highly misleading to 
focus only on more radical critics such as Niemöller. 
Both progressives and conservatives—along with the many Protestants between 
these extremes—were forced to grapple with the changing circumstances of the postwar 
period.  And they did not do so in isolation from one another.  Instead Protestant 
representatives of a variety of ideological, theological, and political perspectives 
attempted in various forums and through various institutions to diagnose the problems of 
their society and to mobilize the forces of German Protestantism to resolve them.  Neither 
side was entirely realistic in its diagnoses.  Neither side was entirely successful in 
implementing solutions.  Both were thoroughly entrenched in the debates and concerns of 
their own time, rather than the debates that their successors might have wished them to be 
engaged in.  But this process of engagement with society and its problems led both 
groups, by their own paths, away from the ideas of the past, toward new, self-critical, 
                                                 
9 Matthew D. Hockenos, A Church Divided: German Protestants Confront the Nazi Past 
(Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2004). 
 
10 Thomas Sauer, Westorientierung im deutschen Protestantismus? 
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ecumenical and international, and liberal democratic understandings of themselves, their 
institutions, and their place in modern German society. 
One major forum for this process was the German Protestant Kirchentag.  This 
massive Protestant convention was founded in 1949, the same year as the two German 
states.  It was devoted to strengthening the spiritual lives of German Protestants, serving 
as a forum of their self-expression, as a place to strategize and coordinate the church’s 
role in society, and as a platform for political and social transformation.  The Kirchentag 
founder and president, Reinold von Thadden-Trieglaff, fell in the middle ground between 
the radical progressive and traditional conservative wings of postwar Protestantism.  
Sympathetic to many of the progressives’ concerns, but unwilling to sacrifice the 
church’s unity and spiritual mission to damaging internecine warfare, Thadden conceived 
of the Kirchentag as a neutral forum where Protestant laity from all of the various church 
factions could come together for discussion and practical cooperation, maximizing their 
influence on parish life and German society as a whole.   
As a neutral forum for all Protestant laity, the Kirchentag attracted an unusually 
broad segment of the Protestant population to its gatherings.  Officially independent from 
the Protestant state churches, it also enjoyed unusual freedom to approach contemporary 
problems in innovative new ways.  By the early 1950s the Kirchentag was drawing 
crowds in the hundreds of thousands to its massive opening and closing assemblies, and 
tens of thousands to its several-day-long programs of workgroup sessions, cultural 
activities, and religious services.  Covered extensively in the religious and secular press, 
on the radio, and on television, its influence was even wider than these attendance 
numbers indicate.  Within two years of its foundation, the Kirchentag had gone from 
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being one among many, to being the principal visible public forum for German 
Protestants.  As church leaders sometimes complained, the public—including church 
members—sometimes seemed unable to differentiate between the Kirchentag and the 
institutional Protestant church itself.11 
The Kirchentag was an enormously diverse and multifaceted phenomenon.  It 
drew Protestants from a wide variety of theological and political persuasions.  And its 
meetings operated on many different levels.  Gathering massive crowds to its major 
services and assemblies, the Kirchentag was one of the most visible public symbols of 
postwar German Protestantism.  Like any large public gathering, its influence went far 
beyond its formal program.  Every Kirchentag was shaped by the spontaneous reactions 
of the crowds it gathered together, by the questions posed after planned speeches and 
lectures, by the conversations that it generated between attendees, the atmosphere that it 
created in the city where it met, and by the responses that it generated in the press and in 
local congregations even after its formal sessions were over.  Indeed, the Kirchentag, as a 
subjective experience, could resonate very differently with its attendees and observers 
than was intended by its organizers.  This was especially apparent when German 
Protestants from the East and West met together, in Berlin in 1951 and 1961 and in 
Leipzig in 1954.  At times like these, the drama of inter-German and Cold War politics, 
rather than the formal intellectual program, dominated headlines and conversations.  The 
same was often true of protest actions at the Kirchentag gatherings of the late 1960s.  
However, even in the midst of these dramatic experiences, the Kirchentag also 
remained an important intellectual forum where Protestants could gather to exchange 
                                                 
11 This was the impression of Eberhard Müller, among others.  See the “Protokoll der 
Präsidialausschuss-Sitzung des deutsche evangelische Kirchentages, Bad Nauheim, Vorgespräch am 
Nachmittag und Abend des 2. Dezember 1952” EZA 71/86/22 
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ideas or to argue about the church, the world, and the relationship between the two.  This 
aspect of the Kirchentag, which persisted beneath the surface even when other more 
dramatic events drew headlines, had tremendous significance for the transformation of 
German Protestantism in the decades after World War II.  It was here that Protestant 
identity and the German Protestant tradition were repeatedly called into question, 
renegotiated, and reformulated by leading figures in the churches.  And while the results 
of these discussions and debates may not have always had the dramatic, immediate 
impact of other Kirchentag events, they generated a persistent ripple effect that spread 
through other Protestant organizations, local congregations, and West German society 
more broadly. 
Several recent studies have addressed the changes in the organizational and 
structural dynamics of the Kirchentag over the course of its existence.  In one recent 
article, Traugott Jähnichen has outlined the development of a culture of “permanent self-
reflection” at the Kirchentag and in the Protestant Academies.  And a recent book by 
Harald Schroeter has examined the Kirchentag as the source of a new “practical 
theology,” a new way of mediating between the church and the “world.”12  Several 
specific issues and debates at the Kirchentag have also received recent scholarly 
attentions, most notably in Dirk Palm’s account of East-West relations at the Kirchentag 
                                                 
12 Traugott Jähnichen, “Kirchentage und Akademien.  Der Protestantismus auf dem Weg zur 
Institutionalisierung der Dauerreflexion” in Gesellschaftpolitische Neuorientierung des Protestantismus in 
der Nachkriegszeit, ed. Norbert Friedrich and Traugott Jähnichen.  Bochumer Forum zur Geschichte des 
sozialen Protestantismus 3 (Münster: Lit Verlag, 2002), 127-44; Harald Schroeter, Kirchentag als vor-
läufige Kirche.  Der Kirchentag als eine besondere Gestalt des Christseins zwischen Kirche und Welt, 
Praktische Theologie heute 13 (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1993). 
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between 1949 and 1961.13  However, scholars have not yet looked systematically at the 
broader changes in Protestant attitudes, ideas, and values that took place gradually at the 
Kirchentag meetings over the course of the 1950s and 1960s. 
It is this larger transformation that lies at the center of this study.  How did 
German Protestant attitudes and ideas change so dramatically in the decades following 
World War II?  What factors influenced and shaped these developments?  And how did 
Protestants—and the broader German public—respond to this transformation?  The 
programs and planning documents for the Kirchentag provide a tremendously rich source 
base for answering these questions.  Due to constraints of time and space, this study has 
only been able to scratch the surface of much of this material, referring only tangentially 
to ongoing discussions of gender and the family, social policy, ecumenical relations, and 
modern theology, among other topics.  It focuses instead on three specific areas of 
transformation within West German Protestantism.  First, it looks at changing Protestant 
attitudes toward the public role of the churches and the relevance of Christian faith in the 
modern world.  What, in short, did it mean to be a Protestant Christian in postwar 
German society?  Second, it examines changes in national attitudes and national identity.  
What did it mean to be a German after the events of the Nazi dictatorship, Second World 
War, and Holocaust?  And, finally, it addresses foundational changes in Protestant 
political attitudes and political culture.  What did it mean to be a politically active citizen 
in the democratic Federal Republic of Germany?   
This study is also divided into three chronological sections, each correlating 
loosely with a different phase in the development of postwar Protestant attitudes.  The 
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first of these, characterized by the dominance of Christian Democracy and overtly 
religious politics, extends from roughly 1945 to 1954.  The second, from roughly 1955 to 
1961, is marked by the breakdown of this religious-political consensus and the gradual 
pluralization and liberalization of Protestant attitudes.  Finally, the period from roughly 
1961 to 1969, represents the consolidation of this left-liberal Protestant consensus and the 
rise of new, more radical challenges from both the Right and Left. 

 
 
 
 
 
PART ONE 
 
1945-1954

 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 1  
 
RECONSTRUCTING GERMAN PROTESTANTISM, 1945-1949 
 
Traveling through Germany in August 1945, the American Protestant minister 
Stewart Herman was greeted by scenes of shocking devastation.  In Bremen, “Buildings 
which formerly shouldered the starlight out of the narrow streets survived as nothing 
more than a very low and jagged silhouette.”  In the capital, where he had served as 
minister of the American church until 1939, he described “dunes of powdered brick and 
shattered stone inertly sprawled on the sandy soil where Berlin’s massive apartment 
houses and commercial enterprises once stood.”  “Out of 187 evangelical churches in 
Berlin,” he reflected, “not one is left intact.”  For those who had survived the war, he 
continued, life was marked by a desperate scarcity of food and the daily hardships of 
rebuilding and survival.  It was also marked by psychological trauma.  “The world has 
heard about the fires which raced through Hamburg sucking all oxygen out of the air,” 
Stewart related, “but relatively few reporters have talked with men who heard hundreds 
of people screaming in the sea of flames as long as there was air to breathe, and later 
walked among the mummified bodies of those who perished in open parks of heat which 
reduced to fine ashes even the records housed in fireproof safes.”1 
Yet even more than this physical, social, and psychological ruin, Herman was 
concerned with the spiritual ruin of the German people in the wake of National 
                                                 
1 Stewart W. Herman, The Rebirth of the German Church (New York: Harper and Brothers, 
1946), 1-10. 
 
Socialism.  Just as the city of Hamburg had been destroyed by bombs, its Protestant 
church had been destroyed by the Nazis in the German Christian movement, who had 
seized control in order to “reform” the church according to racial and national principles.  
The same was true for most other regional Landeskirchen.  With the German surrender, 
most of these German Christian leaders had faded to the background, their place taken by 
those they had persecuted in the church resistance.  But the task of reconstruction was 
enormous.  These men from the Confessing Church—“shrunken frames—ill-clad from 
broken shoes to ragged collars much too large for scrawny necks—and sunken cheeks 
under eyes doubly haunted by the memory of brethren murdered by the Gestapo and the 
vision of a cross that would not let them go”—how would they be able to undo the 
damage of the preceding twelve years?2 
Rebuilding German Protestantism from the spiritual rubble of the Third Reich 
proved to be a complex task, further complicated by deeply rooted divisions over the 
nature and structure of the Protestant churches themselves, new questions about the 
relationship between the churches and the German nation, and changing conceptions of 
the Christian as a politically involved state citizen.  It would take decades for German 
Protestants to work through all of the issues raised by the Nazi dictatorship, the Second 
World War, and the devastating German defeat.  But they began to grapple with them 
already in the first few months following the German surrender, working out very 
different answers over the next several years.  Two factors had an especially dominant 
influence on the development of these answers.  First, the experiences of the churches 
under National Socialism, especially the “church struggle” against the pro-Nazi German 
Christian movement, became a filter through which all earlier points of view were re-
                                                 
2 Ibid., 4-5, 11. 
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interpreted and transformed.  Second, the experiences of the churches in the immediate 
postwar period of reconstruction and rebuilding shaped the application of these lessons.  
The way forward would be beset by burdens from the past, but also bolstered by newly 
strengthened convictions.  It would be buoyed by the tremendous opportunities of 
postwar rebuilding and renewal, but also marred by the temptations of self-justification 
and opportunism. 
 
THE MULTIPLE LEGACIES OF THE CHURCH STRUGGLE 
The lessons that German Protestants learned from the “church struggle” were as 
diverse as German Protestantism itself.  Divided into twenty-eight separate state 
churches, into three distinct theological confessions, and into numerous theological and 
church-political schools of thought, German Protestantism was far from internally united 
before the rise of Hitler.  Since different church-political factions experienced the Third 
Reich differently, it is hardly surprising that they drew different lessons from their 
experiences.  The term “church struggle,” or Kirchenkampf, can be interpreted more or 
less broadly to encompass a wide range of experiences under the Third Reich.  At its 
narrowest, the term refers to the formal struggle for power between the völkisch German 
Christian movement and their various opponents in the Landeskirchen, a struggle that 
peaked from 1933 to 1934, and was largely over by 1936.  However, it can also be used 
more broadly to refer to other experiences of suffering and other claims to victimhood. 
German Protestantism in the Weimar Republic was divided into four major 
church-political camps, all of which were transformed by the experiences of the Third 
Reich.  Two of these camps had roots that went back to the Second Empire of the late 
nineteenth century, while two others gained prominence in the 1920s.  The first of these 
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camps saw the individual Landeskirchen, with their separate authority and theological 
autonomy, as the basic structures of German Protestantism.  These state churches had 
their roots in the wars of religion that followed the Reformation.  With the 
implementation of the Weimar constitution, they lost their historic ties to deposed 
dynastic rulers, but they retained their control over local religious life.  Especially in 
Lutheran territories, they also retained their traditional authoritarian and hierarchical 
structure, which was seen as a necessary defense of Lutheran confessional distinctives 
against the Calvinist tendencies in Germany’s small Reformed and confessionally-mixed 
Union Churches.3 
A second group of Protestants hoped to build a People’s Church, or Volkskirche.  
Advocates of the Volkskirche idea ranged from political liberals and socialists to 
relatively conservative populists.  Liberals, such as Martin Rade, entertained hopes of 
fully democratizing the Landeskirchen by shifting power to elected councils.  Small 
groups of religious socialists held similar views.  This movement had its greatest success 
in the small Reformed Landeskirchen in the Rhineland and Westphalia, where elected 
Synods had always enjoyed greater power than in the Lutheran regions.  Other more 
traditional leaders, such as the influential Prussian churchman Otto Dibelius, hoped to 
combine traditional hierarchical structures with greater popular involvement.  They 
hoped this would make the church relevant again in the lives of the people and, 
potentially, in the political life of the nation.4 
                                                 
3 See Klaus Scholder, The Churches and the Third Reich, Vol. 1, Preliminary History and the 
Time of Illusions 1918-1934, trans. John Bowden (London: SCM Press, 1987), 21-100. 
 
4 Ibid. 
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A third group took these ideas much further, arguing that the principles of the 
Volk (a racially tinged nationalist concept) were central to any present-day understanding 
of the meaning of Christianity.  These völkisch Christians argued that God had created 
each nation or people with a unique and individual destiny.  The German churches had 
the task of promoting a specific German mission.  In its moderate forms, this viewpoint 
went only a small step beyond the patriotic preaching that emanated from the pulpits of 
all participants during the First World War, proclaiming that God was on the nations’ 
side, leading them to triumph over their enemies.  At its extremes it blended into the 
popular neo-paganism of the broader völkisch movement, radically reinterpreting the 
Christian faith to make it more German with little regard for traditional orthodoxy.5 
Finally, a relatively small group of theologians following Karl Barth entirely 
rejected the political pretensions of the other three groups, arguing that the church had a 
purely spiritual, rather than political function.  The church existed, according to Barth, to 
proclaim the revelation of God, as manifested in the scriptures and the person of Jesus 
Christ.  To Barthians, the ethical and political preoccupations of other church-political 
factions were idolatrous distractions from the church’s true mission.  It was not the 
church that transformed society, but the experience of Christ in the proclamation of the 
Gospel’s teachings that transformed the individual.6 
  This theological and church-political diversity was not mirrored in German 
Protestants’ outward political stances.  Nearly all of the adherents of all four of these 
church political factions shared a strong sense of patriotism and nationalism and a strong 
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Reich (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1996). 
 
6 Ibid. 
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traditional conservatism.  Nearly all were similarly united in some form of cultural or 
religious anti-Semitism.  One notable exception was Karl Barth, himself, whose Swiss 
citizenship made him a little more cautious and ambivalent about the destiny of the 
German nation and whose personal politics were Social Democratic.  In the 1920s and 
1930s, however, Barth was quite unique in this respect.  Even most adherents of his 
dialectical theology—which remained decidedly anti-political until it was transformed by 
the experiences of the Third Reich—remained steadfast German nationalists.   
With very few exceptions German Protestants celebrated the rise of Hitler and the 
National Socialists.  Some had reservations about the Nazi’s proclivity for violence and 
vulgarity.  However, Protestants shed few tears for the end of the Weimar Republic, 
which they had generally disliked.  Instead, most were caught up in the excitement of 
national renewal that accompanied the Nazi’s rise.  This attitude can be seen in the 1933 
Easter message that was read in the churches of the large Prussian Landeskirche:  
This year the Easter message of the risen Christ goes forth in Germany to a people 
to whom God has spoken by means of a great turning point in history.   
We know that we are at one with all Protestant fellow believers in joy at 
the awakening of the deepest powers of our nation to a patriotic consciousness, to 
a true community of the Volk, and to a religious renewal. . . . The church knows 
itself bound in gratitude to the leadership of the new Germany.  It is joyfully 
prepared to co-operate in the national and moral renewal of our people.7 
 
Disillusionment set in only gradually.  When Hitler lent his support to the völkisch 
German Christian movement in their struggle to gain control of the individual 
Landeskirchen, uniting them into a more centralized Reich church, Protestant leaders 
from a variety of backgrounds resisted.  When the state and Reich governments 
intervened in their affairs, they protested to the Führer, reminding him of their loyalty.  
And when the SA or the Gestapo persecuted individual pastors or church leaders, they 
                                                 
7 Quoted in Scholder, The Churches, Vol. 1, 236. 
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began to rethink their excitement of the first months of Nazi rule.  But their old beliefs 
were slow to fade.  As late as 1939, Martin Niemöller, who had been in concentration 
camps for nearly two years already, would patriotically volunteer his services at the 
outbreak of the Second World War.8 
Different groups of Protestants experienced this disillusionment at different times 
and in different ways.  Leaders in the churches where the German Christian movement 
operated most heavy-handedly were among the most thoroughly disillusioned and 
embittered.  In these so-called “destroyed churches” whose leaders were often forcibly 
and illegally removed—particularly in the churches under Prussian administration—the 
church struggle moved through at least three progressive phases.  At first church leaders 
sought to oppose the German Christians politically in church elections.  Failing to gain 
enough support in these endeavors and faced with increased persecution, they sought 
legal and administrative solutions.  But when it became clear that the German Christians’ 
illegal seizures of power would not be rolled back, and, indeed, enjoyed the tacit support 
of the Nazi state, they were forced to turn to more radical measures.  At the end of May 
1934, meeting in the city of Barmen, representatives of the confessing church, as these 
opponents called themselves, declared that the true basis of the church was not 
administrative or legal but theological and spiritual.  In a statement drafted primarily by 
Karl Barth and reflecting his distinct theology, they proclaimed scripture and the person 
of Jesus Christ as the only true foundation of the church, questioning the legitimacy of 
any church authority that did not share this foundation.  They also explicitly rejected the 
influence of any political ideology on the content of their faith.  A few months later in 
Dahlem, they went further, declaring in a series of church emergency laws that only those 
                                                 
8 James Bentley, Martin Niemöller (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), 146-147. 
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who stood on this foundation could claim to lead the church.  Although they were slightly 
more cautious in their wording, this amounted to a tacit excommunication of the German 
Christian and Reich Church leadership, and the claim that the confessing church 
(consisting of about one-third of the Protestant ministers) had the only legitimate 
leadership claim.9   
In the three large Lutheran Landeskirchen of Hanover, Württemberg, and 
Bavaraia matters were very different.  In these so-called “intact churches” with their 
popular, conservative bishops and their centuries-old tradition of defending a narrow 
form of orthodox Lutheranism, the German Christians were never able to fully take 
control.  Even when the Reich Bishop and his Allies in the government attempted to 
intervene, the bishops’ popular support (even among committed Nazis) made their 
removal impossible, and they retained a great deal of autonomy.  But this freedom came 
at a price.  Bishops August Marahrens of Hanover, Theophil Wurm of Württemberg, and 
Hans Meiser of Bavaria were all forced to cooperate with local German Christians to 
secure their authority.  And they were required to make numerous concessions to the 
centralizing leadership of the Reich Church.  When they were most heavily persecuted 
these bishops cooperated with the Confessing Churches of the destroyed Landeskirchen, 
signing both the Barmen and Dahlem declarations.  But they did so with reservations, 
never accepting their separatist implications or their radically anti-hierarchical 
ecclesiology.  When the intense persecution subsided, they were willing—even eager—to 
work once again with moderate German Christians and state authorities.  The Confessing 
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Church members saw this as a betrayal, which they never fully forgave, and these 
personal animosities continued into the postwar period.10 
Between 1937 and 1939, when Nazi church politics turned from co-optation to 
more overt persecution, the “church struggle” extended to encompass an extraordinarily 
broad segment within the churches, even many moderate German Christians.11  Many 
who wanted no trouble with the Nazis found that trouble could still come to them.  In a 
sense, anyone who was persecuted by these measures, or who even felt intimidated by 
them, could lay some claim to resistance and suffering on behalf of the church.  In a 
similar way, one could argue that the conservative, nationalist resistance circles that grew 
up during the war years, whose activity culminated in the July 1944 Officers Plot on 
Hitler’s life, were broadly part of the “church struggle,” though they were motivated only 
indirectly by religious concerns.12  Finally, one could potentially broaden the church 
struggle to refer to the courageous actions of those few individuals whose personal faith 
or religious responsibility led them to rescue Jews or to speak out against Nazi euthanasia 
and racial killing.13 
All postwar efforts to restore church unity and order would have to grapple with 
these divisions.  Of the four major church-political factions of the 1920s, only three 
remained in 1945.  The German Christian movement had been thoroughly discredited by 
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the excesses of the Nazis and the disaster of military defeat.  The Landeskirche model 
remained institutionally strong—for it was their reliance on local autonomy, confessional 
distinctness, and traditional hierarchical government that had seen the three intact 
Lutheran churches through the Third Reich.  The Barthian model, a minority view in the 
1920s, gained enormous influence in Confessing Church circles.  At its foundation, the 
Confessing Church owed its theological legitimacy to the Barthian conception of the true 
church, founded on the teaching and confession of the Word.  Indeed, even Lutherans 
such as Martin Niemöller were deeply influenced by Barth’s Reformed theology.  
Finally, the Volkskirche idea was not dead, although its abuse by the German Christians 
had made it suspect in some circles.  While many church leaders came out of the war 
with a renewed fear of the masses, other leaders, such as Otto Dibelius, saw the defeat of 
the Nazis as a new opportunity to strengthen the church’s national influence. 
These church-political divisions were not the only legacy of the church struggle.  
German Protestantism came out of the Second World War marked by much less 
unanimity in national and political matters.  Most members of both the “intact churches” 
and the confessing church had engaged very little with national and political questions, 
focusing primarily on the defense of their own religious autonomy.  This tendency was 
even more pronounced for the majority of German Protestants who had not actively 
resisted in this way.  Yet the persecution of church leaders, the crimes of the Nazis, and 
the disillusionment of German defeat had begun to break down the automatic ties 
between Protestantism, German nationalism, and political conservatism.  A few leaders, 
such as Martin Niemöller on the confessing church side, and Bishop Theophil Wurm of 
the intact Würrtemberg Landeskirche had been more courageous, raising objections to 
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Nazi racial or euthanasia policies.  Their courage lent these figures, and others like them, 
enormous moral authority after the war.  But this authority could be channeled in very 
different political directions. 
 
THE HOUR OF THE CHURCHES 
It was with good reason that the months following the German surrender were 
known in religious circles as “the hour of the churches.”  Both the Catholic and Protestant 
Churches in Germany would play a major role in reconstructing German society from the 
total collapse that accompanied the end of the war.  The task they faced was enormous.  
Millions of soldiers had been killed.  Those who survived were interned in POW camps 
or Soviet labor gulags.  Cities lay in utter ruin.  Citizens lived in a state of fear as foreign 
armies occupied their towns and cities.  Especially in those territories occupied by the 
Soviet Red Army—but sometimes elsewhere as well—harsh reprisals were the order of 
the day.  Murder, looting, and rape were common.  The suicide rate skyrocketed as many 
found themselves unable to face the horrors of the present and the unknown future.  
Germans in territories that were to become Polish or Russian were herded into cattle cars 
and forcefully deported in much the same way that they had deported Jews and others. 
Centralized government lay in a state of virtual collapse.  Local government, too, 
underwent tremendous upheaval as Nazi party members and other collaborationists were 
removed or discretely disappeared from public life.  The occupational authorities, whose 
attention had to suddenly shift from destruction of the German war machine to the bare 
survival of the German people, found themselves overwhelmed.  They struggled with 
meeting peoples’ basic needs, with knowing whom they could trust, and even on a 
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fundamental level, with a language barrier that divided victorious rulers from vanquished 
citizenry.14   
In these circumstances, the Allied authorities welcomed the cooperation of the 
German churches.  They rationalized that whatever their conservatism and nationalism 
had been, the churches had never fully succumbed to Nazi control.  Moreover, the 
churches remained among the few institutions capable of organizing badly needed relief.  
And the German people, undergoing a profound psychological and spiritual crisis, were 
returning to the churches at a rate that had not been seen for years.15  Cooperation 
between the Allies and the German churches was not just based on immediate practical 
needs.  Particularly in the calculations of the Americans and British, the churches would 
play a fundamental role in the democratization of German society.  As General Lucius 
Clay, the military governor of the American zone, suggested, “Lasting reform in 
Germany, must come from within.  It must be spiritual and moral. . . . Religious 
institutions are major elements in the German social structure which must participate in 
any program directed to the building of a peaceful and democratic Germany if it is to 
have hope of success.”16 
The churches were quick to seize this opportunity.  Parish houses became centers 
for organizing humanitarian relief.  Pastors became trusted advisors to occupation 
officers, guides to the complexities of the local community, and respected arbiters of who 
could be trusted and who could not.  Church contacts—though attenuated by the 
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breakdown of society and the churches’ own internal disorder—remained a rare source of 
news of the world outside the local community.  Eventually, as communication and 
transportation became possible again, regional churches began to rebuild themselves.  
Their leaders also renewed their contact with the churches outside of Germany, 
particularly in the United States and Western Europe.  Individually and through the 
Geneva-based World Council of Churches, these churches provided food and other vital 
supplies, and hoped to offer spiritual council and guidance as well.17 
When church leaders finally had time to think about how to restructure their 
churches or to reassess their theology and politics, they did so in the context of this 
renewed relevance and importance.  The opportunities of the postwar era came to play as 
fundamental a role as the lessons of the church struggle in the ways that they re-defined 
their religious, national, and political identities after 1945. 
 
RECONSTRUCTING CHURCH LIFE 
Church life was reconstructed first in the local Landeskirchen.  Following the 
German surrender—even earlier in some cases—the German Christian leaders who had 
dominated church life began to quietly step aside, hoping to fade into obscurity.  New 
church councils were formed from the ranks of neutrals, who had taken no side in the 
church struggle, and members of the local confessing churches.  Leaders who had been 
deposed by the German Christians often returned to their old posts, their authority greatly 
strengthened by the persecution they had endured.  Otto Dibelius, for example, had 
served as General Superintendent in the Berlin-Brandenburg region of the Old Prussian 
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church administration.  Returning after the war, he accepted the title Bishop in the hope 
that it would strengthen his position as a negotiating partner with the Allied authorities.18 
The churches were given a great deal of autonomy to purge themselves of former 
Nazis as they thought appropriate.  This policy had mixed results.  While active German 
Christians were removed from the ministry, church leaders were reluctant to deal with 
former Nazis too harshly.  Especially in the intact Landeskirchen, the process of 
denazification proceded very unevenly.  This was typified by the case of Bishop 
Marahrens of Hanover.  While no more guilty of complicity with the German Christians 
than Wurm or Meiser, Marahrens’ public comments in 1939 in favor of a “total war 
devoid of any sentimentality” were deeply embarrassing to other postwar church 
leaders.19  Yet despite calls to step down from Wurm and Niemöller, among others, 
Marahrens managed to retain his position with local support until 1947.  In Württemberg 
and Bavaria there were also conflicts over denazification, as the bishops who had retained 
their authority even under Nazi persecution resolved to surrender as little as possible to 
the new Allied occupiers.  While the denazification of these churches was punctuated by 
occasional conflicts, most of the work was accomplished through negotiation, and the 
worst offenders were removed.  The retention of former Nazis, primarily in minor 
positions, served as a continual irritation to those who had suffered under the Third 
Reich.  But there was little threat of any relapse into Nazism.  Disillusioned by the 
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 30
outcome of the Second World War, most former Nazis were content to withdraw from 
the world, making little trouble.20 
The Deutsche Evangelische Kirche (DEK), through which the Nazis and German 
Christians had sought to unify the various Landeskirchen into a national church, 
continued to exist as a legal entity.  But its administration had essentially ceased to 
function and its use by the German Christians had discredited it thoroughly in eyes of the 
Confessing Churches.  Although some church leaders, such as Marahrens, hoped to 
simply reconstruct the DEK as though nothing had changed, most had very different 
ideas for the reconstruction of church life in 1945.21 
His moral authority burnished by his condemnation of the Nazi euthanasia 
program, Bishop Theophil Wurm of Württemberg had come to be seen as the de-facto 
leader of German Protestantism.  Supported by the American military authorities, he 
began to travel throughout Germany in the summer of 1945, gaining support among 
church leaders for his plan (begun already during the war) to unify the Landeskirchen in a 
looser, more federal structure.  His efforts culminated in the end of August 1945 in a 
meeting of the leaders of the Landeskirchen and the Confessing Church in the city of 
Treysa, where the provisional government of a new Evangelische Kirche in Deutschland 
(EKD) was formed.  Yet Wurm’s plans were forced from the very beginning to compete 
with two other models for the reconstruction of German church life.22   
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Martin Niemöller—only recently released from Dachau—still hoped to radically 
reform the German church structure to bring it into line with the anti-hierarchical 
principles of the Barmen and Dahlem declarations.  His ideas involved the dissolution of 
the entire historical structure of Landeskirchen.  These would be replaced by a central 
church structure built and governed from below by the members of individual 
congregations.  Niemöller and other representatives of the Reich Brethren Council that 
had governed the confessing church gathered in Frankfurt a few weeks before the Treysa 
meeting to consider their options.  Ultimately, they decided to support Wurm’s plans for 
the EKD, but they continued to hope that their influence would bring about a radical 
break with the trappings of the past.  The major concession they gained was the 
acceptance by the assembled church leaders of the legitimate church authority of the 
Reich Brethren Council.  The council continued to meet in the years following the war, 
but it was given no real place in the hierarchy of the postwar church.  Its authority 
remained largely indirect, limited to advice and admonition.23  Yet, despite this lack of 
institutional authority, the Reich Brethren Council did play a significant role in shaping 
the ideological debates that raged within German Protestantism after the war, particularly 
relating to issues such as German guilt and East-West relations.  Despite these gains, 
however, many of the more radical Barthians in the confessing church were quite 
disappointed by the failure to reform the basic organization and structures of German 
Protestantism.  Of the postwar situation, Karl Barth lamented, “To my astonishment, I 
found in the official church much the same structure, grouping and dominant tendencies 
in which I had seen it hastening to its ruin in 1933.  The progressive elements . . . were 
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still on the scene and at work but they were still a minority compared with the really 
dominant groups and authorities.”24  
On the other extreme, Bishop Meiser of Bavaria saw the end of the war as an 
opportunity to achieve his longstanding goal: the unification of all of the Lutheran 
Landeskirchen.  Meiser hoped that this unification would re-assert the importance of the 
confessional Lutheran churches in Germany.  Serving as a counterweight to the 
Reformed and Union churches, it would help to draw the entirety of German 
Protestantism back in a Lutheran direction.  Meiser ultimately succeeded in bringing 
about greater unity between the Lutheran Landeskirchen, but only within, and not 
against, the structure of the new EKD.25  Meiser’s concerns about the corruption of the 
Lutheran Landeskirchen remained, however, as a major factor influencing the course of 
German Protestantism throughout the 1950s. 
 
GUILT AND NATIONAL SELF ASSERTION 
Already in 1945 their experiences in the church struggle, in the Second World 
War, and in the aftermath of Germany’s defeat, had caused many Protestants to begin to 
rethink their attitudes toward the German nation.  Both persecuted victims of the Nazis 
and disillusioned collaborators were forced to question the largely unthinking patriotism 
and nationalism that had contributed to their present distress.  This process of rethinking 
their national identity progressed gradually through several postwar discussions in the 
churches.  On the one hand, when considering their guilt for the crimes of the Nazis, 
church leaders were forced to re-examine the attitudes that had led them astray.  On the 
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other hand, many found it easy to remain satisfied with their own status as victims of 
Nazism, refusing to look at the ways in which they were also collaborators, and adopting 
a defensive posture toward those who sought punishment or redress. 
More radical members of the confessing church, who had adopted Karl Barth’s 
theology during the church struggle, took a broad view of German guilt and its 
implications for the German nation.  Barth himself, who had lived out the war in his 
native Switzerland after being expelled from the Third Reich, argued along these lines in 
his 1945 essay “How Can the Germans Be Cured.”  He asserted that the fundamental 
sickness of German society had not begun with Hitler and the Nazis, but went back to 
Bismarck, to Frederick the Great, and the entire Prussian tradition of authoritarianism and 
militarism.  And he believed that only a fundamental break from this tradition would 
provide a healthy foundation for rebuilding the church and for rebuilding German 
society.  To break with this tradition, he argued, Germans would have to recognize their 
own guilt for the crimes of the Nazis.  “The only pertinent and constructive question 
concerns the guilt in which all groups were involved. . . .,” he argued, “All Germans 
failed to a certain extent—not only some of them, not only this one or that one, because 
they allowed things to go as far as they have gone.”26  Leaders of the intact churches and 
less-radical confessing church members took a narrower view, seeking to balance 
considerations of German guilt with the defense of the defeated and suffering German 
people. 
These issues came to a head in October 1945 when the provisional council of the 
EKD held its second meeting in Stuttgart.  Here it was not just confessing church leaders 
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like Niemöller who pushed for recognition of German guilt.  The meeting was also 
attended by several Protestant leaders from outside of Germany, led by Willem Visser’t 
Hooft, the General Secretary of the World Council of Churches.  These leaders, too, 
communicated to their German colleagues the importance of confession to the restoration 
of ecumenical ties.  At the opening meeting of the Stuttgart assembly, Niemöller directly 
confronted the feelings of victimization that prevented many Protestant leaders from 
thinking about their guilt:   
Who is guilty for our misery, the Nazis, the militarists, the English, the 
Americans? . . . One thing is completely certain, if we criticize ourselves and, as a 
Christian community, as a church, bow to God’s Word, then we will see our guilt, 
and then we will realize that our people would never have been able to follow this 
path to its end if we had lived in its midst as a Christianity that fulfilled its 
obligations.27 
 
But other leaders, like Bishop Wurm, had misgivings about the effects of any statement 
of guilt.  Wurm did not think the German people, preoccupied with their own suffering, 
were ready for such a statement.  Instead, he feared they would turn their backs on the 
churches.  They would conclude: “There is nothing to be accomplished though 
Christianity.  It has no influence on politics.  We will be treated exactly the same way 
that our people handled the Jews, the Poles, etc.”28 
Despite these misgivings, the council proceeded to draft a statement of guilt, 
declaring, in part: 
With great pain do we say: through us endless suffering has been brought to many 
people and nations.  What we have often born witness to before our 
congregations, we now declare in the name of the whole church.  We have for 
many years struggled in the name of Jesus Christ against the spirit which found its 
terrible expression in the National Socialist regime of tyranny, but we accuse 
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ourselves for not witnessing more courageously, for not praying more faithfully, 
for not believing more joyously and for not loving more ardently.29  
 
This statement was carefully worded.  It recognized that the German churches shared in 
the solidarity of their people’s guilt, but it made it clear that their guilt was passive rather 
than active.  More than their initial enthusiasm for National Socialism and their 
collaboration during the Third Reich, the church leaders accused themselves of wavering 
in their faith under the persecution that they too had endured at the hands of the Nazis.  
This was no wholehearted repudiation of the German national tradition, but it was, at 
least, a recognition that Christian responsibility placed limits on national loyalty.  As 
modest and carefully worded as it was, however, the Stuttgart Declaration of Guilt 
generated a firestorm of controversy when it was published.  As angry letters and public 
denunciations demonstrated, most ordinary Protestants were not yet willing to even think 
about questions of guilt.30   
The public was much more welcoming when Protestant church leaders attacked 
the injustices of Allied war crimes tribunals and harsh denazification measures.  
Enthralled by the public enthusiasm for their remarks, Protestant leaders became some of 
the most vocal critics of the Allied occupational authorities and defenders of the German 
people.  The specific criticisms of church leaders were motivated by a variety of factors.  
Many German Protestants, especially those of more conservative leanings, seem to have 
genuinely feared the complete destruction of the German nation, people, and culture at 
                                                 
29 Ibid., 60-61; see also John S. Conway, “How Shall the Nations Repent?  The Stuttgart 
Declaration of Guilt, October 1945,” Journal of Ecclesiastical History 38, 4 (October 1987): 621-22; 
Victoria Barnett, For the Soul of the People: Protestant Protest Against Hitler (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1992), 210. 
 
30 See Martin Greschat and Christiane Bastert, eds., Die Schuld der Kirche.  Dokumente und 
Reflexionen zur Stuttgarter Schulderklärung vom 18./19. Oktober 1945, Studienbücher zur kirchlichen 
Zeitgeschichte, Vol. 4 (Munich: Kaiser, 1982). 
 36
the hands of the victorious Allies.  Indeed, these fears were only reinforced by early 
Allied plans for Germany.  As members of the privileged social elite, many Protestants 
also feared the implications of Allied policies for the organization of German social life 
and norms.  In practice, many felt that denazification was removing loyal Protestants 
from positions of social and political influence and replacing them with socialists, 
communists, and other dangerous subversives.  In the hunger and physical need of the 
early occupation years, compassion for the suffering of former Nazis and their families 
was another major motivation.  Finally, the problems, flaws, and contradictions within 
the Allied policies themselves provided plenty of fodder for church critics, some of 
whom were genuinely concerned that such policies be carried out efficiently, 
successfully, and fairly.    
Bishops Wurm and Meiser took the early lead in criticizing these policies, but 
even radical Barthians like Niemöller contributed at times to the effort.  Already in his 
first meeting with American officials, just weeks after the end of the war, Wurm was 
pleading for the release of imprisoned Nazis, whose pastors vouched for their 
trustworthiness.  In the following months he continued to inundate the Allied authorities 
with letters calling for Nazi Party members to be judged according to their individual 
actions only, and not their party membership.  Meiser was just as active, collaborating 
with the Catholic Cardinal Faulhaber, to plead on behalf of mid-level party functionaries 
as well as certain SS and Gestapo members, who, they asserted, had not committed any 
“serious crimes.”31 
Later, when the American military government adopted a new denazification law 
based on the principles of individual guilt and accountability, the leaders of the EKD 
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rejected this as well.  They argued that it was incompatible with the principles of rule of 
law since it punished attitudes and not actions and since the actions it punished had not 
been illegal when they were committed.   They also attacked the physical hardship that 
the law was inflicting on relatively “innocent” pre-1937 Party members, high business 
leaders, and members of the Waffen-SS.32  Even Niemöller was critical, viewing the law 
as an impediment to the Christian tasks of reconciliation and forgiveness.  In February 
1945 in his capacity as the superintendent of the church of Hessen-Nassau, he demanded 
of his parishioners, “No longer cooperate in these things that have brought so much 
injustice in their wake, neither as public plaintiffs, nor as willing prosecution witnesses!  
Or you will be in danger of betraying the call to reconciliation that has been placed upon 
you.”33 
Protestant leaders did not just object to the punishment of minor Nazi 
functionaries.  They also took the lead in opposing the trials of war criminals.  While the 
initial Nuremburg trials of the highest Nazi leaders were relatively uncontroversial, even 
these early trials were met with some misgivings.  The third meeting of the EKD council 
in December 1945 gave vent to many of these concerns.  Bishop Meiser, for example, 
argued: “It needs to be made clear that we have nothing to do with this court, in which 
the accusers and the judges are the same people.”  And Bishop Dibelius complained that 
the presence of the Russians as accusers undermined the authority of the tribunal.  The 
council also agreed that it was inappropriate for church leaders to serve as prosecution 
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witnesses in these trials.34  As Hans Asmussen, the president of the Church chancellery 
later explained: “Because we are their spiritual counselors, we are neither their 
confederates against the Allies, nor the confederates of the Allies against them.”35 
In fact, Protestant leaders such as Wurm and Meiser went far beyond this position 
of neutrality in their objections to subsequent trials, including those of leading 
industrialists and diplomats, concentration camp guards, and military officers.36  Like 
their criticisms of denazification, their criticisms of these trials began with objections on 
relatively narrow legal grounds and with warnings that such trials would give the German 
people the wrong idea about the nature of justice.  These modest objections, however, 
became progressively more hysterical and one-sided as time progressed.  One major 
criticism of the war crimes tribunals had to do with the perception that they were nothing 
more than victor’s justice.  As Hans Asmussen wrote to George Bell, the Bishop of 
Chichester, in February 1948:  
No rational person, let alone a Christian can doubt that crimes committed in war 
ought to be expiated through courts and punishment.  But we now have to 
confront the undeniable fact that public opinion, not only in Germany, but also in 
other countries, says, ‘Today the generals are on the dock; with a shift in power 
balance it would be the generals of the former victorious nations.’  No power in 
the world can presently pass equal judgment on all those who have committed 
crimes against humanity in recent years.37 
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This complaint was frequently coupled with criticisms about the fairness of the 
trial procedures and questions about the basic viability of the international law upon 
which the trial proceedings were based.  For example, in a May 1948 petition of EKD 
leaders to Lucius Clay, the military governor of the U.S. zone, Bishop Wurm complained 
of unfair trial procedures, such as the detention and undue influencing of witnesses, of the 
use of “international law, until now lacking in all normative status,” and of the “exclusive 
application of such law to the defeated.”   He concluded that the trials demonstrated “less 
justice than the exercise of power and use of a political instrument.”38  In the trials of 
leading military officers, many of whom belonged to prominent Protestant circles, Wurm 
even compared the tactics of the prosecution to those of the Nazis, specifically 
condemning the trial of military officials as civilians in civilian courts.39  
Drawing on the misgivings of many Americans about the nature of these trials 
and especially about the aggressive interrogation tactics of a handful of prosecutors, 
Wurm was soon seeking to discredit the entire process.  Engaging in substantial 
hyperbole, he publicly complained: “In trial preparations in those cases thus far ending in 
death sentences, criminal methods and repellent tortures have been applied in order to 
extort statements and confessions.”40  Referring to the treatment of war criminals 
themselves as “crimes against humanity,” he also began to assert definite knowledge of 
entirely innocent men being sentenced for war crimes.  Indeed, in press statements, he 
began to refer to “war criminals” only in scare quotes and to refer to the American 
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investigators as “executioners.” Speaking of the American prosecutors, he even went as 
far as to suggest: “Their deeds do not lag behind those of the Nazis in sadism.”41  Wurm 
was not speaking here just for himself.  Although few defenders of war criminals were as 
vehement and persistent, there were few voices in the church or in German society at 
large that were willing to publicly disagree. 
 
PROTESTANTS AND POSTWAR POLITICS 
The crimes and defeat of the National Socialists had a profoundly disillusioning 
effect on the political views of many Protestants.  If the ideals they had so fervently 
supported were now seen as wrong, what could guarantee that new ideals, such as 
democratic self-government, were really any better?  Most church leaders quickly 
overcame these suspicions, realizing that the democratic political ideals of the Western 
Allies offered new opportunities to exert their influence in public life.  Western 
democratic ideals were, at the very least, more attractive than Soviet communism, with its 
atheist and materialist worldview.  By 1946, the experiences of Otto Dibelius under 
Soviet occupation, had led him to conclude: “The dictatorship of a totalitarian state is 
inconsistent with the will of God.  For the sake of the Gospel we need a democratic state 
system.”42  Ordinary Protestant church members were slower to come to these 
conclusions.  Especially among those who had actively served in the Third Reich there 
remained a certain revulsion toward the very idea of politics and a lack of interest in 
democratic participation.  Church leaders were nearly unanimous on the need to combat 
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this view, enticing the disillusioned with the prospect of a thoroughly Christian postwar 
political order created through the active participation of Christian voters. 
In the area of party politics Protestant leaders were more divided, although these 
divisions were not initially as severe as they were in theological or national matters.  
Most leaders accepted the idea that Nazism had arisen from the materialism and 
secularism of Weimar society, and that some sort of spiritual renewal offered the only 
hope for the future.  Without any strong, unified Protestant political tradition to fall back 
on, they found themselves attracted to the ideas of the conservative, Catholic-dominated 
Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and its Bavarian sister party the Christian Social 
Union (CSU).  Even many radical Barthians, such as Gustav Heinemann, the mayor of 
Essen from 1946 to 1949 and later a member of Adenauer’s cabinet, began their careers 
as CDU politicians.  Gradually, however, their emphasis on German guilt, on the 
punishment of former Nazis, and on the total repudiation of militarism, led them to break 
with the party of Adenauer, whose priorities were rather different.  This process was 
gradual, culminating in the late 1950s and early 1960s in the entrance of many prominent 
Protestant leaders into the Social Democratic Party (SPD). 
While the Treysa gathering of the EKD council in 1945 was marked by 
disagreements over the nature and structure of the church, its attendees shared a relatively 
unified political perspective.  In statements drafted for circulation among the local church 
congregations and the clergy, the Treysa delegates blamed the rise of National Socialism 
on the depersonalizing forces of modern mass society and the German people’s rejection 
of Christian principles.  The confessing church, which had stood for Christian truth, 
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became a model for the political role that the churches should adopt.43  However, 
members of the different church factions interpreted this model differently.  Radical 
Barthians, in particular, emphasized the role of the confessing church in resisting the 
idolatry of Nazism.  Others like Wurm, Dibelius, and Meiser envisioned more active 
church participation in the rebuilding of political life. 
Conservative Protestants from the resistance circles of the 1940s were among the 
most emphatic about the need for a new Christian politics.  This perspective is apparent 
in the “Word on the Responsibility of the Church for Public Life,” whose primary authors 
included former members of the Kreisau reisistance circle such as Theodor Steltzer and 
Gerhard Ritter.  This document, circulated by the church chancellery, began by reviewing 
the lessons of the Third Reich.  “The terrible outcome of the past twelve years,” it 
asserted, “has opened the eyes of wide circles inside and outside the church to the fact 
that political community is safe from demonic degeneration only where the principles of 
Christian order make themselves felt in public life.”44  Although the document went on to 
concede that the church was not a political party, and should not take sides in strictly 
political matters, it affirmed that “this does not preclude welcoming with goodwill the 
creation of a political party that is itself committed to Christian principles.”  And it went 
on to endorse early efforts toward the creation of the CDU, expressing a hope that 
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Protestant-Catholic cooperation would “make possible a political association of both 
confessions on the grounds of Christian Union.”45 
Large numbers of Protestants from all church-political parties heeded this call.  
Although the CDU received much of its initial impetus from Catholics, many Protestant 
leaders were also active in its creation.  In Protestant regions such as Hanover, church 
leaders like Bishop Marahrens played major roles in founding local groupings.  And in 
Catholic Bavaria, Bishop Meiser took an active interest in the creation of the CSU, 
sending an aide to formally assist in the process.46  Protestant support for the CDU was 
not limited to the more conservative wings of the church.  Early Protestant CDU 
members ran the gamut from former members of the conservative German National 
People’s Party (DNVP) such as Robert Lehr and Hans Schlange-Schöningen, through 
Weimar liberals, like Ernst Lemmer, Christian Socialists, such as Wilhelm 
Simpendoerfer and Paul Bausch, and younger Protestant figures such as Hermann Ehlers 
and Eugen Gerstenmaier, who had come of political age during the Third Reich, and 
whose formative experiences were in the Confessing Church.47  Even members of the 
Barthian faction, such as Emmi Bonheoffer (the widow of Dietrich Bonhoeffer) and 
Martin Schröter, a former Confessing Church minister in Baden, joined the CDU at first, 
although both left in disillusionment within a few years.48 
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Soon members of the church’s more radical Barthian faction developed 
misgivings about this informal alliance of the Protestant churches and the CDU.  In part 
these misgivings were rooted in their greater distrust of Catholicism, which Barth 
considered a “natural theology” no different at its theological core than the beliefs of the 
German Christians.  And in part they were rooted in the fear that political and social 
influence was leading the churches away from their spiritual duties, especially 
discouraging them from looking self-critically at themselves and at the German past.   
These currents of discontent found early expression in the 1947 Darmstadt Wort. 
In the shadow of the developing Cold War and the increasing Western integration of 
Germany’s western zones, the members of the Brethren Council of the EKD met in 
Darmstadt to discuss recent German political developments.  During the course of this 
meeting, more radical members of the group expanded on the ideas of the Barmen 
declaration, especially its criticism of the influence of politics on the churches.  The 
Barthian theologian Hans Joachim Iwand took these ideas to their extreme, arguing that 
the proper role of the church and of Christians in society was one of constant opposition 
to every party, system, and government.49  With reference to the impending Cold War 
division of Germany, the radical Barthians in the council also rejected the CDU’s 
equation of Christian values with the social and political system of Western Europe.  At 
the same time rejecting the atheistic foundations of socialism and communism, they 
called for a vaguely-defined Christian third way between East and West.  The church, 
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they believed, should take upon itself the task of reconciling Germans in both parts of the 
country to one another.50 
In 1947, however, this was the position of only a small minority of Protestant 
leaders.  The Darmstadt Wort had only twelve signers, three of whom were not even 
members of the Brethren Council.  East German Protestants reacted especially harshly to 
the proclamation, claiming in numerous letters and articles that it betrayed a great deal of 
ignorance and naïveté about the actual conditions of East German life under the Soviet 
occupiers.  As Kurt Scharf, the leader of the Brandenburg consistory, proclaimed: “It 
seems…the Protestant churches in the German West and in the German East speak 
completely different languages. . . . One can only speak this way if one fully misjudges 
the prevailing situation among us, or if one can not, or will not see the truth.”51  Indeed, it 
was not until the controversy over West German rearmament in the early 1950s that large 
numbers of West German Protestants began to move closer to the radical Barthian 
perspective on inter-German relations. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
THE LAY APOSTOLATE 
 
In a circular letter from June 1949, Reinold von Thadden-Trieglaff explained his 
plans for the upcoming German Protestant Woche in Hanover—and for the larger 
Kirchentag movement that would grow out of this meeting.  Looking at the postwar crisis 
in Germany, he lamented the “total destruction” of the German nation, the “wholesale 
disappearance” of the middle classes, the loss of traditional leadership, and the 
“unimaginable numbers” of uprooted refugees and expellees desperately seeking a new 
homeland.  Yet this, he argued, was not the full extent of the crisis.  Alongside of this 
social and material breakdown, postwar Germans also suffered from an “inner 
disorientation of undeniable consequence.”  Even during the darkest days of the Nazi 
dictatorship, the German people had sought solace in the churches and in their religious 
and spiritual tradition.  Yet, now in the aftermath of war and defeat, he argued, “the old 
national church [volkskirchliche] world of our fathers is dissolving.”  Even in the middle 
classes, the traditional core of the Protestant churches, the religious enthusiasm of the 
immediate postwar period was beginning to fade.  People were abandoning their ties to 
the churches and falling into “indifference and skepticism, even downright nihilism.”1   
To Thadden, the extent of this disillusionment was profound, and its 
consequences were dire. 
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Whether intellectual or worker, city-dweller or farmer, whether romantic, Nazi, or 
communist, none of us are the same as we once were.  We are people wholly 
thrown off course, whose earlier ideals have been shipwrecked, whose political 
hopes have been destroyed, and now we are seeing the last foundations of our 
lives called into question.  If this great vacuum—that arose in the souls of young 
Germans in 1945, and that largely remains today—is not filled with Christian 
faith, then there is no way to know where this intellectual, and ultimately social 
and political development could once again lead.2 
 
Yet all was not lost.  “In this situation,” Thadden argued, “German Protestant 
Christendom is called to responsibility, to witness, and to service.”  It was not enough to 
simply rely on pastors and church leaders to address the present-day crisis.  Instead, he 
argued, “The seriousness of the situation can only be addressed through the complete 
commitment of the laity as well.”  Indeed, the “intellectual and spiritual” future of the 
German people was the responsibility of every Protestant Christian in every walk of life.  
In the past, German Protestants had failed to take this duty seriously.  In their passivity 
and self-absorption they had made little difference in the surrounding society.  But now, 
Thadden concluded, “in the middle of a world alienated from God, we must realize the 
lay-apostolate of the church.”3 
This was the central idea behind the Kirchentag movement.  The church was no 
longer the reserve of the clergy or a small stratum of lay-administrators.  It belonged to 
all German Protestants, regardless of their social background or their theological and 
political convictions.  It was, furthermore, a part of the larger worldwide Christian 
community that spanned the borders of continents and nations.  Because they had 
forgotten these fundamental truths about the nature of the church, German Protestants 
had been unable to mount a serious resistance to the threat of Nazism.  The 
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disempowered laity had simply gone along with the national and racial idolatry of the 
German Christian movement.  And the confessing church clergy had been isolated from 
their parishioners, unable to transform their resistance into any kind of broad-based 
movement.  Yet, the postwar crisis offered the opportunity for a new beginning.  If they 
were to move forward, postwar Germans needed to renew their personal faith, return to 
active involvement in the life and governance of the churches, and take up the call to 
faith-inspired public responsibility. 
At the German Protestant Woche in 1949, and at Kirchentag meetings throughout 
the 1950s, this comprehensive vision of the church served as a rallying point for 
Protestants from every theological and political faction.  Like the arguments of prominent 
Barthians and confessing church veterans, Thadden’s call for the realization of the “lay 
apostolate” acknowledged the historical failings of German Protestant churches, their 
subordination to political authority, and their distance from the congregations.  Like the 
Barthians, he also offered an implicit criticism of the postwar restoration of the church’s 
traditional hierarchical structures, promoting the Kirchentag movement as a way to 
counterbalance this development.  Yet Thadden’s vision also shared many points of 
contact with the ideas of more conservative Protestant leaders.  Like the Christian 
Democratic ideology of the Protestant Right, Thadden’s vision promoted Christian faith 
as the only alternative to the nihilism of the Nazi past.  And it emphasized the positive 
responsibility of all Protestant Christians to take an active role in rebuilding postwar 
social and political life.  With its unique appeal to Protestants in every major faction, it 
was this vision of the “lay apostolate”—of the central importance of a mature and active 
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laity—that made the Kirchentag a central forum for the postwar transformation of 
German Protestantism. 
 
REINOLD VON THADDEN-TRIEGLAFF 
Reinold von Thadden-Triglaff’s vision of the “lay apostolate” was born out of the 
experiences of the immediate postwar years.  It was rooted in the social breakdown in 
Germany and the suffering of the German people, but also in the experiences of genuine 
faith and Christian solidarity that emerged to fill this void.  It was also deeply shaped by 
Thadden’s own earlier life and character, by his activities and experiences in the years 
leading up to the “German catastrophe.”  Indeed, the success of the Kirchentag 
movement would not have been possible apart from the convictions and personal contacts 
that Thadden developed before 1945. 
Thadden was born in 1891 into a prominent family of Pomeranian Junkers.  His 
great-grandfather Adolf Ferdinand von Thadden-Trieglaff had been a leader in the 
Pomeranian pietist movement of the early nineteenth century, a close friend of Otto von 
Bismarck, and an important figure in conservative Prussian politics.  In later years, the 
family remained rooted in this heritage, maintaining close ties to both pietism and the 
imperial court.  Thadden’s upbringing was largely typical for a member of the Prussian 
nobility.  It was expected that he would serve as an officer in the military and then retire 
to manage his family’s estates.  After attending an elite military academy, he took up the 
study of law in Paris, eventually moving to the University of Greifswald.  It was there, 
under the mentorship of an old family friend, the future chancellor Georg Michaelis, that 
Thadden began to take his family’s religious heritage more seriously.  In the winter 
semester of 1911/1912, Thadden joined the German Christian Student Association 
 50
(Deutsche Christliche Studenten-Vereinigung, or DCSV), a small Christian organization 
under the leadership of Michaelis.  The DCSV was a highly atypical student association 
for the time.  While most student clubs and fraternities were caught up in the militaristic 
and nationalist frenzy that preceded World War I, the DCSV focused almost exclusively 
on bible study and Christian fellowship.  Unlike most other student organizations—even 
within the Protestant churches—the DCSV was also explicitly ecumenical in character.  
Modeled on the YMCA, the DCSV enjoyed close institutional ties with the World 
Student Christian Federation, which united Christian student organizations from across 
Western Europe and the United States.4   
It was also around this time that Thadden’s religious convictions first came into 
serious conflict with his duty as a Prussian noble.  In 1912, another university student 
challenged Thadden to a duel, and he created a minor scandal when he refused to fight on 
the grounds of Christian conscience.   This act of “cowardice” continued to haunt him, 
especially during the military career that followed his graduation.  Indeed, it was only 
through the personal intervention of Kaiser Wilhelm II that Thadden was able to secure a 
commission as a cavalry officer, and he was consistently promoted behind the other 
officers in his cohort.5   
With the outbreak of World War I, Thadden fought on the eastern front.  After the 
war, he returned to his family’s estates.  Here his curiosity led him into contact with local 
members of the revolutionary “Baltic Soldier’s Council.”  Impressed by their portrayal of 
                                                 
4 Werner Hühne, Thadden-Trieglaff.  Ein Leben unter Uns (Stuttgart: Kreuz Verlag, 1959), 15-45; 
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the social injustice in Germany, he began to reconsider his political convictions.  
Describing himself as a “passionate conservative social revolutionary,” Thadden spent 
1919 and 1920 in Berlin, working with Friedrich Siegemund-Schultze’s Social Work 
Association.  Married in 1921 to Elisabeth von Thüngen, the daughter of a baron from 
southwest Germany, he returned to work on his family’s Pomeranian estates.  During the 
1920s, he became active in the local and state politics of the conservative German 
National People’s Party (DNVP).  Although his views were more in line with the party’s 
Christian Social wing than with the radical faction that emerged under Alfred Hugenberg, 
he remained a loyal party member, and a deputy in the Prussian Landrat, into the 1930s.6 
More important for his future development, in 1924 Thadden also became a 
member of the governing board of the DCSV, replacing Michaelis as president in 1928.  
The contacts he made in this capacity served him well throughout his life.  Indeed, the 
Kirchentag would hardly have been possible without the help he received from his old 
DCSV comrades.  Among the most important of these were Hanns Lilje, the group’s 
General Secretary and the future Bishop of Hanover, Eberhard Müller, who would later 
found the Protestant Academy in Bad Boll, and Heinrich Giesen, who would serve as the 
Kirchentag General Secretary throughout the 1950s.  A great many of the other early 
Kirchengtag leaders first made their acquaintance with Thadden through this work.  In 
this capacity he also developed close contacts with Christian leaders in Western Europe 
and the United States.  Among the ecumenical luminaries he met in this way were George 
Bell, the Bishop of Chichester, William Temple, the future Archbishop of Canterbury, 
and Willem Visser’t Hooft, who would later found the World Council of Churches.  
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Thadden maintained many of these ecumenical ties throughout the 1930s, and several of 
these contacts would later vouch for his early (if largely passive) opposition Nazism.7  
After the Nazi seizure of power, the DCSV came under severe pressure to 
“coordinate” its work with that of the Nazi student movement.  This pressure was 
especially intense due to the lobbying of the Tübingen chapter of the organization, which 
was dominated by the German Christian movement.  After several abortive attempts at 
compromise, Thadden suspended the organization’s board in 1933, and the movement 
fragmented.  As the Nazi persecution of the churches continued during the 1930s, 
however, the DCSV grew in numbers, and became an unofficial student organ of the 
confessing church.  It retained these ties until it was banned in 1938.8  
Thadden himself was also active in the leadership of the Pomeranian and Prussian 
branches of the confessing church.   Between 1935 and 1937, he served as one of the 
major coordinators of the German Protestant Woche, a periodic gathering of confessing 
church members who saw spiritual renewal and evangelism as a response to Nazi 
persecution.  These gatherings brought together leaders from every branch of the 
fragmented confessing church, as well as prominent ecumenical guests such as Visser’t 
Hooft.  After these gatherings were shut down, Thadden returned to Pomerania, were he 
served as chair of the local confessing church and as a member of the Prussian and Reich 
Brethren Councils.  During this period, his work for the confessing church led to several 
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periods of arrest and imprisonment, although he was never held for more than a few 
weeks.9  
With the outbreak of the war, he was called up to active military service.  After a 
number of staff positions in France and Norway, he was appointed the military 
commandant of the Louvain district in Belgium.  Here he distinguished himself in the 
eyes of the local population for the humanness of his regime and his efforts to thwart the 
work of the SS.  In particular, he played an active role in aiding the escape of the rector 
of the Catholic University of Louvain.  Countermanding direct orders, he also prevented 
his soldiers from burning the city upon the German army’s retreat.  After the war, the city 
of Louvain recognized these actions, formally commending him for the conduct of his 
administration.  Shortly after the retreat from Louvain, he was badly injured in a car 
accident.  Discharged from duty, he returned to his Pomeranian estates to recuperate.  He 
arrived just in time to experience the advance of the Red Army.  Arrested under suspicion 
of being a Nazi, he was shipped to a prisoner of war camp in the Arctic Circle, where he 
spent most of 1945.10 
It was here that the idea of the Kirchentag first really crystallized in Thadden’s 
mind.  The conditions in the camp were horrible.  The mortality rate among prisoners was 
exceedingly high.  And Thadden, still recovering from his injuries, became extremely ill.  
However, as he later recounted, he had never before experienced such intense and sincere 
Christian devotion as he did among the men of the camp.  Organizing religious services 
for the prisoners when he was allowed, and smaller devotional gatherings when he was 
not, Thadden came to directly experience Christian faith as a source of hope in even the 
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direst of circumstances.  In these gatherings of men from a variety of different 
confessions and denominations, without any church buildings, any pastors, or even any 
hymnbooks or bibles, he saw a model for the future of the church.  The church, he 
realized, was not rooted not in theology or institutional trappings, but in the sincere faith 
and the active commitment of the laity.11 
Released from the camp in poor health, in December 1945, Thadden found 
himself in Berlin.  Here he survived only with the help of his old church contact, Bishop 
Otto Dibelius, who provided him with food and medical attention.  In Berlin he was also 
reunited with his wife and youngest son.  In addition, Dibelius arranged for Thadden to 
meet with Francis Pickens Miller, another of his ecumenical contacts from the 1920s, 
now serving as a major in the American army.  Taking pity on his old friend, Miller 
helped to smuggle the Thadden family out of Berlin to the estates of his wife’s family in 
southwest Germany.  In desperate need of a throat operation unavailable in Germany, 
Thadden was once again rescued by his ecumenical contacts.  With help from Miller and 
Visser’t Hooft, Thadden was offered a position at the World Council of Churches 
headquarters in Geneva.  And thanks to further help from contacts in the French church, 
he was able to attain an exit visa from the French Military Government.  After his 
operation—the first of many over the course of the next several decades—he took up his 
position on the staff of the WCC.12 
As a representative of the World Council of Churches, Thadden spent much the 
period between 1946 and 1948 traveling to prisoner of war camps in France, Italy, and 
North Africa.  Here his job was to offer spiritual comfort to the prisoners, and to convince 
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them to reject Nazism and nationalism and to accept the postwar order.  In speeches to 
these prisoners, Thadden began to lay out his vision of the “Lay Apostolate.”  He would 
typically describe the horrible conditions in Germany, and he would relate his own 
terrible experiences as a POW in Russia.  But then he would turn to the question of the 
future.  Germany was rebuilding.  Things were getting better.  And Christian faith and 
Christian service lay at the foundation of these efforts.  Germany only had a future, he 
would argue, if Germans repented, returned to the Christian faith, and if they were 
inspired by this faith to take an active role in the postwar rebuilding efforts.13 
During his time in Geneva, Thadden also became active in a variety of church 
leadership positions.  At the first conference of the World Council of Churches in 
Amsterdam in 1946, he was elected as a German delegate to the organization’s central 
committee.  He also served on the board of directors of the Ecumenical Institute in 
Bossey, coming into contact with the future Kirchentag General Secretary Hans Hermann 
Walz.  Upon returning to Germany in 1948, his position in Geneva having been 
eliminated, he also became the chair of the Protestant Student Congregations, and joined 
the leadership boards of the Christian Akademikerschaft and the Protestant Academies.  
At the behest of Heinrich Rendtorff, another old DCSV contact and a theology professor 
at Kiel, he was awarded an honorary doctorate in theology in 1948.  And he was given 
another vaguely-defined church leadership position, as the representative of the church 
chancellery assigned with coordinating the lay-work, evangelism, and Volksmission 
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efforts taking place in the Student Congregations, the Protestant Academies, the Men’s 
and Women’s organizations, and the rest of the “non-diaconal” church associations.14 
Thadden’s first major task in this capacity was to organize a new German 
Protestant Woche, set to meet in Frankfurt in 1949.  The Protestant Woche of the 1930s 
had already been revived in 1948 by Hans Kallenbach, the director of the Protestant 
Academy in Nassau-Hessen, as an evangelistic gathering devoted to personal spiritual 
renewal.  Yet Thadden’s vision for the gathering was much broader.  The German 
churches, he believed, did not just need more coordination among the various church 
works and associations.  They needed a wholesale revival of lay-involvement and lay 
activity.  As he began the work of coordinating the 1949 Woche, Thadden started to see 
the meeting as a step toward realizing his plans for a German Protestant Kirchentag, a 
permanent lay-assembly devoted not just to bible study and evangelism, but to more fully 
empowering the laity to take up leadership in the churches and in society.15 
 
THE KIRCHENTAG IDEA 
On February 3, 1949, Reinold von Thadden-Trieglaff met with a small circle of 
Protestant leaders to formulate their plans for the 1949 Woche.  Besides Thadden himself, 
the meeting included Ernst zur Nieden, the leader of the Protestant Men’s Work, 
Eberhard Müller, the chair of the leadership board of the Protestant Academies, Erwin 
Krämer, a representative of the leadership of the Student Congregations, Hans 
Kallenbach, the director of the Academy in Nassau-Hessen, and Heinz Flink, the 
secretary of the Protestant Men’s Work.  Reporting on their separate organizational 
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efforts, the meeting’s participants discussed the rapidly changing social and intellectual 
environment in Germany and the enthusiastic, but disorganized efforts of the churches to 
keep up.  Reflecting on their common task in the meeting’s minutes, these leaders agreed:  
In these circumstances, amid the varied efforts to renew church life, to awaken 
personal Christian conviction in the congregations, and to embolden wide circles 
of the laity to participate willingly and gladly in the congregational life of the 
churches, it is vitally important that the leaders of the EKD offer intellectual and 
organizational coordination, bringing these movements into ongoing contact with 
the entire leadership of the EKD.16 
 
When it was his turn to speak, Thadden offered an even broader and bolder vision 
for the upcoming gathering: 
If we revive the Protestant Woche today, this is not just a matter of pressing ahead 
as usual, but of the church’s mission “today” in the midst of the terrible after-
effects of a lost war and in view of a dark present full of apocalyptic portents.  We 
are talking about a meeting of German Protestant Christendom of unusually broad 
proportions over an extended period of time.  Even apart from the immediate 
propagandistic effects of such a gathering, this kind of witness to the existence 
and missionary vigor of the Protestant life of faith cannot fail to make an 
impression on the consciousness of our present-day world, alienated from the 
church.  This is especially true if this outward manifestation can be brought into 
contact with a genuinely awakened commitment to the cause of Christ.  The 
Protestant Christian is called in the present day to demonstrate, against every 
countervailing worldview, that he is willing to stand on the side of the cross.  
Insofar as he is serious in this commitment, he will realize that he does not stand 
alone in this struggle.17 
 
The rest of the meeting was spent making plans for this gathering, setting up a 
provisional leadership committee, and preparing a report for Martin Niemöller, the 
president of the local Church of Hessen-Nassau. 
These plans ran into difficulty in mid-March.  Unhappy with the choice of 
speakers and with the intellectual and theological content of the gathering, Niemöller 
rejected the committee’s plans, refusing to allow the gathering to meet in Frankfurt.  
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Their work was only salvaged when Thadden’s old friend Hanns Lilje, now the Bishop of 
Hanover, agreed to serve as a new host and sponsor.  Meeting again in early April, the 
planning committee for the Protestant Woche continued to expand its membership, 
including representatives of the Hanoverian Landeskirche and delegates from an even 
wider selection of Protestant works and associations.  In order to appease Niemöller, 
whose support was still vital to the ultimate success of the gathering, the planning 
committee chose the politician Gustav Heinemann, one of Niemöller’s close associates, 
to be the meeting’s president.  To balance the influence of Niemöller’s Barthian faction, 
the state counselor Hans Meinzolt, a Bavarian Lutheran, was selected as the vice 
president for the meeting.  At this point, plans for the 1949 Woche were still dominated 
by the various Protestant works and associations that had called it into existence.  A 
significant portion of the meeting time was set aside for individual gatherings sponsored 
by these organizations.18 
Over the next few weeks, however, Thadden became bolder in his efforts to use 
the Protestant Woche as the springboard for a new, permanent lay movement within the 
church.  At the committee’s next planning meeting in mid-April, Thadden announced that 
he was no longer working as a representative of the church chancellery, but working 
independently—with the chancellery’s support—to create a new lay organization called 
the German Protestant Kirchentag.  This new organization, which he hoped would grow 
out of the plans for the 1949 Woche, would be “an expression of the public responsibility 
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of our church and a meeting of the broadest spectrum of Protestant Christendom, 
prepared and carried out in cooperation with the works and associations of the EKD.”  
This kind of broad lay gathering was vital, he believed, if the German church was to 
survive.  “Without the activation of the laity,” he argued, “the Protestant church in 
Germany has no future.  The lay person of today is no longer at home in the church, he 
has nothing to do there, nothing to say, and, thus, nothing for which to take 
responsibility.”  However, Thadden continued, if the church would “engage in serious 
dialogue with the laity,” creating an organization like the Kirchentag, this organization 
could hold the church together, and it could provide a common platform for the various 
Protestant organizations.19 
In order to gain support for these plans, Thadden once again appealed to the 
Barthian faction of the church.  As he complained to Willem Visser’t Hooft in early 
April, he was especially frustrated by Niemöller’s opposition to his plans.  To Thadden, 
the Kirchentag perfectly embodied the ideals of the Barthians.  It was a positive attempt 
to address their criticism of the postwar “restoration,” and to empower the laity.  
Moreover, his plans for the bible study meetings at the 1949 Woche were thoroughly 
Barthian in their approach.  And he had gone out of his way to select prominent Barthians 
such as Gustav Heinemann and Oskar Hammelsbeck as speakers.20  Throughout the 
month of April, Thadden engaged in personal diplomacy with many of Niemöller’s close 
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associates and allies, hoping that they would be able to convince him to rethink his 
opposition.21 
These efforts culminated in a presentation to the Reich Brethren Council on April 
27, 1949.  Speaking to this group of former confessing church leaders, Thadden 
emphasized the revolutionary nature of the Kirchentag.  The name “Kirchentag,” he 
explained, had been chosen as a direct reference to the Kirchentag organization of the late 
nineteenth century, called into existence by the social pastor Johann Hinrich Wichern to 
coordinate the work of the various German Landeskirchen.  Although he did not 
explicitly state as much, this name, taken from an official leadership organ of the 
Protestant churches, expressed a bold—even revolutionary—claim about the 
Kirchentag’s symbolic (if not actual) authority.  The Kirchentag was also, he explained, a 
direct outgrowth of the experiences of the church struggle during the Third Reich, a 
renewal of the earlier Protestant Woche that had served the confessing church.22   
The need for a new lay-movement, he continued, had become clear to him during 
his time as a prisoner of war and in his visits to POW camps throughout Europe and 
North Africa.  In these camps he had seen the spiritual vacuum in the souls of postwar 
Germans, and he had realized that only Christian faith had the power to prevent a relapse 
into the destructive ideologies of the past.  Furthermore, he had recognized the growing 
alienation of ordinary Germans from traditional church structures.  Instead of looking to 
the churches, the German people were embracing a variety of mystical and occult 
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philosophies.  Even earnest Protestants, seeking spiritual belonging, were being drawn 
toward the Catholic Church.  This, he concluded, was a result of the lack of any real lay-
movement in the Protestant churches.  The laity had not been given any important role in 
the church, and they no longer felt at home there.23  The Kirchentag, he continued, would 
help to fill this void. 
The German Protestant Kirchentag will call on the laity of the Protestant churches 
to take their Christian vocation in the Protestant church seriously, to confess their 
Protestant faith and to take the active role in building up the congregations to 
which they have been called according to apostolic teachings. . . . In view of the 
distress of millions of refugees and in view of the masses of humanity pushed 
together in the industrial regions of Germany, this cannot remain a matter of small 
evangelistic efforts.  We need a new kind of practical activity, and a widely 
visible sign of this basic self-reflection in the Protestant churches.24 
 
In particular, he continued, the churches needed to reach out to the masses of Germans 
expelled from their lands in the East, feeling isolated and homeless in the aftermath of the 
war.  The Kirchentag, he argued, had a responsibility to draw these isolated individuals 
back into a sense of community and to assure them of their “right to a homeland in the 
church.”25 
Yet Thadden was also careful to explain that this new lay movement was not a 
threat to the authority of pastors and theologians.  Instead, it was an outgrowth of the 
most basic lesson of the church struggle: “Pastor and congregation belong together; 
together they carry the burdens and concerns, hardships and agonies of the church.”  The 
Kirchentag, he went on, was not an “absurd claim for the authority of non-theologians,” 
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nor was it a “liberal debate club.”  Instead, it was a way of creating and preserving 
Christian community in the churches. 
What we need in the churches is the freedom of personal conviction and, at the 
same time, a deep connection to the facts [Sachen].  In this way the laity, and 
above all the young people in the church, can have an opportunity to authenticate 
their faith and to offer their gifts in service to the body of Christ.  Then the pastor 
will have a comrade in arms like he has not had for four-hundred years.26 
 
Thadden went on to allay any fears that the Kirchentag might try to usurp the authority of 
the Church Synod, the existing organ for lay government.  Nothing, he argued, could be 
further from his intent.  However, the Kirchentag did have real public authority of a 
different kind.  “A living Protestant Christianity,” he argued, “has a need for other ways 
to express its communal desires and its public function, besides those which a synod can 
take on.”27 
Addressing the structure of the Kirchentag, Thadden conceded that he had 
borrowed heavily from the Katholikentag, a Catholic lay-gathering with roots going back 
to the nineteenth century.  However, the Protestant Kirchentag would naturally reflect the 
different, unique concerns and styles of the Protestant churches.  Its relationship to the 
Katholikentag would be one of friendly, peaceful competition in the common task of 
proclaiming Christ in the modern world.  The Kirchentag would be organized and run by 
the various Protestant works and associations devoted to the laity.  Its permanence and 
continuity would be assured by the creation of a Präsidial Committee, to be formed by 
expanding on the membership of the original leadership committee of the Protestant 
Woche of the 1930s.  This committee, consisting of both laity and theologians, would be 
elected at the 1949 meeting in Hanover.  Each meeting would also have its own Steering 
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Committee, or Präsidium, also directly elected by the participants.  And practical 
organization matters would be handled by a specially assembled Host Committee of 
people from the city where each meeting would take place.28 
After addressing these preliminary matters, Thadden launched into an extended 
description of his plans for the first Kirchentag meeting in Hanover.  Meeting from July 
28 to August 1, 1949, the Kirchentag in Hanover would offer attendees a rich program 
full of bible study gatherings, speeches, church music, and open discussion.  The opening 
worship service would feature Bishop Otto Dibelius, the President of the EKD council.  
The Hanoverian bishop Hanns Lilje would offer a series of presentations geared toward 
the lay-Protestant.  And the gathering would reach its crescendo on Sunday, August 31, 
when Martin Niemöller and Willem Visser’t Hooft would speak to the entire assembly on 
the topic of “The Christian between the Nations.”  Over the course of the meeting, the 
assembled Protestants would also get to hear from other prominent figures in the 
ecumenical church and from public officials.29 
Thadden hoped that this broad program would allow the church to better 
communicate in the “language of modern man,” to draw in people from the outside or on 
the margins of the church, especially industrial workers and youth.  It would give them a 
place to ask their own questions and to have their own concerns addressed.  It would 
offer them an experience of community and “Christian ‘brotherhood.’”  It would help to 
overcome their disillusionment with the church’s own internal divisions, serving as a 
meeting place for Protestants from every church faction.  It would celebrate the church’s 
ecumenical nature.  And it would equip the laity to take on an active role in the church, 
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the “’worldly’ sphere,” “in their vocation as citizens,” and in “personal witness” to their 
co-workers and families.30 
Thadden’s efforts to appease Niemöller were finally successful. At the meeting of 
the Reich Brethren Council he found enthusiastic support for his idea of a permanent lay-
gathering within the church, and for his plans to transform the 1949 Hanover Woche into 
the first annual German Protestant Kirchentag.  At the urging of a range of other church 
leaders, including Otto Dibelius, the Barthian theology professor Hans Joachim Iwand, 
and leading members of the Brethren council, such as Joachim Beckmann, Niemöller was 
persuaded to support Thadden’s plans.  In a typical reversal, he not only agreed to deliver 
the keynote speech at the Kirchentag’s main Sunday assembly, he also proclaimed his 
willingness to serve as the new organization’s “patron” in the church leadership.  In 
keeping with earlier plans, Thadden agreed to make Niemöller’s ally Gustav Heinemann 
the chair of the meeting’s Präsidium.  And he began to make plans for the creation of a 
series of State Kirchentag Committees to coordinate the organization’s work in the 
individual Landeskirchen.  Writing to his fellow meeting coordinators, an enthusiastic 
Thadden relayed his hopes that the Kirchentag might not only succeed in coordinating the 
lay-organizations of the church, but in actually saving the EKD from its internal 
divisions, serving as a bridge between increasingly hostile church-political factions.31 
Others were less enthusiastic about Niemöller’s support, particularly his plans to 
serve as the organization’s “patron.”  In a letter to Thadden, Ernst zur Nieden expressed 
his happiness that Thadden’s negotiations with the Brethren Council had gone well.  And 
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he approved Thadden’s plans for moving forward with the organization.  But he warned 
Thadden about the difficulty of working with Niemöller, and he worried that Niemöller’s 
opponents might now withdraw from the gathering.  The Württemberg Oberkirchenrat 
Manfred Müller expressed similar concerns, warning that Niemöller would try to 
dominate the Kirchentag organization, making it an appendage of the Brethren Council.  
Perhaps, Müller continued, it would be best to have two patrons: both Martin Niemöller 
and Otto Dibelius.32 
These fears were well-founded.  Thadden quickly ran into new opposition from 
Otto Dibelius, who had thus far been supportive, and from Hans Meiser, the Bishop of 
Bavaria.  Thadden continued to court Niemöller and his associates.  In a letter to Gustav 
Heinemann, for example, Thadden explained that the Kirchentag was a response to the 
forces of “restoration” in the church, a way of renewing church life from below.33  But 
these kinds of arguments made more conservative churchmen nervous.  At the late May 
meeting of the EKD council, Dibelius objected to the Kirchentag name.  Taking the title 
of the nineteenth-century body that had coordinated the policies of the various 
Landeskirchen, he argued, created the false impression that the new lay organization was 
actually some kind of official governing body.  Meiser, whose priority remained the 
defense of orthodox Lutheranism against all other theological tendencies, worried that the 
Kirchentag would promote “unionism,” undermining the purity of the Lutheran 
Landeskirchen.  In order to appease Dibelius, and retain the moral and financial support 
of the EKD council, Thadden was forced to rein in his plans, retaining the name “German 
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Protestant Woche.”  Meiser was much more difficult to appease, although Thadden 
succeeded in allaying his fears somewhat.  After a long personal discussion, Meiser 
eventually dropped his objections to 1949 Woche, but he remained suspicious of 
Thadden’s plans.34 
Having secured the support of the EKD council, Thadden began the work of 
publicizing the 1949 Protestant Woche.  In the public invitation to the gathering, issued in 
the names of Thadden, Lilje, Dibelius, and Niemöller, Thadden once again emphasized 
the importance of revitalizing the Protestant laity.  This was not a matter, he argued, of 
serving the institutional church or any one theological confession.  Instead, the Protestant 
Woche would bring together Protestants from “every German zone” to serve the mission 
of the universal, ecumenical church of Jesus Christ.  Thadden also announced that the 
meeting would be the beginning of a new, permanent lay-movement within the Protestant 
churches.  The response to this invitation far exceeded his expectations.  While Thadden 
had hoped to draw as many as 2,000 attendees, the actual meeting attracted as many as 
7,000 fully registered guests.  As many as 35,000 people attended the larger main 
assemblies.35   
 
THE 1949 GERMAN PROTESTANT WOCHE 
The program of 1949 Protestant Woche attempted to maintain a tenuous balance 
between the conservative and radical factions in the church.  The overall focus was 
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clearly on the areas where all Protestants could agree: the need to return to the church and 
to actively participate in Christian service to society.  However, individual speakers 
approached this common theme in very different ways.   In his opening sermon—the 
most unapologetically nationalist of the gathering—Otto Dibelius praised the 
achievements of the German nation, portraying the period between 1871 and 1900 as the 
pinnacle of German civilization.  This civilization, he argued, had been characterized by 
the unprecedented inward and outward freedom of the German people.  This freedom was 
deeply rooted in the German national character as the people of the reformation, a people 
committed to truth above all else, unwilling to accept delusion or falsehood.  Now, in the 
postwar period, Germans had lost their outward freedom.  In the west, they had become 
“slaves of capitalism, slaves of Truman.”  In the East, they were “slaves of the Russians.”  
All Germans were experiencing bitter suffering, especially the refugees and expellees 
who had lost their homes.  As members of the confessing church and the conservative 
resistance, they had suffered as martyrs under the Nazis.  And they continued to suffer 
the hatred and condemnation of the rest of the world.  Yet in the midst of all of these 
difficulties, they still had the truth of Jesus Christ.  And if they embraced this truth, 
Dibelius argued, it would once again make them free.36 
In his Sunday sermon, Martin Niemöller also began by looking at the present-day 
state of affairs in Germany: the helplessness of the people, their disappointment, their 
material suffering, and their spiritual confusion.  The German people, he proclaimed, had 
“lost their way;” they had been “scattered like sheep without a shepherd.”  Niemöller, 
too, promoted Christian faith and Christian service as the only way out of this crisis.  
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Unlike Dibelius, however, he presented the present-day breakdown as a hidden blessing, 
proclaiming: “Beloved Protestant sisters and brothers!  I believe it was necessary for us to 
experience these disappointments.”  The German people, he explained, had forgotten that 
God was not there to serve them, that they were instead in the world to serve God.  Now, 
they needed to return to the true life of faith, overcoming their personal and national pride 
to embrace the work of Jesus Christ.  Here Niemöller argued: “We can say Jesus Christ a 
thousand times and nothing happens, the word that comes out of our mouths remains 
dead.”  But where Christians turned to God in humility and submission, “there everything 
is made different and made new.”  “There,” he continued, “we Christian people, we 
church Christians will no longer dream expectantly, in the middle of the suffering all 
around us, of the triumph of the Christian congregations; instead, for the first time, this 
suffering will truly break our hearts.”  Only then, he went on, would the church move 
beyond its political and social formulas, its pride and self-satisfaction, its desire for 
outward importance.  Only then would the church truly submit itself to doing God’s work 
in the present-day world.37 
Most other presentations fell somewhere in between these two extremes.  In a 
series of bible study lessons, the conservative theology professor Heinrich Rendtorff, 
preached a straightforward evangelistic message, calling on his listeners to repent from 
their sins and return to faith.38  In another series of speeches on the Christian response to 
the present-day crisis, Hanns Lilje offered a middle position between Dibelius and 
Niemöller.  Warning his audience against the sin of resignation, he called them to active 
Christian service in the world.  Yet he also cautioned them against the dangers of 
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forgetting the past or minimizing their own guilt.  Drawing on the work of the Swiss 
philosopher Max Picard, Lilje argued that Nazism had been an expression of the 
fragmentation and incoherence of modern life.  At its foundation, he continued, this was 
the result of a deeper spiritual crisis.  All of the problems of the present-day world 
pointed to the urgent need for God.  Yet Christian activity needed to go beyond mere 
missions and evangelism.  It needed to take more worldly matters seriously.  In another 
speech, on “The Value of the Human Being,” Lilje elaborated on the contributions of the 
Christian faith to public life.  Christian activity in the world, he argued, was not romantic 
or utopian; it was grounded in sober realism.  It began with the recognition of the value 
and worth of every human being, and it took the concrete, tangible needs of the 
individual seriously.39  
Speaking on “The Foundation of Protestant Activity,” Heinrich Held, a veteran of 
the confessing church and a superintendent in the church of the Rhineland, made the 
Barthian case for the church’s public responsibility.   Christians were called, he 
proclaimed, to a new form of public activity in the present-day crisis.  Protestants could 
not just retreat inward, into a new form of pietism.  Instead, having been saved by God, 
they needed to work for the salvation of the world.  This required public activity in every 
area of life.  Yet this activity needed to begin, as Niemöller had suggested, with self-
criticism and self-reflection.  The true foundation for postwar Protestant activity was to 
be found in the experiences of the confessing church and in the Stuttgart declaration of 
guilt.  The lesson of the church struggle during the Third Reich was that the true church 
was founded on the word of God and the activity of Jesus Christ.  Everything else was an 
idol.  Protestant social activity needed to start with repentance and submission to God’s 
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will.  Only then could it begin to carry out his work in the world.  This meant, in 
particular, that Christians could not blindly follow the teachings of socialism or of 
democracy, the idols of the Christian West, or Christian culture.  The church would not 
bring about the kingdom of God on earth.  But Christ was actively working to transform 
the world, and Christians had a duty to participate in this work.40 
Following Held’s speech, Paul Seeger, a member of the CDU and a leader in the 
Protestant worker’s movement, also called on Protestants to embrace political activity.  In 
particular, he urged the churches to overcome their bourgeois character, reaching out to 
the working classes. And he called for Protestants to unite in defense of the “Christian 
West” against the threat of communism.   Next, Gustav Heinemann—still a CDU 
politician at the time—also called on his audience to embrace democratic political 
activity.  This, he argued, meant working to democratize the churches themselves.  But it 
also meant overcoming the traditional Protestant deference to state authority, embracing 
their personal responsibility as Christians and as citizens, and participating actively in the 
democratic process.  Heinrich Albertz, an SPD politician and another member of the 
Protestant Left, called on his listeners to reject the Cold War division of Germany, 
working to build social solidarity within the Federal Republic.  This social solidarity, he 
argued, would do far more than remilitarization to re-unite Germany and to overcome the 
division of Europe.  Follwing Albertz, the venerable pietist leader Friedrich von 
Bodelschwingh called on all Christians to make hard sacrifices for the good of their 
neighbor.  The Swiss medical doctor Theodor Bovet and Elisabeth Stehfen spoke on the 
crisis of the single woman in postwar society.  And Hans Keller, Hanns Lilje , and 
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Willem Visser’t Hooft called on German Protestants to rethink their national attitudes, 
substituting Christian ecumenicalism for the aggressive nationalism of the past.41 
Finally, on the last day of the gathering, the Protestant Woche hosted a series of 
meetings for Protestant professionals.  Speaking to a gathering of lawyers and judges, the 
state prosecutor Adolf Dombois recalled the breakdown of justice in Nazi Germany.  
Responding to this breakdown, he reminded his listeners that God’s laws—including the 
injunction against murder—superseded the laws of any human state.  In much the same 
way, the medical doctor Wilhelm Giesen reminded doctors of the centrality of the ten 
commandments to their profession, highlighting the commandment against murder that 
so many doctor’s had violated during the Third Reich.  Speaking to teachers, the 
pedagogue Oskar Hammelsbeck defended the educational rights and privileges of the 
churches, focusing on the importance of religious education to the renewal of the 
Christian West.  Martin Donath, a Protestant economist, called on business leaders—
whether socialists or free market capitalists—to work for greater economic justice.  And 
the engineer Hugo Krueger warned a gathering of technical workers against the danger 
posed to individual human worth by the misuse of technology.42 
Most important for the future, however, was the meeting’s main assembly on 
Sunday, July 31.  There, before a crowd of 6,000 people, Gustav Heinemann—speaking 
is his capacity as the meeting’s president—declared the foundation of the German 
Protestant Kirchentag as a permanent lay-gathering within the Protestant churches.  This 
decision was affirmed by the acclamation of the assembly, and the Kirchentag was 
formally called into existence.  During the final days of the 1949 Woche, Thadden was 
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given the task of organizing a provisional leadership for this new organization, and he 
was elected to be its president.  He was also given the difficult task of persuading the 
reluctant council of the EKD to offer its support. 43 
 
FROM THE PROTESTANT WOCHE TO THE KIRCHENTAG 
The formal constitution of the new Kirchentag organization, drafted during the 
1949 Woche, was brief and to the point.  In its entirety, it read: 
I. The members of Protestant Christendom in Germany, assembled in 
Hanover from July 28 to August 1, 1949, have resolved to create an annual 
GERMAN PROTESTANT KIRCHENTAG.  This will serve to equip the 
Protestant laity for their service in the world and in the Christian congregations.  
It will also work to promote community and cooperation with the laity in the 
constituent churches of the World Council of Churches. 
The Präsidial Committee, under the leadership of Dr. von Thadden-
Trieglaff, shall have the task of carrying out this decision. 
The assembled call upon the Protestant laity in all parts of Germany to 
arrange PROTESTATNT TAGE AND WOCHE as a foundation for the 
Kirchentag, in coordination with the Präsidial Committee. 
II. This decision shall be relayed to the council of the EKD.  The Präsidial 
Committee shall have the task of arranging with the council of the EKD for the 
execution of this decision.44 
 
As the president of the newly created provisional Präsidial Committee, it fell to Reinold 
von Thadden-Trieglaff to expand on this formal foundation.   
In a report written shortly after the end of the 1949 Woche, Thadden elaborated on 
these plans.  He began by looking more closely at the historical significance and present-
day function of the Kirchentag.  The founding of the Kirchentag, he argued, was a 
“church-historical event of the first rank.”  In response to the postwar breakdown of 
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German society, the disillusionment of postwar Germans, and the “spectacular 
consolidation of the Roman Catholic church in our day,” German Protestants had finally 
overcome their tendency toward passivity and resignation.  Reflecting on their own 
“spiritual and intellectual inheritance,” they had “announced their bold desire to 
participate in the present-day conflict of worldviews.”45 
The foundation of this activity, he continued, was to be found in the basic 
Christian message of salvation.  Apart from this foundation, the organization could not 
hope to have any outward effect.  However, this faith did not consist merely of “pious 
phrases,” or religious “sentimentality.”  It was, he argued, a faith directed toward “the 
living people of our day in the middle of the actual circumstances of their lives.”  And it 
called on these people to make a “personal and substantive decision” to take their 
Christian calling seriously.  This was a matter of taking active responsibility in the 
churches and of constantly professing their Christian witness in the world.  Building on 
this foundation, the Kirchentag would work for the realization of true Christian 
community in Germany.  It would be thoroughly ecumenical in its perspective, drawing 
people from all of the Protestant churches.  And it would work in close cooperation with 
the Protestant lay-works and associations.  It would address the concrete crises of postwar 
life, speaking to expellees, refugees, and all other “victims of the war and its catastrophic 
end.”  And it would call on all people to recognize their personal responsibility for “the 
intellectual, the social and the political events of our time.”  The Kirchentag, he made 
clear, did not claim the right to intervene directly in the affairs of the state or the church 
leadership.  However, its purpose was public and political insofar as it existed to 
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encourage the Protestant laity—as church members and citizens—to take a more active 
role in both church and national politics.46 
Thadden next proceeded to lay out his plans for the Kirchentag’s own 
organizational structure.  Individual Kirchentag gatherings, he explained, would be 
organized and carried out by local planning committees.  This work would be overseen 
and coordinated by the Kirchentag’s permanent leadership organ, the Präsidial 
Committee, which would be led by Thadden, in his capacity as Kirchentag president.  
This committee, in turn, would be divided into two parts, the Präsidium and the Beirat.  
The first of these would consist of selected members of the local planning committee for 
the upcoming Kirchentag gathering, representatives of new press and cultural committees 
created at Hanover, and delegates from State Kirchentag Committees that would be set up 
in every German Landeskirche.  The Präsidium would also include the chair of the 
previous Kirchentag meeting, in this case Gustav Heinemann.  The Beirat would be made 
up of representatives from all of the various “non-diaconal” church works and 
associations, including the Men’s Work, Women’s Work, student organizations, 
Protestant Academies, and Volksmission organizations.  It would also include delegates 
from the Reich Brethren Council and the Free Churches.   The Kirchentag organization 
would be rounded out with a smaller executive committee, a finance committee to secure 
funds for the annual meetings, and a press committee to handle publicity.  Finally, 
Thadden would have the task of setting up a permanent Kirchentag office to assist him in 
the day-to-day task of running the organization.47  In actual practice during the early 
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1950s, most leadership decisions were made by Thadden and the members of the 
Präsidium.  The role of the Beirat remained largely consultative.  The Präsidium, along 
with various smaller theme selection committees, took on the task of selecting the topics 
and setting the overall tone for each gathering.  But until the adoption of a new 
constitution in 1955, local planning committees and ad hoc Kirchentag workgroups 
remained responsible for most of the actual content. 
During the final months of 1949, Thadden worked to build support for the new 
organization.  His first task was to gain the formal approval of the EKD council for the 
fait accompli with which he had presented them at the end of the Hanover Woche.  At the 
council’s next meeting, in September 1949, he reported on the Woche and on the plans 
for a permanent Kirchentag.  Most council members responded positively to these 
developments.  However, Thadden’s plans foundered on opposition from the Bavarian 
bishop Hans Meiser, who continued to see the organization as a threat to the authority of 
the individual Landeskirchen.  Ultimately, Thadden left the meeting disappointed, unable 
to secure the formal endorsement of the EKD.  He did, however, convince the council’s 
chair, Otto Dibelius, of the Kirchentag’s potential usefulness.  Willing to give the idea 
time to develop, Dibelius prevented the council’s negative decision from being recorded 
in the minutes for their September meeting.  This gave Thadden the freedom to proceed 
with his plans without the endorsement or the direct opposition of the institutional church 
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leadership.  As a fortuitous and unintended consequence of this development, the 
Kirchentag remained formally independent of the Protestant Church in Germany (EKD).  
Over the next several decades, this institutional autonomy—in conjunction with a close 
working relationship with the EKD—would allow the Kirchentag unusual freedom for 
experimentation and the development of new ideas.48 
With the formal recognition of the Kirchentag still a remote possibility, Thadden 
continued to fight for support from the institutional church hierarchy.  In December 1949 
he met again with Meiser and the Bavarian church leadership.  Trying to allay their fears, 
he assured them that the Kirchentag sought cooperation between the different 
confessional Landeskirchen in Germany, but it did not seek any kind of political or 
theological “union.”  He also worked to overcome their suspicion that the Kirchentag was 
a tool of the Barthian faction, designed as a critical alternative to the existing church 
hierarchy.  “My personal plans and efforts,” he explained, “do not arise out of criticism of 
the church.  The church of the Reformation practices its own self-criticism.”  Instead, he 
continued, the Kirchentag’s task was to build stronger ties between the laity and the 
church leadership so that they could work together for the growth of the church.  Finally, 
he assured them: “I have explained to the Reich Brethren Council in all clarity that the 
Kirchentag cannot be only their concern.”  The Kirchentag was not on the side of 
Niemöller and the other Barthians against the Lutheran Landeskirchen.  It existed to unite 
and serve all Protestants in Germany.49 
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On the other end of the church political spectrum, the Kirchentag had enjoyed 
strong support from the Barthian faction ever since Niemöller had declared himself its 
“patron.”  However this support came at a cost.  Barthians in the Kirchentag leadership 
continually agitated for the organization to adopt a more radical political program.  In a 
letter from August 1949, for example, Oskar Hammelsbeck urged Thadden to commit the 
organization more strongly to political change, moving beyond mere talk to action.  
Along with several others, Hammelsbeck also encouraged the Thadden to make greater 
efforts to include members of the working class and the SPD in the Kirchentag 
leadership.50  And Niemöller himself hoped to use the Kirchentag as a means of 
combating the dominance of the Catholic Church and Catholic-dominated CDU in 
postwar West Germany.  In a letter written to Thadden in January 1950, Niemöller 
complained about the “propaganda” of the Catholic politicians and their Protestant allies.  
He went on to suggest that the Kirchentag needed to take a stance against these efforts.  
“It seems to me,” he argued, “that the Kirchentag in August cannot avoid the questions 
that are breaking out everywhere: ‘Why don’t we Protestants go back into the Catholic 
church?’ and ‘What is the duty of the church of the Gospel over against Roman Catholic 
Christendom?”51 
Writing to Gustav Heinemann shortly thereafter, Thadden complained that 
Niemöller’s efforts were likely to do more harm than good.  By politicizing the 
Kirchentag, Niemöller would limit its effectiveness, ultimately weakening an 
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organization that actually sought (positively rather than negatively) to strengthen the 
political involvement of the Protestant laity.  “If we can succeed over the next several 
years,” he explained, “to awaken community consciousness and a sense of confessional 
responsibility in our Protestant laity . . . we will have done more for the strengthening of 
the Protestant side than any theological declaration could do.”52  In a letter to Willem 
Visser’t Hooft, Thadden was more explicit about his frustration: 
Niemöller’s sudden, strongly awakened interest in the German Protestant 
Kirchentag has caused me a bit of trouble recently.  He is, you know, caught up at 
the moment in a strong stream of anti-Catholicism, and he is pressuring me to 
make the Protestant Kirchentag available as a platform for an aggressive anti-
Catholic attitude.  I have no desire to do this, since I am of the opinion that that is 
not what we are there for. . . . Every attack (even with blunt weapons) against 
Roman influence in central Europe will have disastrous consequences, weakening 
rather than strengthening our cause.53 
 
Despite these difficulties, however, Thadden concluded his letter by reporting that the 
Kirchentag continued to garner interest and attention, and he remained hopeful about the 
prospects for the next Kirchentag meeting. 
In preparation for the next Kirchentag meeting in the city of Essen, Thadden spent 
the first several months of 1950 working to consolidate the Kirchentag’s institutional 
structure.  This task was made more complicated by refusal of the EKD council to 
formally endorse the Kirchentag as an official church institution.  In order to provide the 
organization with an official legal status, the “Association for the Promotion of the 
German Protestant Kirchentag” was founded as a public corporation in January 1950.  
The following month Thadden hired Otto-Heinrich Ehlers as the Kirchentag’s first 
General Secretary.  Thadden and Ehlers proceeded to set up a small, temporary office in 
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Essen, from which they could coordinate the work of the local planning committee.  The 
first State Kirchentag Committees were founded around the same time, although these 
never really developed into the broad democratic base that Thadden had initially 
envisioned.  The most pressing problem that Thadden faced at this time, however, was 
not organizational but financial.  Without the official backing of the EKD, Thadden had 
to find other sources to fund the Kirchentag’s work.  Once again, his ecumenical and 
personal contacts served him well.  The Evangelical and Reformed Church in the United 
States, the same body that had funded Thadden’s ecumenical work in Geneva, provided 
him with a starting sum of 10,000 marks.  And this was supplemented by major donations 
from Thadden’s contacts in the business community, principally from the Essen 
industrialists Oskar Söhngen and Hans Broche and from the banker Gotthard Freiherr von 
Falkenhausen.54 
The choice of Essen, an industrial city in the Ruhr basin, as the host city for the 
1950 Kirchentag was not accidental.  To the members of the Kirchentag leadership, one 
of the greatest weaknesses of the prewar churches had been their predominantly middle-
class character.  In the postwar period, even conservative Protestants like Otto Dibelius 
hoped to overcome this history, creating a broad-based Volkskirche.  To these 
conservatives, this was a matter of evangelization and Volksmission, of bringing the 
alienated working classes back into the church.  More radical church leaders, especially 
in the Barthian faction, went a step further, pushing the church to promote Christian 
socialist policies.  By holding their 1950 gathering in Essen, the Kirchentag leadership 
sent a clear signal about their willingness to reach out beyond the traditional base of the 
churches.  And they declared their interest in present-day social and political issues. 
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Meeting in late October, the full Präsidial Committee began to work out the 
program for this gathering.  Every member of the committee could agree that 
Volksmission and evangelism were the foundation of the Essen Kirchentag’s work.  As 
Heinrich Held pointed out, the Katholikentag, on which the Kirchentag was based, might 
focus broadly on social and political issues.  But Protestants—as people of the Gospel—
would have to have Christ at the front and center of their program.  All of the committee 
members also hoped that the gathering in Essen would help to draw industrial workers 
and other alienated Germans back into the church.  Beyond this agreement, numerous 
divisions emerged.  Some members of the committee envisioned the task of Volksmission 
in largely traditional terms, with evangelistic sermons calling on the assembled people to 
return to the churches.  Others, such as the Barthian pastor Herbert Mochalski, urged a 
more open and critical approach, in which workers would be given the opportunity to 
vent their frustrations with the existing church structure.  Committee members also 
disagreed on the question of whether the Kirchentag ought to adopt public resolutions on 
contemporary social and political issues.  The 1949 Woche had adopted resolutions on a 
variety of topics, including the upcoming West German elections and the postwar 
suffering of the German people.  However, the conservative theology professor Heinrich 
Rendtorff complained about the populist tone of these resolutions and their lack of 
political realism.55   
Every committee member could also agree on the centrality of the so-called 
“social question” to the Essen Kirchentag’s work.  Meeting in the industrial heartland of 
West Germany, it was expected that the Kirchentag would look closely at worker’s 
issues.  Another major point of emphasis was the plight of refugees and expellees who 
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had been driven from their homes during and after the war.  Several meeting attendees 
suggested broad thematic interpretations that would bring these topics together.  Heinrich 
Held, for example, proposed a focus on “the renewal of community.”  More 
provocatively, another meeting attendee named Oldag, suggested that the Kirchentag 
focus on the refugee crisis under the rubric of “Christ against the loss of homeland.”  
Finally, Heinrich Rendtorff took the entirety of the postwar social crisis as his starting 
point, arguing: “The ground out of which the topics need to grow is the common, deep 
distress, the loss of homeland, the uprootedness, of the people of our time.”  Rendtorff 
went on to suggest a three-part schema for addressing this topic.  First, the Kirchentag 
could examine the effect of this crisis on the “uprooted person.”  Next, it could look at 
the practical steps necessary for the “renewal of community.”  And, finally, it could 
address the centrality of Christian faith to any solution to the postwar crisis, pointing out 
that “final solutions are only possible where one is guided by Christ in the middle of 
one’s life.”56   
These ideas were further refined over the next several months by the members of 
a smaller Theme Selection Committee.  Meeting in late October, this committee reflected 
on their twofold task for the upcoming Kirchentag.  First, they needed to work to spread 
the Gospel message.  But, second, they also needed to develop Protestant answers to the 
most pressing questions of contemporary life.  The work on the first of these tasks, they 
reflected, was well underway.  The second, however, posed more difficulty.  Warning 
against an overly theological program, Ernst zur Nieden complained: “We have to move 
more quickly to the practical, substantive questions that arise out of the encounter 
between the church and the world today.  Nothing is worse than when every presentation 
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recapitulates the entire theological course of the meeting.  We need to speak concretely to 
concrete topics.”  Several others disagreed vehemently, reminding Nieden that Christ was 
the foundation of all Protestant activity.  In the end, however, this argument was resolved 
by Eberhard Müller and Klaus von Bismarck, both of whom argued against seeing such 
stark opposition between the Kirchentag’s two major tasks.  “The discussion of practical 
problems is necessary;” Müller argued, “the important thing is how we do this.  This can 
be an important evangelistic task.”  For his part, Bismarck added: “Concrete questions 
must be answered concretely, but in connection with and as part of a coherent theological 
framework.”57 
Combining their two tasks into just such a framework, the committee selected the 
bold injunction “Save Humanity!” as the motto for the Essen Kirchentag.  On the one 
hand, this was a clear allusion to the world’s need for Christ, for Christian salvation.  As 
Thadden wrote in the Kirchentag’s formal invitation: 
We humans cannot save humanity.  Not our best judgment, not our best 
intentions, not our sense of responsibility, not even the demonstration of 
thousands of Christian activists can bring about any change.  This can only be 
accomplished through the humble, common reflection on what God has done—
the living, almighty and merciful God.  He has already, long ago saved the world 
in Christ.58 
 
On the other hand, however, this motto tied into the urgent social and material crises of 
postwar German society.  The Protestant churches would not just offer spiritual salvation, 
or “long culture-critical analyses and diagnoses.”  Instead, with Christ’s help, working 
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from a solid Christian foundation, the Kirchentag leaders hoped to offer tangible help and 
concrete solutions to the pressing problems of the present-day.59  
Over the course of the 1950 Kirchentag meeting, from August 23 to August 27 
1950, speakers continued to promote this kind of concrete engagement with “the world”.  
In a series of sermons throughout the Kirchentag, Heinrich Rendtorff called on his 
listeners to “Follow the Lord,” urging them to return to the churches and to Christian 
faith.  Yet he argued that this task was not antithetical to involvement in the world; it was 
the necessary foundation for true service to humanity.   “Jesus Christ,” he argued, “calls 
out for followers. . . . But being a follower means, at the same time, being sent by Christ 
into the world to serve others.”  This was not a matter of endorsing any one worldview or 
political ideology, but of being ready and willing to sacrifice oneself for the good of 
one’s neighbor.60 
Speakers elaborated on this theme in the Kirchentag workgroup entitled “Save 
your Faith.”  Looking at the church’s loss of influence and credibility in postwar 
Germany, the author Willy Kramp argued that the churches had lost the public-minded 
spirit of the Reformation, withdrawing into themselves and their own tradition.  In order 
to again have a visible presence in the world, he argued, the churches needed to broaden 
their social base beyond the middle class.  They also needed to encourage the lively and 
active participation of the laity, not just the pastors and theologians.  And, finally, they 
needed to find answers to the challenges posed to Christian faith by the Enlightenment 
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and by modern Marxist philosophy.61  In another speech, the minister Dieter Andersen 
argued that the churches’ declining influence was a result of Protestants’ own behavior.  
Instead of living pious Christian lives within the world, they were too often hypocritical, 
arrogant, or legalistic in their attitudes.  The doctor, Wilhelm Giesen continued by 
arguing that the churches focused too much on their own institutional well-being, 
ignoring the needs of the individual.  Sermons, for example, were too academic and 
intellectual.  And church leaders—on both the Left and Right—were too engaged in 
byzantine political infighting to address issues of importance to the public.  Finally, 
Gustav Heinemann concluded that the churches had been too concerned with narrowly-
defined piety and their own political agendas to involve themselves in God’s work in the 
world.  Pushing for the church to broaden its social base, Heinemann argued: “Christ has 
come to seek and save the lost; this is our salvation, for both respectable members of our 
middle class society and for those rejected by it.”62 
Meeting in other workgroups, under slogans such as “Save the Family,” “Save 
your Homeland,” and “Save your Freedom,” Kirchentag speakers were even more direct 
in addressing the concrete problems of “the world.”  The prescriptions offered in the 
workgroups remained largely conservative and traditional.  Speakers affirmed traditional 
social and family structures as the antidote the social crises of modern life.  They argued 
for Christian faith and Christian community as a solution to the loss of homeland.  And 
they emphasized paternalism and Christian social values as solutions to the tensions in 
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modern industrial life.63  Despite this traditional and conservative focus, however, the 
Kirchentag in Essen did represent an important new beginning for the Protestant 
churches.  Protestant social and political thought remained firmly rooted in older ways of 
thinking.  But by critical examining their own past and opening the door to engagement 
with the outside world, Protestants at the Essen Kirchentag were taking the first tentative 
steps toward change. 
 
SUCCESS AND CONSOLIDATION 
The Protestant Kirchentag in Essen was a major success.  With roughly 35,000 
fully-registered guests attending the multi-day Kirchentag program, the gathering was 
four to five times as large as Hanover.  The numbers at the meeting’s massive main 
assembly were even more impressive.  While Thadden had expected a crowd of only 
35,000, the main assembly attracted somewhere in the vicinity of 180,000 people.64  This 
tremendous success guaranteed the future of the Kirchentag, but it also posed new 
challenges.  A few church leaders, such as Bishop Meiser, remained skeptical about the 
organization’s goals.  However, the massive public resonance of the Essen Kirchentag 
finally convinced the majority of Protestant leaders of the meeting’s potential.  Although 
the Kirchentag remained formally independent from the Protestant Church in Germany, 
after Essen it enjoyed a huge degree of unofficial support.   
The success of the Essen gathering also made it clear, however, that the 
Kirchentag organization needed to expand to meet the unexpected interest it had 
generated.  In the month before the Essen Kirchentag, Thadden’s old DSCV contact 
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Heinrich Giesen had able to secure a temporary leave from his position as a youth pastor 
to assist with the final Kirchentag logistics.  In September, after the meeting’s success, 
Thadden was able to convince him to join the staff full time, as a second General 
Secretary.  From this point on, the first General Secretary, Otto-Heinrich Ehlers, focused 
on the business and logistical aspects of the Kirchentag, while Giesen took charge of its 
theological and intellectual program.  In October 1950, the Kirchentag also established a 
permanent office in the city of Fulda, a central location not far from the estates of 
Thadden’s wife.  Since Fulda belonged to the territory of one of the smallest German 
Landeskirchen, the Church of Kurhessen-Waldeck, this location ensured that the 
organization would not be unduly dominated by the influence of any one Landeskirche.  
The location also had great symbolic resonance, since Fulda was the headquarters of 
Germany’s Catholic Bishop’s Conference.  As a result, the choice of Fulda both 
guaranteed the Kirchentag’s autonomy and re-asserted its claim to speak on behalf of all 
of the Protestant Christians in Germany.65   
Its organizational and institutional bases covered, the Kirchentag stood poised to 
transform the dynamics of postwar German Protestantism.  As a massive public 
celebration of Christian faith and spiritual life, the Kirchentag would serve as a rallying 
point for postwar Protestants, drawing them back into active involvement in the churches.  
As a major public forum for all of the competing theological and political factions in the 
church, it would also serve as a focal point for the transformation of Protestant ideas and 
attitudes.  Finally, as an organization dedicated to the active responsibility of Protestant 
Christians in public life, the Kirchentag would play a major role in the political and social 
transformation of postwar Germany.
 
65 Schroeter, Kirchentag, 71. 

 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3 
  
“WE ARE STILL BROTHERS!” 
 
In July 1951 the third annual German Protestant Kirchentag met in the city of 
Berlin.  For five days German Protestants from both sides of the divided city—and from 
both sides of the divided German nation—gathered together to celebrate their common 
faith.  Tens of thousands of Protestants from the “eastern zone” flooded into the city.  
Stadiums and churches were filled to their capacity, and crowds overflowed into the 
streets as the East German Volkspolizei struggled to maintain order.  The slogan for the 
gathering was “We are still brothers!”  And, although Kirchentag leaders were careful to 
explain that their real emphasis was ecumenical Christian brotherhood not national unity, 
the gathering could not avoid taking on a major national political resonance.  Kirchentag 
leaders were drawn into complex negotiations with the governments of both German 
states, as both tried to turn the gathering to their advantage.  Newspaper and magazine 
writers commented on the meeting’s national symbolism.  And Germans inside and 
outside of the churches could not help speculating on its geo-political significance.  If the 
popular success of the 1950 gathering in Essen had consolidated the Kirchentag’s place 
within the Protestant churches, the 1951 Kirchentag in Berlin played a similar role with 
the German public at large.  For the next decade, until the construction of the Berlin wall, 
the Kirchentag would be at the center of inter-German politics.1  
Kirchentag meetings in the “eastern zone”—in Berlin in 1951 and Leipzig in 
1954—were, unquestionably, the most visible signs of German Protestant national 
identity after the Second World War.  But these gatherings, with their massive public 
celebrations of “brotherhood,” were not the only places where Kirchentag visitors 
considered such issues.  After 1951, the Kirchentag took up the task of promoting 
German Protestant unity.   But it did not abandon its original mission.  The Kirchentag 
program remained devoted to filling the spiritual vacuum of the postwar period, to 
strengthening the faith and public responsibility of the Protestant laity.  And, as part of 
this larger overarching task, numerous workgroups and speeches at the Kirchentag 
meetings of the 1950s addressed important underlying questions related to German 
national identity.  To what extent were the churches, with their longstanding National 
Protestant tradition, responsible for the catastrophe of World War II?  How could they 
overcome this dangerous tradition?  What could fill the vacuum of national identity for 
postwar Germans who had lost their homes and livelihoods in the aftermath of the war?  
How could the churches foster a sense of community spirit and belonging without falling 
into national idolatry?  And what did it mean to be a German Protestant in a land divided 
down the middle by the politics of the escalating Cold War? 
On one thing, they could agree.  The German catastrophe—the Nazi dictatorship, 
war, and defeat—had only been possible because the German people had fallen away 
from God.  Without a return to the churches and the life of faith, it would be impossible 
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to move forward as a nation.  But if the Germans rejected the idols of blood and soil, 
nation and race, if they created a new sense of community founded on faith in Jesus 
Christ, then there was hope for the future.   Reinold von Thadden-Trieglaff expressed 
these sentiments quite clearly in an early report on plans for the 1950 Kirchentag in 
Essen.  After the surveying all of the problems that plagued postwar German society, he 
argued: 
We are convinced that the German inclination toward “self-centeredness,” 
isolation, and passivity can only be overcome through a new experience of 
community life.  This can only come about through active contact with the life of 
the Christian churches, where the power to fill the great vacuum of the present 
and to stifle the present day crisis-atmosphere can be found.  Perhaps it is only by 
these means that Germany can again find its place in the community of nations, 
contributing to the religious, economic, social, and international reconstruction of 
the world.2 
 
At Kirchentag meetings throughout the 1950s, Protestant leaders pursued this task, 
offering Christian faith and Christian community as substitutes for the dangerous 
nationalism of the past. 
Beyond this basic agreement, however, church leaders were deeply divided on 
questions of national identity.  More conservative Protestants, like Otto Dibelius, the 
Bishop of Berlin, continued to operate within the old National Protestant framework.  To 
Dibelius and others who shared his perspective, the churches did not stand against the 
nation; they stood for a different, better national tradition.  Adherents of this conservative 
perspective were further divided over the question of Cold War division.  Some like 
Dibelius embraced vehement anti-communism, seeing the West German state as the true 
heir to the German nation and hoping for reunification on West German terms.  Others, 
however, denied that either German state was a true heir to the German nation.  Many of 
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those who argued this way prioritized reunification over the ideological debate between 
communism and western liberal democracy.  And they sought a neutralist “third way” 
between the opposing sides of the Cold War.   
On the opposite side of the political spectrum, members of the church’s radical 
Barthian faction—in keeping with Karl Barth’s own perspective—argued that the 
Prussian national tradition had set the stage for the Nazis.  To the adherents of this 
viewpoint, the National Protestant tradition was a form of idolatry antithetical to true 
Christian faith.  Yet members of the Barthian faction also tended strongly toward Cold 
War neutralism.  This position grew out of a combination of naiveté toward communism 
and high-minded opposition to the assertive policies of the West German government.  
To many Barthians, the western integration and rearmament policies of the West German 
state demonstrated a refusal to learn the lessons of the Second World War.   
Many other church leaders fell between these extremes.  And ordinary members 
of the Protestant churches—while clearly more nationalist than their leaders—reflected 
the same diversity of opinion.  Members of all of these groups might participate in the 
massive all-German rallies sponsored by the Kirchentag.  But they did so for different 
reasons, promoting very different concepts of the church, the nation, and the relationship 
in between. 
 
THE SPIRITUAL AND SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF THE NATION 
Questions of Christian brotherhood and national community were already present 
at the first Kirchentag gathering, the Evangelische Woche of 1949.  At this early 
gathering, discussions of these issues took on a primarily spiritual and religious focus and 
were characterized by a large degree of agreement between speakers representing a 
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variety of political viewpoints.  All could agree on some level with Heinrich Held, the 
president of the Church of the Rhineland, when he argued that the foundation of 
Protestant public activity was the work of Christ, referencing the Stuttgart Declaration of 
Guilt as a warning against abandoning God’s truth for the idols of national politics.  And 
no one could really disagree when the elderly pietist Friedrich von Bodelschwingh called 
on his listeners to embrace self-sacrifice and Christian charity.3  Other speakers were 
somewhat more provocative.  Paul Seeger, a veteran of the Protestant worker’s 
movement, made clear in a speech on social responsibility that reconciliation in the social 
sphere required German Protestants to overcome their middle-class character, concerning 
themselves with the circumstances of workers and other social outsiders.  And Gustav 
Heinemann argued that Christians were called to build bridges between the conflicting 
parties in international politics.4   
Heinrich Albertz, the refugee minister of Lower Saxony, and one of very few 
Protestants in the Social Democrat (SPD) leadership, was more provocative in his 
arguments.  Albertz combined these social and international understandings of 
reconciliation in a thinly veiled appeal for Christian brotherhood against the hypocritical 
actions of the CDU.  To Albertz, the war and its aftermath posed two major problems for 
German society.  First, it had led to greater social inequality.  Sharp differences had 
emerged between those who had lost their property and those who had not, between the 
impoverished refugees flooding into West German states and those who were already 
comfortably settled.  The war had also divided the German people into two opposing 
Cold War camps.  The churches, and all Protestant Christians, were called to overcome 
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their own disappointment and bitterness, taking responsibility to resolve these problems.  
To Albertz the solutions to both of these problems were linked.  The sooner the Federal 
Republic could integrate refugees into society, offering generous social help, the easier it 
would be for them to renounce violent programs for the restoration of their former lands.  
This, in turn, would alleviate tensions between the East and the West, making 
reunification more likely.  Here Albertz engaged in direct political polemic, attacking the 
CDU and its leaders, whose “Christian Party” or “Christian Program” did not lead to 
truly Christian actions.5  
Most other Protestant leaders avoided such direct politicization, emphasizing the 
spiritual side of reconciliation and working to overturn existing nationalist attitudes.  
Here the Dutch minister Willem Visser’t Hooft, the general secretary of the World 
Council of Churches, made it clear that—other than the people of Israel—God had not 
chosen any special people.  Instead all people were brothers in Christ, members of a 
church that transcended national boundaries.  But this, he argued, did not mean that 
Christians had policy solutions to all of the world’s problems.  There were no easy 
answers to the divisions between the nations of the world, but Christians could do their 
part by adopting the role of humble servants, rather than self-interested aggressors.  Adolf 
Keller and Hanns Lilje, the Bishop of Hanover, took similar stances, emphasizing the 
unity of Christians in every nation and their common calling to live out Christian 
principles in their individual lives.6 
Many of the same ideas appeared in the public resolutions adopted at the 1949 
Woche.  But these ideas were combined with the much more defensive, national concerns 
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of ordinary Protestant attendees.  Since the final text of these resolutions was prepared by 
a carefully chosen committee, chaired by Heinrich Held, it is likely that their ultimate 
wording was far more temperate and moderate than the views of the average Protestant, 
balancing national concerns with Christian principles of brotherhood and community.  
But these statements still have a rather different emphasis than the speeches of the formal 
program, focusing on German unity and German suffering.  In a relatively mild 
resolution on the upcoming West German Bundestag elections, for example, they drew 
attention to the painful division of the German people, calling on Protestants to vote for 
candidates concerned with the circumstances of the “entire Volk.”  These candidates 
would be concerned with justice and peace “for the afflicted, those who have lost their 
homeland and existence, and for all of the despairing.”  In another resolution, a “Request 
for a Just Peace Settlement,” they were much less equivocal.  Here they complained of 
the millions of Germans driven from their homes in the East, prisoners of war laboring in 
prison camps far from home, and the policy of disassembling German industrial plants, 
which made any economic recovery impossible.  Most of all, they complained: “A 
dividing line runs through the middle of the heart of our Volk, which yearns in its 
brokenness for a common order of justice and freedom.”7 
The multifaceted question of community—with its spiritual, social, and 
international components—took center stage in the planning of the 1950 Kirchentag in 
Essen.  Yet the “German Question” was also not entirely absent.  Numerous committee 
members emphasized that the Kirchentag also had an important role to play in 
maintaining relations between Protestants in the East and West.  Herbert Dost, a Leipzig 
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deacon, called for the greatest possible inclusion of participants from the “Soviet Zone,” 
“if it really to be a Kirchentag for the entirety of German Protestantism.”  And at the 
suggestion of Heinrich Held, a leader in the Church of the Rhineland, it was resolved that 
the Kirchentag gathering of the following year would be held somewhere in the East.8  
But the focus was distinctly on the domestic, social aspects of Christian and national 
community. 
Workgroup discussions on how to rescue the German “Homeland” [Heimat] 
emphasized the substitution of Christian charity for revanchist politics.  Here Heinrich 
Albertz again took the most political tone, repeating his charges from the preceding year 
in a complex mixture of pacifist politics and national stridency.  In this workgroup 
devoted to saving the homeland, Albertz stated unequivocally that the German homeland 
was not limited to the Federal Republic, but extended into the “Soviet zone” and beyond 
to the territories taken away after the Second World War.  Albertz strongly condemned 
the injustice of this situation.  But he argued that military force would not restore these 
territories to Germany.  “Germany can in no way be defended by a security budget, 
rearmament, or similar measures,” he claimed, “on the contrary, it can only be defended 
through social justice.”  Only by creating an attractive, socially just society could West 
Germans prepare the way for eventual unity with the communist East.9   
While Albertz saw the domestic and inter-German sides of community as closely 
related, other speakers focused on the concrete problems of social integration in the West.  
Many sought to spiritualize these problems.  Dr. Elisabeth Pfeil, for example, spoke of 
the psychological trauma of the uprooted refugees and the difficulties they had in 
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responding to the uncertainty of their new lives.  Recognizing that full integration of 
these refugees would be difficult and would take time, she called upon her listeners to 
help create a “community that reaches beyond the bonds of human society.”  “Here,” she 
continued, “I am speaking of our community before God, about our community in Jesus 
Christ.”  Elisabeth Stehfen, too, spoke of isolation felt by so many in postwar Germany.  
“At its foundation,” she asked, “behind all of their complaints and demands, is there not a 
profound desire for homeland, for love, for security in a community or with people who 
are ready to really help carry their burdens?”  In the bigger picture, she continued, all 
humans were refugees from paradise, but Christ had offered access to humanity’s 
“ultimate homeland [Urheimat], to security, to genuine community.”  The solution here 
was not entirely otherworldly, however.  The church had a concrete role to play.  German 
Christians needed to overcome the sentimentality and middle-class moralizing of the past, 
becoming active in the practical everyday life of their communities and recognizing their 
call to missions.10   
In another speech, Klaus von Bismarck tried to move these ideas beyond the 
purely spiritual realm without engaging in the symbolic pacifism and neutralism of the 
Barthians.  Christians in postwar Germany had a duty, he argued, to direct the vision of 
their suffering fellow humans to the cross of Christ.  And they had charitable 
responsibilities.  But beyond these, they were also called to involvement in the complex 
workings of West German social policy.  Like Albertz, Bismarck argued that social 
justice was a precondition for peace, and he encouraged his listeners to work for a just 
social order.  But he also made clear: “I personally distrust all overly categorical 
resolutions, including those for peace.  I am personally convinced that we Christians—if 
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we soberly contemplate our situation—have no reason to speak fearfully of the threat of 
the coming German rearmament.”  Instead of focusing on the fight against rearmament, 
Christians needed to work in co-responsibility with their non-Christian colleagues to 
create a better society.11 
Otto Dibelius, the conservative bishop of Berlin, concluded this workgroup with a 
sermon that emphasized the same themes of social integration and peace that had 
dominated the earlier speeches.  He began by arguing that the very idea of homeland was 
threatened by the upheavals and displacements, the “injustice and violence” of the 
preceding years.  But homeland was a gift from God, something that all people were 
supposed to have.  To rob someone of his or her homeland was a sin, and the churches 
had a duty to confront this evil.  But the answer was not violence or war.  Instead, he 
argued: “God’s mercy requires that we provide a homeland for those who have lost 
theirs.”  The church needed to oppose revenge and to support social welfare measures 
like the “Equalization of Burdens law” of the Adenauer government.  Instead of agitating 
for lost territories, German Protestants needed to let refugees know that they were 
“citizens with equal rights and beloved cohabiters with God and man everywhere in the 
German Fatherland.”12 
 
CHRISTIAN BROTHERHOOD AND POLITICAL SYMBOLISM 
Discussions of brotherhood and community changed their focus with the first 
truly all-German Kirchentag in Berlin.  This gathering marked a shift away from spiritual 
and practical discussions of social integration in the FRG, toward sweeping national and 
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religious symbolism.  Although the Kirchentag leadership had previously resolved to try 
to hold the 1951 gathering somewhere in the GDR, it is clear that many leaders such as 
Reinold von Thadden and General Secretary Heinrich Giesen had mixed feelings about 
this prospect.  Instead, they pushed strongly for a 1951 gathering in Stuttgart, where it 
would be possible to continue their critical discussion of West German political and 
social issues.  Apart from the enormous physical and financial burdens of carrying out a 
Kirchentag in Berlin, they feared that any Kirchentag in the East would lose its ability to 
deal concretely with policy problems, becoming dangerously politicized by the charged 
Cold War environment.  On the other side stood Protestants of both Barthian and 
conservative nationalist persuasions and a great deal of the leadership of the Protestant 
Church (EKD).  Each of these groups supported an East-West Kirchentag for different 
reasons, but all emphasized the gathering’s symbolic importance more than its 
intellectual content.  To Barthians and other Cold War neutralists, a Berlin gathering 
would signify that Germans in the West had not forgotten or abandoned their brothers in 
the East.  It would also be an opportunity to contrast Christian brotherhood and 
reconciliation with military rearmament and Cold War division.  To anti-communists in 
the Federal Republic, it provided an opportunity to embarrass the Socialist Unity Party 
(SED) that governed the East.  To church leaders, it was a chance to rally the Protestant 
youth in the Eastern zone, strengthening their faith in the face of communist 
persecution.13 
With the decision to hold the 1951 Kirchentag in Berlin, the Präsidium was 
unwillingly dragged into the complexities of Cold War geopolitics.  Negotiating with the 
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leaders of the German Democratic Republic, they were only able to gain permission for a 
gathering in both sides of Berlin if Barthians such as Niemöller and Heinemann, who had 
spoken out prominently against West German rearmament, were given key positions on 
the Kirchentag program.  Beyond such specific agreements, there also loomed the threat 
of last minute harassment or cancellation if the tone became too critical of the East 
German regime.  Fearing that the Kirchentag might wholly capitulate to East German 
demands, becoming a mouthpiece for communist peace propaganda, the government of 
the FRG also became involved, offering secret financial support for the gathering in 
return for political balance.14 
The divide on national questions between ordinary Protestant opinion and that of 
the Kirchentag leadership was apparent once again in 1951.  The formal program placed 
an emphasis first and foremost on the religious concept of Christian brotherhood, not on 
national unity.  Leaders repeatedly reminded the public that the Kirchentag was not a 
political gathering.  When questions of nationalism arose in the various speeches and 
sermons it was usually so the speaker could reject the extremes of the past or suggest a 
better Christian vision for the present.  Only occasionally, in the larger gatherings, did 
speakers walk a fine line between Christian and national expressions of brotherhood.  In 
the question and answer periods after the formal speeches, however, it was an entirely 
different matter.  Here the full breadth of Protestant opinion becomes apparent, ranging 
from radical Barthian pacifism and even pro-Communist sentiment, on one side, through 
the angry nationalist rejection of German division, to strident anti-communist attacks on 
Niemöller and Heinemann as shills for the SED. 
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In their first venture into the geopolitical arena, most Kirchentag and church 
leaders remained cautious.  At a press reception before the Kirchentag, Thadden 
acknowledged that the 1951 gathering was something of a “political sensation.”  But he 
also issued a word of caution: “We are also clear that the Kirchentag will bring us into 
dangerous proximity with various propagandistic tendencies and that, perhaps, there will 
be attempts here and there to see political direction in words and thought processes that 
are intended to be understood in decidedly Christian terms.”15  Against those who were 
tempted to look for such meaning, Thadden argued that the real “sensation” of the 
Kirchentag was to be found in its meaning for German Protestantism, holding its first all-
German meeting since the end of the war, and in the ways that German Protestants were 
reforming themselves and rethinking their place in the postwar world.16 
Thadden’s warning was repeated by Otto Dibelius, who stated: “We will be sorry 
if this Kirchentag is forced too much into the political sphere.”  Yet, in a subtle jab at the 
SED, Dibelius also emphasized the spontaneous character of the gathering and the 
atmosphere of intellectual freedom that would predominate.  Eberhard Stammler, of the 
Kirchentag publicity committee, informed the press that they would soon witness an 
opening worship service that would include leaders of both German states, but he 
cautioned against reading too much political significance into this contact.  The 
Kirchentag was not making a statement about international politics, but about “Christian 
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obedience.”  It was being held in Berlin as a symbol of the religious unity of German 
Protestants, but it was not a political gesture.17 
Thadden reemphasized this clear rejection of political symbolism at the 
Kirchentag’s opening assembly, drawing attention instead the brotherhood of all 
Christians and the importance of brotherhood in developing a strong community of 
Christian laity.  Other speakers, however, walked a fine line between the spiritual and the 
political.  Otto Dibelius, for example, argued that German Protestants had a duty to build 
bridges between different classes, political groups, religious confessions, and also, 
between the people of the East and West.  He went on to simultaneously affirm that 
Germans were members of one nation, with a common inheritance, while also 
emphasizing that Christian love, not national feeling, compelled them to come together. 
We build these bridges because we know that we must get across from one shore 
to the other, not just because we are members of one nation and bearers of its 
inheritance, from which we cannot be separated without being made wholly 
rootless.  We build them because the distress of the world can no longer bear that 
people stand in opposition—in ugly antagonism—to one other.18 
 
The former privy councilor Reinhold Quaatz, a lawyer who had been instrumental 
in the behind the scenes work of drawing the Kirchentag to Berlin, also spoke of the 
importance of the city as “the center of the German Reich,” now “a shadow, a memory, . . 
. a city without future.”  But he argued that the real importance of a Kirchentag in Berlin 
was that this was the location of the greatest hardship and distress in Germany.  Quaatz 
claimed that he was referring here to “social distress,” but national division—the 
“distress of the German Volk”—was the theme to which he continually returned.  In a 
typical passage, he argued: “We see before us a Volk in confusion, a Volk in perplexity, a 
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Volk divided by the violence of its powerful masters.  What is even worse, we fall into 
the danger that one brother will become the enemy of the other.  We fall into the danger 
that the settled borders run through the middle of our hearts.”  Here Quaatz brought 
together the religious and political elements of his thought.  Repentance and submission 
to God, he argued, were the only ways to truly reconstruct the German nation, and only 
this reconstruction of Germany would allow the reconstruction of a new Europe.19 
This opening gathering also presented several symbolic challenges to older 
nationalist ideas.  Guest speakers included representatives of German Catholicism and the 
German free churches, an industrial worker, and a “negro pastor” from the Ivory Coast, 
who emphasized Christian brotherhood across traditional lines of division.  Provost 
Heinrich Grüber of Berlin’s Marienkirche, a former inmate of Sachsenhausen and 
Dachau, also reminded his listeners of German war guilt and the need to seek 
reconciliation with the peoples of the world.  Looking back to 1945, he reminded:  
After a war whose guilt lies heavily upon us and whose horrors continue to 
tremble within us, our Christian brothers from abroad came to us.  People whose 
nations had just been at war stood together before God in common adoration. . . . 
We were conscious of God’s name, kingdom, and will, and therefore were aware 
of the brotherly solidarity of those who break bread, who forgive and help to carry 
one another’s burdens, and who struggle against evil.   
 
In the same way that Christian brothers had gathered to offer solidarity and forgiveness 
after the war, the Kirchentag was to symbolize the solidarity of German Protestants, of 
Berliners, of Germans, and of all humanity.20 
The bible lessons for the week, led by the theology professor Martin Fischer, 
emphasized the importance of Christian brotherhood and reconciliation in a divided 
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world.  Here Fischer warned Germany’s “lost sheep” to await the salvation offered by the 
good shepherd   Only this would keep them safe against “wolves” like the Nazis who had 
argued “You are nothing, the Volk is everything” or the communists, who argued “You 
are nothing, the production process is everything.”21  But Christians were not called to 
take sides in the ideological conflicts of the world.  Rather then engaging in anti-
communist activities, they had a duty to offer Christian love as an alternative to war, 
propaganda, and self-justification.   
The church has to remain on the fence between all sides, as long as all sides are 
led by a self-justification that can no longer receive or offer forgiveness.  Long 
before the world wars began, the world had already opted for war in the 
newspapers.  Long before the world murdered with weapons, it murdered with 
words, since dishonor sets the stage for murder.22   
 
Rather than letting themselves be dragged into this cycle of evil, Christians were called to 
live according to different ideals of brotherhood and mutual service. 
Even at the Kirchentag men’s gathering, which brought together Hermann Ehlers, 
the CDU Bundestag president, and such prominent Barthian critics of the CDU as Gustav 
Heinemann, Martin Niemöller, and Heinrich Grüber, the emphasis was firmly upon the 
Christian principles both sides could endorse.  While Heinemann and the other Barthians 
called for Christian unity between the East and West, rejecting the antagonistic pattern of 
the world, Ehlers defended foreign policy realism.  But Ehlers also agreed on the need to 
take the other side seriously, without resorting to propagandistic slogans.  And, although 
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he defended both Cold War antagonists’ rights to have and promote their own positions, 
he was careful to renounce violence as a means of settling such disputes.23 
In the formal speeches of the workgroups, too, the emphasis remained primarily 
spiritual, frustrating those who wanted greater political confrontation.  Some planners had 
hoped that the Kirchentag would emphasize national themes.  As one member of the 
church workgroup complained: “In the presentations, ‘Volk and Fatherland’ are too little 
emphasized.  Brotherhood for the salvation of Volk and Fatherland; the masses will 
respond to that.”  But this was a minority viewpoint among the Kirchentag leadership.  In 
response to this suggestion, Heinrich Giesen retorted sharply: “We want to be careful in 
our use of political formulations.  It is not Jesus’ promise that he will bring back the 
Fatherland with its old borders from Lorraine to Königsberg.  The bible says nothing 
about that.”24   
If anything the formal presentations of the church workgroup were critical of this 
“Volk and Fatherland” way of thinking.  Gustav Heinemann’s speech, in particular, on 
various misunderstandings of the church, sharply criticized the church’s past role in 
Germany, especially its “state and conservative middle-class ties.”25  This speech 
received a generally positive reception in the spiritually focused church workgroup.  
Commenters praised Heinemann’s words as an indication of how far the church had 
come in the last twenty years, re-emphasized the brotherhood of believers from all 
nations, and, frequently, endorsed the Barthian call for German unity and peace.  Another 
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speaker, the Hamburg missions director Walter Freytag, endorsed the centrality of 
German national identity, but only to promote the idea of collective guilt.  Declaring that 
the nation would be judged by God for its sins, Freytag argued: “The church must not 
exhaust itself in the negative prevention of anti-Christian nationalism, instead it must 
defeat it inside and out through the power of Christ’s spirit, pointing our Volk in a new 
direction toward renewal through human worth.”26 
The formal presentations in the workgroup devoted to politics and brotherhood in 
the Volk dealt mainly with questions of Christian political life in the two Germanys, 
especially questions of state power and resistance.  Only one speech in this workgroup—
given by the popular author Willy Kramp—touched directly on questions of the German 
nation.   Substituting Christian faith for nationalism, Kramp argued that the German 
people had been seduced away from God by the “idols of blood, soil, and national 
egotism,” which had led to the terrible catastrophe of the preceding years.  The churches 
had also been too middle-class, ignoring the needs of many Germans and uncritically 
accepting the traditional alliance of throne and altar.  But after the war, he continued, God 
had given them “the grace of a new beginning.”  Rather than serving any earthly power 
or force, they were now called to serve God, experiencing freedom and transformation 
through the power of Christ.27 
Yet the comments of workgroup attendees make it clear that questions of 
nationalism and national community were on peoples’ minds.  Martin Richter, a member 
of the CDU-East and the mayor of Dresden, suggested that distress and evil in Germany 
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were not just matters of state power, as most of the speakers had implied, but were 
closely tied to the question of what would become of the German Volk.28  Julius Nimpte 
from Brandenburg, spoke against West German rearmament on nationalist grounds, 
arguing: “I know only one fatherland, and that is Germany.  My heart can only be 
devoted to the whole state, not just one part of it.”29  Theodor Winzer, a town councilman 
from Happenheim, argued that the lesson to be learned from the two world wars was that 
“against Christ every people will tear itself apart.”  He went on to argue that the only way 
to prevent the self-destructive tendencies of the nations of the world from ending in 
catastrophe was to embrace Christian political involvement, supporting Christian parties 
like the CDU.30  Many others sought to spiritualize the problem, promoting Christian 
love as a sort of Third Way in international politics.31  And Pastor Johannes Müller of 
Berlin-Friedenau presented a formal declaration on the international situation, calling on 
the Allies to allow Germans to work out their own problems without interference, 
rejecting propaganda and violence, and calling on Germans to work for the brotherhood 
of all peoples.32  Hermann Ehlers, the CDU Bundestag president, responded to these 
comments by emphasizing the complexity of geopolitics, endorsing calls for Christian 
intercession through prayer, and warning against Christian arrogance in the face of the 
problems of the world.33 
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A SELF-CRITICAL TURN 
The 1952 Kirchentag was held in Stuttgart in an atmosphere of national 
disappointment.  While the Berlin Kirchentag of the preceding year had been a massive 
celebration of German Protestant unity, the crowds at Stuttgart would consist primarily of 
West Germans.  Adding to the bitterness of this renewed separation was the fact that the 
GDR regime had invalidated the travel permits of 20,000 East German Protestants—
including several speakers—only weeks before the Kirchentag was to meet.  Previously 
skeptical of East-West symbolism at the Kirchentag, Thadden responded to these 
circumstances—and the vicious press attacks of leading Barthians, who claimed the 
Kirchentag leadership had unnecessarily antagonized the GDR regime—by calling for 
political realism.34  At the same time, he began to accept the Kirchentag’s role as a 
symbolic island of East-West unity and reconciliation.  Pointing to the threat of self-
destruction posed by the East-West tensions in Europe, he argued that this necessitated 
close cooperation with the “eastern world”  “This,” he explained, “is the apostolic 
function of the German Protestant Kirchentag in the middle of our divided land; we must 
suffer together, fight together, and believe together across these tensions.”35  Still, to 
Thadden, this duty was primarily spiritual, not political.  As he clarified during the later 
main assembly, the Kirchentag existed to empower Christian laity to spread God’s 
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message of salvation.  They could not refuse this duty with respect to the entire Eastern 
portion of the Volk, for “withholding this message of life would be fratricide.”36  
 Held in the city where the 1945 Stuttgart Declaration of Guilt had been adopted, 
the 1952 Kirchentag dealt extensively with national questions, focusing primarily on the 
burdens of German guilt and the difficult road forward.  At the main assembly, which 
drew over 200,000 people and was carried on all of the major radio stations, Hendrik 
Kraemer, a Dutch representative of the World Council of Churches, argued that “radical 
self-criticism” was a Christian duty.  Here he pointed to the work of the Stuttgart 
Declaration of Guilt:  
It was an ecumenical act of guilt-confession, of forgiving one another before God 
and the world.  It was, thus, a healing act.  Has it been granted to the German 
churches and the Kirchentag, to today think, live, and act out of this healing unity 
of confession, forgiveness, and the praise of God?  This is God’s will!37 
 
Gustav Heinemann followed this appeal with his own call to take the lessons of 
Stuttgart seriously.  Here he clarified that the Stuttgart Declaration had not been an 
admission of guilt on behalf of the German nation.  Instead it had been recognition that 
German Protestants bore guilt for their sins of omission in “the years before the attacks 
on other peoples and during the eradication of political opponents, Jews, and the so-
called lives unworthy of life.”  This had been a powerful act of ecumenical reconciliation 
at the time, but it didn’t settle the issue of guilt once and for all.  Rather than continuing 
to justify themselves and calculating the war guilt of both sides, German Protestants 
needed to take concrete actions to promote peace in the present day.  For Heinemann, this 
meant a clear denunciation of West German rearmament.  And while he acknowledged 
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that Protestants were too divided to speak with one voice on this issue, he urged his 
listeners to renounce propaganda and hate and to work for peace between the nations.38 
While Heinemann called Protestants to take a political stance against the 
nationalism of the past, Thadden, Lilje, and Heinrich Giesen promoted a spiritual 
understanding of the Volk, wherein Christian brotherhood served as a sort of replacement 
for nationalism.  Otto Dibelius once again stretched this spiritual notion almost to the 
breaking point, moving freely in his closing prayer between spiritual and national 
conceptions of homeland.  Thanking God for the unity that he had given German 
Christians in the East and West in “a community . . . that nothing can tear apart,” 
Dibelius pleaded that German prisoners of war might be allowed “to return in this hour to 
a renewed Fatherland” and that refugees, who had lost their land when driven out of the 
former Eastern territories, might “attain the object of their longing.”39 
In the workgroup on the church, the main focus was again on the idea of the 
church as a spiritual “homeland.”  Here Helmut Küppers of Magdeburg, recalled the role 
the church had played during the postwar breakdown of German society.  In a world full 
of despair and hatred, the church had become a place of acceptance and forgiveness.  
Several former soldiers complained in the discussion period that this ideal had not been 
fully realized in their own experiences.  They had returned and found themselves 
unwelcome reminders of a war that people wanted to forget.40  But Gisela Pfeiffer of 
Göttingen expressed the workgroup’s ideal vision of the church, when she argued: “For 
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us, church became a homeland, where we moved from the total solidarity of guilt into the 
community of forgiveness.”41 
Guilt was also a major focus of the political workgroup, where the question of 
German-Jewish relations was directly addressed for the first time at the Kirchentag.  Ever 
since plans had been announced for the Evangelische Woche in 1949, Adolf Freudenberg, 
a founder of the German Protestant Committee for Service to Israel, had been lobbying 
the Kirchentag leadership for a more direct consideration of German Protestant guilt and 
responsibility for the Nazi treatment of Jews.42  Freudenberg had hoped that the 1949 
Woche might adopt a resolution on this topic and Thadden, agreeing that such a statement 
was long overdue, had encouraged him to draft one for consideration.  But it appears that 
time constraints and different priorities prevented this resolution from ever being 
discussed or voted upon.43  Over the next several years Freudenberg and several of his 
co-workers remained in contact with Thadden and Heinrich Giesen, providing them with 
advice on the contents of the church and political workgroups.  By late 1951 Freudenberg 
and Karl Heinrich Rengstorf were strategizing with Giesen on how to fit the Jewish 
question into the existing Kirchentag program.44   
Their opportunity arrived in 1952 when Otto Küster, a lawyer representing the 
West German government in international negotiations on the topic of restitution to 
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Israel, created a public controversy, resigning his position and condemning the 
government’s position.  Küster argued that economic factors were being weighted too 
heavily in the government’s thinking, while moral considerations were being ignored.  As 
the debate grew more vehement, he also accused the government of harboring anti-
Semites, who failed to understand the importance of restitution.  Eberhard Müller and 
Heinrich Giesen collected the documents related to this controversy, forwarding them to 
the members of the church and political workgroups, who were asked to try to integrate 
them into the program.45 
 They do not appear to have succeeded with regard to the church workgroup.  But 
matters were different in the workgroup on politics, where the Barthian theologian 
Helmut Gollwitzer spoke on foundations of Christian political involvement.  Gollwitzer 
began by reminding his listeners of the horrible events of the preceding years, of the war, 
of forced labor camps, the boycott and gassing of Jews, the expulsion of Poles, and the 
postwar retribution against Germans.  The main question here for the church, he argued, 
was not the question of passivity raised in the Stuttgart Declaration.  Instead it was the 
question of the churches own direct guilt in these events.  “Did they participate in this,” 
he asked, “or did they act completely differently?”  The same question was posed for 
Christians in the present day: would they go along with the world, or follow a different 
plan?46   
Gollwitzer continued by declaring that God was a God of peace, of justice, and of 
forgiveness.  Because God was a God of peace, Christians were called to promote peace 
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in the world.  With regard to West German rearmament, he therefore questioned: 
“Shouldn’t we be concerned that with uniforms and weapons our Volk, still deeply sick, 
will once again be vulnerable to the lurking dangers of revenge, megalomania, the lust for 
power, the violation of peoples, bondage, and inhumanity?”  And he argued that rather 
than obsessing over their own suffering, they should concern themselves with the needs 
of other peoples.47  Because God was a God of justice, German Christians also needed 
“to learn to listen again to the voice of Justice,” creating a German Rechtsstaat.  Finally, 
because God was a God of forgiveness, Germans needed to seek forgiveness for all of 
their past crimes.  They had to seek forgiveness, specifically, from all of the other nations 
that they had wronged, and particularly from Israel.  “Our attitude toward the question of 
guilt,” he concluded, “will determine whether we enter the future as a people that has 
learned its lesson, or as one that has not.”48  
CDU Bundestag president Hermann Ehlers, speaking later in the same 
workgroup, took a surprisingly similar view of German guilt, although he differed on its 
political implications for the present.  He argued here that Germans did not realize the 
full implications of the unjust system of the Nazis, which had infected statesmen, 
generals, judges, policemen, and other officials, causing them to fully dispense with any 
normative standards of justice.  “If we really understood this,” he argued, “we would not 
try so cheaply and superficially to cleanse ourselves what has happened.”49  Ehlers 
proceeded to caution against self-justification, reminding his listeners of German crimes 
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against the Jews, and calling for practical efforts to seek forgiveness.50  Yet he also 
offered hope that God, in his grace, had provided the Germans with a chance for a new 
beginning, a chance to create a new Volk and a new state that would avoid the errors of 
the past.51 
These speeches provoked heated reactions from the gathered crowds.  Many 
endorsed Gollwitzer’s anti-rearmament stance, some because Germany was too sick to 
responsibly remilitarize and some, like the housewife Margarete Redlich, because she 
would rather starve than endure another night of bombing raids.52  Some recalled their 
own experiences as passive observers of Nazi crimes, including the transport of Jews to 
their deaths.53  Many CDU members called for political realism, defending the need for 
West German rearmament.54  Finally, some listeners responded defensively.  As Dr. 
Helene von Watter of Cologne complained:  
It would be unjust only to look now at certain guilty parties. Earlier it was several 
ruling families who were supposed to be the guilty, and now, above all else, it is 
supposed to be those who carried arms.  Don’t forget the victims of the war.  They 
are the ones in every country who were just doing their duty. . . . Let’s also not 
forget the camaraderie of the bomb shelters and the bunkers!  We need Christian 
fidelity to our brothers, but also to our Volk and its past!55 
 
The question of German responsibility for crimes against the Jews was dealt with 
even more directly in a relatively poorly attended meeting of the Committee for Service 
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to Israel, held concurrently with the Kirchentag program.  Here Deacon Hermann Maas 
of Heidelberg supported generous restitution, arguing: “We Germans have to turn around, 
to do penance!  The church has long overlooked this.  Repentance is not the same as 
restitution—before God and man, there is much that cannot be made right.  But humble 
help and sacrifice is possible.”56  Following up on this, Pastor Vogt, from Switzerland, 
also spoke on the need for repentance, arguing for the need to root out anti-Semitism not 
only in the surrounding society, but also in the churches themselves.57 
 
POLITICAL DIVISION 
The Kirchentag gatherings of 1953 and 1954 took place in a rapidly changing 
political context.  In 1953, the Barthian politician Gustav Heinemann, who had resigned 
in 1950 from Adenauer’s cabinet over the issue of rearmament, formed a new All-
German People’s Party (GVP), which campaigned for election almost exclusively on the 
anti-rearmament platform.  Since Heinemann had been heavily involved in the 
Kirchentage of the preceding years and, since German Protestants dissatisfied with the 
CDU formed the bulk of Heinemann’s support, the Kirchentag of 1953 met in an 
environment of considerable political tension.  On a more general level, Protestants were 
beginning by the mid-1950s to more clearly articulate their political differences and to 
gravitate more clearly to one political perspective or another.58  This made it harder than 
ever to maintain the veneer of rhetorical agreement that Protestants had relied upon to 
assert unity at the Kirchentag.  The emphasis was less and less on the spiritual principles 
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upon which all could agree, and more and more on the practical policy differences that 
bitterly divided them.  On the international level, the 1953 workers’ uprising in East 
Berlin further complicated the East-West mediation attempts of Protestants at the 
Kirchentag, causing the anti-communist Right and the neutralist Left to cling ever more 
strongly to their beliefs.  The “Word” of the 1953 Kirchentag might remind Protestants: 
“We may not write off the other as the representative of a foreign interest or follower of a 
hostile ideology.”59  But ever-widening division characterized the Protestant political 
reality.   
These divisions came to fore in 1953 in a portion of the political workgroup’s 
program devoted to the question of “Our Nation among the Nations.”  Martin Niemöller, 
who opened this panel, began by contrasting the ever-present complaints of Germans 
about their treatment at the end of World War II with the German’s own crimes that were 
no longer spoken about.  These crimes had powerful implications for the place of 
Germans in the world today.  Germany could not just seek reconciliation with the nations 
of Western Europe, for they had sinned against the people of the west and the people of 
the east.  Instead, he argued: “We are always caught between the millstones, because we 
owe a debt to both sides and somehow need to make it good to both.”60   
Niemöller turned here to a more detailed explication of this guilt, considering its 
implications for German national identity.  The existence of nations, he argued, was a 
simple fact of history.  But nations were not permanent groupings.  Nations could be born 
and nations could die out.  And they would no longer separate people in the future 
Kingdom of God.  Instead, people were divided into nations as a result of sin.  Yet 
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despite these divisions, people remained ultimately dependant upon each other.  The 
Germans had lost sight of this fact long before the rise of Hitler.  They had been raised in 
a nationalistic climate, “And this nationalism has long been decorated with a religious 
gloriole: were we not the people of Luther, did the world not have us, our religious 
struggles and sufferings, to thank for the Gospel?”  Hitler had not added anything new; he 
had only brought to the surface that which was already there in the hearts of Germans, 
including German Christians.61  Germans had been seduced and had committed horrible 
crimes and now they were living in the disillusionment that followed.   
Yet their past sins gave Germans in the present a special responsibility.  God had 
called them to a special task of international reconciliation. 
It is [God’s] doing—and not ours—that our nation resides in that very part of the 
earth where both people groups oppose each other, where they cannot come to 
any understanding with their irreconcilable positions, and where they threaten the 
peace of the whole world.  That we—only we—completely apart from our own 
designs, live on this border between ‘East’ and ‘West,’ shows us our task. We 
must endeavor to come to an understanding with both sides, and thereby to also 
create an understanding between them, for without such an understanding there 
can be no peaceful coexistence between the nations.  We need to work to make 
our nation a bridge where the peoples of the East and West can meet.  If our 
nation has any task today, it can only be this.62 
 
Ulrich Scheuner, a law professor at the University of Bonn, followed Niemöller’s 
moral appeal with a more academic discussion of the same issues.  Scheuner, like 
Niemöller, argued that the existence of nations was a basic fact of life.  But he added that 
no nation—other than Israel—had been specially chosen by God.  Problems arose when 
the nation became an idol, leading to alienation from God.  As an alternative to this 
temptation, Scheuner argued that the nations of Europe needed to work together for peace 
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and mutual benefit.  This did not mean giving up one’s own national perspective or 
becoming a “world citizen,” but it did require practical cooperation and the building of 
trust.63  Finally, Walter Freytag advocated an involvement in world missions as a way of 
transcending the narrow perspective of the Volk.  The task of missions, he argued, was 
not rooted in some European superiority over the people of Asia or Africa, but was 
instead the manifestation of their Christian duty to love their neighbor.64 
These speeches—and particularly that of Niemöller—provoked a firestorm of 
controversy.  Anti-communists argued that West Germany had a duty to defend itself 
against Bolshevist expansion and territorial aggression and that negotiation with an unjust 
state [Unrechtsstaat] was futile.  One speaker from Kassel went even further, accusing 
Niemöller of engaging Goebbels-like propaganda in his efforts to sell Cold War 
neutralism as an essential Christian teaching.  While Kurt Scharf, the discussion 
moderator, struggled to restore order in the chaos that followed this charge, similar 
objections dominated the remainder of the discussion period.  The workgroup ended in a 
renewed state of uproar when another attendee, Gustav Landau, shifted the focus from 
German guilt to German victimhood.  Taking issue with calls for Germany to make 
restitution for the crimes of the Nazis, Landau suggested it was only fair that the 
Americans make similar restitutions to Germany for the war damage they had done.65   
In his final defense, Niemöller fully retreated from the political into the spiritual 
realm.  It was not his job, he insisted, to give his listeners political advice, or to make 
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political arguments.  He was speaking of Christian principles, of basic Christian 
obedience to the word of God.66  In the workgroup’s concluding panel discussion the 
following day—which Niemöller did not attend—Helmut Gollwitzer continued this 
defense.  Niemöller’s critics, he argued, were acting out of base political motives, 
betraying their Christian beliefs in their treatment of Niemöller.  Niemöller, on the other 
hand, was making the basic spiritual argument that no absolute ideal, whether nationalism 
or socialism could take the place of God.67 
If anything, the atmosphere surrounding the 1954 Kirchentag in Leipzig—the 
only Kirchentag ever held entirely within the GDR—was even more politically charged.  
While its formal program was far more inwardly oriented and spiritual than those of the 
preceding years—marked by an almost conspicuous avoidance of hot political issues—
this Kirchentag, merely by virtue of its location, could not avoid politicization.  When the 
largest crowds that the Kirchentag had yet experienced—more than 650,000 people, 
almost all from the GDR—gathered in the pouring rain for the meeting’s main assembly, 
they were clearly making a statement.  Less triumphal than Berlin, with its confident 
proclamation of Christian brotherhood across the iron curtain, the Leipzig Kirchentag, 
called on these gathered crowds to “Be Joyful in Hope,” even in the face of continual 
setbacks.  As citizens of the GDR, this meant persisting in their faith, even when 
persecuted by the regime.  As Germans, this meant maintaining hope that unification 
might still be possible.  As Heinrich Giesen proclaimed in the “Word” of the Kirchentag: 
“No one knows whether we in the East and West will soon be united.  Perhaps a long, 
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hard way lies ahead.  There is the danger that the one side will collapse in exhaustion, 
while the other will seek only its own security.  We do not want this, we will not allow it.  
We will hold fast to each other.”68 
Both the church and political discussions of this Kirchentag sought to combat the 
utopianism of communism with an increased emphasis on Christian apocalyptic 
teachings.  Hope and salvation—they argued again and again—were not to be found in 
technology or social organization, but only in Christ’s return.  And this knowledge was to 
be the source of courage and steadfastness, whatever persecution or difficulties they 
might face.   
Yet one workgroup discussion, in the normally apolitical workgroup on country 
and village life, generated enormous controversy in both German states.  Speaking on 
property rights, with reference to the collectivization of agriculture in the GDR, Klaus 
von Bismarck managed to offend both sides of the political spectrum.  On the one hand, 
his critical stance toward the GDR’s treatment of its citizens earned him a scorching 
rebuke in Neues Deutschland, the East German state newspaper.  It was his call for 
Christian love and forgiveness, rather then vengeance and revanchism toward Germany’s 
eastern neighbors that created a firestorm in the West. 
Bismarck introduced himself to his audience as an East Elbian Junker and as an 
expellee, driven from his family lands in the East.  Like other refugees, he could be 
tempted to see those now living on his estates as his enemies.  But Christians were not 
compelled to feel this way.  They had the freedom to operate according to a different set 
of principles, seeing all property as God’s, not their own to dispose of as they wished. 
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Yes, beloved brothers and sisters, I am speaking here of private property as 
though it was a concept to be written on the blackboard and explained. 
But at this very moment my heart longs for the meadows, the fields, and 
the trees of my now-Polish-administered homeland in Pomerania.  Speaking 
openly and soberly, I see no way to return without a war and new terrible horrors.  
I will not go back for this price.  It is my personal opinion—that some of you, 
perhaps, can never adopt—that we have no right before God to have or to take 
back that which God has taken away, even if the law of nations or civil law offer 
us a claim.69 
 
In a gathering of people more concerned with East German agricultural policy 
than with the refugee issue, Bismarck’s speech evoked only positive responses during the 
comments period.  After it was carried in the West German press, however, the reaction 
was quite different.  Both Bismarck himself and the Kirchentag leadership were deluged 
with letters from expellee lobbyist groups, attacking his position as an inappropriate 
mixture of theology and politics, presented in an inappropriate forum, and providing 
propaganda fodder for the East German regime.  In a long letter to the Kirchentag leaders 
and to his leading critics, Bismarck responded to these charges.  Like Niemöller, when he 
was attacked for his views on the German place in the world, Bismarck stressed the 
Christian principles that underlay his position.  But unlike Niemöller, Bismarck tried to 
differentiate between spiritual principles on which all Christians should agree and the 
policy implications of those principles, on which there might be significant differences. 
On the purely spiritual level, Bismarck made it clear that he had only argued that 
Christians must learn to live in the tensions between their desires, on the one hand, and 
God’s designs on the other.  Given the events that led to the expulsion of Germans from 
the East, he added, it was important for Christians to consider not only their rights, but 
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the Nazi aggression that was truly to blame for their plight.70  Furthermore, he argued 
that it was the refugee groups, not himself, who were guilty of confusing spiritual a
political principles.  Too often these groups acted as though Christianity lent support to 
nationalist stances, as though God was simply on their side.  They never considered the 
implications of their beliefs for others like the Poles.
nd 
                                                
71  Naturally, Christians were free to 
disagree politically, but they were not free to ignore Christian teachings.  “The freedom 
of the Protestant Christian in politics,” he continued, “lies directly in the tension between 
belonging to a Volk, with its interests, and affirming the obligations of Christian 
conscience.”72   
 
CONCLUSION 
At the Kirchentage of the early 1950s, German Protestants continued the process 
of rethinking their national identity that they had begun during the church struggle of the 
Third Reich and carried further in debates over German guilt and German suffering in the 
late 1940s.  When it came to national questions, most Protestant leaders shared similar 
basic goals.  They hoped to restore the positive elements of national community in 
Germany, fostering social integration, charity work, community-mindedness, and 
national belonging, while simultaneously overcoming the more chauvinistic and 
exclusionary tendencies of earlier German nationalism.  They hoped to both heal and 
restore the German nation, not to supersede or do away with it.   
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At the Kirchentag, Protestants adopted three major overlapping strategies for this 
task.  First and foremost, they sought to substitute religious and spiritual categories of 
belonging—Christian brotherhood, the church as homeland, Christians as a Volk—for the 
“idolatrous,” anti-Christian nationalism of the Nazis.  Nearly all Kirchentag speakers and 
leaders could agree on the importance of this task, which applied their postwar 
evangelistic zeal to “worldly” problems in the hope that Christian faith would renew 
society.  As a result the Kirchentag programs were full of attacks on Nazism as a form of 
spiritual hubris, contrasted with humble Christian obedience to the commands of God.  
On a symbolic level, too, the whole Kirchentag phenomenon was a bold assertion of a 
Christian unity and community that transcended the nation.  Unlike the 
Volksgemeinschaft of the Nazis, this Christian community included all classes, all races, 
and Christian brothers and sister from all nations.  This vision was politically flexible, 
compatible with the views of less extreme nationalists, of moderate conservatives in the 
CDU, and of Barthians who rejected the CDU’s inter-German and foreign policy 
programs.  Its most consistent defenders were moderate conservatives like Eberhard 
Müller, Reinold von Thadden, and Hanns Lilje, who argued that this position was 
politically neutral, but who personally endorsed the “realistic” foreign policy of the CDU.  
This was also the position of major CDU leaders like Hermann Ehlers when the agitation 
of Barthians put them on the defensive, since it implied that Christian principles were 
compatible with a variety of concrete policy programs.   The advocates of other national 
views also saw this as a starting point.  When they found themselves on the defensive, 
they could always fall back on this position, claiming that they were dealing in spiritual 
not political terms. 
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A second strategy for dealing with questions of national identity saw the church 
not only as a substitute for older concepts of nationalism, but as the leading force in the 
creation of a new better national community.  At its most modest this strategy blended 
into the approach described above, but its adherents were often adept at wringing as 
much national meaning as possible out of ostensibly spiritual proclamations.  Few, if any, 
Kirchentag speakers endorsed the extreme nationalism of the refugee and expellee 
groups, whose primary political goal was the return of their former lands in the East.  
Many more harbored strong anti-communist views, but these were modified by their 
desire to operate as freely as possible in the GDR, waxing and waning with the 
vicissitudes of SED church policy.  However, ordinary Kirchentag attendees seem to 
have been somewhat more nationalist than the major church leaders.  As seen in their 
resolutions and in Kirchetag discussion periods, they remained quite concerned about the 
“unfair” policies of the Allies toward Germany, the need to overcome an externally 
imposed German division, and the rights of expellees to return to their lands.  Speakers at 
the Kirchentag rarely endorsed these goals directly, but they allowed their “spiritual” 
statements to indirectly embrace these positions in their conflation of religious and 
national-political principles.  Old national conservatives like Otto Dibelius and Rheinhold 
Quaatz might have embraced very different Cold War politics—anti-communism for 
Dibelius and neutralism for Quaatz—but both were guilty of this approach.  Indirectly, 
speeches like theirs held out hope to their listeners that the churches would take the lead 
in defending German national values against the changing world order. 
Finally, members of the Barthian faction, particularly in the circle surrounding 
Martin Niemöller, took the substitution of spiritual for national principles one step 
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further.  They argued that the only way to overcome the idols of the nation, which had led 
the German people into rebellion against God, was to embrace wholesale national 
contrition for their past misdeeds.  It was not enough to get rid of older nationalist 
concepts; Germans had to embrace their new special role as a people devoted to making 
up for their past, assuming a leading role in the reconciliation of all peoples and nations.  
As a result, they emphasized German guilt for the crimes of the Nazis, at times even 
accusing the churches and their members of complicity.  This view of special German 
guilt is also what led them to spearhead the anti-rearmament campaign in West Germany.  
And it played a major role in their rejection of conservative West German anti-
communism, since the communists, while imperfect, were carrying out God’s 
punishment of the German people.  Ironically, these beliefs could themselves border on 
nationalism at times, since they asserted a special German place in the world and a 
special German mission.  In many ways, this was simply the mirror image of earlier 
national Protestant views, a sort of negative nationalism.  According to this way of 
thinking, if Germans wanted their nation back, they needed to atone for their sins.  Then 
God might return what they had lost.  This message allowed Barthians to tap into the 
same nationalist tendencies they claimed to oppose—national pride, a German-centered 
view of world politics, the desire for reunification—when they sought support for their 
own political positions. 
As the 1950s progressed the political disagreements between these groups became 
more and more difficult to ignore.  The desire to present a common spiritual front had 
made overt political conflict less common at the first several Kirchentage, but the 
Kirchentag’s entrance into Cold War politics with the 1951 gathering in Berlin opened 
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the door to greater politicization.  In addition to the politicization of the Kirchentag itself, 
Protestant political beliefs, thrown into disarray by the experiences of dictatorship, war, 
and defeat, had begun to restabilize by the mid-1950s.  No longer as disillusioned and 
confused by the postwar political landscape, Protestant Kirchentag attendees increasingly 
identified themselves with the fixed political programs and agendas of existing political 
parties.  Rather than just Protestants, they were Christian Democrats, members of the All-
German Peoples’ Party, even, in a few instances, Social Democrats.  They could often 
still agree on basic religious principles, but their focus was shifting from these 
agreements to the areas where their political views diverged.  The question was no longer 
how to avoid the politicization of their religious beliefs.  Instead they would have to learn 
to manage and live with such political conflict. 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4 
 
 PUBLIC RESPONSIBILITY AND PROTESTANT POLITICS 
 
From its first meeting in 1949, one of the major tasks of the Kirchentag was to 
encourage German Protestants to embrace “public responsibility,” taking an active role in 
addressing the social and political problems of postwar German life.  This had been one 
of the primary reasons that Reinold von Thadden-Trieglaff had called the Kirchentag into 
existence.  And it remained at the center of his thought throughout the 1950s.  Addressing 
this task at the opening of the Stuttgart Kirchentag in 1952, Thadden reminded his 
audience of the urgent need for Protestant political activity.  In the middle of “the most 
difficult economic, social, political, and international questions,” he argued, it was not 
enough to offer only spiritual and charitable help.  Above and beyond these vital tasks, 
Protestants also had a duty to take their faith seriously in the political sphere. 
If we Protestant congregations can succeed in slowly becoming more mature, in 
freeing ourselves from our usual state of dependence, in courageously formulating 
and standing behind our own statements of faith, then the civic community, that 
is, the city and state, will doubtless benefit.  Then we will gradually overcome the 
fatal weakness in our postwar rebuilding efforts, the lack of inwardly independent 
persons endowed with their own judgment and with faith-inspired civil 
courage….For genuine, selfless, and courageous service to our people and to the 
nations can only be truly learned by following Christ.1 
 
The renewal of faith, in other words, was a necessary foundation for the renewal of 
public life.  And the postwar political system could only succeed if Christians embraced 
the call to faith-inspired political activity. 
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Thadden was not alone in these views.  Many Germans had reacted to the 
experiences of the Nazi dictatorship, the war, and defeat with profound political 
disillusionment, greeting postwar rebuilding efforts with indifference and resignation.  
But the leaders of both the Catholic and Protestant churches worked hard to combat this 
perspective.  Particularly in the Federal Republic, they saw the postwar reconstruction as 
a new opportunity for the churches to take a leading role in public life.  And they 
promoted “public responsibility” and faith-inspired political activity as important 
Christian duties.  At the Kirchentag, Protestant leaders were nearly unanimous in these 
convictions.  Indeed, many went even further, seeing the “public responsibility” of 
Protestant Christians as a potential foundation for the creation of a unified Protestant 
political ideology.  By mobilizing members of the Protestant churches under a common 
political banner, they hoped to actively transform postwar German society in accordance 
with Christian principles.  And they often viewed political differences within the 
churches as dangerous signs of political weakness. 
At the same time, however, postwar Protestants found themselves deeply divided 
over many political issues.  All could agree on the need for a new form of faith-inspired 
political activity.  But they disagreed sharply about what this meant in practice.  To many 
more conservative Protestants, especially those in the CDU/CSU, Christian political 
activity was a matter of defending the rights and privileges of the institutional churches.  
It involved the promotion of Christian social and moral teachings.  And, with the 
escalation of the Cold War, it came to include the task of defending the “Christian West” 
against the forces of “godless Bolshevism.”  To others, especially members of the 
Barthian faction, Christian political activity was much more personal and much more 
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limited in scope.  Drawing on their experiences in church struggle, many Barthians 
argued that Christian political activity was primarily a matter of standing firm in one’s 
religious convictions against the claims of every political ideology.  The Christian had a 
political duty to resist every political idol: the idols of Nazism and communism, but also 
the idol of capitalism and even the ideology of the “Christian West” itself.  Many other 
Protestants found themselves somewhere between the extremes of Christian Democratic 
self-assertion and Barthian self-criticism.  And even within each of these camps, 
Protestants were still divided by a variety of other political questions.  What economic 
and social policies should the churches promote?  What was the right attitude toward 
social modernization?  What would Christian politics look like under a communist 
dictatorship?  And how would they be different in a modern liberal democracy? 
Political discussions at the Kirchentag meetings of the early 1950s were marked 
by tensions between the desire for political unanimity and unavoidable fact of political 
difference.  At the earliest Kirchentag gatherings differences remained muted.  Speakers 
focused on areas where everyone could agree, emphasizing general principles and 
working together to combat political disillusionment.  Over time, however, as political 
opinions within the churches became more fragmented, and as political differences 
became more entrenched, these disagreements became harder to ignore.  By the middle of 
the 1950s, Protestants at the Kirchentag were forced to shift their focus away from 
forging a unified political program, acknowledging and learning to live with some degree 
of political pluralism. 
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LAYING THE FOUNDATION 
As we have already seen, the topic of “public activity” had a central place on the 
program of the 1949 Protestant Woche.  Nearly every speaker at this gathering 
encouraged German Protestants to take an active part in the political and social problems 
of the day.  Political differences between members of the Barthian faction and more 
conservative Protestants remained relatively muted, more differences in emphasis than 
real political substance.  And most political discussions included the keys ideas from both 
of these perspectives, combining calls for public responsibility with warnings against the 
danger of political idols. 
Speaking on the “Foundations of Protestant Activity,” for example, the Barthian 
church leader Heinrich Held called on his listeners to embrace active political 
involvement, rejecting the “pious” tendency to withdraw from the public life.   As Held 
explained: “[Christ] is not just Lord of the church, but also Lord of the world.”  This 
meant that Christians had a responsibility to carry out God’s work in every area of public 
life, and they had a duty to hold the state to God’s higher law.  “This,” he explained, “is 
why the church needs to remember the state, and it is why church members need to enter 
into the political parties.”  Yet Held also argued against politicizing the churches, or 
committing them uncritically to any one political ideology. 
We must model our activity after God’s activity.  We cannot uncritically affirm 
politics or economics, democracy or socialism, culture or the Christian West, or 
accept them as the ultimate good. . . . Ideas, programs, and worldviews cannot and 
must not serve as the catalyst for Protestant activity.  They are opinions and 
interpretations that deserve their due.  But Protestant activity begins by taking 
God’s activity seriously.2 
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In another speech, Paul Seeger, a CDU member and a leader in the Protestant 
worker’s movement, made a similar appeal for “public responsibility.”  He began by 
detailing the history and importance of the Protestant worker’s movement, urging the 
churches to overcome their historical middle class character.  And he went on to call on 
his listeners to take an active role in politics.  “To us and to our people,” he argued, “it is 
not a matter of indifference who leads our political parties, who is active as a deputy on 
the state and federal levels, who is on the boards of the unions, or on the factory 
councils.”  Instead, he continued: “In all of these divisions of public service, we need 
Protestant men and women of conviction, people who have a clear social and economic 
foundation rooted in Christian responsibility.”  This did not mean, he conceded, that 
Protestants needed to all belong to the same political party.  But, promoting Christian 
Democratic anti-communism, Seeger strongly encouraged cooperation between 
Protestant and Catholic workers, who needed to unite in defense of the “culture of the 
Christian West” against the common threat of “Bolshevism.”3 
Following Seeger, Gustav Heinemann, the mayor of Essen and a member of the 
church’s Barthian faction, offered a more self-critical version of Christian Democratic 
politics.  Like Seeger, Heinemann called for his listeners to take an active role in political 
life.  But he rooted this call in a much more direct and principled defense of democracy.  
He began with a basic assertion: the time of the alliance of throne and altar was past.  The 
churches were no longer subject to the rule of the state; but Protestants had been slow to 
recognize this fact.  “Are we clear,” he argued, “that our state has become a democratic 
state?  It is up to us what happens next!  Or do we have doubts that our generation has 
been charged to take up the tasks that lie at our feet?”  The German people, he continued, 
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had been given the “grace of a zero hour,” a new beginning, but now they had to decide 
how to move forward.  God had equipped them for democratic politics, given them many 
gifts that could be put to the service of a new democratic state.  Protestants understood 
the true value and worth of the individual human being.  They had been given the 
capacity for political and social responsibility.  They had special religious insight into the 
human character.  They enjoyed true Christian hope.  They had a special God-given 
capacity for justice and for love.  And they had a proper understanding of the limits of 
state authority.  And all of these things put them in a unique position with regard to the 
state.  Their task was not simply to support the existing political authorities, but to hold 
them accountable to God’s higher law.  Rather than serving as automatic supporters of 
the state, as they had in the past, Protestants needed to be a democratic “counterweight” 
to overreaching political authority.4   
The 1950 Kirchentag in Essen was less overtly political than 1949.  It was also far 
more conservative in tone.  No one workgroup was devoted specifically to the issues of 
politics or public responsibility.  However, the need for Protestants to take an active 
public role ran through the entire Kirchentag program.  In a gathering devoted to the 
problems of community and social life, speakers addressed the crises of the churches, the 
family, the German “homeland,” and modern industry.  And, in all of these discussions, 
speakers defended traditional values in the face of social change.  Yet this traditionalism 
and conservatism was not entirely backward looking.  This is clear in discussions of the 
family and the modern industrial economy.  Speakers in these workgroups promoted a 
traditional social agenda.  But, to varying degrees, they also acknowledged the need to 
adapt their ideas to the modern world.  Just as important, without exception they accepted 
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the need to work out their ideas within the framework of West Germany’s democratic 
political system.  
The workgroup on the family was unquestionably the most conservative gathering 
at the 1950 Kirchentag.  In the workgroup’s first presentation, the businessman Günther 
Koch addressed the dangers that modern industrial life posed to the family, calling on 
Christian political activity to remedy these problems.  Koch began by painting an idyllic 
portrait of traditional social life.  In earlier times, he argued, when husbands and wives 
had worked side by side in agriculture, there had been no tension between career and 
family.  But the specialization and mechanization of modern industrial life had separated 
both man and wife from their traditional family roles.  Men who were unemployed—an 
unfortunate result of the vicissitudes of modern industry—lost their identity as providers, 
becoming a burden on their families.  Yet overwork, whether forced or voluntary, was an 
equal danger to happy family life.  Separated from their wives and surrounded by female 
co-workers, men were tempted to marital infidelity.  Women working in offices and 
factories had little time for domestic chores.  And, away from their homes, working long 
hours to support consumer lifestyles, both men and women neglected the tasks of the 
domestic sphere, especially the task of raising children.  Happy family life, Koch 
continued, required a balanced approach to work.  And Christians had a duty to create a 
social system that would make this balance possible.  Christians might disagree strongly 
on the specific social and economic policies they endorsed, on what was a fair wage, on 
how to achieve full employment, on the heated question of industrial co-determination, 
and on the details of the unemployment insurance system.  But all were called to 
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seriously engage themselves in these debates, rejecting an economic order based on 
“egotism” in order to take responsibility for postwar social conditions.5   
Speaking on education and child rearing, Johanna Stöffler also called for 
Christian solutions to the dangers posed by modern life.  Taking the postwar social 
breakdown as her starting point, Stöffler examined the material deprivation of refugees, 
expellees, and others displaced by the war.  In these difficult circumstances, she argued, it 
was the children who suffered most, going without money, apprenticeships, and homes.  
Concerned with their own material circumstances, however, society had forgotten the 
plight of these children, who were “living personalities,” blessed with precious 
individuality and worth in the eyes of God.  Motivated by “the crassest materialism” 
parents practiced abortion, infanticide, and basic neglect.  Yet children needed true 
parental affection, a loving family and community.  And, in order to grow into mature 
adults, they needed rules and authority figures, and traditional moral values.  The solution 
to this crisis, she continued, would not be found in any human program or plan.  It would 
only come about through an individual and communal return to Christ.  Parents needed to 
have the courage, she concluded, to uncompromisingly “choose the way of the Gospel.”6  
Speakers in the workgroup on the economy and industry held took a similar view 
of the ills of modern society.  Addressing contemporary economic debates, such as 
industrial co-determination, changes to the social insurance system, and unemployment, 
Otto Klein, also lamented the development of modern “mass society” [Vermassung].  
Klein blamed this dangerous development on an over reliance on heartless economic 
rationalism.  Like speakers in the family workgroup, he went on to promote a fairly 
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traditional social agenda, emphasizing individual worth and social cooperation.  But he 
also made several concessions to modern economic realities, endorsing economic 
principles such as private property and calling for further debate and cooperative 
discussion of the technical details of social organization.7   
Eberhard Müller also advanced traditional conservative economic ideas.  He 
began by addressing the opposing dangers of collectivism and individualism, of all 
systems of economic organization—whether communist or capitalist—that failed to 
properly understand the importance of individual personality [Persönlichkeit].  The 
danger of communism was clear in this regard.  But even nineteenth century liberalism, 
with its ideals of human freedom, had been complicit in the economic enslavement of 
industrial workers.  Real freedom, he argued, did not mean absolute individualism, but 
existence within “organic” social structures such as the family, church, and community.  
Yet Müller was clear that this traditional social vision needed to be achieved through 
democratic political activity.  To guard against the dangers of individualism and 
collectivism in the postwar world, he argued, the churches needed to promote greater 
political involvement.  They needed to work against the “ohne mich” philosophy of 
resignation that characterized the attitudes of many postwar Germans.  Protestant 
Christians also needed to recognize that Social Democracy was not their enemy, but their 
ally in this fight.  Working with both conservatives and Social Democrats they needed to 
cooperate to find mutually acceptable solutions to the complex technical problems of 
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modern economic life.  Indeed, he continued, real solutions would only come about 
through ongoing discussion and debate.8 
 
POWERS AND AUTHORITIES 
Shortly after the 1950 Kirchentag, political divisions in the churches became 
much more heated.  Objecting to early plans for West German rearmament, Gustav 
Heinemann, the highest ranking Protestant politician in West Germany, resigned on 
August 31, 1950 from his position as Interior Minister in Adenauer’s cabinet.  Although 
he remained a member of the CDU until 1952, Heinemann began to move toward the 
political Left.  Along with other politicians and pastors from the church’s Barthian 
faction, Heinemann allied himself with the SPD, taking a leading role in the populist 
campaign against rearmament.9  Other more conservative and moderate Protestants, 
including Reinold von Thadden-Trieglaff, Eberhard Müller, and Hanns Lilje responded 
by organizing their own informal circle to foster Protestant support for the government’s 
rearmament plans.10   
The disagreement over rearmament transformed the Protestant political landscape.  
Up to this point, political disagreements between Barthians and more conservative 
Protestants had remained relatively muted.  They had largely revolved around differences 
of theological emphasis, rather than concrete policy prescriptions.  But now they began to 
grow into full-blown political opposition.  Members of both political factions continued 
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to promote greater political involvement among the Protestant public.  But the prospects 
for political unity within the Protestant churches became much more distant.  Writing to 
Klaus von Bismarck on October 23, 1950, Reinold von Thadden worried about the long-
term implications of these developments.  He argued that Protestants needed to respond 
to Heinemann’s maneuvers with “extensive foundational deliberations” about church and 
national politics.  And he expressed his concern that ordinary church members would 
become politically confused without a unified leadership, ultimately choosing to 
withdraw from the political sphere altogether.11 
As an organization devoted to Protestant unity, the Kirchentag was slow to reflect 
these new divisions.  As we have seen, Reinold von Thadden-Trieglaff worried that 
public political disagreements between major Protestant leaders might drive the 
Protestant public away from political life, undoing much of the Kirchentag’s past work.  
Other Protestant leaders seem to have been similarly uncomfortable with political 
disagreement, preferring to emphasize general principles on which everyone could agree.  
This tendency toward abstraction and generalization was given additional strength by the 
need to address the problems of both West and East German political life, especially after 
the first truly all-German Kirchentag in 1951.  Most concrete policy disputes in the 
Federal Republic had little relevance to East German Protestants.  While, at least on some 
level, the general principles of Christian political involvement seemed relevant to the 
circumstances in both German states. 
At the 1951 Kirchentag in Berlin, members of both political factions continued to 
promote “public responsibility” and democratic political activity.  Speaking to a group of 
students, for example, the theologian Hans-Joachim Iwand concisely expressed the 
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Barthian understanding of political activity.  Teaching on the book of Romans, Iwand 
argued that the gospel made an existential claim upon all people, calling every individual 
to participate in God’s work of transforming the world.  The Gospel, he continued, was 
not just an ethical system, limited to the realm of ideas.  It was a system of life.  
Christians were called to respond to the gospel’s claim with concrete action, helping 
others in need regardless of the consequences for themselves.  In a subtle jab at 
Protestants in the CDU—who prided themselves on their political realism, accusing the 
Barthians of “enthusiasm” [Schwarmerei]—Iwand argued that such “enthusiasm” was 
preferable to a “cold realism” that ignored the suffering of others.12  He also made it clear 
that this political perspective required a break with German Protestantism’s apolitical 
past.  When confronted with evil, Protestants were called to oppose it directly, not to 
withdraw from the world.  As Iwand argued: “Christians do not abstain from politics.  
Christians should never say, ‘we have no political opinion.’  That is not Christian.  It has 
only become this way because we have had no political opinions for so long.  If this does 
not change we are lost.  After Bismarck political thought in Germany ceased.”13  But 
Christian involvement also did not mean opposing evil with evil.  It meant transforming 
the political world through the power of Christ. 
The political workgroup of the 1951 Kirchentag—which drew a combined 
audience of 40,000 listeners across three days of meetings—also focused on defending 
politics and combating the tendency to withdraw from public life.  While speakers in this 
workgroup were clearly most concerned to address political conditions in the GDR, they 
attempted to do so in a way that was also relevant to West German Protestants.  This 
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resulted in speeches that focused very broadly on general political principles, rather than 
dealing more directly with specific issues and controversies.  Interpreting and applying 
these principles was left largely to the listeners, whose comments indicate that they came 
to widely divergent conclusions.   
In its first session, the political workgroup addressed the question “Does power 
lead to evil?”  The Barthian theologian Heinrich Vogel, of the Kirchliche Hochschule in 
Berlin, opened this presentation by recognizing the many atrocities and injustices that had 
resulted from the misuse of power in the twentieth century.  But he argued that it was not 
power itself that was evil.  Rather, evil arose when the people in power concluded that 
their political ends justified any means.  Given this history of misuse, however, power 
needed to be approached with caution.  Here Vogel posed two foundational questions.  
First, after the experiences of the twentieth century, how could anyone ever trust power 
again?  Second, how could people avoid its abuse?  To answer these questions he shifted 
from political considerations to the level of spiritual principles.  God was the ultimate 
source of all power; but, in the person of Jesus Christ, God had also become the ultimate 
victim of power’s misuse.  In doing so, he had set the ultimate example for Christians in 
the present world.  Power existed for serving God and serving others, not for gaining 
mastery over them.  This was also true on the level of state politics.  Governments had 
authority from God to resist and hinder evil, not, as so many twentieth century ideologies 
had sought, to control and dominate.14 
In the following speech Otto Heinrich von der Gablentz, a member of the 
conservative Kreisau resistance circle during World War II, defended political activity in 
even stronger terms.  While he acknowledged that his listeners had a negative view of 
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state power after their experiences under a totalitarian regime, Gablentz argued that 
power was a simple fact of life.  It was not something that one could ever escape or avoid 
coming into contact with.  Instead, his listeners needed to be willing to “dirty their hands” 
in political activity.  Recognizing that his listeners from the West and East had very 
different needs and problems, Gablentz divided his message into two parts.  The first 
looked at the temptation to misuse power.  The second examined at the equal and 
opposite temptation towards political resignation.  The key to avoiding both of these 
difficulties lay in properly understanding power from a Christian perspective.  There 
were two important principles to understand.  First, humans were sinful whether or not 
they had any power.  This was a fundamental aspect of human nature.  Second, God had 
the ability to make anything good, even something that humans had misused as badly as 
politics.  When people truly understood that their political power came from God and was 
under his authority, they would learn to see their fellow humans as brothers.  Then the 
powerful would avoid the selfishness or idolatry that led to power’s misuse.  And those 
who were inclined toward the “ohne mich” perspective, would avoid the temptations of 
bitterness and hatred, because they knew that God was truly in control.15 
In the discussion period that followed these speeches, a few listeners argued 
directly against these calls to political involvement.  Dr. Hermann Kühn of Nienburg, for 
example, took issue with the attacks that both speakers had made against the “ohne mich” 
perspective of political withdrawal.  He argued that the bible neither endorsed nor 
condemned political involvement.  Jesus had not engaged in overt political activity.  And 
ordinary Christians also had the right to avoid political matters.  Other listeners advocated 
various forms of assertive Christian politics.  The teacher Anna Ritter, for example, drew 
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attention to the example provided by King Frederick William I of Prussia, who, she 
argued, had embodied Christian principles in his treatment of his subjects.  And Theodor 
Winzer, a city councilman from Happenheim, explicitly called on his listeners to join the 
CDU, supporting its Christian political program.16 
 The majority of audience members, however, were more interested in working 
out the implications of Christian principles for politics in the East.  One anonymous 
engineer from Leipzig, for example, argued that East Germans needed the courage to 
express their convictions publicly, especially in defense of individual personality 
[Persönlichkeit].  Several others argued more or less explicitly that the GDR was a state 
that actively opposed Christianity, a state that Christians could not support in good 
conscience.  As Dr. Schapitz of Reichenhall explained, the state operated under God’s 
authority insofar as it followed God’s laws.  But if the state went against God’s 
commands, then Christians’ first responsibility was to God and not the state.  Count Paul 
Yorck von Wartenburg, whose brother had been a leader in the July 1944 officer’s plot 
against Hitler, also counseled that even an evil state had authority from God.  It should 
not be directly opposed; but Christians did have a duty to counter its lies with the truth.  
Others, like Martin Richter a politician in the CDU-East and mayor of Dresden, defended 
the GDR regime, arguing that many of the injustices in the East were not the fault of the 
state, but of the incompleteness of its policy programs.  Christians, he suggested, needed 
to help those who were suffering by working alongside the state in these endeavors.17  
Finally, several discussion participants, such as Pastor Junge from Hamburg, argued that 
neither German state stood fully behind Christian principles.  According to Junge, the 
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“Manchesterism” of the Western world was as great a potential threat to human freedom 
as the communism of the East.18 
In its second session, entitled “A Slave to Two Masters,” the political workgroup 
focused more explicitly on the conflicting claims made by God and the political 
authorities on every individual.  Johannes Anz, the Oberkonsistorialrat of Magdeburg, 
began by comparing the circumstances of Christians in the GDR to the difficulties of 
early Christians.  Christians in the early church—like those in the present—were called to 
obey God’s commandments, including the Great Commission to make disciples in all 
nations.  In both the late Roman Empire and in present day East Germany, however, the 
political authorities sought to restrict these activities.  Christians in the GDR were faced 
with a dilemma.  Should they respect the God-given authority of the state, obeying the 
bible’s injunction to political obedience?  Or should they follow God’s commandment to 
actively engage in evangelism?  To a lesser extent, this dilemma was also present for 
Christians in the West, who might be tempted to obey the dictates of modern mass 
society, rather than God’s word.   Anz answered this dilemma by pointing out that all 
earthly authorities were still under the authority of God.  They were limited in their scope 
and had no right to oppose God’s will.  Even when Christians faced persecution, 
obedience to God had to be their priority.  This did not justify political resistance to the 
state, but it did mean that they needed to continue to confess and bear witness to God’s 
message, regardless of the persecution they might endure.19 
The author Willy Kramp made the same basic point in the workgroup’s next 
presentation, applying it more broadly to the citizens of both German states.  All 
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Christians in all parts of the world, he argued, were torn between the demands of political 
authority and the demands of God.  This tension did not just exist under totalitarian 
systems such as Nazism or Communism.  Indeed middle class Germans had had their 
own idols of “materialism” and “culture” long before the rise of the Nazis.  Rather than 
defending their own class interests, German Christians were called to be transformed by 
the truth of Christ’s death and resurrection and to devote their lives to discipleship.  Then 
they would no longer be the slaves of any master, but free servants of Christ, bearing 
witness to his truth in whatever circumstances they found themselves.20 
After these presentations, many listeners from the West responded by expressing 
solidarity with their persecuted brothers in the East.  And many from the East took 
advantage of the discussion period to speak directly about the dilemmas they faced in 
their daily lives.  Still others tried to draw more general political conclusions.  Annelise 
Paradowski of Hamburg, for example, drew on the preceding speeches to defend the 
importance of “Christian civilization,” which she believed was under threat in the modern 
world.  Many others expanded on the speakers’ less emphasized criticisms of the West 
German system.  Hermann Lutze, a pastor from Barmen, argued that West Germans also 
had totalitarian temptations.  Christians could only affirm the western political system if 
they did so critically.  In particular, he argued, “We do not affirm the forces of capitalist 
exploitation or Americanization.”21  Lucie Lehman, a farmer from Mecklenburg, also 
pointed out the complicity of many West German pastors in spreading the political 
propaganda of the West German government.  And, another listener, August Wilhelm 
Lagen argued that the church needed to adopt a critical stance toward all political 
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systems.  Yet, despite these criticisms of the West, the focal point of the meeting 
remained firmly fixed on the dilemma of Protestant Christians in the East.22 
 
THE DIFFICULTIES OF DEMOCRATIC POLITICS 
Political discussions at the 1952 Kirchentag in Stuttgart and the 1953 Kirchentag 
in Hamburg, returned to the difficulties of establishing a democratic political system in 
the Federal Republic.23  These discussions continued to place primary emphasis on the 
essential political unity of German Protestants, focusing on general areas of agreement 
rather than on emerging political differences.  All speakers could agree on the importance 
of Christian principles to political life and on the need for German Protestants to become 
active citizens of the new democratic West German state.  However, as time went on, it 
also became more difficult to hide the widening political gap between supporters of the 
CDU and the emerging Protestant Left.  
As in previous years, speakers at the 1952 Kirchentag in Stuttgart repeatedly 
called their listeners to political involvement.  At a reception for political guests before 
the opening worship service, for example, the Federal President Theodor Heuß addressed 
the obligations of his listeners as both Christians and as citizens.  While he acknowledged 
that the limited freedom of Germans in the East made it more difficult to think along 
these lines, he argued that inward piety and outward political activity were not mutually 
exclusive.  Drawing on the history of the pietist movement in Württemberg and on his 
own recollections of his political mentor Friedrich Naumann, a liberal politician of the 
Wilhelmine era, he argued that inner belief found its proper outward expression in 
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concern for the problems of the world—in politics.24  During the opening worship service 
both Reinold von Thadden-Trieglaff and Hans Meiser, the bishop of Bavaria, also 
reiterated the importance of Protestant political activity.  Thadden emphasized the need 
for German Protestants to develop greater political self-confidence and maturity so that 
they could contribute solutions to the problems of the world.  And Meiser went even 
further in endorsing conservative Christian politics, proclaiming: “Where Christ does not 
reign, things cannot help but fall apart.”25 
As in previous years, the workgroup on the family and education was home to the 
most traditionally conservative politics.  Particularly in their discussions of education and 
raising children, speakers frequently contrasted the dangers and evils of the modern 
world with the virtues of earlier social structures.  Dr. Johannes Thieler of East Berlin 
made this point particularly strongly when he starkly contrasted the materialist world of 
the present with an earlier “world of culture, where the beautiful, the true, and the good 
should reign.”  Unfortunately, he argued, this world of culture, of mature individuality, 
was under constant attack.  “All around,” he noted, “the beautiful is supplanted by the 
ugly, the truth with lies, and the good with the demonic.”26  Protestants, he argued, had 
an obligation to engage in political activity in order to defend this tradition against th
threats of “foreign culture,” of “kitsch, propaganda, and over-civilization.”  Rather than 
embracing the resignation of the “ohne mich” movement, they needed to fight to save the 
world from its demonic impulses.
e 
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in part, at the government of the GDR, this does not appear to have been his only target.  
It is clear, in any case, that his comments had a resonance among the West Germans who
made up most of his audience.  And the following speech, by Johanna Stöffler of 
Kirchheim, while not as dramatic, addressed the same general threat.  If parents could not 
inculcate maturity in their children, she argued, they would leave them helpless to stand 
against the “slogans of the masses, the catchphrases of contemporary opinion.”   Without 
a proper Christian upbringing, their children would lose their individuality to the 
anonymity of modern mass society.
 
                                                
28 
The political workgroup in Stuttgart was again the best attended.  Its major theme 
was German guilt: the question of how to come to terms with the recent past.  But all of 
the speakers also considered the implications of German guilt for present-day politics.  
Here, in a speech directed against West German rearmament, Helmut Gollwitzer 
proclaimed that Christians had a duty to be involved in the political process.  Like more 
conservative Protestants, such as Thadden and Lilje, Gollwitzer believed that political 
matters could not be removed from the religious realm.  Instead he asked: “Can anything 
happen to people in the political sphere that is not immediately also an urgent question 
for the church?”  But he also contrasted truly Christian politics with the idolatrous 
political activity of the Catholic CDU.  Looking at the urgent questions of East-West 
relations and Cold War politics, he argued:  
Many of us wish that we could answer these questions with clear directives from the 
church, issued by the holders of some leading position or another, and we look 
enviously at the Catholics who seem to have so much more unity.  But it seems to me 
that we should not be looking to some church body, but should be asking God’s word 
itself.29  
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If Protestants would look to the life and teachings of Christ for their political values, they 
would see that God had not called them to promote conflict and war, but to foster peace, 
justice, and forgiveness in the middle of the present-day crisis.30 
The workgroup’s second speaker, Hans Puttfarcken, a councilor in the Hessian 
Justice Ministry, also defended Christian political activity.  Like Gollwitzer, he 
emphasized the Christian responsibility to resist political idols and to promote 
reconciliation.  But, unlike Gollwitzer, he did not direct these comments against the 
policies of the West German CDU.  Defining politics as the “human effort to rightly 
order public life,” Puttfarcken argued that it simply wasn’t possible to avoid political 
entanglements.  Everyone in a democratic state— even mere observers—had some 
degree of political responsibility.  And they had to learn how to exercise this 
responsibility properly.  This was a matter of avoiding selfish, one-sided politics in favor 
of service to one’s fellow citizens.  “We Christians,” he argued, “do not bind ourselves to 
any ideology, no matter what side it comes from.  Our activity is not guided by the 
principles of an ideology, but by God’s will, by concrete, present-day responsibility for 
our fellow-man, for our brother.”31  This political activity, he continued, had three proper 
manifestations: the love of one’s neighbor, the need to fight against evil in the world, and, 
finally, the need to pursue reconciliation between opponents in the too-often fractious 
realm of politics.32  
The workgroup’s second session, on the role of politics in the construction of a 
better future, was dominated by more conservative political voices.  Franz Reinhold 
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Hildebrand, the president of the Evangelische Kirche der Union, began this session by 
addressing the unique perspective that Christians had in politics.  Modern man, he 
argued, was beset by two political temptations.  On one side, there was the danger of 
believing there was no future, of giving oneself over completely to resignation.  On the 
other side, was the opposite error of the “future-drunk,” who sacrificed everything for the 
sake of their utopian ideals.  But Christian political activity inhabited the middle ground 
between these two extremes.  Religious faith gave Christians hope, motivating them to 
pursue a political program.  But it also offered sober view of what humanity could and 
could not accomplish by itself.  The foundation of Christian politics was not self-
assertion or the pursuit of one’s own narrow goals.  Instead Christian activity was rooted 
in Christ’s love for all of humanity.  Christians were called to a different political 
standard than people in the world.  “A Christian politician or economist,” he argued, “is 
free, too, to give his opponent his due, to see the person, and not to insist on his own 
ideas as though they have eternal value.”33 
In the following speech, the CDU Bundestag president Hermann Ehlers offered a 
defense of Christian Democratic politics.  He began by advocating political realism and 
concrete political activity against the “spiritual and Christian arrogance that degrades 
political responsibility.”  Alongside their ultimate hope in the future return of Christ, he 
argued, Christians had a present-day duty to “address the tasks and problems of our daily 
lives, and to solve them as best we can.”34  He went on to argue that the true principles of 
Christian public responsibility were firmly rooted in the commands of God.  It was not a 
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matter of blindly submitting to authority, but of engaging in serving and sacrifice 
motivated by the love of one’s neighbor.35   
Ehlers proceeded to lay out nine basic principles of realistic Christian politics.  
First, since all human endeavors were provisional, Christian politicians did not need to be 
reluctant to create provisional solutions to the problems they faced.  They did not need to 
solve problems for all time.  Second, their knowledge that all human ideas were fallible 
compelled them to consider alternative points of view, but also gave them the obligation 
hold steadfastly to those ideas that they had thoroughly scrutinized.  To Ehlers this 
scrutiny and debate was essential to the proper functioning of democracy.  Third, 
Christians were obligated, insofar as it was possible, to work to persuade their political 
opponents, not just to outvote them.  Practical compromises were central to this process, 
as long as they did not go against fundamental Christian beliefs.  Fourth, politicians had 
an obligation to make decisions as well as they could.  They could not relinquish this 
responsibility by refusing to decide on complicated matters.  Fifth, the state had an 
obligation to exercise force to defend the common good, even though Christians were 
aware that force alone could not solve the world’s problems.  Sixth, Christians should not 
elevate their own political and national goals to the level of spiritual principles.  Seventh, 
Christians were called to recognize even the fine distinctions between ideologies and 
worldviews (such as communism and capitalism), not simply lumping them together as 
common manifestations of human weakness.  Eighth, Christian politicians had a 
responsibility to defend the interests of individuals and groups, while balancing this task 
with concern for the common good.  As long as they did not see party loyalty as the 
ultimate good, they did not need to be entirely above party politics.  Finally, Christian 
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politicians needed to be willing to make unpopular decisions, not just blindly carrying out 
the will of the people.36  
In a sign of the growing politicization of the Protestant public, these speeches 
elicited a tremendous variety of commentary from the audience.  Even more than in 
Berlin, the predominantly West German audience of the Stuttgart Kirchentag was 
interested in practical political debates, rather than just the general principles of Christian 
political activity.  As in the previous year, several listeners rallied to the defense of the 
“ohne mich” perspective.  Wolfgang Scheu, a pharmacist’s assistant from Tübingen, 
argued that he was staying out of politics because none of the existing sides reflected his 
interests.37  And Reinhold Schönfield of Berlin-Buckow, claimed to speak for the youth 
when he complained of his disappointment with democracy and his frustration with 
parliamentarians who ignored the will of the people.38  Nevertheless, voices calling for 
greater political involvement dominated the discussion periods.  Most of these comments 
seem to reflect the “realism” of the CDU more than the Barthian perspective, but they 
also demonstrate a surprising degree of openness to the SPD.  Arguing against 
Gollwitzer’s anti-rearmament stance, the retired colonel Reinhold Kiep called for 
political realism in international relations.  And Bundestag members Emil Marx of 
Wuppertal and Annemarie Keiler of Marburg defended their own involvement in the 
CDU.  Along with Dora Sater, a nurse from Mannheim, Keiler also called on women to 
become more active in politics.  Others, however, like the writer Erwin Knipp, asked 
whether it was unchristian to celebrate the victory of one political party over another.  
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And several questioners, including many self-proclaimed CDU members like Wilfred 
Überschwer of Neuwied and Kurt Neumann of Berlin, called for greater cooperation with 
the SPD.39  Emmi Welter, a city representative from Aachen, also called for Protestants 
to take an active role in all of the Federal Republic’s political parties, not just the CDU.40 
The Hamburg Kirchentag in 1953 took place in an even more politically charged 
environment, meeting only two weeks before a heated West German election.  This 
election had special significance to German Protestants, aggravating the already deep 
divisions within the church.  In 1952 Gustav Heinemann, long at odds with the party’s 
leadership, had finally resigned from the CDU.  He went on to found the All-German 
People’s Party (GVP), a new party devoted almost exclusively to the anti-rearmament 
cause.  And in 1953, with the help of his supporters in the Protestant churches, he entered 
Bundestag elections as the new party’s leader.  Fearing that the heated emotions of this 
election campaign would eclipse the Kirchentag’s larger message, Reinold von Thadden-
Trieglaff and the other members of the Kirchentag leadership worked to steer the 
Kirchentag away from direct political controversy.  Hoping to prevent the complete 
politicization of the gathering, they refused to invite speakers such as Heinemann and 
Ehlers, who were contesting the election.41  But even so, they continued to fear that 
Heinemann’s supporters, like Martin Niemöller, would take advantage of the Kirchentag 
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platform to engage in direct political advocacy.42  In this environment of deep political 
division within the churches, however, an important new political topic emerged in the 
Kirchentag program.   For the first time, at the suggestion of the Präsidium member 
Klaus von Bismarck, the Kirchentag political workgroup took up the complicated 
questions of democratic political pluralism.43 
This growing acceptance of pluralism was also apparent in other areas of the 
Kirchentag program.  Speaking at the press reception at the beginning of the gathering, 
Reinold von Thadden-Trieglaff emphasized the fact that German Protestants were not 
wedded to any one political party.  But, whatever their political views, they did have a 
duty as citizens to take part in the upcoming elections.44  A more pluralist perspective 
was also apparent in the prominent role given to Max Brauer, the SPD mayor of 
Hamburg, who spoke at both the Kirchentag reception for politicians and at the opening 
youth rally.  Delivering his remarks to 19,000 young Protestants, Brauer advocated 
respectful relations between church and state, premised on the idea that they operated 
within separate spheres of life.  But Brauer took care in his remarks to strongly 
differentiate his views from the East German church policy of the SED, warning that the 
state had no right to regulate religious worship and assembly.45  The political reception 
also featured the reading of greetings from President Heuß, who could not be present, but 
who emphasized Protestants’ unity in religious faith, whatever their disunity at the polls.  
                                                 
42 See the correspondence between Heinrich Giesen and Niemöller, including letters from Giesen 
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43 See Bismarck’s comments, “Protokoll über die Themensitzung für den 5. Deutschen 
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And the CDU interior minister Robert Lehr, a Catholic, spoke on the importance of 
Catholic-Protestant cooperation, especially in crafting social and family policy.46 
The most conservative workgroup in 1953 was, as usual, the workgroup on family 
and school policy.  The atmosphere in this workgroup, later criticized by Kirchentag 
leaders for its overly strident tone, was strongly colored by ongoing bitter disputes in 
Hamburg over the city’s elimination of church-taught confessional religious education in 
the schools.  This was particularly apparent in speeches by Karl Witt, a professor from 
Hermannsburg, and Irmgard Feußner, a school principal from Gießen.  In his 
presentation, Witt warned parents of the vital role played by teachers in the modern mass 
educational system in shaping their childrens’ values and beliefs, and he warned that this 
instruction inevitably advanced some kind of ideological and religious agenda.  Children 
in the current system were in danger of being misled or of becoming confused when 
confronted with the bewildering variety of worldviews that lay behind their education.  
And this was precisely why they needed confessional religious instruction, and not some 
watered-down ethics course, if they were to avoid the dangers of modern mass society.47  
Feußner bemoaned the loss of tradition apparent in modern mass education.  Blaming 
Nazi ideology, Allied denazification efforts, and social modernization for the present 
crisis, she lamented: “As a result of the great catastrophes of the last 40 years, our people 
no longer possesses any tradition . . . no power to unify and shape, no unchallenged 
examples or symbols.”48  Without the aid of families and churches, the schools would not 
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be able to reconstruct German society, guarding children against dangerous ideologies, 
while teaching them to become mature adults.  For this reason, both private and public 
schools needed Protestant teachers, who could imbue their students with Christian 
values.49 
The most explicit political discussion at the Kirchentag took place in the political 
workgroup, in a session titled “What can decontaminate our communal life?”50  
Reflecting the struggle of German Protestants to come to terms with modern democratic 
politics, this discussion was marked by two very divergent approaches to political 
conflict and pluralism.  Speaking first, Theodor Paul Pfizer, the mayor of Ulm, blamed 
the breakdown of the old middle class political tradition for the divisiveness of present-
day politics.  Unlike this older form of politics, carried out by educated elites, modern 
politics was being destroyed by the influence of mass parties and interest groups that only 
cared about the advancement of their own agendas.  In a society that was no longer 
organically grown, he argued, “people thrown together by fate have increasingly little 
sense of what connects them, of their common responsibility.”51  Divided into these 
groups, they were no longer capable of making fine political distinctions, instead seeing 
the whole world in black and white.  And this led them to prioritize the good of their own 
political party over the common good, opening the door to a whole array of lies, tricks, 
and political deception.   Since parties thought of nothing except winning the next 
election, they abandoned any sense of civil courage in favor of pure political calculation, 
making real compromises and agreements impossible.  Instead of this competitive 
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50 “Was kann unser Zusammenleben Entgiften?”    
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system, Pfizer argued that political problems could be solved if the representatives of 
different interest groups could only be made to sit down and rationally work out their 
differences together.52  
In the next presentation, the journalist and CDU politician Ernst Lemmer 
addressed many of the same issues, but instead of calling for a return to the elite politics 
of the past, he called upon his listeners to inwardly embrace modern democracy, with its 
liberal, pluralistic values.  Lemmer began by defending democracy itself, arguing that 
although elections were unpleasant and messy, seemingly conducted to appeal to the 
lowest common denominator, they were the byproducts of valuable freedoms such as the 
freedom of speech and the freedom of thought.  However unpleasant they might find 
some aspects of this system, he warned his listeners that it was better than the 
alternatives.53   
Lemmer went on to argue that the basic problem of all modern politics was 
intolerance toward other peoples’ opinions.  This intolerance, he continued, referencing 
the activities of the US Senator Joseph McCarthy, led to the politics of character 
assassination and defamation.  Political intolerance also led to a breakdown in 
communication, as party members refused to listen to the representatives of other 
perspectives.  And it caused party leaders to act more like functionaries than like 
democratic representatives of the people.54  If they wanted to overcome these problems, 
Germans needed to mature politically.  This would require them to fundamentally change 
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their political attitudes, becoming active citizens who embraced the new democratic 
system.  As Lemmer argued:  
The state is no eternal thing-in-itself, and the parties even less so.  Everything is 
in a state of constant flux; even totalitarian regimes cannot remain perfectly rigid, 
as we are almost amazed to experience.  And this is even truer for a democracy, 
that draws its strength from the people. . . .  
The time for this constricted slave-mentality is past; the comfortable, trite 
admonition ‘Trust your magistrate!’ is antiquated. . . . Even in a democracy, 
freedom and human rights are not just given out, picked up off the streets.  They 
must be worked for at all times, and their realization must be vigilantly guarded.55 
 
In order to function, he continued, democracy required “inwardly free democrats,” who 
would not embrace mass politics, trampling minorities underfoot as conservatives had 
done during the 1920s, but would instead defend the rights of every citizen.56 
 
AN INWARD TURN 
While the 1953 Kirchentag in Hamburg had begun to explicitly address the 
complexities and difficulties of democratic politics in the FRG, the 1954 Kirchentag in 
Leipzig went in a very different direction.  Plans to restructure the Kirchentag 
organization in order to encourage more concrete and practical engagement with 
everyday problems were put on hold in 1954.  And, to the apparent frustration of several 
members of Kirchentag leadership, the Leipzig gathering was instead characterized by 
the inwardly focused, spiritualization of politics that had prevailed at many earlier 
Kirchentag meetings.57  Geared toward the circumstances of Protestants in the East, the 
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majority of the 1954 workgroups focused on the comparison of the Christian and 
communist worldviews.  The church workgroup offered Christian hope in the ultimate 
return of Christ as an alternative to communist utopianism.  In discussions of education 
and child rearing, Christ was offered as the exemplary model of human behavior in 
contrast to communist notions of the “new man.”  And in the political workgroup, 
speakers addressed the meaning of God’s lordship over the entire world and the Christian 
commitment to justice.58 
In planning sessions for the Liepzig gathering, East German church leaders made 
it clear that they were not looking for concrete answers to practical political questions.  
Instead, in the words of Johannes Anz of Magdeburg, the Kirchentag should “deal with 
these problems working outward from the depths of the bible.”  According to Reimer 
Mager, the president of the Saxon Landeskirche, this was not a retreat from confrontation 
with the SED, it was instead a bold engagement in the conflict of worldviews going on 
between communism and the churches.59  But the Kirchentag’s focus was decidedly 
theological and spiritual, asserting Christian truth, but not addressing the question of how 
this should be lived out in daily life. 
This was apparent throughout the Leipzig Kirchentag.  In the church workgroup, 
the student pastor Johannes Hamel reminded his listeners that Jesus was the ultimate 
judge of humanity, whose return they should be expecting.  But when it came to practical 
political questions, he simply asserted that neither liberal nor Marxist worldviews were 
Christian.  Christianity was not itself political.  Christians were free, instead, to work 
                                                 
58 “Themenkonvent v. 11/12. März 54,” 11-12 March 1954, EZA 71/86/127; “Themenkonvent 
3./4. Januar 1954 in Berlin,” 3-4 January 1954, EZA 71/86/127. 
 
59 “Themenkonvent.  Plenum 3.1 Abends” 3 January 1954, EZA 71/86/127. 
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within any political system as long as they were careful to follow God’s commands.60  
And in the workgroup on family and education, Heinrich Vogel argued that both East and 
West German society were—in their own ways—degrading the image of humanity.  
Indeed, all of human history consisted of the false images that people made of God and of 
themselves.  But God always destroyed these images in order to remind humanity that the 
true image of perfection was to be found in Jesus Christ.61  While other workgroup 
members took issue with the starkness of this formulation, arguing that images, 
exemplars, and models of behavior could be useful, as long as they did no go against 
Christian teaching, the overall level of discussion in this workgroup remained on this 
abstract, theological level.62 
This abstract tone also prevailed in the formal presentations of the political 
workgroup, although audience members tried to push the discussion in a more pragmatic 
direction.  Here the Hamburg Professor Kurt Dietrich Schmidt argued that Christians 
owed allegiance to the state, since God was ultimately behind all state power.  
Government was a gift that God had given to prevent the dissolution of human society 
into chaos.  And even bad governments, so long as they fulfilled this function, needed to 
be respected.  This had been true in the Third Reich and it remained true in the GDR.  
Individual Christians had only three political duties: to steadfastly bear witness to 
Christian truth when the state went against God’s commands, to obey their conscience 
when it went against the state’s demands, and to make sure that their own actions were 
just in the eyes of God.  Active resistance to the state was not appropriate, but this 
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passive resistance was required.63  Discussion of these ideas quickly divided between 
those who agreed with Schmidt’s admonition to passivity and those who worried that 
passive resistance might not be enough.  Here one attendee, Erich Lorenz, quoted from 
Bonhoeffer to argue that this passive witness to God’s truth would someday change the 
world.  On the other side, a discussion participant named Dr. Nockten expressed 
skepticism toward this approach, asking whether this wasn’t just a way of looking the 
other way and allowing the state to continue abusing its power.  But the perspective of 
most workgroup participants was less confrontational, emphasizing the need to pray for 
the authorities and to continue to place their hope and faith in Christ.64 
Following this discussion, Franz Reinhold Hildebrand, the president of the 
Evangelische Kirche der Union, spoke on the Christian conception of justice.  Here he 
argued that, just as it had during the Third Reich, the church had a constant obligation to 
stand on the side of justice and to oppose injustice in society.  But this duty did not 
involve active resistance.  Instead, as the confessing church had shown, “The confession 
and defense of the Gospel is at the same time the defense of humanity, human rights, and 
human freedom.”65  God’s higher law was the true measure of justice in the world and 
Christians needed to promote this higher standard.  But when they found themselves in 
conflict with the government, they were not called to rebel.  Instead the resistance they 
were called to was “spiritually active, but physically passive.”66  Finally, Gustav 
Heinemann took a much more activist approach to justice, but he directed his criticism at 
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colonial conflicts in the Third World, rather than life in the GDR.  Heinemann argued 
that justice was a process rather than a static result.  Humans, as imperfect as they were, 
were called by God to take justice seriously and to promote it around the world.  And 
although they would never fully succeed in creating a perfectly just society, they had to 
devote themselves to this task.67 
 
CONCLUSION 
Coming out of the experiences of the Nazi dictatorship and the Third Reich, 
leaders in both the Catholic and Protestant churches in Germany recognized the need for 
a new form of Christian politics.  By presenting political involvement as a Christian duty, 
and working to promote the dominance of Christian teachings in political life, they hoped 
to overcome the disillusionment and resignation of ordinary church members, enlisting 
them in the work of postwar rebuilding.  In the early Federal Republic, most Catholics 
and many Protestants channeled their political energy into the activities of the CDU/CSU.  
Indeed, even many Protestants who were unhappy with the dominant role of the Catholic 
church in West German society, were active the CDU/CDU in the late 1940s and early 
1950s.  And those who rejected the politics of the CDU/CSU generally still shared most 
of the basic assumptions and attitudes of Christian Democracy.  Generally speaking, 
members of the CDU and of the nascent Protestant Left could both agree on the need to 
unite all Christians—or at least all Protestants—in a common political ideology.  And 
members of both groups hoped to draw on this faith-inspired political activity for the 
transformation of postwar German society. 
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This desire for unity, however, was thwarted in practice by the emergence of 
significant political differences between more conservative Protestants and members of 
the Barthian faction.  These differences were rooted in different interpretations of the 
legacy of Nazism and the experiences of the Third Reich.  More conservative Protestants 
blamed these events on the breakdown of traditional social and religious values.  
Barthians often agreed with this assessment, as far as it went, but they also insisted on 
looking at the church’s own guilt and the complicity of the German Protestant tradition.  
As a result, more conservative Protestants were much more likely to endorse the assertive 
Christian politics of the CDU as the solution to Germany’s postwar political crisis.  
Barthians, by contrast, remained skeptical that any party or program could truly embody 
Christian principles.  The rearmament debate of the early 1950s, along with Heinemann’s 
exodus from the CDU, helped to move this disagreement from the level of political 
philosophy and political theology to the level of concrete political opposition.  By the 
election of 1953, these divisions had become so pronounced that they could no longer be 
ignored. 
Yet Kirchentag leaders were slow to acknowledge this division for a variety of 
reasons.  In part, they saw political disunity as a sign of weakness, and they feared that 
disagreements within the Protestant churches would lead to renewed disillusionment.  In 
part, they viewed the Kirchentag as a source of unity in the churches, an organization 
dedicated to holding the two political camps together.  Finally, the Kirchentag’s role as a 
forum for Protestants in both the FRG and the GDR necessitated a certain degree of 
generality and abstraction.  Citizens of the two German states faced very different 
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concrete political problems, but general Christian principles could be easily applied 
Protestants in both the East and West.   
Kirchentag organizers only gradually overcame this emphasis on Protestant unity.  
At the 1953 Kirchentag in Hamburg, they took the first tentative steps toward 
acknowledging the positive role of difference and political pluralism in a democratic 
state.  Yet, this perspective remained contested, as many Protestants continued to long for 
the “organic” unity of an older form of politics.  And, as the 1954 Kirchentag in Leipzig 
clearly demonstrated, this way of thinking made little sense to Protestants living in the 
GDR, who remained a sizable portion of the Kirchentag constituency.  These ideas could 
only be refined and developed at later Kirchentag meetings, as speakers began to pay 
more attention to the complexities of West German political life. 
 
 
 
 
 
PART TWO 
 
1955-1961

 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 5  
 
“REALITY TODAY” 
 
 
By most standards the 1954 Kirchentag in Leipzig was an unprecedented success.  
The only Kirchentag ever to take place entirely within the German Democratic Republic, 
it enjoyed extensive press coverage around the world.  Meeting in the shadow of failing 
East-West diplomacy, as the prospects for eventual German reunification seemed 
increasingly remote, it demonstrated powerfully that German Protestants were committed 
to bridging the iron curtain, standing in solidarity with one another.  It was 
unprecedented, too, from a standpoint of sheer size.  Attracting 650,000 people to its 
main assembly, it demonstrated that the Christian churches were alive and well, even in 
the East where they suffered persecution.  The Kirchentag has never since drawn such 
massive crowds.1 
Yet many members of the church and Kirchentag leadership responded to these 
successes with ambivalence.  It was impossible to deny the public importance and the 
symbolic resonance of these massive Kirchentag demonstrations.  But their phenomenal 
outward success was also seen as a threat to the meeting’s core spiritual and intellectual 
tasks.  Traveling together to the United States for the second conference of the World 
Council of Churches in Evanston, Illinois, Gottfried Noth, the bishop of the host 
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Landeskirche of Saxony, expressed these concerns to Reinold von Thadden-Trieglaff.  
The meeting’s message, he complained, had been universally misinterpreted “both 
politically and spiritually.”  And its large numbers threatened to pull the church into the 
dangerous realm of mass politics.  Reporting these sentiments to the Präsidium, Thadden 
somberly concluded: “If this is the general opinion, then the Kirchentag has played itself 
out.”2 
Others shared these misgivings.  While a few Präsidium members hoped that the 
Kirchentag would build on the political legacy of Leipzig, becoming an important factor 
in inter-German and Cold War diplomacy, most were uncomfortable with this role.3  The 
Hamburg theologian Hans Rudolf Müller-Schwefe acknowledged that God had done 
“extraordinary” and “astonishing” things at the Kirchentag meetings of the early 1950s.  
But he argued: “The danger grows ever greater that the ordinary things won’t work.”  
Responding to those who wanted another eastern Kirchentag in 1955 to follow-up on the 
successes of Leipzig, the Württemberg Oberkirchenrat Manfred Müller contrasted these 
“evangelistic and demonstrative” meetings with the more substantive leadership role the 
Kirchentag could play in the West.  And he rejected the geo-political arguments in favor 
of another Eastern gathering, suggesting: “If political considerations are to play a role [in 
our decision], then the Kirchentag is near its end.”  Even Heinrich Giesen, who reveled in 
the all-German significance of Leipzig, acknowledged that the experiences of that 
gathering were unrepeatable.  And Joachim Beckmann, a leading figure in the Church of 
the Rhineland, argued: “The time of these ‘legendary Kirchentage’ has ended with 
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Leipzig.  We will never again achieve these heights.  This is why we need a moment of 
reflection: what do we want from the Kirchentag?”4 
Different members of the leadership had very different answers to this question: 
evangelism and Volksmission, a demonstration of the importance of the churches in the 
Communist East, a spiritual gathering of committed church members, a forum where 
Protestant intellectuals could address the problems and crises of the present world, or a 
place where those who were alienated from the state churches could rediscover and 
explore their faith.  All of these elements had been present in previous Kirchentag 
gatherings, but it was becoming difficult to hold them all together.  The small full-time 
staff of the Kirchentag was overburdened.  The Kirchentag organization was still 
operating under provisional by-laws adopted in 1951.  And many important decisions 
about the annual content of the Kirchentag meetings were being made on an ad hoc basis, 
without much oversight or consistency from year to year.  In short: the Kirchentage of the 
early 1950s were characterized more by enthusiasm and activity than by any concrete 
program or organizational structure.   
Starting in 1955 with a much-needed break from the cycle of annual meetings, the 
Kirchentag leaders began to address this deficit.  The meeting’s organizational structure 
was clarified and better defined.  Previously informal planning processes were 
institutionalized.  And questions about the relationship between the Kirchentag, the state 
churches, and a wide array of other Protestant organizations began to receive more 
attention.  On a more fundamental level, Kirchentag leaders also began to address the fact 
that life in Germany had changed significantly since 1945 or 1949.  In the West, material 
prosperity was replacing the devastation and hardship of the immediate postwar years.  A 
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relatively stable parliamentary democracy was emerging out of earlier chaos and 
disillusionment.  And within this new political and social system, new problems and 
questions were coming to the fore.  Grand symbolic gestures of all-German unity might 
still attract considerable attention, but they also distracted the Kirchentag from the 
pressing need to address new West German realities.  If they wanted their beliefs to be 
taken seriously, Kirchentag leaders realized, they would have to start asking difficult 
questions about the role of the Kirchentag itself, the church, and the Christian faith in an 
increasingly secular, modern world. 
 
INSTITUTIONAL REFORM 
The need for a thorough reform of the institutional side of the Kirchentag had 
long been clear to most Präsidium members, and especially to the Kirchentag staff.  It 
was only in late 1950, after the first two Kirchentag meetings, that the organization had 
even established a permanent business office.  And the two General Secretaries, Otto-
Heinrich Ehlers and Heinrich Giesen, along with a small clerical support staff, had been 
constantly overwhelmed by the task of coordinating the massive gatherings of the early 
1950s.  In a similar fashion, the various organs of the Kirchentag leadership had been 
loosely organized in 1951.  But many important questions remained about the make-up of 
these bodies and their relationship to each other.  In actual practice, the governing 
Präsidium and the members of the full time staff might lay out major themes and key 
ideas for a given gathering (usually in extensive consultation with the leaders of the local 
state churches), but implementing this program required the extensive cooperation of 
outside individuals and organizations.  This diminished the central control of the 
Kirchentag leadership and lessened the consistency of the message from year to year. 
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These problems were the subject of more or less continual discussion at the 
Präsidium meetings of the early 1950s, but little progress was made in solving them.  
Instead, they were subordinated to another of the Kirchentag’s major goals, that of 
gathering Protestants together to demonstrate their unity despite geographical, political, 
and theological divisions.  The desire to maintain momentum and to take advantage of 
opportunities to expand into the GDR always seemed to eclipse more concrete 
organizational and practical considerations.5  The Kirchentag in Leipzig epitomized this 
tendency.  In a 1953 letter to members of all of the Kirchentag’s leadership committees, 
Reinold von Thadden-Trieglaff explained the thought process behind the Leipzig 
Kirchentag.  He began by acknowledging the pressing need to address West German 
problems more concretely.  And he admitted the difficulty of doing this in the East.  But 
he continued: “On the other hand, the open political situation of the moment . . . obliges 
us to meet in the GDR as soon as possible.”6   
In the initial enthusiasm of these gatherings, practical problems and 
disagreements could often be ignored.  But as the Kirchentag developed and became 
more successful, these problems persisted.  The first attempt to address them in a 
systematic fashion occurred in 1953.  After the Hamburg Kirchentag, Heinrich Giesen 
collected more than 300 criticisms and reform suggestions from church leaders, 
Kirchentag workers, and other attendees.  Categorizing and systematizing these 
suggestions, he presented them to a special joint meeting of the Präsidium and the larger 
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Präsidialausschuss in mid-November.  Working in smaller sub-committees concerned 
with various problem areas, members of the Kirchentag leadership elaborated on these 
problems and they worked to develop solutions.  Several common themes emerged in 
these meetings, and the Kirchentag leadership worked to address these issues over the 
course of the following year. 
A large number of these criticisms grew out of the difficulty of trying to appeal 
simultaneously to Protestants in the East and the West.  Topics that were germane to the 
experience of Protestants in the GDR, seemed vague and generic to Protestants in the 
West.  And the complexities of West German political and social life seemed hopelessly 
abstract and irrelevant to Protestants in the East.  No one wanted to dispense with these 
East-West gatherings, with their powerful all-German symbolism.  However, Kirchentag 
leaders recognized that it was becoming difficult to generate real conversation and 
discussion between Protestants from the two German states.  Thematic unity was only 
possible by avoiding details, but this watered down the Kirchentag message almost to the 
point of irrelevance.  Members of the Kirchentag leadership considered a variety of 
solutions to this problem, including alternating between eastern and western themes on 
different days.  Yet none of these proposals gained substantial support.  In practice the 
problem was never really resolved.  Instead, entirely separate groups became responsible 
for planning the meetings in the East and West.  Some degree of superficial unity was 
maintained, but the content of discussions at the East and West German Kirchentag 
gatherings continued to diverge.7 
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Another frequent criticism involved the activities of the workgroup planning 
committees.  These committees, it was argued, were too large, with too many inactive 
members and too much turnover of personnel.  This made it difficult for them to really 
accomplish much real planning, and it led to a lack of continuity and thematic coherence 
from year to year, or even within a single Kirchentag.  Most Kirchentag leaders could 
agree that the organization needed smaller, more dedicated planning committees that 
could meet several times a year to discuss their topics, to choose speakers, and to critique 
these speakers’ contributions.8   
Since many other Protestant organizations, including the Protestant Academies, 
Men’s and Women’s Works, and Student Congregations were engaged in similar tasks, 
this also raised larger issues of coordination.  These lay-organizations had been actively 
involved in planning the first several Kirchentag meetings, but the phenomenal growth of 
the Kirchentag and the accompanying increase in last-minute planning, had made such 
cooperation difficult.  Most members of the Präsidium and Präsidialausschuss agreed that 
it was necessary to restore these contacts, if the Kirchentag was to have an informed and 
coherent program.   In particular, they hoped to find ways to work more closely with the 
Protestant Academies—Protestant think-tanks that addressed a wide variety of political 
and social issues.9  Eberhard Müller, a member of the Präsidium and the director of the 
Academy in Bad Boll, took the lead in encouraging and coordinating these efforts.  He 
stressed, however, that these plans would only be successful if the Kirchentag abandoned 
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its cycle of annual meetings, creating more time for planning and discussion.10  Tensions 
also arose between members of the Kirchentag leadership and other organizations that 
had been active in the earlier planning process.  Leaders of the Protestant Men’s Work, 
for example, were assured that they had a major role to play in organizing the Kirchentag.  
But as the Kirchentag’s own thematic and workgroup leadership committees were 
strengthened, this practical involvement was largely reduced to publicity and follow-up 
work.11  Many of these works and associations continued to hold their own sessions 
during the Kirchentag, but these became ever more distant from the official program. 
Another common criticism was that the Kirchentag did not have enough influence 
on the Protestant churches, individual congregations, or German society as a whole.  The 
workgroups, it was argued, needed to do more to popularize their ideas and insights 
beyond the scope of the Kirchentag meetings themselves.  Members of the leadership had 
several suggestions for how this could be accomplished.  Many German states already 
had Kirchentag State Committees [Landesausschüsse] that worked to promote the 
Kirchentag on a local and regional level.  Some hoped to expand and further develop 
these committees, giving them the task of follow-up work within the local churches.  
Others suggested that the Kirchentag should become more active in publishing religious 
and academic materials.  And, in order to exert more direct political influence, it was 
even suggested that the Kirchentag should establish an informal committee in the West 
                                                 
10 Hans Hermann Walz, “Vermerk.  Betr. Besprechung mit Pfarrer Dr. Eberhard Müller,” Bad 
Boll, 21 December 1954, EZA 71/86/131; Heinrich Giesen, Circular Letter, 24 November 1954, EZA 
71/86/131. 
 
11 On tensions with the Männerwerke in particular, see RvTT to Klaus von Eickstedt, 1 August 
1953, EZA 71/86/104; for more general discussion, see RvTT, Kommuniqué, 23 March 1955, EZA 
71/86/132; and Hans Hermann Walz, Vermerk, 6 December 1954, EZA 71/86/132. 
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German Bundestag.  Over the next several years, Kirchentag leaders pursued all of these 
ideas, with mixed success.12 
Finally, the variety of these criticisms and the discussion they generated made it 
obvious that different groups within the churches (and within the Kirchentag leadership) 
had very different expectations and goals for the Kirchentag itself.  Some wanted to focus 
more on evangelism, some on teaching and ministering to local church members.  Some 
wanted to emphasize the topics of German division and East-West reconciliation, while 
others thought this was a distraction from examining the problems of West German 
society.  For some, it was enough that the Kirchentag rally together believers in a public 
expression of their faith.  Others—in thinly veiled allusions to the Nazi past—complained 
about the dangers of such mass gatherings.13   
As they moved forward with their plans for the 1954 Kirchentag in Leipzig—
entirely within the GDR—Kirchentag leaders did not entirely abandon their institutional 
reform efforts.  The Leipzig Kirchentag would have a different focus from meetings in 
the West,  and it would be planned and coordinated by a special Eastern Committee 
[Ostausschuss], made up of prominent East German church leaders.14  The West German 
workgroup leaders, in turn, would take advantage of this time to better organize and 
coordinate their work for the next Kirchentag in the west.  With regard to the larger 
question of competing priorities, Reinold von Thadden continued his conciliatory efforts.  
In a meeting of the Ostausschuss in late 1953, he frankly acknowledged the tensions that 
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13 Präsidiums und Präsidialausschuss Sitzung.  Besprechungsgruppe III, 14 November 1953, EZA 
71/86/22; “Abschrift aus der “Junge Kirche” vom 15. Sept. 1953,” EZA 71/86/22. 
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existed between the various functions of the Kirchentag.  But he insisted it was best to 
remain open-minded and responsive to events, allowing God to set the organization’s 
priorities.15 
Even apart from the massive gathering in Leipzig, 1954 was an eventful year for 
the Kirchentag.  In the middle of the year, Otto-Heinrich Ehlers, who had managed the 
day-to-day business of the Kirchentag operation since 1950, left for a job in private 
industry.16  He was replaced by Hans Hermann Walz, the deputy director of the 
Ecumenical Institute at Bossey and the leader of the World Council of Churches’ 
Secretariat for Lay-Work.17  Walz had been involved with the planning for the 
Evangelische Woche of 1949, but he had not been active with the Kirchentag since that 
time.  He brought to the position of General Secretary a broader, more ecumenical vision 
of the church and a more academic and policy-oriented mindset.  Whereas Ehlers had 
worked strictly on the business side of the Kirchentag, leaving content-related issues to 
Heinrich Giesen, Walz would be actively involved in the process of setting the 
intellectual tone of future gatherings.  In particular, he would be instrumental in forging 
contacts between the Kirchentag workgroups and policy experts in the universities. 
The end of 1954 also saw the publication of the Evangelisches Soziallexikon by 
the Kirchentag’s workgroup on the economy and society.  Conceived as an extension of 
the basic work of the Kirchentag, this thousand-page reference work was intended to 
guide and inform German Protestant attitudes in all areas of social life.  In doing so, it 
was also an attempt to demonstrate the essential unity of Protestant social thought despite 
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the differences that existed between different factions in the church.  As Friedrich 
Karrenberg, the volume’s editor, argued:  
The fact that such a high degree of consensus can be reached, despite all 
confessional and political differences that so often burden our life in the church 
and the state, shows that the frequently asserted disunity and lack of direction of 
German Protestantism does not exist, at least not in this area.   
 
By creating the common ground for a discussion of Germany’s social problems, 
Karrenberg further hoped to encourage Protestants to exercise “genuine responsibility in 
all essential areas of daily life.”18 
This was the first of many similar reference works published under the aegis of 
the Kirchentag, and it demonstrated a new commitment to disseminating and transmitting 
ideas from the Kirchentag workgroups to a wider audience.  It was followed shortly 
thereafter a wide array of other guides, including Heinrich Giesen’s devotional and 
instructional books, Der mündige Christ and Wenn man dich fragt nach Glauben und 
Leben and Hans Hermann Walz and Franklin Littell’s ecumenical Weltkirchenlexikon.  
Starting in 1956, the Kirchentag also began to work with Kreuz Verlag in Stuttgart on the 
professional publication of the yearly Kirchentag proceedings.19 
After Leipzig, the Präsidium further clarified its commitment to institutional 
reform, deciding not to hold any Kirchentag meeting in 1955.  During this break, the first 
real time off since 1949, Kirchentag leaders worked to address major personnel changes, 
to continue to implement the reform ideas of 1953, and to rethink the content of the next 
meeting, set for 1956 in Frankfurt.  This time was also used to reexamine basic questions 
                                                 
18 Friedrich Karrenberg, “Foreword,” Freidrich Karrenberg, ed, Evangelisches Soziallexikon 
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about the organization of the Kirchentag itself, a process that culminated in November 
1955 in a new set of institutional by-laws.  These new rules re-emphasized the 
independence of the Kirchentag from the EKD and the state churches (something that 
was originally an accident), reaffirming its position as a financially and legally separate 
entity.  They also diminished the formal role of the bishops and other church officials in 
the Kirchentag leadership.  And they worked to clarify the relationship between various 
offices and leadership committees.20    
The new by-laws of 1955 confirmed the position of the Präsidium as the 
Kirchentag’s highest governing body.  This committee was responsible for general 
oversight of the entire Kirchentag organization, and it retained final say over every 
important decision.  Under the leadership of the President, the Präsidium also included 
two vice presidents, the chair and vice chair of the finance committee, and as many as 
eight additional members.  Five of these were nominated by the Kirchentag officers and 
elected by the Präsidialversammlung—a larger committee directly beneath the Präsidium.  
The other three were chosen directly by the Präsidium members themselves.  The 
Präsidialversammlung, or governing assembly, replaced the earlier Präsidialausschuss 
and Beirat.  It included all of the members of the Präsidium and the finance committee, 
the chairs and as many as six other representatives of the Kirchentag State Committees, 
the two chairs of every workgroup, and both Kirchentag General Secretaries.  It could 
also include as many as ten representatives from the various Protestant lay-works and 
associations, and as many as fifteen other individuals chosen by its membership.  The 
                                                 
20 Karl Kupisch, Quellen zur Geschichte des deutschen Protestantismus von 1945 bis zur 
Gegenwart, Vol. 1 (Hamburg: Siebenstern Taschenbuch Verlag, 1971), 103-110; see also Harald Schroeter, 
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Präsidialversammlung provided the Kirchentag with something approximating a 
democratic basis.  Its members elected the Kirchentag president, the vice presidents, and 
most of the other members of the Präsidium.  Apart from this, however, its role was 
largely advisory.  Beneath the Präsidialversammlung a new even larger group, known as 
the Kuratorium, was also formed.  This group served as a sort of “friends of the 
Kirchentag” organization, promoting and publicizing its work.21 
Under the new organizational by-laws, the Kirchentag president retained a great 
deal of power.  As the public face of the entire organization, he was responsible for 
maintaining high-level relations between the Kirchentag, the state churches, and the two 
German states.  The president also retained veto power over the decisions of all other 
Kirchentag committees.  He was aided in his work by the Präsidialrat—an executive 
committee within the Präsidium—and by the General Secretaries, who were responsible 
to the president and the Präsidium alone.  The General Secretaries, in turn, had the task of 
overseeing the day-to-day work of the Kirchentag organization and the thematic planning 
for each Kirchentag gathering.  They were also responsible for coordinating the efforts of 
the individual workgroups, called into semi-permanent existence by the Präsidium in 
order to address specific topics and subject areas during the Kirchentag meetings.  “It is 
the task of the workgroups,” the by-laws explained, “to take positions rooted in Christian 
responsibility on the major questions of our time, in the areas of the church, political, 
social, and cultural life.  In particular, this is intended to help the lay-membership of the 
church . . . to take their tasks in the church and the world seriously.”22  In order to better 
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Gegenwart, Vol. 1 (Hamburg: Siebenstern Taschenbuch Verlag, 1971), 109. 
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coordinate these groups, the leaders of each workgroup would also meet together under 
the General Secretaries as part of a newly formed Workgroup Leadership Committee, 
working to ensure the intellectual coherence and thematic unity of each Kirchentag 
meeting.  In this task, both the General Secretaries and the Workgroup Leaders were 
expected to work closely with the Protestant Academies and any other public groups 
whose knowledge could contribute to a better Kirchentag program.23 
While many aspects of this structure were similar to the provisional structure of 
the Kirchentag since 1951, the clearer designation of different levels of leadership and 
their respective responsibilities led to much smoother functioning in the future.  The 
Workgroup Leadership Committee, in particular, brought together planning functions that 
had previously been widely dispersed across multiple levels of leadership, formalizing 
them in one place.  This, in turn, led to far more coherence and continuity in the year-to-
year messages and overall themes.  Many open questions remained about the purpose and 
goals of the Kirchentag, especially in the disagreements between those who wanted to 
prioritize all-German gatherings and those who wanted to focus more on the 
circumstances in the West.  But the concrete practical problems that had plagued the 
Kirchentag since the beginning were finally brought under control.  This left the 
Kirchentag leadership with more time to devote to questions of content. 
 
THE CHURCH IN THE WORLD 
Since its beginning in 1949, the Kirchentag had been dedicated to gathering 
German Protestants together to strengthen their faith and to equip them for service in the 
world.  Yet the world in which German Protestants found themselves in 1955 was quite 
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different from the world of 1949.  In the middle of the “economic miracle” and the 
rapidly changing social structures that came in its wake, older models of the church 
seemed less relevant to everyday life.   
Nearly every church-political faction of the early 1950s had shared the belief that 
society was urgently in need of a faith-based transformation.  Barthians might frame this 
need in personal and existential terms while more conservative Protestants worked for a 
Volkskirche and a new CDU-led alliance of throne and altar.  But all of these groups saw 
Christian faith as the only solution to the pressing problems of the postwar world.  Yet, 
events had begun to frustrate these assumptions.  This emphasis on the centrality of 
personal faith to the problems of the social and political world seemed relevant but 
impossible to implement in the communist East.  In the complex and prosperous society 
of the West, on the other hand, faith often seemed increasingly unrelated to real world 
problems. 
By the mid-1950s, many Kirchentag leaders had come to the conclusion that they 
would need to adapt to these new circumstances if they were to have any resonance at all 
outside of a narrow spectrum of active church members.  They did not abandon their 
optimistic belief in the centrality and transforming power of faith, but they recognized 
that this was harder to see in the modern world.  Over the next several years, they 
developed two responses to this challenge.  First, they worked to promote a more vibrant, 
practical, everyday faith that was not limited by the conventions of the past.  They hoped 
that by modeling this faith at the Kirchentag, they could also transform local 
congregations into something more in line with modern reality.  Second, they worked to 
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better understand the workings of the modern world.  Convinced that faith was still 
relevant, they sought to rediscover this in the concrete details of modern life.   
This change in emphasis was gradual, starting in the mid-1950s and continuing 
into the middle of the following decade.  The Kirchentag of 1956 in Frankfurt took place 
in the midst of these changes.  Although it represented less of a departure from the past 
than many of its organizers had hoped, retaining the old workgroup divisions and many 
older themes, Frankfurt also saw the emergence of a new perspective on these perennial 
problems.  These new approaches, as well as their limits, are clear in two programmatic 
speeches addressed to Kirchentag planners in early 1955. 
In a sermon to the theme selection committee in January, the pastor Adolf 
Sommerauer spoke on the authority and the relevance of the church in the modern 
world.24  Rather than simply asserting this relevance, as many speakers at earlier 
gatherings had done, Sommerauer began by questioning it.  The slogan of the 1956 
Kirchentag would be “Be Reconciled with God,” he pointed out; but what right did the 
church have to command this action?  Wasn’t the man on the street right to greet this 
command with skepticism?  What gave the church the authority to demand this kind of 
response?25 
According to Sommerauer, the church was not prepared to answer these 
questions.  It had lost its ability to communicate with the common man.  It was too 
focused on abstract and scholarly theological questions to concern itself with practical, 
useful theology.  “I don’t think that one can comfort oneself,” he argued, “by saying: ‘But 
we know what theology is, it’s just that the others don’t believe what we are saying.’”  
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25 “Themenausschuss der Arbeitsgruppen,” 24-26 January 1955, EZA 71/86/131. 
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The problem was deeper and more fundamental.  The church had ceased to be a living 
organism.  It had lost any connection to ordinary people, especially industrial workers 
and others heavily involved in modern economic and social structures.  Indeed, many 
were so alienated, he argued, that they “no longer even feel friendship toward the 
church.”  The church would only be able to reach these people, he concluded, through a 
new, practical theology that was not limited to sermons and theological propositions, but 
instead found its expression in the experience of belief and the consciousness of 
belonging to the body of Christ.26 
These ideas were not entirely new.  The Kirchentag had always been home to 
evangelistic appeals that sought to connect with the everyday lives of ordinary people.  
But it did reinforce an important, though subtle, shift in emphasis.  Even at the 
Kirchentag, many earlier sermons had started from the perspective of theological truth, 
assuming that this theology would work itself out more or less automatically in the real 
world.  Sommerauer, by contrast, acknowledged the growing divide between the church 
and the people.  De-emphasizing formal theology and dogmatic instruction, he sought to 
bridge this division through a more active, lively, and existential form of faith. 
Two months later, in a speech to the workgroup leaders, Hans Hermann Walz also 
called for the Kirchentag to engage more concretely and more critically with the 
problems of the modern world.  Walz had spent his first several months on the 
Kirchentag staff going over the transcripts and documents of the earlier Kirchentag 
gatherings.  In this study, he found much to commend, but he also saw some very serious 
weaknesses.  In particular, he praised the Kirchentag for its role in bringing together 
Protestant believers to celebrate their faith.  And he identified several important ideas that 
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had emerged in Kirchentag workgroups.   These included the call to greater Christian 
responsibility in social and political life and the belief that the church should take a more 
active role in the world.  But the workgroups, he argued, needed to go beyond this level 
of discussion.  In the past, they had been content merely to meet together and to declare 
their interest in the world’s problems.  However: “Little new was said in them, they 
seldom arrived at a straightforward position in their discussions of the big, divisive 
questions of church and public life, and their content—in terms of the message of the 
Kirchentag—could not be seen building on itself from year to year.”27   Now, Walz 
argued, the workgroups needed to be more systematic and more matter of fact in their 
approach, striving for concrete and practical answers to the problems they addressed.  To 
be sure, some of these answers would be found the spiritual elements of the Kirchentag 
program: “in penance and adoration before God.”  But Kirchentag planners also needed 
to look for answers “in life in the world, in wrestling with personal, social, political, and 
cultural problems.”28 
In practice, Walz argued, this new direction had three implications for the 
practical work of the Kirchentag planners.  First, the workgroup leaders needed to have 
“good antennas,” “the ability to feel the pulse of the church, society, and the Volk in 
which we live.”  Rather than starting from a theological standpoint, they needed to start 
by observing the world around them.  Second, they needed to be able to analyze and 
process these ideas, breaking them down into their component parts.  This would allow 
them to offer their listeners “practical advice” and even “astonishing new realizations.”  
And it would guide them in issuing “calls to common action.”  Finally, they needed to 
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radiate these ideas outward, so that they could make a difference in the everyday lives of 
ordinary people.29   
Walz also identified several “submerged” themes that needed to be given more 
attention at future Kirchentag meetings.  The first of these was the question of German 
guilt and the task of restitution.  Kirchentag workgroups needed to address German-
Jewish relations.  But they also needed to look at other issues such as colonialism and 
Third World development.  Second was the realization that the church in Germany was 
part of a larger, worldwide Christianity.  Christian brotherhood was not just relevant to 
the problems of German division; it carried responsibilities toward the problems of the 
entire world.30  
These new ideas had an immediate impact on the content of the Kirchentag, but 
they also ran up against certain degree of institutional inertia.  Already at the theme 
selection meeting in January, several Workgroup Leadership Committee members 
expressed dissatisfaction with the overarching theme of reconciliation, believing that it 
tied their hands and prevented them from exploring more thorough changes to the 
existing workgroup structure.  But within this somewhat constricted framework, they also 
began to address more practical questions.31   
These changes were most obvious in discussions of politics and life in the 
“world.”  But there was also a somewhat subtler empirical and practical shift in the 
workgroup on the church.  In preparing for their 1956 gathering, this workgroup did not 
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try to supplant the perspective of everyday life with a more spiritual or otherworldly 
perspective.  Instead it worked to show that God was already present and active in human 
affairs.  God had affirmed the world, both in its creation and its redemption, and he 
desired a relationship with humanity.  Summarizing the group’s ideas, the physicist 
Günther Howe wrote, “God says yes to modern man in his internal divisions, in his 
schizophrenia; yes, to the man who is so different from the one the pastor imagines sitting 
beneath his pulpit.”  But God’s affirmation of the world did not stop with the individual 
person.  “God also says yes to this world and its power groupings,” Howe continued, “He 
makes these things right: nations, states, parties, economic groups and all the rest. . . . 
God also says yes to nature.”32  This was not an affirmation of the status quo.  The world 
still needed Christ on both an individual and systemic level.  But God worked with and 
not against his creation, and Christians were called to do the same. 
During the Kirchentag itself, this argument was advanced by Dr. Weber of 
Göttingen.  Weber contrasted God’s “yes” to the world, with humanity’s self-destructive 
tendencies inherent the world’s inhumane social structures and practices.  These 
tendencies were especially apparent, he argued, in the atom bomb and other forms of 
mechanized destruction.  But God’s affirmation of the world, he continued, worked 
against these tendencies.  God preserved the world, overruling humanity’s attempts to 
destroy it.  As God’s people on Earth, Christians, too, were called to help work out this 
“yes,” embracing human worth and creating a form of Christian humanism [Humanität], 
based on the work of Jesus Christ.33  Following Weber’s speech, the writer Rudolf 
Alexander Schröder elaborated on the same ideas.  Schröder began by reminding his 
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listeners of the historian Leopold von Ranke’s famous dictum that all eras were 
immediate to God.  This was not just true for history, he argued, but for every 
individual’s separate world of experience.  God desired to be in conversation and 
communion with every person in the world.  And nothing humans could do would deflect 
this interest.  This, he proclaimed, was reason to rejoice.  But it also carried a lesson for 
human actions in the world.  Human beings had a responsibility to view their own 
answers to the problems of the world—relations across the iron curtain, refugee and 
expellee politics, and questions of war and peace—in light of God’s “yes.”  In all of these 
areas, it was not right to pursue their own interests; instead they were called to work to 
accomplish God’s will.34 
This affirmation of the world and of modern reality characterized the entire 1956 
Kirchentag, not just the workgroup on the church.   Looking at the gathering in Frankfurt, 
the Münchener Merkur praised the “realistic impulse” and the “desire for rational 
compromises” that were apparent in the workgroups.  And the Mannheimer Morgen 
praised the “factual,” “passionate,” and “comprehensive” scope of its themes in their 
engagement with everyday life.  But other papers saw room for still more movement in 
this direction.  As the Westdeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung reported: “At the next 
Kirchentag, the increasing practicality [Sachlichkeit] of the listeners needs to be 
harmonized with the presentations.  But the Kirchentag threatens to grow beyond its 
resources.”35 
This shift toward the realistic and practical was temporarily interrupted in 1957 by 
the possibility of another Kirchentag wholly within the GDR.  Hoping to take advantage 
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of Stalin’s death and the short-lived thaw that followed, several church leaders, including 
Lothar Kreyssig and Martin Niemöller, began to test the waters for a possible Kirchentag 
in Thuringia or Saxony.  With the approval of Otto Nuschke, the Deputy Minister 
President of the GDR and the leader of the CDU-East, these efforts culminated in an 
invitation from the GDR authorities to hold a decentralized Kirchentag simultaneously in 
Weimar, Erfurt, and Eisenach.   But they soon became a casualty of the rapidly shifting 
political winds in post-Stalinist Eastern Europe.  Already at the Frankfurt Kirchentag, 
these plans were dealt a setback, when the preferential treatment of West German 
politicians and the supposed snubbing of Nuschke enraged both the East German press 
and the organs of the neutralist church faction in the West.  As East German hardliners 
worked to reassert their control, they also undermined Nuschke’s apparently sincere 
efforts to work with the Kirchentag.  In February 1957, the East German Politburo 
formally decided to halt the Kirchentag plans, hoping to do so in a way that would deflect 
any blame onto the Kirchentag leadership.  From this point forward, planning activities 
for the Kirchentag were hindered, and severe demands were made to control the choice of 
speakers.  By late spring it had become clear that the Kirchentag would not go forward, 
and the Präsidium members found themselves scrambling to fend off the attacks of 
Niemöller and other members of the Protestant Left.36 
These events reinforced the difficulty of trying to simultaneously serve the needs 
of Protestants in both German states.  With the failure of their efforts in the East, the 
Präsidium turned with renewed vigor to the question of Kirchentag reform in the west.  
                                                 
36 Dirk Palm, “Wir sind doch Brüder!,” 247-253; see also “Protokoll: Arbeitstagung des Deutchen 
Evangelischen Kirchentages am 24./25.9.1956 in Berlin,” EZA 71/86/149, the various correspondence 
related to the collapse of the Thuringian Kirchentag in EZA 71/86/480 and the collected press reports in 
EZA 71/86/297 and EZA 71/86/282. 
 
 186
Friedrich Lahusen, the Bremen businessman who served as the Kirchentag’s West 
German vice president, used this opportunity to call for greater clarity with regard to the 
Kirchentag’s task.  The fact that God had, in the past, given the Kirchentag a major role 
to play in East-West relations, he argued, did not mean that it was forever trapped in such 
a role.  Instead, the Kirchentag needed to change with the changing times.  Calling for 
greater independence from the state churches and from the Protestant Works and 
Associations, Lahusen argued that the Kirchentag should focus its efforts on reaching out 
to the nominal Protestants, for whom the Kirchentag was their only remaining contact 
with the church.  He also argued that the Kirchentag should continue its engagement with 
the problems of the modern world.37 
In order to work through these issues, the Präsidium decided not to hold another 
major Kirchentag until 1959.  In lieu of major Kirchentag gathering in 1958, they decided 
to instead sponsor a conference of Protestant academics and experts, where they could 
develop ideas and approaches for better integrating Christian faith with the realities of 
modern life.  The theme of this “Kirchentag Congress” would be nothing less than 
“Reality Today,” referring to “the need to draw up a balance sheet for the overall 
situation and to determine anew the tasks of German Protestantism, the church, and the 
Kirchentag.”38 
In approaching this daunting task, Walz and the members of the Workgroup 
Leadership Committee continued the Kirchentag’s shift toward a more empirical 
perspective.  This shift was subtle but significant.  Rather than viewing the church and 
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the world as entirely separate spheres, they saw them as interrelated.  Rather than trying 
to wholly transform the world by the power of faith, they worked to discover the 
manifestations of faith already in the world—to identify those places where the world 
was already looking to the church for answers.  Instead of asserting their relevance in the 
world, they posed this relevance as a question.  Their task, in short, was to try to answer 
this question as concretely and specifically as possible.   
They began this task in earnest in October 1957 at a major planning meeting in 
Arnoldshain.  During the course of this meeting, speakers began to lay out the agenda for 
the upcoming congress and to set up new themes and topics for the Kirchentag as a 
whole.  Speaking on “The Protestant Church at the End of the Modern Era,” the Hamburg 
theologian Hans Rudolf Müller-Schwefe argued that the church needed to wholly 
reconceptualize its self-understanding.  The Protestant churches had perfectly embodied 
the general tendencies of the modern era: individualism, the fragmentation of 
perspectives and worldviews, and the opposition between man and nature, between 
theology and real life.  But the church struggle of the Third Reich had shown the 
limitations of this model of the church, as many Christians had too readily identified the 
Kingdom of God with the Kingdom of the World.  Now, however, the modern world was 
at its end, giving way to the age of the masses.  And in this new era of history, the church, 
too, had a new set of tasks.  It was not enough to simply adapt itself to the new era, 
embracing a new set of values in place of the old.  The experiences of the confessing 
church taught that the church was not to be anchored in any one worldview.  Instead, he 
argued: “The church is the experience of the Kingdom of God that is always moving 
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towards completion.”39  The church’s task was to work this out in practice.  For German 
Protestants this meant rethinking their historical nationalism and confessionalism as well 
as their traditional teachings on war.  Living in an increasingly secular age, they also 
needed to renew the life of the churches themselves through the experiences of worship 
and the sacraments.   And they needed to maintain their distinct identity by avoiding the 
materialism of the surrounding culture.40 
The doctor Wilhelm Kütemeyer and the physicist Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker 
also addressed the relevance of the church to modern life, looking respectively at the 
social sciences and physics.  Both argued that the church had an indispensable role in 
modern scholarship, offering theological and ethical guidance in a world that had lost 
sight of individuality and humanity.  Since the time of Galileo, both argued, there had 
been an artificial division between faith and science.  But now this era was at its end.  
According to Kütemeyer, the question was not whether humanity would rediscover 
religion, it was the form that this rediscovery would take.  If Christians did not succeed in 
making people aware of the humanity of God and his presence in the world, then people 
would turn instead to other pseudo-religious systems.41  To Weizsäcker, Galileo had gone 
too far in claiming that science and mathematics were the ultimate measures of reality.  
Modern physics, he argued, had overcome this view.  In a world where physicists had the 
power to destroy the world, they had recognized their need for theological and ethical 
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guidance.  Now the only question was whether the church would engage with them in 
dialogue.42 
In another address, the philosopher and educational reformer Georg Picht 
elaborated on the relationship between theology and philosophy, advocating a vibrant, 
existential faith in place of the rigid orthodoxy and institutional constraints of the past.  
He began his argument by blaming the church itself for the “sickness” of the world.  The 
history of theology, he explained, demonstrated the ways in which God’s divine truth had 
been forced to conform to human philosophical categories.  In the process it had lost its 
power to challenge and transform.  The church had become a rigid institution that had 
little relevance to daily life.  And the intellectual, cultural, and spiritual traditions of the 
church had been secularized, becoming detached from God’s transcendence.  Now, in 
this secular world, people were searching for meaning and inspiration that could only 
come from God.  But the churches were often too concerned with worldly power to offer 
this to them.  Or, on the other extreme, they were too otherworldly and detached from 
life.  Instead they needed to bridge this divide between ontology and eschatology, 
between lived reality and God’s unfolding history.  This task, Picht asserted, would not 
be accomplished through theology, but through the concrete, everyday expression of the 
love of one’s neighbor.43 
Summarizing these ideas for his own notes, which were later circulated to 
members of the planning committee, the Präsidium member and physicist Günther Howe 
described the modern reality in which the church found itself.  As Nietzsche had argued, 
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God was dead in the modern world, and it was the church itself that had killed him.  
Drawing on Heidegger and Karl Barth, Howe argued that Protestants had reduced their 
conception of God to mere “religious experience,” conforming themselves to the “spirit 
of modernity.”  And by losing the concept of God, the Protestant churches had 
contributed to two further problems in modern society.  First, without any concept of 
God, the world had also destroyed and debased the image of man.   Second, it had lost its 
grounding in reality.  Physics had become divorced from morality and ethics.  The death 
of God—and the absence of the archetypical father figure—had led to a psychological 
crisis of authority.  In both German states, politics had been reduced to an anti-humanist, 
valueless technocracy.  Art had become unmoored from any religious or humanist 
tradition.  Traditional understandings of society and social class had become obsolete, but 
had not been replaced by anything better.  To Howe and the other Kirchentag leaders, the 
church alone could restore the world’s conception of reality, by pointing to its ultimate 
foundation in God.44 
Drawing together approximately 500 professors, scientists, and intellectuals, the 
Kirchentag Congress of April 1958 sought to concretely address these problems.  
Kirchentag leaders hoped that these discussions would rejuvenate the lay movement, 
bringing unrest and dynamism to the church.  But they knew that this would require a 
willingness to think in new directions.  The Congress began with several opening 
speeches on “Aspects of Reality.”  These speeches addressed several areas of life that the 
Kirchentag had not previously explored.  Besides looking at older Kirchentag themes, 
such as the church and political life, they addressed modern realities in anthropology, 
communication, art, and physics.  After these opening speeches, attendees met in eight 
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discussion groups (corresponding to the above themes but also including education, 
society, and the economy).  Here they were encouraged to discuss the issues of modern 
reality as frankly and openly as possible.  In order to ensure a wide ranging discussion, 
group leaders were instructed: “No boundaries should be imposed on the radicalism of 
the questioning, there should be no taboos with regards to content.”45  Although few of 
these speeches or discussions were truly radical, they did help to push the Kirchentag in 
new directions.  At the very least, they suggested new ways of thinking about the church 
and the world.  And they made the Kirchentag leadership aware of new realities that 
could no longer be ignored.   
In his opening speech on the church, for example, the Hamburg missions director 
Walter Freytag, questioned the church’s traditional role and traditional boundaries.  
Instead of focusing on the German Volkskirche of the past, he drew attention to the 
church outside of Germany, outside the walls of the church building, and outside of 
traditional theology.  The church as whole, the worldwide community of all Christian 
believers, he argued, had spread across the world, taking hold in a vibrant way in Africa 
and Asia.  But at the same time, the churches in Europe had shrunk.  Rather than being 
the religion of the majority in one part of the world, Christianity was becoming a 
minority religion spread across the entire globe.  This reality had implications for the 
church’s activities.  “From a human perspective,” Freytag argued, “there is no hope of 
Christianizing the world in the way that our fathers considered self-evident.”46  On the 
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other hand, Christian ideas and Christian vocabulary had been appropriated by non-
Christians in countless different areas.  This created new opportunities for dialogue.  As 
Freytag continued: “No newspaper in the world, no political propaganda manages 
without Christian vocabulary.  Social justice, brotherhood, humanity, and peace are 
examples.  They have been detached from their Christian roots and their meanings have 
changed.  But one cannot do without them, if one wants to gain a following.”47   
According to Freytag, the boundaries that separated German Protestants from 
other parts of the body of Christ, from Catholics and Orthodox, Fundamentalists and 
Enthusiasts [Schwärmer] were also obsolete.  All of these different denominations and 
confessions had their place in the body of Christ.  All needed to be accepted.  And even 
within German Protestantism itself, there were divisions to overcome.  Christians in 
western society often found themselves divided into two major groups: those whose 
belief was rooted in personal faith and those who were rooted primarily in the outward 
trappings of Christian culture.  In one sense, Freytag argued, only the former were the 
real church.  But, he continued, perhaps this perspective was too narrow.  Perhaps these 
groups were not so clearly separate from each other.  Certainly in times of crisis—for 
instance during extreme moments of anti-religious persecution in the GDR—many 
cultural Christians had taken brave stands for faith.  Rather than thinking of these people 
as second-class Christians, perhaps they should be seen as the church’s front courtyard or 
as a bridge to the rest of the world.48  In conclusion, Freytag argued that the church could 
not be limited by human categories.  There was no right model of the church for all 
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places and times.  Instead of being judged by their location or organization or theology, 
churches needed to be judged by their effectiveness in proclaiming and embodying the 
gospel of Jesus Christ in the world.49 
Other speeches challenged the church to come to terms with other aspects of 
modern reality, including the insights of psychoanalysis, sociology, and anthropology.  
Yet it was the discussions that followed these speeches that had the greatest effect on the 
Kirchentag’s self-understanding.  As much as they pushed in new directions, the 
programmatic speeches that opened the Congress could be made to fit within the existing 
agenda of the Kirchentag planners.  Their insights could be appropriated into older 
models of the church in society without requiring fundamental changes.  Indeed on the 
most basic level, most assumed that the churches and the Kirchentag could maintain their 
position as the agenda-setters of Protestant culture.  However, the open discussions that 
took place during the Kirchentag Congress presented a much more fundamental 
challenge to this model.  In many discussion groups, there were no easy answers to be 
found.  Instead, these discussions highlighted the complexity and stubbornness of the 
problems themselves. 
Summarizing discussions in the “Anthropology section,” for example, Hans 
Schomerus wrote: “The discussion . . . was, at first, disappointing overall.”  Speakers, he 
continued, seemed to completely misunderstand each other and to mischaracterize each 
other’s arguments.  There was little agreement between them.  And they could not come 
up with a common program for solving society’s problems.  On the other hand, however, 
they had a very fruitful discussion when they turned from problem solving to diagnosis.  
Discussion participants could agree on the areas where the Protestant church had lost 
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touch with “reality.”50  Other section reports were not quite as dramatic, but they, too, 
demonstrated that it was easier to discover problems than solutions.  The Kirchetag 
Congress had generated a variety of new questions and new ways of thinking about the 
world, but it had not provided any easy answers.  
Yet this was itself an important development, helping to push the Kirchentag in 
new directions both thematically and stylistically.  In their assessments of the Congress, 
both Thadden and Walz emphasized the good that had come out of these discussions.  As 
Thadden acknowledged in the Foreword to the Congress’s published proceedings: 
The people who speak here from positions of academic and practical experience 
have not discovered the simple redemptive formula that many may have expected, 
but they have recognized and clearly articulated the fact that, precisely the 
diversity of modern experiences of reality, forces us to remain in close human 
contact and academic dialogue.51 
 
Walz also praised the positive atmosphere of the congress, more than its specific 
findings and conclusions.  “In our complicated world,” he argued, “even the simplest 
message often requires long and difficult preparation.”  In the past, he continued, the 
Kirchentag had conducted this preparatory work within a small circle of planners and 
leaders.  But the Kirchetag Congress represented a broadening of these planning circles, 
“an attempt to enlist a broader public in this work.”  This task would be difficult, and the 
Kirchentag still needed to work out a proper balance. 
We can only understand reality improperly, speaking in concepts, which 
encompass us more than we understand them.  When we operate on different 
conceptual levels, the confusion is made complete.  But on the other side, there is 
the danger of premature harmonization, of schematizing things according to a pre-
                                                 
50 Ibid., 109-111. 
 
51 RvTT, “Foreword” in Ibid. 
 
 195
existing template.  Perhaps, in order to avoid this danger, we went a little too far 
in the opposite direction.52 
 
Looking back a month later, Walz had drawn several lessons from this 
experience, coming to see the Congress as the model for a new type of Kirchentag.  The 
sometimes-confusing plurality of perspectives at the Kirchentag Congress, he concluded, 
was not a problem to be avoided.  Instead, it reflected the strength and diversity of 
Protestant thought.  The Kirchentag was not simply a public expression of Protestant 
identity or a gathering devoted to Volksmission.  It was a place of meeting where 
Protestants from all perspectives and walks of life could come together, in all of their 
disunity and diversity, to carry out a conversation with one another and to engage in 
dialogue with the world.53  This shift in perspective—as much as the contents of any 
individual discussion—would set a new tone for the future of the Kirchentag. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The Kirchentag gatherings of the early 1950s emphasized the transformative 
power of faith, offering Christian salvation as the immediate solution to all of the world’s 
problems.  Yet, this universalizing narrative, which had enjoyed substantial public 
resonance in the immediate postwar period, and continued to enjoy resonance in the 
GDR, had lost much of its appeal to West Germans by the middle of the 1950s.  The 
problems of society were simply too complex to be understood only as the manifestations 
of individual spiritual life.  In order to maintain their relevance in these new 
circumstances, the leaders of the Kirchentag were forced to adapt.  They did not abandon 
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their belief in the importance of personal salvation—which remained the central premise 
upon which all of their activity was based.  But they looked for ways to better understand 
the world’s problems on their own terms.  And they sought concrete expressions of faith 
that would speak directly to the circumstances in which people found themselves. 
The institutional reforms that the Kirchentag adopted in the mid-1950s were an 
important first step in this transformation.  As long as the Kirchentag lacked well-defined 
procedures and organizational structures, it was impossible for its workgroups to engage 
consistently in this kind of concrete, fact-based discussion.  But with more time, better-
delineated responsibilities, and increased cooperation with academics and subject-matter 
experts, workgroup leaders could plan a coherent program that developed and built upon 
the discussions of the preceding years.   
The increased difficulty of holding Kirchentag gatherings in the East also 
contributed to this shift in emphasis.  Prior to the collapse of plans for the 1957 
Kirchentag in Thuringia, the Kirchentag leadership had been severely divided between 
those who wanted to prioritize Protestant All-German unity and those who wanted to 
develop a more sophisticated intellectual program.  While this division was not fully 
overcome until the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961, the failure of the 1957 
Kirchentag decidedly helped the case of those who wanted to focus on the circumstances 
in the West. 
In their efforts to rediscover the relevance of faith in the modern world, 
Kirchentag leaders in the late 1950s did not abandon their earlier interest in Volksmission 
and evangelism.  Instead, they worked to root these tasks more concretely in the realities 
of modern life.  Rather than offering a one-size-fits-all program, they hoped to speak to 
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the individual circumstances of their audience.  But this empirical turn had unintended 
consequences.  This process of questioning their own theological assumptions and 
working to reconcile their theological assertions with everyday reality, did not lead to 
easy answers.  Instead it offered a new, more flexible and more tentative model for the 
activity of the church in the world.  As Walz observed after the 1958 Kirchentag 
Congress, there simply was no one Protestant worldview or one Protestant answer to the 
world’s problems.54  But this did not have to be seen as a problem.  The Kirchentag did 
not need to be a source of simple answers.  Instead it could be a place where ordinary 
Protestants could ask their questions, where they could discuss and argue with each other, 
where they could engage in dialogue with the world. 
 
54 Ibid.  
 
 
 
CHAPTER 6  
POLITICAL PLURALISM 
 
Between the middle of the 1950s and the middle of the 1960s, German Protestant 
political attitudes underwent a significant transformation.  Most devout Protestants in the 
early 1950s found themselves in broad agreement with the basic idea of Christian 
democracy: the belief that Christian faith and Christian morality were the only solid 
foundations for a postwar political system.  Because of this broad support for some form 
of Christian politics, most were drawn, at least at first, to the politics of the Christian 
Democratic Union (CDU) and Christian Social Union (CSU).  Indeed, the initial political 
division among Protestants was less between CDU/CSU and SPD voters, than between 
those who withdrew from politics altogether and those who embraced political activity as 
a Christian responsibility. 
This began to change as bitter debates over West German rearmament and the 
western integration policies of the Adenauer government created sharp divisions in the 
Protestant churches.  Many leading Protestants supported Adenauer’s policies, despite 
occasional misgivings and criticisms.  These supporters included prominent politicians, 
such as Hermann Ehlers and Eugen Gerstenmaier; leading churchmen, such as bishops 
Otto Dibelius, Hanns Lilje, and Hans Meiser; and Hans Asmussen, the former president 
of the EKD consistory.  Important lay-leaders such as Reinold von Thadden-Trieglaff and 
Eberhard Müller, were also generally supportive of the CDU’s westernization and 
rearmament policies.  But these policies also had their fierce Protestant critics, including 
politicians such as Gustav Heinemann and churchmen such as Martin Niemöller and 
Helmut Gollwitzer.  As the rearmament debates raged on throughout the first half of the 
1950s, the Protestant church found itself increasingly divided.1 
These divisions and their long-term repercussions can be seen particularly clearly 
in the career of Gustav Heinemann.  In the late 1940s, Heinemann was a leading 
Protestant politician as the CDU Mayor of Essen and as the Federal Interior Minister in 
Adenauer’s first cabinet.  He was also one of the most important lay-leaders in the 
Protestant church itself, serving as the president of the EKD synod.  But in 1950 he 
resigned his cabinet position in protest over the early rearmament measures of the 
government, becoming one of rearmaments’ most outspoken opponents.  In 1952 he left 
the CDU entirely, founding the All-German Peoples’ Party as a platform for the anti-
rearmament agenda.  For the next three years, he was a leading public figure in the 
grassroots anti-rearmament campaign, which ended in 1955 when the Federal Republic 
formally remilitarized under the aegis of NATO.  The same year, amid much controversy, 
Heinemann’s critics in the church stripped him of his leadership position, arguing that his 
actions had compromised the church’s official neutrality on the rearmament issue.  In 
1957 he joined the SPD, quickly rising to a position of party leadership, serving as justice 
minister during the turbulent late 1960s and as federal president from 1969 to 1974. 
Heinemann’s political journey was certainly more dramatic than that of most 
German Protestants, but it was in keeping with the overall trend.  While Protestant 
support for the CDU declined slightly between 1953 and 1969, support for the SPD grew 
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continually at a regular pace over the same period.  This was especially true among 
Protestants who were most actively involved in the churches.  In 1953, 21 percent of 
regular Protestant churchgoers identified themselves as supporters of the SPD.  This 
number rose to 29 percent by 1958 and 42 percent by 1965, peaking at 50 percent in 
1969.2 
This “social democratization” of German Protestantism was a complex process.  
Disillusionment with the politics of the CDU was not enough, in itself, to bring about this 
shift.  Indeed there were substantial barriers to Protestant-SPD cooperation.  The 
Protestant churches had a long history of hostility to the socialist worker’s movement.  
And, until 1959, the Social Democrats remained formally committed to Marxist ideology, 
with its atheistic worldview and anti-religious trappings.  In order to move beyond 
disillusionment, into real cooperation, Protestants needed to do more than just reject the 
ideas of the CDU.  They also needed to overcome their hostility toward the SPD.3  On an 
institutional level, this meant forging personal and professional contacts with leading 
socialists.  On an intellectual level, it required the creation of a common set of ideas, 
attitudes, and policy goals.  Finally, accepting the possibility of closer cooperation with 
the SPD required Protestants to rethink some of their fundamental assumptions about the 
nature of politics itself.  Rather than taking their own basic agreement on important 
political issues for granted, Protestants were increasingly forced to deal with the reality of 
significant political differences.  Only gradually did they shift from seeing these 
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differences as a problem to be overcome, to recognizing the positive value of political 
pluralism.   
 
TOWARD COEXISTENCE 
By 1956 all of these issues were coming to the fore.  Large numbers of Protestants 
were disillusioned by the bitter rearmament debates of the previous year and by the West 
German entry into NATO.  And increasing numbers were alienated by the social 
conservatism of the Adenauer CDU.  But Protestant relations with the SPD were still 
relatively cool.  While some Kirchentag leaders had long sought greater engagement with 
the SPD, their efforts had been hampered by a lack of personal contact and the scarcity of 
Protestant SPD members.  A few Protestant Social Democrats, such as Heinrich Albertz 
and Ludwig Metzger had played an active role in earlier Kirchentag meetings, but they 
were in the clear minority.  This began to change in the mid-1950s as the barriers 
between the SPD and the churches became more permeable.   
At the Frankfurt Kirchentag of 1956, contacts between Social Democratic and 
Protestant circles began to develop on both the popular and leadership levels.  In a change 
from previous gatherings, the emphasis here was less on evangelizing the working class 
than on forging real connections.  In a planning meeting for Frankfurt, leaders of the 
Hessian Landeskirche informed Hans-Hermann Walz of the importance of the SPD in 
local politics.  While they warned that these socialists were often hostile to the churches, 
they made it clear that many would still attend the Kirchentag.  The Kirchentag program 
would need to speak to these people.4  Communicating indirectly, through their contacts 
in the churches, members of the national SPD leadership, such as Wilhelm Mellies, also 
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expressed new interest in involvement at the Kirchentag, making it clear that they would 
welcome a formal invitation to attend.5 
This improvement in relations between the churches and the SPD was especially 
clear in the speeches of the Frankfurt Kirchentag’s political reception.  While local SPD 
leaders had occasionally spoken at such gatherings in the past, these speeches had tended 
to be defensive in tone, focusing on the need for tolerance between the churches and the 
SPD.  Speaking in Frankfurt, the SPD Minister President of Hessen, Georg August Zinn 
went much further in his attempts at rapprochement.  He began his talk by lavishly 
praising the role of the churches in German political life.  In particular, he lauded their 
active efforts on behalf of East-West reconciliation.  He also made it clear that the SPD 
respected the churches and accepted their important political role.  Even though it 
remained committed to religious tolerance for all, this was not based on indifference to 
the importance of religion.  Instead, tolerance was intended to secure the freedom of all 
people.  This idea of freedom, he continued, had its origins in Martin Luther, who defied 
the authority of church leaders, believing that every individual was directly responsible 
before God for his or her actions.  This same freedom lay at the heart of German 
democracy.  It was this freedom that gave Protestants at the Kirchentag the authority to 
work together with people from all segments of German society to solve their common 
problems.  Calling for Protestant cooperation with the SPD, Zinn concluded: 
We will work with each other, not against each other, as we attempt to solve our 
mutual problems in the areas of politics and society, economics and culture.  
When he returns home, every Kirchentag attendee should help in his own way in 
the construction of a united, free, and social Germany.6 
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Walter Kolb, the SPD mayor of Frankfurt, followed up on this call by 
highlighting some of the areas where Protestants and Socialists could work together.  
Praising the role of the Protestant churches in fostering German democracy, Kolb 
reminded his listeners of the 1848 Frankfurt Parliament in the Paulskirche, where the 
idea of German democracy had been born.  He went on to talk of the threat that nuclear 
destruction posed to the world.  Adopting the language of the Protestant Left and the 
Frankfurt Kirchentag’s slogan, “Be Reconciled with God,” Kolb acknowledged that only 
such reconciliation with God could avert the world’s destruction in nuclear war.  And he 
praised the efforts of German Protestants to work for this reconciliation between God and 
man and between the peoples of the East and West.7 
Finally, Theodor Heuß, the FDP Federal President, spoke on the freedom of the 
Protestant churches to pursue new forms of politics.  When Heuß’ own mentor, the 
minister and liberal politician Friedrich Naumann had attended SPD meetings in the 
1890s, he had been disciplined by the church authorities.  Only a few Protestants, such as 
the pastor Theodor von Wächter, had let their consciences lead them toward socialism 
and they had been treated as outcasts.  But now, in the Federal Republic, all Christian 
citizens had the freedom and the duty to follow their conscience in the political sphere.8 
This new openness to the SPD could also be seen in the themes and discussions of 
the political workgroup.  Here, German Protestants came to gradually embrace the value 
of political and social pluralism.  And they began to take seriously the criticisms that 
younger, more realistic SPD and FDP members were leveling against the Cold War 
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politics of the CDU.  Already in 1953, at the height of the West German rearmament 
debate, the Kirchentag’s political workgroup had begun to address the issue of social and 
political division.  This workgroup, on the forces that “poisoned” communal life, had 
given vent to the deep misgivings that most Protestants felt toward modern democratic 
politics.  While the CDU politician Ernst Lemmer had defended the virtues of democratic 
pluralism, Theodor Paul Pfizer, the mayor of Ulm, was more in line with the majority 
when he complained about the nefarious influence of special interest groups and divisive 
politics, calling instead for a return to a more organic community, governed by mature 
and responsible natural leaders.9 
Between 1953 and 1956, when the political workgroup returned to this theme, the 
divisions within German Protestantism had only become more extreme.  The bitterness 
surrounding the rearmament debates of the previous year and treatment of Heinemann by 
his conservative opponents in the EKD were still fresh in the minds of many German 
Protestants.  With the entry of the Federal Republic into NATO, the prospects for 
German unification also seemed increasingly distant.  Yet the theme of the Frankfurt 
Kirchentag was reconciliation—between God and man—but also between enemies and 
opponents in politics, in society, and in international diplomacy.  When they met in early 
1955 to plan for the upcoming Kirchentag, leaders of the political workgroup faced a 
clear challenge: how to concretely bridge this gap between the political realities of the 
late 1950s and the religious call to reconciliation. 
Several themes emerged out of this discussion: the question of just war, the role 
of groups and organizations “that stand between the state and the individual citizen,” “the 
message of Christianity in conflict with the model of the western world.”  But above 
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these diverse problems, bringing them all together was the concept of “coexistence.”  As 
the workgroup planners reported:  
The substantive question is this: can people with fundamentally different 
approaches to the forces that shape public life live together in one world, in one 
Volk, in one state?  And how is this life together to be constructed?  This question 
plays a role in foreign and domestic politics.  It also stretches into the realm of life 
together between Christians and non-Christians.  The result of reconciliation with 
God cannot be some universal human stew [Einheitsbrei], but instead can only be 
the effort to work out existing antagonisms in such a way that one also sees the 
fellow humanity of one’s opponent.10 
 
Since the term coexistence was politically explosive, especially in relation to inter-
German politics, where it implied an acceptance of political realities such as division and 
East German communism, the workgroup leaders resolved to avoid using the term.  But, 
meeting several times over the next few months, they were unable to agree on a more 
concrete and practical formulation of these ideas, beyond the fact that they wanted to 
apply their ideas to both foreign and domestic politics.11 
Eventually two topics emerged from their discussions.  The first, relating back to 
earlier misgivings about modern mass politics, centered around questions of social and 
political organization, the role of interest groups, and individual freedom.  The second, 
provocatively titled “How much should peace cost?”, dealt with the concrete ideological 
and political sacrifices that might be necessary to secure European peace and stability.  
This topic was later broadened to also look at relations between Christianity and other 
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religious and pseudo-religious worldviews, examining the question of whether (and how) 
they could get along.12 
Each of these topics, as they were presented at the 1956 Kirchentag, represented a 
mixture of new ideas and older Kirchentag themes.  The first, entitled “The Organized 
Person,” began with Günther Jacob, the church superintendent from Cottbus, who spoke 
of human existence within the atheistic system of the GDR as an attempt to hide from 
God.  Jacob attempted to expose the utopian illusions of this system, arguing that true 
freedom could only be found when people arrested their flight from God, returning to the 
Christian community of faith.13  This message was little changed from those of the 
Leipzig Kirchentag of 1954.   
Jacob was followed by the prominent liberal legal theorist Theodor Eschenburg, 
who spoke on the role of political organizations and interest groups in German society.  
While many previous Kirchentag speakers had focused primarily on the negative aspects 
of these organizations, Eschenburg presented a more nuanced view.  He began by 
defending the importance of these groups.  Without the freedom of association, the right 
to form such groups and parties, political freedom would not have developed in 
Germany.  And these groups continued to have an important “protective function” against 
abuses of power in modern society.  Eschenburg achknowledged that the explosion of 
self-serving and narrow interest groups could also cause problems.  As he conceded: 
“This disorienting abundance of overlapping organizations, with their more or less one-
sided demands, sometimes struggling against each other, sometimes working together in 
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constantly changing lines of battle, this causes great discomfort.”  Indeed, this discomfort 
had been so great in 1933 that a large number of German had embraced the Nazis, with 
their promise of one Führer, above all party interests.  But giving in to this discomfort 
had been disastrous.  “They let their organizational freedom be taken away,” he argued, 
“and thereby lost their political and personal freedom as well.”14 
The freedom to organize interest groups was, admittedly, open to abuse.  
Organizations could be misused and perverted in ways that also threatened individual 
freedom.  In their “organizational egoism,” “tendencies to self-justification,” and rivalries 
with one another, interests groups often lost sight of the common good.  And as the fronts 
between them hardened, real conversation and argument could become difficult.  At the 
same time, as interest groups gained power, their members often lost their individual 
freedom.  And this led to a division between the “organizers” and the “organized.”  When 
they were part of a larger group, individuals could even be manipulated to do things they 
would never do on their own.15 
The solution to these problems was not to be found in subordinating interest 
groups to state control, as was done in the Third Reich and the GDR.  But liberal 
democratic social models also faced challenges in the changing circumstances of the 
modern world.  “The liberal democracy of a relatively small upper-class, that limits itself 
to security and order,” Eschenburg argued, “functions differently than the democratic 
organization-state of our modern mass society.”16  Rather than complaining about the 
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problems of social and political organization, it would be necessary to work out a new 
system.  Political and welfare organizations were necessary in the modern world.  But 
Eschenburg believed that their place needed to be better delineated to guard against 
abuses.  In particular, he called for clearer lines between non-government and 
government organizations, criticizing the practice of elevating interest group officials to 
positions in the government itself.  He also argued that non-governmental organizations 
needed to exercise more self-restraint and respect for government leaders and that they 
needed to be subject to more oversight.  Both members of the Bundestag and ordinary 
interest group members needed more critically examine the claims and demands that 
these groups were making.17 
Several themes emerged in the discussion following these speeches.  Many 
listeners continued to think of social interest groups in broad, theological terms, calling 
on Christians to stand against the idols that made total claims upon them.  Others returned 
to debates about the respective places of passive and active resistance in the GDR.  
Rudolf von Thadden, the Göttingen historian and son of the Kirchentag president, argued 
for the need to apply these principles to the churches themselves, reorganizing them to 
meet the needs of modern society.  And several CDU members criticized Eschenburg for 
minimizing the political role of ordinary citizens and their organizations.  As the 
Bundestag member Elisabeth Schwarzhaupt argued, the existence of multiple interest 
groups was necessary “in a democracy, where the people are sovereign.”  These groups 
occupied a “pre-political space, where discussion and opinion-forming are weighted more 
heavily than the representation of interests.”  These groups needed to be encouraged, she 
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continued, since they promoted individuality, not the subordination of the individual to 
the masses.18 
The second topic of the 1956 political workgroup was the “cost of peace,” the 
sacrifices that might need to be made in order to coexist with others.  In many ways, this 
was also a continuation of earlier Kirchentag themes, especially insofar as it focused on 
the need for Cold War reconciliation.  But it represented a new approach to this topic in 
the Protestant churches.  Protestants had previously been divided between so-called 
“realists” in the CDU and “enthusiasts” around Heinemann and Niemöller.  By the mid-
1950s, however, as more “realistic” foreign policy thinkers emerged in the SPD and FDP, 
this division began to break down.  While CDU members had long promoted their Cold 
War ideology as the only alternative to complete pacifism and defenselessness, members 
of other parties now argued that it was the CDU that was being unrealistic in its foreign 
policy.  These thinkers began to define “realism” as a recognition of the permanence of 
German division and the need to work out some form of coexistence with the GDR and 
the Soviet Union.  In essence, they offered concrete policy ideas, rather than just 
theological principles, to those who wanted peace and reconciliation. 
These ideas were still very controversial in 1956.  Indeed, a correspondent for the 
right-leaning Protestant newspaper Christ und Welt proclaimed that the very question 
“What should peace cost?” was “treasonous.”19  Combining this topic with the question 
of Protestant relations with non-Christian religions was probably an attempt to diminish 
this scandal.  Yet in their own way, each of these topics pointed to a new desire among 
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German Protestants for concrete, practical rapprochement with their various opponents 
and rivals. 
The first speaker on this topic was Stephen Neill, an Anglican bishop in India.  
Neill began by laying out the fundamental problem for relations with non-Christian 
religions.  Christians believed that the lordship of Christ needed to be the basic starting 
point for all of their thinking.  How then could they get along with those who disagreed?  
Were they required to constantly oppose all of the ideas of eastern religions and western 
materialist ideologies?  Or could they find some common ground?  In response to these 
questions, Neill argued that every religious system contained some element of good.  
Hindus understood the nature of religious peace.  Buddhists understood political peace.  
Muslims understood the principle of brotherhood.  Marxists drew attention to real human 
suffering and need.  And western secularism had given rise to advances such as modern 
medicine.  All of these groups also stood opposed to Christians in various areas, but this 
should not rule out cooperation.  Rather than opposing these groups, Christians had a 
duty to seek out common ground, to engage in discussion, and to respectfully present 
them with the truth of Christianity.20 
Neill was followed by Karl Georg Pfleiderer, an FDP politician, diplomat, and 
leading critic of Adenauer’s foreign policy.  Pfleiderer began his presentation by looking 
at the disasters of German foreign relations in the twentieth century.  In one generation, 
he argued, Germany had gone from being a proud, efficiently-governed, scientifically-
leading, economically-growing nation to a position of defeat and division.  The Germans 
had committed terrible atrocities, turning the whole world against them.  And, he 
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concluded: “In the end, there stood our people defeated, broken, burdened with every 
kind of guilt.”21 
Pfleiderer emphasized the fact that this was not an accident: “It would be false to 
speak of destiny and fate and to leave it at that.  We will not speak of destiny and fate, but 
of our flaws, the mistakes that we made, the mistakes we must cast away and never again 
commit.”  “The worst error,” he continued, “lies in the clear fact that we devoted 
ourselves too attentively to everything that has to do with the state, the army, 
administration, and economics and too little—far too little—to everything related to 
politics and relations with other ‘powers.’”22  Germans had been self-centered.  They had 
ignored the interests of others and had denied that morality and ethics had any place in 
the world of foreign affairs.  And the German churches, too, had contributed to this, 
passively acquiescing to the state, when they should have been promoting a different 
agenda. 
The time for this, he argued, was past.  Now the church needed to be involved in 
the question of the future of Germany.  But it also needed to recognize that this was not 
just a German problem.  German division was part of a larger European and world 
problem, tied up with questions of European security, armament and disarmament, border 
disputes, political differences, questions of Soviet and American power, and the 
ideological dispute between communism and capitalism.  The citizens of other states, and 
not just Germans, had a stake in these issues.  In light of all of these competing interests, 
he continued, there was little hope for any immediate German reunification.  Negotiations 
between the East and West had broken down.  If they wanted to avert war, then, Germans 
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needed to recognize and accept this state of affairs.  They needed to rethink their foreign 
policy from the ground up.23 
This was not just a matter of resolving economic and political disagreements, 
especially when one considered relations with Eastern Europe.  Germans had carried out 
terrible atrocities on the eastern front.  In doing so, they had given up any claim to being 
a people of law or justice.  If they wanted to repair these relations, they needed to rebuild 
a foundation of trust with their eastern neighbors.  This would require them to adopt a 
more nuanced and realistic perspective.  Among other things, they needed to recognize 
that neither communism nor capitalism were monolithic systems.  Each contained 
internal diversity and was capable of changing gradually over time.  They also needed to 
recognize and accept the legitimate security needs of the Soviet Union.  And, they needed 
to open their economy to the east, developing trade with the Soviet Union and providing 
foreign aid to the underdeveloped nations of Asia.24   
Pfleiderer’s speech was intended to overcome East-West hostility, creating the 
basis for some kind of détente.  Yet the reactions of his audience demonstrated the 
concrete difficulties inherent in this task.  First and foremost among these, his audience 
was not willing to accept the status quo, especially when it came to German division.  
Instead, in an audience than included Otto Nuschke, the deputy minister president of the 
GDR and Hermann Kalb a CDU-East member of the GDR Volkskammer, most 
comments and questions focused on the unavoidable ideological opposition between 
Christianity and communism, the persecution of the East German churches, and the 
undemocratic practices of the GDR regime.  When Theo Schliep, a pastor from Rögatz, 
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directly challenged Nuschke and Kalb to allow free elections and freedom of the press, 
the room erupted in a flurry of applause and angry shouting.  Only after several minutes 
of trying to restore order was Nuschke able to respond to his critics.  Playing to his 
audience, he insisted that the East German state was not locked in opposition to the 
churches, in fact it provided them with financial support.  And he argued that the tension 
between East and West were wholly the result of the West’s continual threats of nuclear 
war.  In a round table discussion the following day, Kalb followed up on these ideas, 
defending the legitimacy of East German democracy and arguing that Walter Ulbricht 
would be more than willing to allow new, all-German elections if Adenauer would go 
along.  Other members of the round table were understandably skeptical of these claims, 
pointing out the difference between a democratic constitution and democratic practice.  
But all remained fixated on the primacy of the inter-German question.  On a popular 
level, at least, the ideal of coexistence had not yet supplanted the ideal of reunification.25 
The Frankfurt Kirchentag, however haltingly, had pointed in a new direction for 
Protestant politics.  Especially in its political workgroups, it represented an attempt to 
overcome the bitter divisions between the Protestant Right and Left, forging a new 
realistic political consensus.  But these attempts were not entirely successful.  As the 
newspaper Deutsche Woche of Munich reported: “The Kirchentag has shown that 
disputed matters can be discussed more rigorously in its environs than elsewhere, but also 
that it cannot fully detoxify or solve these problems.  Whoever came to Frankfurt with 
overly-high hopes will be disappointed.  This is where the idea of the Kirchentag as 
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forward-looking public breaks down.  Here are its boundaries.  It is a bridge, nothing 
more.”26 
Coverage in the conservative Protestant newspaper Christ und Welt, normally 
very favorable to the Kirchentag, was even more critical, reflecting a sense of betrayal.  
In one Kirchentag report, Hans Schomerus argued that the gathering had largely missed 
the point of its message “Be reconciled with God.”  Kirchentag attendees had been too 
caught up in their own political concerns, too superficial in their speeches and 
discussions, too self satisfied, too needlessly critical of the West and uncritical toward the 
East.  They had failed to see that reconciliation could not be brought about by human 
beings, neither by politicians nor by theologians playing at politics.  Instead, the 
reconciliation that German Protestants sought could only be found in God, in the 
reconciliation between God and man embodied in Jesus Christ.27  Writing a few weeks 
later, Barbara Klie attacked the commercialization of the Kirchentag and the mass-
political atmosphere that had driven away the community feeling of earlier meetings.  
Rather than offering solutions to the problems of modern life, the Kirchentag was in the 
process of embracing the very causes of those problems: modern technology, modern art, 
modern sociology, modern ideas of family and marriage.  For anyone, she concluded, 
who really cared about the church and its tradition, the Kirchentag had opened its doors 
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too wide.  Yet this, she argued, was probably still not wide enough too satisfy those who 
wanted to drag the church wholly into the modern world.28 
 
OVERCOMING POLITICAL ILLUSIONS 
Despite these attacks, the Kirchentag maintained its new course, continuing to 
look critically at the political status quo.  In keeping with the overarching theme of 
“Reality Today,” the political section of the 1958 Kirchentag Congress devoted itself to 
the question of the “illusions” that dominated West German political life, preventing the 
consideration of hard political realities.29  Current events lent a special resonance to this 
theme.  In September 1957, the CDU had won an unprecedented election victory, 
attaining an absolute majority for the first time.  Their slogan had been “no experiments,” 
their emphasis on the steady hand and experienced leadership of Konrad Adenauer.  Yet 
this triumph for the CDU quickly gave way to renewed foreign policy crisis and debate.  
In early 1958, Adenauer’s cabinet began to pursue the possibility of arming the 
Bundeswehr with nuclear weapons.  This controversial policy led to a replay of the mid-
1950s rearmament debates, as SPD politicians, lacking the votes to prevent this 
development, turned to a grassroots anti-nuclear campaign.  Once again, the Protestant 
churches were bitterly divided over rearmament issues.  Yet the issue of nuclear 
armament, conjuring up images of nuclear war and the total destruction of humanity, 
resonated far differently than the issue of NATO membership.  In comparison to the 
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debates of the mid-1950s, an increasingly large number of Protestant leaders found 
themselves harboring severe misgivings about the wisdom of the government’s plans.   
To address these concerns at the congress itself, Kirchentag leaders chose the 
SPD politician Adolf Arndt to speak, not on nuclear arms per se, but on the more 
fundamental dangers of political ideology.  Arndt began his presentation by examining 
the twofold nature of politics.  Politics was the process of making sense of one’s 
surroundings and of acting on the basis of this understanding of reality.  As such it was 
central to healthy human existence.  But politics—in the form of negative political 
ideology—could also be a means of “self-justification” rather than understanding, a way 
of acting on the basis of false understandings of the world.  “This is the politics of 
illusion,” he argued, “that begins from the standpoint of the unreal, aims for unrealizable 
goals, and thereby loses reality itself.”  Alluding to recent German history, Arndt made it 
clear that this form of politics was dangerous, leading to “catastrophe.”  But since all of 
history was a mixture of healthy and illusory politics, how could one discern the good 
from the bad?  Where could one find political certainty? 
Here Arndt made his case against the politics of the CDU.  The present danger 
was that, having lived through the catastrophic consequences of one set of demonic 
illusions, people might be driven by fear into the arms of even greater illusions.  In their 
desire to find absolutes, to find ahistorical certainty, they could fall victim to even more 
powerful falsehoods.  In their desire to find God, they could actually lose sight of God’s 
reality, even attempting to “master” God himself.  Being aware of this problem did not 
mean embracing political relativism.  But it did mean being circumspect and careful in 
any attempts to define reality.  Above all, Germans needed to look for concrete answers 
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to present-day political problems, not to look for answers that would be true in every 
place and time.  This had clear implications for Protestant politics:  
If this discussion is to be helpful . . . it will not be enough for the theologians . . . 
to point out timeless truths.  It will not be enough to explain this loss of reality 
through the loss of God, through secularization, as though the biblical view of 
humanity wasn’t always a view of people who had fallen away from God, as 
though we could or should make the world less worldly.30   
 
Instead of appealing to unmediated theological concepts, it would be necessary to 
concretely examine and dispel the political illusions of the present day. 
The first of these illusions, according to Arndt, was the idea that one could ever 
be completely illusion free.  This was the illusion that underlay the Western idea of the 
“free world.”  If they wanted to truly engage with political reality, Protestants needed to 
look very closely as this concept of freedom and its political implications.  At the most 
basic level, they needed to ask themselves how this concept could be misused. “Is 
freedom a justification?” he asked, “And does it justify everything?”  Taken to its 
extremes, even this ideal of freedom could be destructive, leading to a form of politics 
where every individual lived in his or her own reality.  Or it could be used to justify war 
or to glorify death, blinding people to these sobering realities for the good of some 
abstract political end.31 
The ideal of political responsibility could also serve as an illusion.  In a world 
where politics had become a form of mass consumption, a matter of “show and noise,” 
the semblance of political involvement and political responsibility could actually prevent 
people from acting in a truly responsible manner.  Truly responsible politics would begin 
by asking the right questions, by looking at real, fundamental problems.  But modern 
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politicians substituted fidelity to a worldview in place of actual thinking.  “Here,” he 
continued, “we must ask the church whether Christian faith has become such a 
worldview.  What is the politics of Christian responsibility supposed to mean?”  This 
label, he argued, was not based on anything Christian within the politics in question.  
Instead, it served to declare that the political policies and results of its proponents were 
Christian, whatever their concrete content.32   
Politicians, even politicians who proclaimed themselves to be acting out of 
“Christian responsibility,” could be led astray in a number of ways.  For example, they 
could let their position as the representatives of others blind them to the teachings of 
Christian morality.  Here Arndt directly addressed the debate over nuclear weapons.  
Christians as individuals were strictly forbidden from thinking of nuclear war as a 
legitimate means to their political ends.  But when they thought of themselves as 
representatives of others, rather than as morally responsible individuals, they could find 
ways to justify even this kind of destruction.33   
“Christian politics” could also be led astray by failure to understand the 
perspective of others, leading to the caricature and misrepresentation of political 
opponents.  According to Arndt, this failure to take another person’s perspective seriously 
was the fundamental problem of West German domestic and foreign policy.  Healthy 
politics involved cooperation and understanding, not misrepresentation and attacks.  
“Politics,” he continued, “is only possible when one values and sets as one’s goal the 
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building of at least the foundations of some form of community; any other behavior is no 
longer politics, but unbelieving, pitiless preparation for annihilation.”34 
Healthy political activity was instead based on the recognition that one’s 
opponent was, in fact, the embodiment of “reality,” representing the natural limits on 
one’s own power.  One did not have to agree with one’s opponent, but one had to 
recognize that cooperation and negotiation would be necessary to accomplish one’s own 
political goals.  This kind of politics was not primarily about power [Macht], with its 
logic of inevitable mutual destruction, but was instead about the art of the possible 
[Machbare], about concrete possibilities for cooperation and negotiation.35  Here Arndt 
issued his most direct challenge to the politics of the CDU, arguing that it was wrong to 
oppose one dangerous ideology with another, whether the idea of the “free world,” the 
Christian west, or even so-called foreign policy “realism.”  Rather than responding in this 
way, Christians had the freedom and duty to avoid cynical political calculations, choosing 
grace and love over “the nothingness of murderous illusion.”36 
The discussion that followed Arndt’s speech demonstrated the growing 
complexity of Protestant political thought.  Rather than breaking down along “pacifist” 
and “realist” lines, as had such debates in the early-1950s, this discussion focused on the 
many different reasons why one might oppose nuclear deployment in Germany.  This 
might include opposition on the basis of a theologically-inspired, principled pacifism.  
But it also might be founded on any of a variety of more specific grounds: fear of the 
destruction of humanity in nuclear war, fear of the consequences of such a war in Europe, 
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or other misgivings about the potential for these weapons’ misuse.  While the political 
section of the Kirchentag Congress was divided over the basic question of whether West 
German should obtain nuclear weapons, they could agree on many of the important 
underlying questions.  No participant in the discussion adopted a principled, theological 
stance against nuclear weapons, although they urged respect for those who did.  And 
none believed that the use of these weapons should be considered lightly.  From a 
theological standpoint, all agreed that “every means should be used to prevent such a 
war.”  But not all agreed that the mere presence of nuclear arms would lead to such 
destruction.37 
There was much greater agreement on Arndt’s more general political warnings.  
In particular, participants expressed concern over the seemingly “deterministic” nature of 
German politics, where decisions were made without real discussion and debate and 
where alternatives were not even taken seriously.  In contrast to this determinism, they 
championed the idea of “Christian freedom,” the ability of mature Christian individuals 
to make political decisions following the dictates of their own consciences.  This was not 
something that could be defended in the abstract.  To guarantee this freedom, political 
actors needed to abide by concrete standards that limited their actions for the good of the 
community.  This was true for the churches and for Christian parties as well.  As the 
discussion members concluded: “Even Christian faith may not be secured or defended by 
resort to arms.”38 
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A NEW FOUNDATION 
The Munich Kirchentag of 1959 was far more conservative in tone than the 
congress of 1958, reflecting the dominance of the conservative local Landeskirche.  
Traditional themes predominated, with no less than five of the expanded ten workgroups 
devoted to issues of primarily religious relevance.  Although the planning process for the 
Kirchentag contained its share of political disputes, the political workgroup itself avoided 
contentious issues such as nuclear armament and East-West division.  Rather than 
returning to the political positions of the past, however, the group used this as an 
opportunity to create a more systematic foundation for its new political orientation.  
Dealing with foundational issues of church-state relations and political pluralism within 
the church, the Munich Kirchentag laid the groundwork for an entirely different 
theoretical understanding of Protestant political involvement than that of the early 1950s. 
In planning the themes of the upcoming Munich Kirchentag, members of the 
political workgroup focused more than ever before on the problems of West German 
society.  Even very “western” Kirchentag meetings of the past, such as the 1953 
gathering in Hamburg and the 1956 gathering in Frankfurt, had still been planned with 
the expectation of considerable East German involvement.  1959 was different.  Although 
the leaders of the political workgroup wanted to avoid turning Munich into a “West 
German Kirchentag,” maintaining some degree of openness toward the sensibilities of 
Protestants in the East, they knew that very few East German Protestants would be in 
attendance, and they resolved to use this opportunity to deal more concretely with 
political issues in the West.39    
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To the frustration of some workgroup members, including Hans Dombois, the 
chair, this did not lead to continued discussion of the politically charged questions, such 
as nuclear weapons and East-West relations, that had dominated in 1956 and 1958.  In 
part, at least, this was due to the influence exerted on the workgroup by local CSU 
politicians, such as Roland-Friedrich Messner.40   But the workgroup also rejected 
Messner’s suggestion for a focus on Catholic-Protestant tolerance and cooperation.  
Instead, at the suggestion of the Bonn law professor Ulrich Schuener, they devoted 
themselves to a critical assessment of West German politics.  Scheuner hoped that a 
careful examination of the religious foundations of West German politics would serve to 
“lead the people of the west away from their self-assurance toward the realization of the 
questionableness of their political existence.”  At the suggestion of Joachim Beckmann, 
the president of the Church of the Rhineland, this topic was reworked so that it could be 
expressed in a more positive fashion.  In the end, it was decided that the workgroup’s first 
major theme would focus on the “foundations and limits of the church’s political 
responsibility.”41 
Summarizing the workgroup’s ideas, and connecting it to the theme of the 1958 
congress, Hans Dombois argued that Protestants had a “plain duty to expose the truth.”  
This included the truth of the gospel and its claims upon the individual and nation, but it 
also included the recognition of uncomfortable political realities.  To many workgroup 
members, this topic was clearly directed against political Catholicism and against the 
CDU.  Indeed, in planning meetings Dombois asked whether the ideas of CDU Catholics 
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were similar to the illusionary politics of the Protestant churches in the Weimar Republic, 
arguing that both 1918 and 1945 had given rise to self-perpetuating political myths that 
needed to be overcome.  And the SPD leader Fritz Erler made this argument much more 
explicitly.42  CDU members, such as the Bundestag deputy Elisabeth Schwarzhaupt, were 
more defensive, blaming the complexities of modern society and the legacy of the Third 
Reich for the deficiencies of postwar politics.  In the complex world of modern politics, 
she argued, people needed the moral guidance of the churches.43 
Heinrich Lades, the CSU mayor of Erlangen, and Joachim Beckmann, the 
president of the church of the Rhineland, were given the task of addressing these 
questions of church-state relations at the Kirchentag gathering itself.  In their speeches, 
both attempted to affirm the important role of faith in political life, while also steering a 
course between political extremes.  On the one hand, both were critical of traditional 
Lutheran political teachings, which entirely separated the church and the state into 
different spheres of life.44  On the other, both were also critical of Catholic politics and of 
the CDU, complaining that the “clericalization” of politics was bad for both the church 
and the state.  Lades approached this topic from the perspective of practical politics, 
while Beckmann looked at the theological foundations of Christian political activity.   
Lades began by looking at the role of the institutional church in political life.  He 
argued that the church had important, albeit indirect, public responsibility in at least three 
areas.  First, in a modern democratic state, information was an important political tool.  
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Interests groups and parties were always working to manipulate this information in order 
to support their causes.  But the churches had an “obligation to the truth.”  Through 
Sunday morning sermons and the activities of the church press, the church needed to 
question the self-serving, black and white stances of the political parties, offering their 
members clearer and more objective information.  Second, the churches had a duty to 
offer religious guidance on a wide range of theoretical political questions.  From the 
standpoint of Christian teaching, what was private property?  What was the state?  What 
were social justice, freedom, family, and education?  For centuries the Lutheran churches 
had attempted to avoid these foundational political questions, and in doing so they had 
tacitly endorsed the status quo.  It was better to be open and direct about their political 
positions, avoiding potential confusion.  Finally, the churches had an important role in 
establishing moral and ethical standards that would underpin public life, informing the 
decisions of citizens and leaders.  Christians might not always agree on what questions 
were matters of basic Christian teachings and what questions were matters of individual 
conscience, but these disagreements did not absolve them of their responsibility.  Instead, 
Lades urged bishops and pastors to offer their advice and moral guidance to political 
figures: “Stand by them as brothers, with tact, but also with courage!”45 
At the same time, Lades recognized important limits to the political role of the 
institutional churches.  Christian teachings were relevant to every area of life, including 
politics, but Lades cautioned against direct religious rule.  First, the churches did not have 
the right to attempt to control the government, either through direct means or through 
alliances with parties and interest groups.  Naturally, individual Christians had a duty as 
citizens to be politically active in these ways, but the churches should avoid direct 
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involvement in matters of state.  Second, insofar as this was possible, the churches 
needed to avoid turning purely political questions into matters of dogma and to avoid 
offering their members direct political instruction.  Third, in order to avoid this error, it 
was essential for Church leaders to clearly indicate when their political pronouncements 
were being offered as private citizens and when they were speaking on behalf of the 
institution.  Fourth, the churches needed to respect democratic principles.  This meant 
that it was inappropriate for the churches to negotiate agreements with the state over the 
heads of church members and citizens.  Finally, the churches had the responsibility to 
take their political teachings beyond vague axioms, such as “Render unto Caesar what is 
Caesar’s, and unto God, what it God’s.”  But they also needed to remain mindful of 
concrete facts and circumstances, to recognize their limits of their own expertise, and to 
avoid offering simple “Christian” answers to the complex problems of the world.46 
Beckmann approached the same set of problems from a more theological 
standpoint.  Like Lades, he sought to chart a middle course between political activism 
and disengagement.  Looking at the theological foundations of the church’s political 
activity, he argued: 
The church is not a political entity, it has no political message.  Its task is not 
politics, but the proclamation of God’s word.  It must be strictly differentiated 
from the state, for the church is not of this world.  But, the church does exist for 
the world.  It can only fulfill its divine task, if it does not stay out of the world, but 
really lives in it and with it, bound to the world in genuine solidarity. . . . 
Therefore, the church cannot and may not withdraw from its God-imposed 
political responsibility.47 
 
The church’s political responsibility, he continued, was an outgrowth of its 
religious task.  But these two duties were not identical.  As the Barmen Declaration had 
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made clear, God had a claim on all aspects of life, including the political.  But Protetsants 
did not agree with the Catholic conception of Christian politics. 
Christian politics is not politics in the name of God or in the name of Christianity 
or of the church, and also not politics according to Christian principles, according 
to the demands of the Sermon on the Mount, or the guidelines of natural law.  
Instead, it can only be rightly understood as the politics of Christians, who know 
their political thoughts and actions are subject to the consolations and demands of 
God in Jesus Christ, and who seek to obey God in this area.48 
 
The institutional church needed to clearly differentiate between its primary religious 
message and the secondary political convictions that might arise out of this message.  The 
failure to do so would only distract from the church’s true calling, with negative effects 
for both the church and the state.  Instead, both church and state had their own roles.  The 
state had no right to prevent the church from carrying out its religious and charitable 
duties.  But the churches had no right to directly intervene in politics.49 
On the other hand, individual Christians had an obligation to take their beliefs 
seriously in the political realm.  The only limits to this activity arose when their political 
activity brought them into direct contradiction with God’s commands.  On such 
occasions, when obedience to God and obedience to the political authorities came into 
conflict, their obedience to God had priority.  Here Beckmann referred to Germany’s own 
recent history: “When authority degenerates into tyranny, when it takes inhuman actions, 
the political responsibility of Christians in obedience to God, can even require them to 
take extraordinary action to remove the tyrants, as took place in the resistance movement 
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of 1944 against Hitler.”  The church had no right to demand such actions, nor to forbid 
them.  Instead, such decisions belonged to the conscience of each individual believer.50 
The main ideas of Lades and Beckmann were relatively uncontroversial, 
generating little argument in the discussion period that followed.  As a few comments 
from audience members made clear, however, political divisions within the church were 
growing ever wider, and attempts to find some principled middle ground could come 
under attack from both the Right and the Left.  Reflecting an extreme version of the 
church’s earlier Christian Democracy, one audience member argued against so much 
focus on the limits of Christian responsibility.  He even argued that every audience 
member had a duty “to ensure that every politician, that everyone who has political 
influence, is a Christian.”51  On the other side of the spectrum, Johannes Rau, at the time 
a young SPD Landtag deputy from Duisburg, argued for a more activist form of Christian 
politics.  While Beckmann believed every Christian had a duty to passively resist an 
unjust government, Rau contended that silence could also be a form of betrayal.  Instead, 
Rau argued, the churches needed to take a more active and vocal role in promoting left-
wing Christian politics.52  
For their second major theme, the leaders of the political workgroup chose the 
topic of political divisions within the church itself.  In particular, they looked at the 
question of whether, and to what extent, Christians needed to agree in political matters.  
Addressing the fundamental question of the relationship between theological truth and 
political pluralism, they asked: 
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Whether differences of opinion could take place on different levels, so that there 
are some foundational questions, questions of life and death, for which no 
alternatives can be theologically considered.  And on the other hand, whether 
there are secondary questions that even dogmatic Germans must acknowledge can 
be answered differently.  With regard, then, to Catholic social-ethics or the earlier 
dogmatic position of the SPD, the political systems of the East, and even the naïve 
nationalism of the old Protestant church, it is necessary to separate the historically 
relative from matters of principle.53 
 
Yet the workgroup quickly returned to more comfortable territory, de-
emphasizing pluralism in favor of a more personal moral focus, arguing that the 
fundamental problem was a matter of taking one’s opponent seriously, “not just as the 
advocate of a position, but instead as a person.”  In order to ground these ideas in actual 
practice, the workgroup decided to invite the leading Social Democrat Fritz Erler, and 
Edo Osterloh, the CDU Culture Minister of Schleswig-Holstein, as speakers.  By 
bringing together these political opponents, the workgroup hoped to demonstrate that 
opposition and conflict were not only “foundational presuppositions of a democratic 
system,” but also the best guarantee that “the human being is still being taken seriously in 
politics.”54  This choice of speakers is itself significant.  Erler was a major leader in the 
SPD, while Osterloh was a minor state official.  The fact that no more prominent CDU 
official could be found to speak opposite Erler clearly demonstrates the growing distance 
between the CDU and the leaders of the Kirchentag.  
In planning meetings for the Kirchentag, Erler played an important role in 
pushing for a more fundamental treatment of political pluralism, rather than a limited 
focus on personal morality.  To Erler, there were two sets of fundamental problems that 
exacerbated political disagreements between Christians.  First, as people who were 
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strongly committed to the truth of their religious beliefs, Christians of all political stripes 
too easily carried this mindset over into their political opinions, turning political 
questions into matters of absolute truth and falsehood.  Second, at least in Germany, 
Christians had adopted one-sided perspectives on issue of church-state relations.  Until 
the time of the church struggle, during the Third Reich, German Protestants had hardly 
even differentiated between the church and state.  But since the church struggle, some on 
the Protestant Left had adopted a completely opposite perspective, in which the state was 
seen as the enemy of the church.  They needed to overcome these outmoded, black and 
white perspectives on the world of politics recognizing that disagreement was normal and 
healthy. 
Any treatment of the themes of politics and political opposition must begin from 
the position that Christians can be political opponents.  This belonging to different 
camps is a basic result of pluralist society and of freedom.  The idea that one must 
always prevent conflict in political life and must try to find complete agreement 
misunderstands the basic requirements of a free state system.55 
 
Erler returned to this theme in his speech to the Kirchentag audience.  Christians, 
he noted, often argued that unity and agreement were necessary in politics.  But this idea 
was antithetical to the very nature of modern democracy.  Democratic politics did not 
operate on the basis of consensus, but on the basis of “the struggle between opinions.”  
Naturally, unity was desirable when it came to the most important and fundamental 
questions of national life.  But even then, this unity was not worth any price.  In times of 
emergency or extreme crisis, all political parties might cooperate for the common good.  
But this was the exception rather than the rule.  In normal politics, opposition played a 
vital role.  The party of opposition had a duty to hold the majority accountable, and they 
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had a responsibility to offer viable political alternatives.  And in a country like Germany, 
with its rich and diverse religious tradition, it was only natural that Christians would 
gravitate toward different political parties.56 
This had not always been the case in the past.  Before 1918, the Protestant 
churches in Germany had allied themselves with the authoritarian state.  The churches 
had worked against any political groups that sought to challenge this power, identifying 
themselves with the political and social conservatives.  But this had been bad for the 
churches, leading to alienation between the churches and the working class.  Similar 
problems were possible in the present day as well.  The differences between the present 
political parties in West Germany were not religious, but instead were centered on 
different concepts of social organization.  When one political party declared itself 
Christian, rather than taking a more appropriate label such as conservative, it only 
confused the issue.57 
In the same way, it was dangerous for a political party to use religious arguments 
to generate support for its policies.  Very few practical political disagreements were 
matters of religious principle.  Instead, they rested on differences of judgment about 
concrete circumstances, the prioritization of goals, and the proper means to achieve them.  
“In the realm of politics,” he argued, “different solutions are always possible.”  The 
danger was in confusing one’s personal opinions with religious obligations or dictates of 
conscience.  “A well-founded opinion is still not a dictate of conscience,” he argued, 
“Opinions can be influenced and changed by arguments.  Between different opinions 
there can be compromises.  Conscience, by contrast, requires obedience, allowing no 
                                                 
56 DEKT 1959, 410-11. 
 
57 Ibid., 412-13. 
 231
discussion or compromise.”  Confusing these two led to unnecessary animosity and 
antagonism between political parties.58 
The real problem in politics, Erler concluded, was not that Christians needed to 
“be nice to each other.”  It was not that they needed to treat other Christians better.  It 
was that they needed to behave as Christians towards others, toward non-Christians and 
political opponents.  They also needed to recognize that conflict and disagreement were a 
normal part of politics.  Christians were no longer called to simply submit to state 
authority; they had a duty to argue and dispute with the authorities.  As Christians and 
citizens of a democratic state they were not beneath authority, they were part of it.  They 
needed to recognize this fact, seeing government officials as flawed people like 
themselves.59 
Osterloh took a more conservative approach to the topic of political opposition, 
focusing primarily on the moral obligation to love one’s neighbor and its political 
implications.  Yet, he too, came to the defense of pluralism within society and within the 
church.  He began by arguing that Christians needed to act differently in politics than 
non-Christians, bearing witness to their faith even in the way they interacted with their 
enemies.  In this respect, Christian Europe had failed to set an example for the world, as 
Christian nations had warred against each other in the two world wars.  Now, however, 
they needed to serve as better witnesses of their faith, treating their opponents with 
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respect, not “seeing them as enemies to be fought with any available weapon up to the 
point of mutual annihilation.”60 
This did not mean that Christians should be politically passive and 
accommodating.  If they lived within a society that denied them basic political rights, 
under a totalitarian regime like the Third Reich or the GDR, then political opposition 
could be a Christian duty.  But it was important to recognize that this was not an attempt 
by Christians to seize power for themselves.  Political opposition was only legitimate in 
the defense of basic rights and in the service of their fellow man.  Even when fighting 
against a totalitarian state, Christians were to hold fast to their principles, loving their 
enemies and countering evil with good.61 
In contrast to such circumstances, the political opposition between Christians 
within a democratic state like the Federal Republic seemed minor.  Osterloh conceded 
that every party in the Bundestag had Christian and non-Christian members.  The 
divisions between them were not matters of faith, but only differences of political 
conviction.  These Christian politicians in all of the parties of the Federal Republic were 
bound together as Christians, whatever their political differences might be.  They were 
required to see their opponents as fellow believers and fellow human beings, recognizing 
that their common bonds were more important than their disagreements.  And Christians 
in every party were required to work together in the defense of individual self-worth, the 
freedom of conscience, factual political debate, and mutual respect.  They needed to 
recognize that they themselves were sinners, and they needed to forgive the sins of their 
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opponents.  And they needed to respect the right of their opponents to engage in 
opposition to the government, and to criticize government policies.62 
But there was always the danger that Christians would instead use their faith as a 
form of self-justification, something that always confirmed the rightness of their own 
beliefs.  They might lose the ability to distinguish between their own opinions and basic 
theological principles.  This danger arose when politicians used theological arguments to 
defend their politics and when theologians engaged directly in political activity.  It could 
lead them to substitute dogmatism for faithful obedience and to substitute the “unbearable 
certainty of the Pharisee” for the tolerance and respect that their faith required of them. 
This kind of conflict was destructive to both the church and to wider society.63   
These attitudes were especially destructive because there were many areas where 
Christians could come to legitimately different positions on the pressing political issues 
of the day.  “Faith,” Osterloh argued, “does not lend us omniscience, and the bible 
contains no formula for individual political behavior.  Until the last day, even we 
Christians must wrestle over the correct path, recognizing that we all can err, as long as 
we live.”   The Catholic church might issue direct political instructions to its followers, 
but Protestants believed in the importance of individual conscience.  It should hardly be 
surprising, then, that some would embrace pacifism, while others would be convinced the 
justness of arming themselves with nuclear weapons.  The important thing was to prevent 
these differences of opinion from degenerating into personal hatred and defamation.  
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Instead, Christian political opponents needed to strive to understand each other and to 
recognize their common responsibility in political life.64  
These ideas generated little controversy in the discussion period that followed.  
Most of the approximately 6000 listeners in attendance seem to have agreed with the 
basic premises of both speakers’ presentations, recognizing that the complex political 
questions of modern society did not have simple, agreed upon religious answers.  There 
was some debate about the legitimacy of the use of “Christian” in the name of the 
Christian Democratic Union.  But most agreed that this name did not represent any 
exclusive claim to being the only party of Christians, referring instead to the party’s 
historical development and foundational beliefs.  Indeed, Erler turned this criticism on its 
head in a joking reference to the theological earnestness of the new SPD circle around 
Gustav Heinemann.  Arguing that he opposed the idea of “Christian parties” even against 
those who sought to create one out of the SPD, he conceded to Osterloh that, despite the 
moralistic rhetoric of these Protestant socialists, “it is still alright for Christians to vote 
for the CDU.”65   
 
CONCLUSION 
While Protestants remained deeply politically divided in the late 1950s, it is 
obvious that several important changes were underway.  Prominent Protestant 
conservatives, such as Eugen Gerstenmaier, continued to wield significant influence in 
the churches and in CDU politics.  But the overall trend seems to have been marked by 
growing disillusionment with the CDU.  Part of this was clearly a response to the CDU’s 
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aggressive rearmament and Cold War politics, especially as these politics became more 
extreme and uncompromising.  Arguments, for example, that West Germany needed to 
have some form of military defense in place seem to have resonated with a large number 
of Protestants, many of whom could not go along fully with the extreme pacifist and 
neutralist implications of Heinemann’s political views.  Seeking to acquire nuclear arms 
for the Federal Republic was a far different, and far more aggressive measure.  It was 
bound to generate far greater levels of resistance, even among those who supported 
NATO and the Bundeswehr.  By the late 1950s, as the prospects for German reunification 
became more distant, both the neutralist rhetoric of the Protestant Left and the aggressive 
Cold War rhetoric of the CDU seemed outdated.  More and more people were looking for 
practical ways to coexist, rather then hoping for major political triumphs.  In the midst of 
these changing priorities, the moderately conservative and liberal Protestants who 
dominated the Kirchentag political workgroup, found themselves drawn into dialogue 
with the more “realistic” foreign policy thinkers of the SPD and FDP. 
As they began to distance themselves more from the politics of the CDU, they 
were forced to confront a second set of questions about the fundamental nature of 
Christian politics.  German Protestants had always had some misgivings about the 
predominantly Catholic character of the CDU.  Even prominent CDU politicians from the 
Protestant churches had questioned the direct role that the Catholic church sometimes 
played in electoral politics.  These misgivings seem to have grown over the course of the 
late 1950s.  Rather than remaining in the shadow of this form of Christian politics, West 
German Protestants in the late 1950s began to more vocally advocate their own Protestant 
alternatives.  These alternatives emphasized the political freedom of the individual 
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Christian, the importance of following one’s own conscience, and the dangers of 
“clericalized politics” and “politicized theology.”  This newer, more individualistic 
conception of Christian politics did not lead, in itself, to any immediate break with the 
CDU and CSU.  Many of those who criticized the extremes of clerical politics remained 
loyal members of these parties.  But these new ways of thinking lent themselves just as 
well, if not better, to the political philosophies of the FDP and SPD, especially after the 
SPD officially abandoned Marxism in the Bad Godesberg program of 1959.  Many of 
these new ideas were very basic.  Their acceptance did not have immediately far-reaching 
effects.  But, by creating a solid foundation for political pluralism within the Protestant 
church, they paved the way for more dramatic political developments in the future. 

 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 7 
  
CONFRONTING THE PAST 
 
 
On the morning of August 13, 1959 a bus full of church leaders departed the 
Munich Kirchentag for the Dachau concentration camp outside of the city.  Upon their 
arrival, they met with a small delegation from the local Protestant congregation and 
proceeded to the location of the camp’s crematorium.  Ernst Wilm, the president of the 
Church of Westphalia, and a Protestant minister formerly imprisoned in the camp, spoke 
a few words on the significance of the site.  Georg Schniewind, the Kirchentag vice 
president, read a passage from the book of Daniel.  Then, accompanied by hymns, 
Heinrich Troeger, the vice president of the Bundesbank, laid a wreath emblazoned with 
the motto “You are my witnesses.”  Although the ceremony seems to have focused 
primarily on the witness of Protestant ministers who had perished in the camp, there is no 
question that the fate of Jewish Holocaust victims was also on the participants’ minds.  
That evening, in their largest meeting hall, the Kirchentag held a special gathering on the 
topic of “Israel,” discussing German and Christian anti-Semitism, guilt for the Holocaust, 
and the question of Jewish-Christian relations.1 
This was an important turning point for German Protestantism.  It was not the first 
time that these topics had been addressed at a Kirchentag, but never before had they been 
discussed so explicitly and so boldly.  Never before had these questions been the sole 
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focus of such a large meeting, attracting several thousand listeners and filling the 
Kirchentag’s largest meeting hall.  Until 1959, such explicit and concrete discussions of 
German guilt and Jewish-Christian relations had been limited to the small concurrent 
meetings of the German Protestant Committee for Service to Israel.  These meetings had 
rarely attracted more than a few hundred participants and had often been much smaller.  
When questions of German guilt had been raised in the Kirchentag’s larger meetings, the 
emphasis had never been this direct and concrete.  Instead, the crimes of the Nazis had 
been subsumed under theological categories, treated as a prime example of human 
sinfulness, of every person’s need for God.  Or they had been used for political ends by 
anti-rearmament campaigners who equated true repentance with their own political goals.  
After the 1959 Kirchentag, by contrast, these discussions were much more explicit and 
their tone was more self-critical.  The actions of the churches—even the Confessing 
Church—were not fully exonerated.  The Christian roots of German anti-Semitism were 
not dismissed, but carefully scrutinized.  And, amid ever-growing controversy, traditional 
theological teachings about Judaism became matters of heated debate. 
It is not that German Protestants had been previously unaware of their guilt for the 
Holocaust and the other crimes of the Nazis.  The Kirchentag had not been a site of 
collective amnesia.  In fact, German guilt had come up in countless different contexts in 
the previous ten years of the Kirchentag’s existence.  But, until the late 1950s and early 
1960s, the vast majority of German Protestants had managed to keep this knowledge 
separate from their self-image and group identity.  It was a form of passive knowledge 
that posed no direct challenge to their beliefs, attitudes, or ways of thinking.  With the 
Kirchentag meeting of 1959, and the activities of the Jewish-Christian workgroup that 
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emerged out of this gathering, all of this changed.  German guilt, anti-Semitism, and the 
Holocaust became fundamental questions for German Protestant identity.  Thereafter, 
these questions could no longer be ignored. 
 
THE TURNING POINT 
In the late 1950s, German Protestants became more interested in the questions of 
German guilt, restitution, and Jewish-Christian relations.  But until the Kirchentag of 
1959, this growing interest found little expression in the Kirchentag program.  Adolf 
Freudenberg’s German Protestant Committee for Service to Israel sponsored gatherings 
of interested individuals during most Kirchentag meetings, but these sessions normally 
attracted very small crowds.  In 1954, at a Kirchentag with 60,000 fully-registered guests, 
for example, the committee only requested a meeting room that would be large enough to 
accommodate an audience of fifty.2  There were several signs, however, that interest was 
growing.  For their next meeting in 1956, the same committee requested a substantially 
larger hall, large enough to accommodate 500 people.  And, in a programmatic speech to 
the Workgroup Leadership Committee in 1955, Hans Hermann Walz, the new Kirchentag 
General Secretary, singled out the issue of “restitution” as an important area for future 
discussion, something that the Kirchentag had neglected at previous gatherings.3  Yet 
these new impulses ran up against a large degree of institutional inertia.  While few 
Protestant leaders were willing to directly oppose these endeavors, many saw them as a 
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low priority.  And few of their advocates were willing to devote the energy needed to 
overcome this passive resistance.4  
The initial impetus for a more direct engagement with the legacy of Nazism came 
from Klaus von Bismarck, a leading member of the Kirchentag Präsidium.  In an October 
1958 letter to Reinold von Thadden-Trieglaff, and in a meeting the following month with 
Heinrich Giesen, Bismarck explained his plans.   In 1959 the Kirchentag would hold its 
first meeting in Munich, the “capitol of the Nazi movement.”  And this presented an 
important opportunity to officially acknowledge the Nazi past.  At Bismarck’s urging, 
Giesen agreed to create a small committee to consider how to integrate this theme into 
the existing Kirchentag plans.  And the Kirchentag leadership also began to consider 
Bismarck’s suggestion that the Kirchentag hold a collection for some kind of memorial at 
the Dachau Concentration camp, possibly for the construction of an ecumenical study 
center.5 
While the immediate reaction to Bismarck’s suggestions was underwhelming—
Giesen explained that the Kirchentag staff had initially misunderstood his plans—the idea 
of looking more closely at the Nazi past began to gather support.6  At the next meeting of 
the Kirchentag Präsidium, committee members enthusiastically embraced the idea of 
taking up a collection to commemorate the holocaust.  But they disagreed about how to 
best spend this money.  In keeping with Bismarck’s original idea, many members wanted 
to fund the creation of a memorial of some kind: a sculpture, a church, an ecumenical 
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study center, or even a youth hostel specifically open to “all races.”  Others hoped to 
support the Jewish community more directly, proposing financial aid for Jews in 
Germany or abroad, and even a collection to aid the construction of a German 
synagogue.7   
Präsidium members also began to make plans for an assembly to commemorate 
the victims of the Holocaust, asking first Albert Schweitzer and then Martin Buber to 
give the keynote address.  The self-critical theme of this gathering was already taking 
shape in Thadden’s letter of invitation to Buber: 
In the coming August, there in the German south, it will be a matter of calling our 
church and our people with a new seriousness to be aware of the injustice and 
violence inflicted twenty years before on innocent people, many of whom were 
especially loyal and valuable citizens of our state, and who we horribly 
annihilated.  This all belongs to the problem of the “unmastered past” that weighs 
heavily upon us.  Only through God’s forgiveness can this be taken away and 
transformed by a younger generation.8 
 
Thadden went on to discuss the importance of combating neo-Nazism among German 
youth and reeducating the Germans so that such crimes could never be repeated.   
Unfortunately, for reasons of health, neither Schweitzer nor Buber were able to 
attend the Kirchentag.  Unable to think of another speaker who could equal the stature of 
these men, the Kirchentag leadership scaled back their plans.  In consultation with 
Protestant victims of the Nazis, such as Ernst Wilm, the president of the Westphlian 
Landeskirche who had spent several years as a prisoner in Dachau, they began to 
assemble a somewhat less dramatic program.  Eventually, they settled on a small wreath-
laying ceremony for the morning of August 13, and an evening gathering the same day 
where a handful of Protestant speakers would address the problems of anti-Semitism and 
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Jewish-Christian relations.  Heinrich Troeger, the vice president of the Bundesbank 
would open the gathering.  He would be followed by the theologians Walther Zimmerli 
and Helmut Gollwitzer, both of whom had recently returned from trips to Israel and 
would report on their trips.9 
Unlike previous gatherings on this sort, the 1959 “Israel Evening” was heavily 
promoted by the Kirchentag leadership.  Although it was forced to compete for attention 
with another evening session, featuring Hanns Lilje the bishop of Hanover, Kirchentag 
officials were clear that this was to be the evening’s main event.10  The Kirchentag 
leadership, at least indirectly, also promoted these themes as a major emphasis of the 
1959 gathering.  In the Kirchentag’s press reception, for example, Thadden spoke on the 
importance of confronting the German past.  In his comments, he made it clear that the 
catastrophic nature of recent German history was not some kind of accident.  Instead, the 
rise of the Third Reich, German defeat, and national division were the results of 
Germans’ own failures to properly deal with the social and national challenges of the 
nineteenth century.  After laying out some of this history, he turned to the failures of all 
German people: 
These things belong to a debt of guilt that does not pertain only to us.  
Nevertheless, we who make up the older generation must not ignore them.  In the 
state, and in the same way in the church, we have too long submitted to 
authoritarian rule.  We have been unused to taking responsibility, often uncertain 
in the measures we have taken, all too accustomed to patiently acquiescing to the 
willful acts of the bureaucratic authorities, and all too immature in making 
personal decisions.  It is high time, that we leave behind this passivity, growing 
into a capacity for cooperation for the good of our entire society.11 
                                                 
9 See Giesen to Wilm, 3 February 1959, Wilm to Giesen, 2 March 1959, Giesen to Otto Küster, 12 
March 1959, and Otto Küster to Giesen, 20 March 1959, EZA 71/86/138; see also Kammerer, In die 
Haare, 15. 
 
10 Fridelbert Lorenz, Vermerk, 21 May 1959, EZA 71/86/138. 
 
11 DEKT 1959, 21. 
 244
 
Here Thadden adopted a pragmatic and forward-looking tone, calling attention to German 
guilt, but avoiding direct confrontation with the worst of the Nazi atrocities.  In the 
evening gathering on Israel, the errors of the past were confronted much more directly. 
Speaking on behalf of the Präsidium, Heinrich Troeger opened the gathering with 
some personal reflections on the importance of the evening’s topic.  “Who among us in 
this hall,” he asked, “can avoid constantly wrestling with this theme ‘We Germans and 
the Jews,’ after the dreadful experiences of the past decades.”  However, he continued, 
the Kirchentag needed to look at more than just the guilt of the German nation.  The 
Christian churches, too, had been responsible for promoting dangerous and mistaken 
beliefs about the Jews.  And German Protestants had a responsibility to confront this 
legacy as well.  Here Troeger confessed his own past confusion and the errors of his 
ways.  In his confirmation classes and in the sermons of his childhood minister, he had 
been indoctrinated with two ideas that had driven a wedge between him and his Jewish 
fellow students.  The first was the false teaching that the Jews were solely responsible for 
Christ’s suffering upon the cross.  The second was the mistaken belief that Christianity 
was the only religion that promoted the love of one’s neighbor, while Jews believed only 
in God’s justice.  It had taken him years, Troeger confessed, to see that all people—and 
not just the Jews—bore responsibility for Christ’s death on the cross.  And only recently 
had he come to see that Christian ideas of love were already foreshadowed in the books 
of Moses.  Moreover, despite their prideful claims to be the only religion of love, 
Christians had utterly failed to express this love in their relations with the Jews.  Drawing 
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attention to this contradiction, Troeger concluded:  “What, I ask, is the value of the love 
of one’s neighbor, if it does not lead at minimum to tolerance between all people?”12 
The Göttingen Old Testament scholar Walther Zimmerli opened the next speech 
with a basic question.  The motto of the 1959 Kirchentag was “You will be my People,” 
words that God had originally spoken not to the church but to the Jews.  How then, could 
the church think about the meaning of these words without also considering their own 
recent treatment of God’s chosen people?  “Here in the territory of our Christian West,” 
he reminded his listeners, “we have experienced a storm of hatred and an outpouring of 
inhumanity toward the Jews that no one would have earlier thought possible.”  Even 
before the World Wars, the Poles and Russians had carried out pogroms against the Jews.  
The French had persecuted them in the Dreyfus affair.  And anti-Semitism had spread 
and grown throughout all of Europe.  In Germany, “the land of the Reformation,” this 
hatred and anti-Semitism—promoted even in the churches—had culminated in the 
unthinkable.  The Nazis had only taken the legacy of Christian and European anti-
Semitism to its logical conclusion in their attempt to work out a “Final Solution” to the 
“Jewish question.”  The results had been calculated mass murder.  Yet these efforts to 
annihilate the Jews had failed.  In the creation of the modern nation of Israel, God had 
saved a remnant of his people.13 
Zimmerli had visited Israel the previous autumn and he described to his audience 
the experiences of his trip.  Drawing on his encounters with Israel’s Jews, he painted a 
portrait of a vibrant people passionately committed to their religious tradition.  The 
Judaism he had seen did not line up with common Christian portrayals of a dry and 
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formal faith.  It was not dead, but very much alive.  In fact, Christians could learn much 
from the Jews’ passion for God and for the Torah.  And even political Zionism, he 
asserted, could serve as a model for the Christian West.  In the community life of the 
Kibbutzim, for example, Zimmerli saw a model of faith-inspired sacrifice and community 
spirit.  In their daily lives, these Jewish settlers were joyously living out their faith in way 
that Christians would do well to imitate.14 
How, then, in the aftermath of the Holocaust, should Christians interact with these 
people of living and vibrant faith?  Zimmerli proposed several answers to this question.  
First, although Christians had often been stubbornly blind to this fact, the first half of the 
bible consisted of the Hebrew Scriptures.  As a result, Christians were bound to Jews as 
fellow recipients of the word of God.  The Jews had been the first to receive this word 
and had carried for many years before the Christians came along.  This fact should impel 
Christians toward humility, especially when it came to their own place in God’s plan.  
Second, Christians needed to recognize that their own savior, Jesus of Nazareth, was a 
Jew.  The salvation Jesus offered was for all peoples, including his own.  Third, since 
Jesus death had been for the sins of all people, it was not the Jews that had killed him, but 
the actions of every human being.  It was a scandal that Christians had turned this 
doctrine on its head, using Jesus’ death as an excuse to persecute the Jews.  Good Friday 
was a time to look at one’s own sins, not the sins of others.  And Easter was a celebration 
of forgiveness and reconciliation, two attitudes conspicuously lacking in the church’s 
teaching about the Jews and in its dealings with them.  When Christians approached the 
Jews with the message of Jesus death and resurrection—and Zimmerli believed that this 
was necessary—they needed to do so in a spirit of humility, recognizing their own 
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failings.  And they needed to do so with a willingness to let their own beliefs be changed 
and transformed by the encounter.15 
Following up on this idea, the Berlin theologian Helmut Gollwitzer began the 
next presentation with another basic question.  Would Christians recognize the debt that 
they owed to the Jews as God’s chosen people, people for whom Christ died, and to 
whom gentile believers owed their own knowledge of Christ, their very salvation?  
Or will this all be turned into misunderstandings and misuse, in which this 
message is turned into a means of self-exaltation and self-assertion, reaching its 
pinnacle when the Jews in your midst are treated with rejection, instead of 
solidarity, contempt instead of respect, not with a testament of the love of Christ, 
but arrogantly trampled underfoot with malevolent hatred? 
 
Throughout history, Gollwitzer argued, Jews had been demonized in Christian teachings.  
Even Luther, who had himself later turned to “evil, unjustifiable” attacks on the Jews, 
had recognized these injustices in his earlier years.  And, as a result of these attacks, 
Christians had transformed the cross from a symbol of reconciliation into a symbol of 
persecution; they had made the name of Jesus into a curse.16 
This was why, as Gollwitzer argued, the “Jewish question” was really the 
“Christian question.”  “If there is not a fundamental change within the Christian 
churches,” he argued, “then our people will also never change.”  The racial anti-Semitism 
that had led to the Nazi persecution of the Jews had its origins in the ideas and teachings 
of the Christian churches.  And this guilt was not removed by the fact that the Nazis had 
later used these teachings to attack the churches as well.  Nevertheless, this experience 
had taught the churches an important lesson: Christianity and Judaism were inseparably 
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bound together.  If one attempted to purge Christianity of Judaism, one lost the entirety of 
Christianity as well.17 
The fact that anti-Semitism had progressed so far in Germany had implications for 
the German people as well.  Prejudice against the Jews was deeply rooted in the German 
consciousness.  Indeed, Gollwitzer asserted, it was so deeply rooted that “good will is not 
enough to free many of us from it.”  But Germans had two means of confronting these 
prejudices.  The first was to see in their own history how dangerous these prejudices 
could be, to recognize them as the seeds of murder and inhumanity.  The second was to 
look at the present-day state of Israel in order to see the falseness and stupidity of these 
beliefs.  Many Germans were still bound by well-worn prejudices about the Jews, that 
they were “different” than the Germans, that they only craved money, that they were a 
people without honor and the other German virtues.  Yet the existence and growth of the 
state of Israel demonstrated the error of these beliefs.  Few nations could boast of people 
so willing to devote themselves to such hard work, so community-minded, so willing to 
forgive others who had wronged them.  Seeing the danger and the falsehood of their 
prejudice, Germans needed first to reorder their thinking about the Jews.  Second, they 
needed to put their new understanding into practice, praying for the Jews and offering 
help in their struggles.  There were many different areas where Germans could contribute 
to the well being of Jews in Israel, in Germany itself, or in exile from Germany, living 
elsewhere in the world.  But only in such concrete actions of repentance, could Christians 
and Germans show their true remorse, and their true character.18 
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Although it received less press coverage than its planners had hoped, this 
gathering created quite a stir.  Both the Kirchentag leadership and the speakers 
themselves were inundated with letters praising the meeting as an important step in the 
right direction.19  Meeting with Gollwitzer immediately following the evening session, 
several participants even began to discuss plans for possible future gatherings.  Several 
months later, further encouraged by letters of support, Gollwitzer wrote to Heinrich 
Giesen to communicate these plans.  “The attendance that evening,” he argued, “and the 
strong echo it has generated (which can also be seen in many of the letters that 
participants have sent to you), shows how much resonance these ideas have found.  In our 
opinion, it also obligates the Kirchentag leadership to devote special attention to these 
matters, not to let them drop again.”  He continued by relating his plans to create a 
special committee—outside of the structure of the institutional church—to continue the 
discussion of these issues, possibly as a new permanent workgroup at the Kirchentag.20  
These plans would eventually lead to the formation of special, semi-autonomous 
Kirchentag workgroup.  But the Kirchentag leadership also had their own plans for 
further pursuing these questions and themes.  
 
THE “GERMAN CATASTROPHE” 
When the Kirchentag leadership met in early 1960 to determine the program for 
their next major gathering, they returned to the question of the German past and its 
implications for the future.  The desire to look anew at German guilt did not just come 
from the group around Gollwitzer, which focused on the problematic area of Jewish-
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Christian relations.  It was expressed in some form or other by a broad spectrum of the 
Kirchentag leadership.  Some of the interest in this question was theological—how to 
make sense of recent German history in the light of Christian teachings about human guilt 
and forgiveness in Christ.  But this exclusively theological treatment of the German past 
was no longer enough to satisfy many Protestant leaders.  When the leaders of the various 
church and theological workgroups met in January 1960, they discussed the possibility of 
devoting one theological workgroup entirely to the topic “History-Fate.”  There was 
substantial agreement among the workgroup leadership that this was an important and 
necessary topic that would fill a gaping vacuum in German Protestant thought.  But there 
were some disagreements about how controversial topics such as the German past should 
be addressed.  Some workgroup members such as the theologian Hans Böhm clearly saw 
this workgroup as a way to help German Protestants understand the rise of Nazism, 
German guilt, and defeat through the lens of Christian teachings about the incarnation of 
Jesus and the unfolding of “salvation history.”  Others, such as Klaus von Bismarck, 
argued that these theological discussions needed to be accompanied by a more concrete 
consideration of problems and solutions.  Among these concrete questions, Bismarck 
hoped to address broad topics such as “Volk and Destiny” and “Israel and the Jewish 
Question.”  Both Böhm and Bismarck agreed, however, that this discussion could not be 
limited to the past, but also needed to look at the future implications of recent German 
history.21 
In a preliminary discussion of the Kirchentag’s major themes in March 1960, 
discussions of this theme remained rather vague and impersonal.  Rather than looking 
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specifically at German crimes or German guilt, the emphasis was on “powers, their 
manifestation as historical forces, and the question of our future political, economic, and 
personal existence.”22  Over the next several months, however, Kirchentag planners 
moved steadily away from this abstract, theological approach to the German past, laying 
the groundwork for a much more concrete and grounded historical discussion.  In the 
words of Friedelbert Lorenz, this workgroup would begin by “firmly and soberly 
explaining why all of this has happened to us, from the standpoints of secular history and 
theology.”  Only after this careful and factual historical assessment, would it turn to the 
theological and political implications of these events for the German present and for the 
future.23  In order to ensure a grounded historical discussion, the Kirchentag leadership 
decided to invite an academic historian to deliver the first speech of the workgroup, 
eventually settling on Helmut Krausnick, the director of the Institute for Contemporary 
History in Munich.  They also considered inviting a Marxist historian from the GDR to 
offer another perspective on the course of recent German history, but ultimately decided 
against this.24 
Krausnick’s historical presentation, titled “Our way into the Catastrophe of 1945 
– Explanation and Reflection Today” had two main goals.  First, it was intended to 
address the tension between factual historical explanations of the German past and highly 
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charged and politicized contemporary discussions.25  By presenting the Kirchentag 
audience with basic information about historical developments in Germany that had led 
to the rise of Nazism and the “catastrophe” of 1945, it was intended to create a common 
framework for further discussion.  Workgroup planners were particularly concerned to 
overcome the generational division in understandings of the past, explaining for the youth 
how the rise of Nazism had been possible, while, at the same time, forcing the older 
generations to confront their own mistakes and errors.  As such, it was also intended to 
advance the discussion beyond various one-sided, political, or self-exculpatory 
explanations.  As workgroup member Lothar Albertin summarized: “For us, this is part of 
the necessary imperative to offer an account.  It is not limited by generational boundaries 
and must not be falsified through hopes of untimely domestic- or foreign-political 
gain.”26 
The second major goal of Krausnick’s presentation was to force the Kirchentag 
audience to really confront their own guilt and culpability for these developments, setting 
the stage for a discussion of how to overcome the same tendencies in postwar German 
society.  As Ulrich Scheuner argued in one planning meeting, this presentation needed to 
do more than just state “the facts.”  “Even more,” he argued, “it is necessary that the 
presentation does not just show how National Socialism came about, but also considers 
what tendencies are still virulent in Germany today, making totalitarian movements 
possible.”  To this end, working with Krausnick, the workgroup attempted to identify the 
various places in recent history where Germany had gone wrong, focusing especially on 
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intellectual developments and flaws in the German character.  In his comments during the 
workgroup’s planning meetings, Thadden clarified the importance of this task: “In the 
conclusions drawn from this illumination of our recent past, the turning points cannot be 
laid out too radically.  In many areas of social life, for example in the Bundeswehr, there 
are still patriarchal concepts of order.  The Kirchentag has always concerned itself with 
the maturity of the congregations; it needs to promote political maturity with the same 
stridency.”27 
At the Kirchentag gathering itself, Krausnick began his presentation by calling on 
his audience to recognize the importance of examining their recent past, however 
uncomfortable this might be. 
Sixteen years separate us today from a catastrophe that is entirely unique in the 
history of our people, a history already replete with low points.  While many still 
try to evade the facts of this catastrophe and the reality of its causes and 
consequences, in a questionable attempt at the normalization of German life and 
thought, we are all affected by them on a fundamental level.  Our entire people 
remains in their shadow, and the borders that divide its living body are only the 
most visible expression of this. 
 
After sixteen years, he continued, it was time to begin to look into the causes of this 
catastrophe, and to look for its lessons.28  Krausnick went on to warn his audience against 
attempts to distance themselves from this past.  For the older generation, he argued, there 
was simply no way to avoid a consideration of personal responsibility and guilt.  But 
even the younger generations would not be able to escape the burden of the German past 
simply on account of their age.  They, too, needed to consider the burdens of history that 
continued to weigh upon their lives.  Krausnick also warned against the tendency to 
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politicize this history, to reduce historical explanation to the service of one-sided political 
goals.  “It is not a matter,” he argued, “of propaganda and defense against the outside, but 
of order and clarity in one’s own house.’”29 
In the body of his presentation, Krausnick went on to painstakingly lay out the 
dangerous intellectual and moral failings that had paved the way for National Socialism.  
The course of German history, he argued, had not been set on some pre-ordained path 
that led directly from Luther to Frederick the Great to Hitler.  All along the way, there 
had been choices.  And all along the way, there had been mistakes and failures.  Already 
in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, Germans had embraced a form of 
romantic thought that rejected French and British notions of rationality and natural law.  
In place of this, they had emphasized the importance of the embeddedness of the 
individual in organic historical processes of development.  And above the individual, in 
the same hierarchical system, they had placed the state, making it the embodiment of all 
human values.  Still, Krausnick clarified, those foreign historians who drew a direct line 
from philosophical idealism to Nazism were mistaken, for these earlier German thinkers 
still held on to the ideal of an all-European community of peoples.30 
It was only after the disappointment of the 1848 revolution that this romanticism 
was transformed into the “realism” of Otto von Bismarck.  The “iron chancellor” had 
united Germany creating the basis for a more particular form of national politics.  But 
Krausnick was quick to defend Bismarck against other historians’ charges of foreign 
policy cynicism and cold political calculation.  He argued that Bismarck had not been 
“the apostle of iron and blood.”  Instead, in contrast to later German leaders, he had 
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realized that power was not enough for a successful foreign policy.  His policies had also 
taken into account the feelings and interests of Germany’s neighbors, and the careful 
balance of power in Europe.  Krausnick argued that it was only later that disciples of 
Bismarck, such as the Prussian historian Heinrich von Treitschke, had transformed the 
chancellor’s realism into a form of political cynicism, where power was all that mattered 
and might made right.31 
At the same time as these political and intellectual developments, Europe was 
undergoing dramatic social and economic changes.  Among their many consequences, 
these developments led to a weakening of the Christian churches and a weakening of 
Christian moral teachings.  In Western Europe, this loss of Christian morality was offset 
by the rise of humanistic ideals.  But in Germany, traditional Christian morality was 
supplanted by much more sinister ways of thinking.  In Germany, Darwin’s theory of 
evolution devolved into an extreme form of social Darwinism, where nations and peoples 
were seen as locked in a violent struggle for survival.  Already in the 1890s, social 
Darwinist theorists in Germany were arguing that stronger races had the right to 
annihilate the weaker.  This was the intellectual environment into which Hitler was born, 
these were the ideas that had nurtured his worldview.  Among the more respectable 
middle classes, this crude Darwinism had not yet taken hold.  But these groups were 
infected with their own form of dangerous nationalism.  This was not the relatively 
benign national sentiment of the romantics, but a new ideal that made much more 
absolute claims upon the individual.  Already in the early years of the German Empire 
this nationalism was directed against “outsider” groups such as Catholics and Socialists.  
Later it was directed against national minorities such as the Poles.  These ideas combined 
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with the crude social Darwinism in the development of a new racial form of anti-
Semitism.  Although these dangerous ideas were not yet respectable, they were growing 
more popular as they were promoted by groups such as the Pan German League.32 
At the same time, Germany began to engage in a new, reckless form of foreign 
policy, based not on Bismarck’s realism, but on illusions of world power.  Ignoring the 
attitudes of other European nations and the delicate balance of European power, they 
soon found themselves isolated and surrounded, caught in an unwinnable two-front war.  
Krausnick conceded that many Germans had supported this war out of legitimate patriotic 
motives, such as self-defense.  But, as the war went on, they had embraced shortsighted 
nationalism, demanding radical and unrealizable concessions from their enemies.  When 
they realized the war was lost, the military general staff cynically manipulated German 
politics to place the blame for defeat on the civilian politicians.  This laid the groundwork 
for the later myth that the German armies had not lost the war, but had been betrayed by 
the politicians at home.33 
Germany’s defeat in the First World War was followed by the November 
Revolution that created the democratic Weimar Republic.  But this republic never 
enjoyed the loyalty or support of its citizens.  Democracy was seen as a foreign 
imposition of Germany and its supporters were never able to really change this 
perception.  Here Krausnick singled out the Protestant churches for criticism, arguing that 
they were so used to serving the interests of the traditional rulers that they could not even 
conceive of any existence apart from the bounds of traditional authoritarianism.  They 
had rejected democracy because they associated democratic ideals with the atheism of the 
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French Revolution and of militant Marxist organizations.  And they had refused to accept 
the reality of Germany’s military defeat, because they had too closely come to identify 
themselves with the interests of the nation.34    
The Weimar Republic had also been crippled by the actions of other groups.  Old 
army officers gravitated to the parties of the radical Right.  Even many social democrats 
found it difficult to give the new state their full support.  And the provisions of the 
Versailles Peace Treaty, especially as enforced by the French, made it difficult for the 
republic to achieve any kind of social stability.  As various right-wing groups openly 
worked to undermine the state, the army remained completely neutral.  And even when 
the situation stabilized somewhat, the anti-democratic forces made considerable political 
gains.  With the onset of the worldwide financial crisis that began in 1929, the 
parliamentary system in Germany finally broke down.  After the failed efforts of 
Chanellors Brüning, Papen, and Schleicher to restore order, the members of Germany’s 
respectable conservative parties threw in their lot with Hitler.35 
Hitler set about consolidating his power, aided by the naiveté of many Germans, 
including many in the churches, who refused to heed the warnings of people like Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer.  Although Hitler’s aims seemed more moderate at first, his actions were 
driven by a crudely social-Darwinistic worldview, founded on militant anti-Semitism and 
radical territorial expansion.  Within Germany, Hitler set up a system of domestic terror.  
And he began to put his racial ideas into practice with the “euthanasia” program and the 
persecution of Germany’s Jews.  In the foreign policy arena, his insatiable expansionism 
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led to outbreak of the Second World War.  And, in this war, his two major aims came 
together in the mass murder of Poles and the deportation and murder of Europe’s Jews.36 
Yet these actions, Krausnick insisted, could not be blamed solely on Hitler and 
the Nazis.  The German people could have resisted Hitler, but they rarely did so.  Only 
late in the war did conservative and military circles finally attempt to overthrow Hitler’s 
regime, and their plans did not succeed.  Krausnick went out of his way to defend the 
actions of the July 1944 plotters.  These men had not been traitors, but true patriots.  They 
had been the only ones who had sought to defend Germany against the menace of the 
Nazis, and in their actions they demonstrated that Germans were capable of better.37 
Krausnick’s speech was followed by an unusually lively question and answer 
period.  Addressing audience questions, Krausnick expanded on several aspects of his 
presentation, further examining the weaknesses of Weimar democracy, the warning signs 
that Germans had failed to heed with regard to the Nazi party, and the various myths that 
had underpinned extreme German nationalism.  He also elaborated on the economic 
factors that had led to Weimar’s collapse, the role of the Center and liberal parties in 
Hitler’s rise to power, and the failed opportunity to create a democratic monarchy in 
Weimar.  He also responded to several questions that were more defensive in tone: didn’t 
the Nazis do any good for anyone?  To what extent was the Versailles settlement to 
blame for the eventual rise of Nazism?  Hadn’t the Western powers also contributed to 
the collapse of the Weimar system?  Alongside Krausnick, other members of the 
workgroup leadership also addressed a variety of audience questions.  Hans Dombois 
considered the responsibility of the Protestant churches for the rise of Nazism, examined 
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different theological conceptions of guilt, and summarized present-day church teachings 
with regard to democracy.  Lothar Albertin considered the question of whether the older 
generation would ever be able to fully re-order its thinking away from the dangerous 
ideas of the past.  And Johannes Rau, then an SPD member of the North Rhine-
Westphalian Landtag, elaborated on the perspectives of the youth toward the German 
past and on parallels between Nazism and political developments in West Germany.  The 
CSU politician Roland-Friedrich Messner looked at the relationship between Christian 
morality and politics, confronting the question of whether Bismarck could be seen as a 
Christian politician.  And, finally, Ephorus Wätzel offered a theological defense for the 
actions of the July 20, 1944 plotters, looking more closely at the theological significance 
of their actions.38 
The workgroup’s second presentation—titled “Our Way into the Future – Guilt 
and Opportunities”—focused on the political and theological implications of this history.  
The original plans for this session called for speeches by the SPD politician Adolf Arndt 
on the political aspects of this question, and by Martin Niemöller on its theological 
dimensions.  These plans ran into difficulties when the CDU Bundestag deputy Elisabeth 
Schwarzhaupt, one of the workgroup’s more conservative members, argued that this line-
up was too politically one-sided.  Given the Kirchentag leadership’s always unstable 
relationship with Niemöller, it was decided that it was unwise to withdraw his invitation.  
As a result, Arndt was dropped from the program and Niemöller was given full 
responsibility for the topic.39 
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Niemöller’s draft for this speech focused on the lordship of Christ over all areas 
of life and the limitations this placed on the allegiance of the Christian to the state.  It also 
attacked the desire of many Germans to minimize their own guilt and argued that only by 
accepting and learning the lessons of the past could German Christians move forward 
into the future.  Finally, it emphasized the idea that German guilt could only be overcome 
by embracing solidarity with other nations and races.  This, Niemöller argued, had 
implications for the Cold War, but also for role that European nations played in helping 
to advance Third World development.40 
Workgroup members were generally supportive of these ideas, but several 
disagreements arose in the particulars.  Johannes Rau, for example, wanted to make it 
clear that no future actions could remove the guilt of the German past.  The work that 
Niemöller called for, for reconciliation “between the different generations in Germany, 
within the church, between the church and the people, and in the ecumenical world” was 
an appropriate response to the lessons of the German past, but it would not make the past 
go away.  Others such as Hans Dombois and Erich Müller-Gangloff wanted Niemöller to 
broaden his focus to look at guilt and forgiveness for German society as a whole. But 
Niemöller was adamant that such forgiveness was impossible outside of the church.  
Non-Christians could only understand suffering, they had no way to understand their 
guilt.  As a result, any offer of forgiveness would only embolden them to sin again.41 
These disagreements became moot when Niemöller decided in late March 1961 to 
boycott the upcoming Kirchentag, withdrawing from his position as a speaker.  This 
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decision was based on the outcome of negotiations between the Kirchentag leadership 
and the GDR regime regarding the location of the 1961 Kirchentag.  Plans had originally 
called for the Kirchentag to take place on both sides of the divided city of Berlin.  
However, the GDR regime, in the middle of a tense standoff with the western powers 
over the status of the city, had no interest in allowing such an all-German gathering.  As 
an alternative, they offered the possibility of another Kirchentag in Leipzig.  However, 
they made it clear that they would not allow certain “NATO pastors,” such as Otto 
Dibelius to travel to this meeting.  Ultimately, the Kirchentag leadership rejected these 
alternatives, deciding to go ahead with their original plans, but to limit them to the 
western sectors of the city.  Niemöller, who had always been suspicious of the political 
motives of the Kirchentag leadership—especially with regard to matters of inter-German 
politics—accused the Kirchentag of putting Cold War politics ahead of the Gospel.  
Arguing that the decision of the Kirchentag leadership “cannot be understood as anything 
other than a glorification of the free Christian world over against a totalitarian and 
tyrannical Eastern World,” he declared his intention to boycott the meeting.  Niemöller 
also urged his church-political allies to do the same.42 
At this point, the political workgroup asked Lothar Kreyssig, the president of the 
State Church of Saxony, to take over Niemöller’s speaking duties.  Kreyssig based his 
presentation on the themes that Niemöller had already developed, emphasizing the need 
to accept God’s punishment, God’s willingness to forgive sinners, the need to for those 
who had been forgiven to continue Christ’s work of reconciliation in the world.  This, as 
the entire workgroup leadership could agree, meant undertaking concrete acts of 
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reconciliation.  But it did not involve the endorsement of any one political position.43  
These plans were thrown into disarray once again when Kreyssig was unable to receive 
permission to travel to West Berlin to deliver his speech.  In the end, his speech was 
delivered by Hans Reinhold Hildebrandt, the President of the Protestant Church of the 
Union, who worked from Kreyssig’s notes, putting the ideas of the draft into his own 
words. 
In sharp contrast to Krausnick’s speech of the previous day, Hildebrandt’s 
presentation focused primarily on the theological dimensions of German guilt.  He began 
by looking at the natural tendency of Germans to think only about the future, without 
truly considering the burdens of their past.  This, he argued, was a dishonest and self-
defeating undertaking.  If one could not confront the realities of one’s past, then one 
could not create a better future.  Instead, one only became more deeply mired in unreality 
and illusion.  In both halves of the divided German nation, people had found their own 
illusions that blinded them to these realities.  In the west, they were too busy enjoying 
material prosperity to consider their guilt.  And in the east they were blinded by the 
simplistic lessons of communist ideology.  But Germans in both West and East needed to 
soberly confront their past, if they wanted to move beyond it.44 
Next he turned to the nature of German guilt, to the old debate about who was 
really guilty for the crimes of the Nazis.  Did the whole German people share in some 
form of collective guilt?  Did the younger generation have to atone for the guilt of their 
parents?  These, he argued, were the questions of Cain, who had asked “Am I my 
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brother’s keeper?”  And, he continued, referring to the ongoing trial in Jersualem, they 
were also the questions of the “Eichmann inside of us.”  But, in fact, Germans were 
called to bear the burdens of their people.  This was the nature of belonging to a 
community or to a family; every member was responsible for the actions of one another.  
They all shared in a solidarity of guilt before both God and man.45 
Recognizing this guilt was also not enough by itself.  It was not some magical 
process that would make everything better.  Throughout all of history, humans had been 
torn between their God-given calling to live in the world as stewards of God’s creation 
and the temptations of sin that perverted these actions.  Only through the death and 
resurrection of Christ did they have the power to truly recognize their own guilt and to 
truly begin anew.  The effects of sin were so pervasive that even the church and its 
teachings could be perverted, could themselves be a source of evil in the world.  The 
message of love and forgiveness made manifest in the cross of Christ had been perverted 
in this way throughout the history of the church.  For thousands of years Christians had 
accepted murderous anti-Semitic teachings, fanatically persecuting their Jewish 
neighbors.  Christian conquistadors had brutally subjected the peoples of South America.  
Heretics and witches had been pursued by the inquisition and burned by the millions.  
And the native peoples of Africa had been captured and sold into slavery—all by a 
people that claimed to follow the teachings of Christ.  Belonging to a Christian 
community or Christian society was not enough.  The only true path into the future lay in 
confronting the reality of the cross of Christ, in recognizing the inseparable simultaneity 
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of guilt and forgiveness.  Only when fully aware of one’s own guilt, could one truly 
experience the grace of a new beginning.46 
Before Germans could create a better future, then, they were called to examine 
their guilt.  They needed to see the deaths of six million Jews in the Holocaust as the 
consequences of their own anti-Semitism and hatred.  And they needed to uncover the 
truth about their own inhumanity.  In recent years, they had acquired a number of aids to 
this process.  Reminders of their actions were all around them: in the Eichmann trial in 
Jerusalem, in a new television documentary on the Third Reich, in the diary of Anne 
Frank, a new film on the Nuremburg Trials, and in visits to concentration camps.  Living 
in the shadow of these events, the Germans were becoming a sober and skeptical people.  
But they also needed to see their personal moral responsibility for these events.  When 
they saw pictures of Jewish women and children being led to the gas chambers it was not 
enough to feel bad.  They needed to consider whether true followers of Christ would have 
accompanied them in their suffering, taking their place or suffering alongside them.  Here 
Hildebrandt related a personal story that Kreyssig had included from his own past.  To 
the present day, Kreyssig had written, he was haunted by the memory of a Jewish 
Christian whose deportation to a concentration camp he had personally witnessed.  He 
had tried to comfort this man in his suffering.  But perhaps he had been called to more 
than this.  Perhaps, it had not been right to let this man face death alone.  Recognizing 
that God had forgiven their sins, did not mean letting go of these images.  It meant 
holding on to them, letting them direct their future actions.47  
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Going forward into the future as a forgiven people meant changing their behavior.  
It meant constantly guarding against a return to these evils.  It meant overcoming their 
tendencies to political resignation in order to take an active role in changing society.  And 
it meant recognizing that their own sins were not absolved by the fact that others had also 
been sinful in their actions.  When Germans accepted their sin and embraced the true 
forgiveness available in Christ, this would lead them to change their entire perspective on 
the world.  True followers of Christ, who had learned from their past, would follow in the 
footsteps of men like Dietrich Bonhoeffer and the members of the July 1944 plot against 
Hitler, putting their faith into action.  “Changing one’s mentality, receiving forgiveness, 
beginning to work toward better obedience,” Hildebrandt argued, “this is an open future, 
this is a mastered past.”48 
Various members of the workgroup leadership once again followed this speech 
with clarifications and answers to audience questions.  In response to those who felt that 
concepts of collective guilt were unfair, Hans Dombois acknowledged Theodor Heuß’ 
distinction between “collective guilt” and “collective responsibility.”  From a juridical 
standpoint, he conceded, Germans were not all guilty of crimes against humanity.  But all 
were responsible for letting these things happen.  He also acknowledged that many 
ordinary soldiers had simply been trying to do their duty.  Johannes Rau counseled 
German youth whose parents would not confront their guilt to avoid an attitude of self-
righteous condemnation, being gracious in the face of their parents’ failings.  Rau and 
Roland Friedrich Messner also responded to a number of questions that sought to derive 
more immediate political lessons from the German past, looking at controversies over the 
military chaplaincy, nuclear arms, the question of obedience to the GDR regime in the 
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East, and political developments in the Federal Republic.  Both argued that Protestants 
were divided on these issues and should follow the dictates of their own conscience.  But 
they also affirmed their responsibility as citizens to remain engaged and involved in such 
controversies.49  
Finally, in a round table discussion at the end of the gathering, members of the 
workgroup leadership turned their attentions to more practical political concerns.  Here 
all of the speakers were again careful to affirm the importance of political involvement, 
the necessity of politics, and the dangers of traditional apolitical attitudes.   Yet there 
were also several disagreements about the precise political lessons to be drawn from the 
past.  Messner, for example, argued that the primary lesson was the need to guard against 
abuses of power. But Rau saw more specific continuities between the past and present, 
focusing on the ongoing need to overcome Germany’s dangerous nationalist and 
militarist traditions.  Messner also defended many members of the Nazi party and the 
German military, arguing that they had simply been doing their duty.  Rau, by contrast, 
argued that Christians needed to take more personal responsibility for their actions.50 
The leaders of the political workgroup also coordinated a commemoration of the 
July 20, 1944 Plot on Hitler’s life, meeting exactly seventeen years later at the Plötzensee 
memorial to executed members of the resistance.  Here Franz von Hammerstein spoke of 
the example set by all of those in the resistance against Nazism, whose unpopular actions 
had demonstrated their true and heroic obedience to God’s laws, even when the whole 
people had been disobedient.  He emphasized that the various members of the resistance 
had come from many different backgrounds, socialists and Christians, women and men, 
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Catholic and Protestant, politicians and professors, soldiers and civilians.  But all had one 
thing in common: “All rose up against terror and delusion in the name of humanity.  
Acting, suffering, and dying in the name of humanity, that is what they did here together, 
and in this they were the hands of the living God.”  In closing, as Hammerstein recited 
the prayer of a Jewish victim of the Nazis, Reinold von Thadden laid a wreath to 
commemorate these victims.51 
At the same time, another memorial service was held in the Sophienkirche in 
Berlin.  Here Friedrich Graf zu Lynar also spoke of the obedience of the resisters to the 
will of God and the failure of the German churches to obey as boldly and directly.  “The 
church,” he argued, “is and remains the location where injustice receives 
excommunication, where lies are exposed, where poisonous evil must be denounced, the 
location where mercy is practiced from the source of all life.”  Too many Christians had 
ignored their duty during the Third Reich, failing to be the manifestation of God’s 
presence in the world.  Yet God’s power was present in the world, even in times of evil 
and suffering.  As Sophie Scholl, who had been executed as part of the White Rose 
resistance circle had written before her death: “I cannot understand why so many pious 
people today fear for the existence of God, simply because people pursue his traces with 
terrible and shameful deeds, as though God does not have power.  I feel his power in 
everything, since everything lies in his hands.  Instead, we must fear for the existence of 
humanity, since they have turned away from him.”52  Christians in Germany needed to 
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learn from this example.  The future had already begun.  Their task was to follow in the 
footsteps of people like Sophie Scholl, seeing their own lives as an opportunity to do 
God’s will.53 
 
JEWS AND CHRISTIANS 
The 1961 Kirchentag in Berlin also saw the continuation of the work begun in the 
1959 evening session on “Israel.”  Immediately following the 1959 meeting, a circle of 
enthusiastic supporters had gathered around Helmut Gollwitzer, with the hope of creating 
a more permanent forum to discuss these issues and to lobby for the reform of church 
teachings and practices.  The widespread positive reaction to the 1959 gathering also 
spurred the Kirchentag leadership to consider the continuation of this discussion in a full-
fledged workgroup.  These plans were still quite vague when the theme selection 
committees began to meet early in 1960.  Some Kirchentag leaders seem to have wanted 
to tie the themes of this gathering back into the existing Kirchentag program, rather than 
focusing so directly on questions of Jewish-Christian relations.  One early suggestion for 
a future workgroup, for example, would have submerged these issues into a far more 
theological discussion of anti-Semitism as a form of atheism.  Still other Kirchentag 
planners hoped to discuss these topics in another special evening gathering, rather than 
devoting an entire workgroup to them.54 
By May 1960, however, Kirchentag planners had begun to develop ideas for a 
more focused “Israel” workgroup.  “Looking simultaneously at atheism and anti-
Semitism in one workgroup,” they concluded, “is clearly too much.”  Instead of watering 
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down their discussion of anti-Semitism, they divided the atheism question between 
several other workgroups, giving the question of Jews and Christians priority.  At this 
point, the plans for this workgroup were still quite broad and undeveloped.  Initially they 
called for two discussions.  The first would look at the status and role of Jews in the 
world “from the time of the Old Testament and after the destruction of Jerusalem until 
today.”  The second would examine anti-Semitism as a form of atheism, in its rejection of 
God in the person of the Jew, Jesus of Nazareth.55  These plans continued to face some 
opposition.  In a meeting of the Präsidium in June, several members again downplayed 
the importance of a separate workgroup on these issues, arguing that they should be 
relegated to another evening meeting.56 
Eventually, however, the forces in favor of a separate workgroup on Jewish-
Christian relations prevailed.57  Meeting with Helmut Gollwitzer and Adolf Freudenberg 
in September, Friedelbert Lorenz, the academic director of the Kirchentag, began the 
work of assembling a new workgroup leadership committee for the topic “Jews and 
Christians.”58  By November the Hamburg Old Testament Professor Hans Joachim 
Kraus—whose work focused on the Jews as the people of God—had agreed to serve as 
chair of the new workgroup.  At his suggestion the themes for the 1961 meeting were 
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again reworked.59  While earlier plans had called for largely descriptive presentations, 
Kraus favored a more argumentative and theologically pointed approach.  Instead of 
simply looking at the history of Jews in the world, the first presentation would be titled 
“God’s Way into the World.”  It would strongly emphasize the role of the Jews as God’s 
chosen people, without whom there could be no Christianity.  The workgroup’s second 
presentation would not simply look at anti-Semitism as a form of atheism, as a clear 
deviation from traditional Christian teaching.  Instead, Kraus wanted to look more closely 
and self-critically at the origins of anti-Semitism in the teachings of the early church 
itself.  “Here,” he argued, “we cannot just speak of temptation, instead we need to talk 
about guilt.”  These anti-Semitic origins would then be traced in their evolution through 
the middle ages, the ideas of modern philosophers, and finally through their effect on the 
modern psyche.  For the workgroup’s final Sunday gathering, Kraus hoped that 
Gollwitzer could preach on the passage of Romans 11, demonstrating theologically that 
God had not abandoned his chosen people.  With the suggestion of the Jewish social 
psychologist Eva Reichmann as one of the workgroup’s speakers, Kraus was also 
instrumental in inaugurating a change that would later become the workgroup’s signature 
feature.  It would not be made up only of Christians talking about Jewish-Christian 
relations, but would include Jewish members.  It would itself become a forum for Jewish-
Christian dialogue.60   
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The new workgroup held its first official planning meeting in January 1961.  This 
discussion followed the format suggested by Kraus, but was modified in a few key areas.  
Among other changes, the workgroup leaders decided that their first discussion, on the 
Jews as God’s chosen people, needed to also have a Jewish speaker, someone who could 
address Jewish self-understandings.  Eventually the workgroup would settle on Rabbi 
Robert Raphael Geis of Dusseldorf.  More controversially, it was also suggested that the 
workgroup’s bible lesson for the first day should be presented by a Jewish theologian.  In 
a clear sign of the tensions within the group, and within German Protestantism more 
broadly, discussion of this suggestion erupted into a major argument.  On the one side, 
many of those present argued that it was clearly inappropriate to have a Jewish speaker 
presenting the workgroup’s bible lesson.  As adherents of this viewpoint argued: how 
could someone who did not accept the basic premise of the Gospel be asked to give 
theological instruction at the Kirchentag?  Since all of the scriptures had been fulfilled 
and given meaning in Christ, a Jew could not have a proper understanding even of the 
Old Testament.  On the other side of this debate were those who argued: “We need to 
take a risk, to expose all of our Christian beliefs to the fire.  We need to be ready to let 
ourselves be questioned, to listen to a testimony of Jewish faith.”61  In the end, against 
the protests of Kraus and Gollwitzer, plans for a Jewish bible lesson were vetoed by t
Kirchentag Präsidium.
he 
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Another source of tension arose with Martin Niemöller’s decision to boycott the 
1961 Kirchentag in Berlin and with his attempts to persuade his supporters to do 
likewise.  Since many of Niemöller’s strongest church political allies, such as Karl 
Kupisch and Helmut Gollwitzer, were in the leadership of the workgroup on Jews and 
Christians, this decision threw the entire workgroup into turmoil.  In their March 1961 
meeting, the workgroup approved an official letter of protest to the Kirchentag 
Präsidium.63  And in a meeting with Reinold von Thadden in May 1961, Gollwitzer had 
the opportunity to personally express his concerns with the political direction of the 
Kirchentag leadership.  But he was ultimately persuaded to continue his involvement.64  
Similarly, in letters to the workgroup members drafted in June and July, Thadden sought 
to defend this decision, while emphasizing the important work of the workgroup and the 
need to move forward despite their disagreements.65  Ultimately, plans for the workgroup 
proceeded despite these tensions. 
Since the idea of a Jewish bible teacher had been vetoed by the Kirchentag 
leadership, Gollwitzer was given the task of presenting the workgroup’s bible lesson.  
Speaking on the assigned text of Psalm 139, he focused on the God’s presence in the 
world, even in the darkest times.  God was not just present in the “Christian West” but to 
people in all of the world.  No one had a monopoly on God.  In fact, he pointed out, the 
words of the psalmist were not first and foremost a Christian prayer, but a Jewish prayer.  
God had promised the Jews that he was there with them, even in their times of trouble.  
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They were his people.  God had been there with them even in Auschwitz, even during the 
terrible cruelties inflicted upon them, in their deaths in the gas chambers, and in the 
earlier periods of Christian persecution against them.  Indeed, Christians had access to 
fellowship and community with God only by way of the Jews, through the death of the 
Jew, Jesus Christ.  Jesus’ followers in the church were called in the same way to 
renounce the way of the world, following Jesus instead.66 
Gollwitzer’s bible lesson was followed by the workgroup’s first discussion, on the 
Jews as “God’s Way into the World.”  This discussion began with Theodor Vriezen an 
Old Testament scholar at the University of Utrecht, who addressed the nature of God’s 
selection of Israel as his chosen people.  This was a controversial topic, he 
acknowledged, that many in the worldwide church did not take seriously.  But the 
experiences of Europeans in the last several decades demonstrated the need for Christians 
to wrestle with their theological assumptions.  Since the events of the Second World War, 
he explained, he had been forced to rethink his own beliefs about the nature of Israel’s 
calling, and he wanted to share his findings with the Kirchentag audience67 
God, he argued, had revealed himself to the Jews in a way that was unique in 
history.  While many religious traditions had some concept of a creator God, this God 
had usually been seen as impersonal and distant.  With the Jews, however, God had 
entered into a personal relationship.  He had chosen them as the vehicle through which he 
would make himself known to the world.  This was clear in God’s calling of Abraham to 
leave his homeland and to become the father of a new people.  Even in times of great 
suffering, as in the exile, God had reaffirmed this bond.  Speaking through the prophets, 
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he had called them to return to him and had promised to preserve them.  And he had 
given them a special task.  The Jews, as the prophet Isaiah had written, were to be a “light 
among the nations.”  This special calling carried with it loneliness, struggle, suffering, 
and the hostility of others.  But these struggles were not a sign that God had abandoned 
his people.  In fact, Vriezen explained, God had promised to protect them. 
Whoever harms Israel, will themselves be shamed. . . . Whoever treats Israel 
unjustly . . . will receive God’s punishment.  This applies to the ancient world and 
to the modern, it applies to the Assyrians and also to the Germans, to the Arabs 
and the Slavs, to Christians and non-Christians, to the church and to the world.  
We have all sinned in that we have not lived in holy fear of God, but have 
trampled his will underfoot.68 
 
God’s will for his people had had its truest expression in Jesus of Nazareth, who 
had “taken the calling of his people upon himself, in order to renew Israel in the 
knowledge of God’s election and to call them to a life of unconditional service in the 
Kingdom of God.”  Jesus’ mission was itself the clearest sign of God’s election of Israel.  
However: “He had not deposed the chosen people from their task, but returned them to 
their highest calling.”  Far from proclaiming an end to the special mission of the Jews, 
Jesus had expanded it, removing the barrier between Jews and Gentiles so that others 
might enter into Israel’s special relationship with God.  Unfortunately, the teachings of 
the Apostle Paul about the inclusion of the church within God’s chosen people had been 
misinterpreted as a denial of God’s continuing relationship with the Jews.  This was a 
terrible mistake.  God’s promises were, in fact, eternal and irrevocable.  Israel remained 
the people of God, the church’s “elder sister.” The church needed to recognize this fact 
and to seek reconciliation with the Jews.   “The church,” he concluded, “must change its 
understanding, before we can speak with Israel from the heart, before Israel can accept 
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the church as a partner on its path toward the Kingdom of God.  The church must be 
forgiven.  And Israel must be given time to overcome their mistrust.”  This would be 
difficult, but it would be necessary in the end, because the church and synagogue shared a 
common calling and a common mission.69 
In the next presentation, Rabbi Robert Raphael Geis spoke on Jewish 
understanding of their calling and place in the world.  He began by situating the Jewish 
people within the narrative of the first books of the bible.  God had created the world and 
desired to have a relationship with humanity.  But humans had repeatedly rebelled against 
God’s teachings.  In doing so, they had earned God’s judgment.  In order to restore this 
relationship, marred by humanity’s disobedience, God had chosen Abraham to be the 
father of a special people whose existence would be an expression of God’s continuing 
love for his creation.  Israel had been chosen to be a sign of God’s desire for 
reconciliation and a model of the future state of reconciled humanity.  This was apparent 
in at least three tasks that had been given to the Jews.  First, they were called to fight 
against the creation of idols, the human tendency to worship natural forces rather than the 
creator God.  Second, they were called to fight against the power of kings and rulers, who 
acted out of nothing besides the desire for personal power.  Finally, they were called to 
keep themselves pure of these corruptions.  They were called to reject even the Jewish 
temple and the sacrificial system when it hardened into a form of religious arrogance and 
oppression.70 
The Jews, according to Geis, had not always been diligent in pursuing this calling.  
They had often wavered or even abandoned God’s mission.  And, in the process, they had 
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also become an example, not only of God’s love for humanity, but of his judgment 
against sin and rebellion.  During the time of the exile, God had purified his people.  
Those who had abandoned their calling were cast off, but a remnant were restored to their 
true purpose.  “Here,” Geis argued, “destruction and preservation go together at the same 
time; and the grace of election is apparent in both.”  This had become even clearer after 
the destruction of Jerusalem in AD 70.  The scattering of the Jews and their suffering in 
exile were signs of both their continuing election and the punishment for turning away 
from their calling.71   
Because the Jews had been called by God to take an active stance against 
“heathenism,” they had often been subject to persecution.  Indeed, influenced by heathen 
ideas, Christians had sometimes led this process.  But the Jews, Geis argued, did not 
oppose the message of Jesus, only the heathenism that had become ingrained in 
Christianity.  This had become especially clear in recent German history, when Hitler and 
the Nazis had explicitly embraced barbarism and heathen ideas.  They had opposed the 
Jews because they recognized the Jews owed allegiance to a different God—“the God of 
social justice, of compassion, and love, the one and only God.”  In their zeal to destroy 
the Jews, the Nazis had also turned against Christianity.  This had had unintended 
consequences, however.  For in the midst of this persecution, Christians had rediscovered 
their inescapable connection to Judaism.  They had come to see that it was not possible to 
attack Judaism without also attacking the core of the Christian faith.72   
This realization created new openings for the future, and Geis concluded his 
speech with a few words on how Jews and Christians could get along.  Christians had 
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sometimes been right, he said, to see the Jews as a people that had turned its back on 
God.  But they had been wrong to think that God could ever really abandon his people.  
Instead of seeing the Jews as those who had rejected God’s teachings, they needed to 
learn from them, in order to better understand their own faith.  And if the Jews did, again, 
turn their backs on their calling, Christians were called not to persecute them, but to 
gently chide them and to remind them of their mission.73 
In the question and answer period following Geis’ speech, several Protestant 
ministers and theologians addressed the audience’s many questions.  In all of these 
responses they focused on the idea of the Jews as God’s chosen people and the 
persistence of this calling up to the present day.  In particular, they worked to defend this 
position against earlier theological interpretations.  How, for example, could the church 
reconcile the Apostle Paul’s affirmation of the Jews as God’s people in Romans 11, with 
his apparent denial of this in 1 Thessalonians?  Was there a difference between the 
Jewish and Christian Gods?  And had the church replaced Israel as God’s chosen people, 
or were both Jews and Christians now included in God’s community?  Paul’s comments 
in Thessalonians, they argued, had not been intended as a rejection of Judaism as a 
whole, but referred only to very specific and concrete theological disputes between early 
Jewish-Christian and Gentile-Christian communities.  Both faiths worshipped one and the 
same God.  And, while Christians were now included in God’s calling, Jews also 
remained God’s chosen people.74 
Another set of much more complicated questions concerned the Christian belief in 
Jesus as the Jewish Messiah and the implications of this belief for Jewish-Christian 
                                                 
73 Ibid. 
 
74 Ibid., 428-430. 
 278
relations.  Here workgroup members were themselves clearly divided.  Pastor Leuner, a 
Jewish Christian argued that it was only the actions of Christians, their centuries of 
persecution against the Jews, that prevented Jews from recognizing Jesus as their 
Messiah.  Schalom Ben-Chorin, a Jewish speaker, acknowledged the respect that many 
modern Jews had for Jesus as a Jewish teacher.  But he reiterated their rejection of Jesus’ 
messianic claims.  And another workgroup member, Lili Simon, worked to explain Jesus’ 
comments that he was the only way to the Father.  These comments, she suggested, did 
not exclude the Jews since, in context, he was speaking here of the path that his disciples 
should follow, not making any universal claim.  Rabbi Geis, by contrast, reaffirmed the 
important theological differences between Judaism and Christianity, arguing “the things 
that separate us need to be allowed to remain; it would be a fundamental 
misunderstanding to not take these seriously or to try to discuss them away.”  
Nevertheless, all of these speakers called for Christian humility in relation to the Jews 
and for tolerance and continued discussion.75 
In their final comments both Vriezen and Geis cautioned against trying to 
accomplish too much too soon.  Vriezen again acknowledged the controversial nature of 
the workgroup and the difficulty to rethinking one’s long-held beliefs.  But he argued that 
the Gospels themselves were unmistakable in their affirmation of the Jews as God’s 
chosen people.  Jesus remained a point of contention between Jews and Christians, but 
this disagreement should not prevent them from seeking cooperation and discussion.  
Geis was even more determined to acknowledge the many theological differences that 
separated Jews and Christians.  But he urged his listeners to focus on the many 
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underlying areas of agreement.  And he called Christians in the audience to live a true 
Christians, following the example of men like Dietrich Bonhoeffer.76 
On its second day, the workgroup “Jews and Christians” examined the origins of 
modern anti-Semitism.  The church historian Karl Kupisch began this session with a 
presentation on Christian anti-Semitism.  He began by reminding his listeners that they 
could not simply dismiss the anti-Semitic horrors of the Nazis as something unrelated to 
their own beliefs.  While Christian and modern racist forms of anti-Semitism were 
unquestionably different, the latter had grown out of the former.  They had only been 
possible because of a long tradition of Christian teachings against the Jews.  After 
looking briefly at the anti-Semitic beliefs of the ancient Greek and Roman writers, who 
branded the Jews “atheists” for their rejection of the classical gods, Kupisch turned to 
writings of the early church fathers.  Out of the theological disagreements between early 
Christians and Jews, the church fathers had developed their own anti-Semitic beliefs, 
beliefs that went far beyond mere intellectual disagreement.   They had come to see the 
Jews as a people cursed by God, a people who deserved nothing but persecution.  With 
the rise of the “Christian West” after the conversion of Constantine, this had led to 
special legal persecution of the Jews.  Among other things, Jews had been limited to a 
narrow spectrum of professions, such as money lending and trade, and these restrictions 
had served as the roots of modern anti-Jewish stereotypes.  In the Middle Ages, and 
especially during the time of the crusades, spiritual renewal within European Christianity 
had led to increased persecution of the Jews, who were accused of ever more fantastic 
crimes.  Church leaders, such as Pope Innocent III, had even gone so far as to proclaim 
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that God had condemned the Jews to a life of slavery, and Christian communities had 
frequently erupted in spontaneous violence against them.77 
Although many of the worst of these beliefs were rooted in medieval superstition, 
Kupisch continued, the Reformation had not put an end to anti-Semitic persecution.  
Even the reformer Martin Luther, although not an anti-Semite in the modern sense, had 
come in the later years of his life to accept the idea of the Jews as cursed, and to advocate 
violence against them.  And these ideas had continued to shape the beliefs of German 
Protestants even into the present day.  As one example of this influence, Kupisch 
reminded his audience of the anti-Semitism of the nineteenth century Imperial Chaplain 
and social reformer Adolf Stoecker and of his followers.  The beliefs of Stoecker could 
not be equated with those of the Nazis, but they did belong to the roots of this later anti-
Semitism.  Only in the present-day, did German Protestants finally have an opportunity to 
really overcome this past.78   
Kraus spoke next, beginning with a summary of the major forces behind medieval 
anti-Semitism and tracing the evolution of these forces in the modern world.  Christian 
anti-Semitism, he argued, had typically grown out of two impulses.  After the emperor 
Constantine converted to Christianity, Christianity and political citizenship had become 
intertwined.  This had led to the exclusion of Jews from political life.  Similarly, 
prevailing mystical understandings of the sacraments led to the belief that Jews were a 
foreign element within the Christian community.  These same ideas, in a more 
secularized form, persisted in eighteenth and nineteenth century thought.  For example, in 
the philosophy of Hegel, “absolute spirit” was associated with the principles of 
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Christianity and the New Testament, while the God of the Old Testament was seen as the 
radical antithesis of these ideals.  The mystical dualism of the Middle Ages, in which 
Jews were seen as foreigners, had become in Hegel a form of metaphysical dualism, in 
which Judaism was associated with all that was evil and bad.  These ideas became central 
to German idealist philosophy and also crept into the teachings of the German churches.79 
The political anti-Semitism of post-Constantine Europe, in which Jews were 
excluded from the political community, was also replicated in Prussian notions of the 
Christian state.  Kings, such as Friedrich Wilhelm IV, had limited the citizenship rights of 
Jews.  Of even more importance, early nationalist thinkers often excluded Jews from their 
conception of the German religious-national community.  Thinkers such as Ernst Moritz 
Arndt argued, instead, that the national community had no place for Jews and needed to 
be defended against their encroachments.  These sentiments continued to develop into 
even more radical forms as Germans defined themselves in opposition to other groups.  
As the nineteenth century nationalist Friedrich Jahn had argued, “It is every German’s 
duty to hate all foreigners.”  This hatred had not been turned exclusively against the Jews, 
but it had laid the groundwork for later anti-Semitism.  These ideas had heavily 
influenced the ideas of the “German Christians” in the Weimar Republic and Third 
Reich.  Later, these ideas had also been combined with crude biological theories, to argue 
that Jews were an inferior race and even a danger to the German people.80 
In various forms, these ideas had become widespread in Germany.  They had been 
popularized in the churches by men like Adolf Stoecker and had become dominant in the 
German student associations.  Eventually they had spread throughout the respectable 
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middle classes.  These ideas had influenced the ideas of the Nazis and they had made it 
much easier for the Nazis to promote their own more radical version of anti-Semitism.  
“Today we need to clearly see,” Kraus argued, “that the Christian-German ideology was 
the ground out of which this murderous spirit arose.”  Even the Confessing Church had 
been infected.  Because of the latent anti-Semitism of many of its members, the 
Confessing Church had been unable to take an unequivocal stand against the Nazi 
persecution of the Jews.  Germans in the present day needed to make a clear break with 
this past, something that could only take place if they were willing to engage in self-
criticism.  This did not mean adopting “a (more or less obligatory) declaration of guilt” 
but required real soul searching and self-examination “from the heart.”  For the churches 
themselves, this would mean the critical re-examination of their own teachings, 
especially about the death of Jesus.  The church needed to overcome millennia of false 
teachings, recognizing that Jesus had died for the sins of all, including the Jews.  Every 
human being was responsible for this, and no one group could be singled out as Christ-
killers.81 
Finally, the Jewish sociologist Eva Reichmann spoke on the roots of middle class 
German anti-Semitism.  Unlike the other two speakers, she did not focus primarily on the 
ideas of intellectuals, but on the social and psychological factors behind popular anti-
Semitic beliefs.  For the common man, anti-Semitism was not rooted in Christian 
theology or racial philosophy.  These idea systems were merely used to rationalize 
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existing prejudices.  Instead, at least in the middle classes, anti-Semitism had arisen out 
of the fear that Jews had too much influence in society.82   
In the body of her speech, Reichmann set out to explain the origins of these 
prejudices, separating fact from fiction and conspiracy theory. Because Jews had had 
only limited vocational choices, it was not surprising that they had become over-
represented in business and in professions such as law, medicine, and journalism.  But 
they had still only been a minority in these areas.  There had always been many “Aryans” 
who had also worked in these fields.  Historical factors also explained the high proportion 
of Jews in big cities and their attraction to the parties of the political Left.  But despite the 
influence that Jews had had in Germany, they had never dominated in the way that anti-
Semites believed.  While anti-Semites had branded Weimar a “Jewish Republic,” only a 
very small handful of Jews had ever served in its government.  Out of the 387 
government ministers between 1918 and 1932, only two had been Jews, while three 
others had some Jewish ancestry.  Out of the 500 top state officials, only fifteen had any 
Jewish blood.  Among the major bankers and creditors in Weimar, there had been just as 
many non-Jews as Jews.  The same was true for the free professions of law and medicine.  
And Jews had been just as hard hit as non-Jews by the economic crisis of the late 1920s.  
But popular prejudice had never been dependent on the facts.  Instead, it was rooted in 
“envy, suffering, unhappiness, and enmity” in the need for a scapegoat to blame for the 
“inflation, economic crises, and mass unemployment.”  A full 44 percent of Germans had 
embraced these errors when they voted for the Nazis in 1933.  Now, at the Kirchentag, it 
was time to “take an axe” to the roots of these old prejudices.  Germany was making a 
real effort to turn around, but it was still haunted by “the ghosts of the past.”  In order for 
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there to be a real new beginning, individual Germans had to examine their own personal 
guilt and reorder their own thinking.83 
In the question and answer period following these speeches, workgroup members 
again elaborated on the speakers major ideas and worked to clear up misconceptions.  
Many questions sought to add nuance to the speaker’s presentations.  Some asked about 
the role of the Christian tradition in opposing anti-Semitism or drew attention to anti-
Semitic thought outside of Germany.  Others tried to connect Christian anti-Semitism to 
Catholic teachings or to explain anti-Semitism as a response to the actions of Jews 
themselves.  In their answers, workgroup members continually worked to bring the 
discussion back to responsibility that German Protestants themselves had for the 
persecution of the Jews.84 
On the final day of the Kirchentag, before an audience of 10,000 people, the 
workgroup leadership continued these efforts, presenting a declaration calling on German 
Protestants to seriously examine their own past guilt and to rethink their teachings and 
actions.  This declaration was also released to the press and was widely published, 
stirring up considerable controversy in more conservative Protestant circles.  It began by 
declaring that Jews and Christians shared an insoluble bond and that the denial of this 
fact was the root of Christian anti-Semitism and anti-Jewish persecution.  And it went on 
to condemn every form of anti-Semitism [Judenfeindschaft] as “godlessness” that led 
inevitably to “self-destruction.”  Calling attention to the Eichmann process in Jerusalem, 
it declared that all German Protestants shared in the guilt uncovered by this trial and it 
laid out several concrete proposals for how the church could demonstrate its repentance 
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and re-orientation.  First, parents and teachers needed to break their silence, so that the 
crimes of the past could be examined and discussed.  Second, German Protestants needed 
to be aware of the dangers inherent in hierarchical “command structures.”  Rather than 
simply following orders, officials needed to be prepared to take personal responsibility 
for their actions.  And public officials who were implicated in the persecution of the Jews 
needed to be removed from office.  Third, Germans had a special duty to advance the 
well being of German Jews and the state of Israel, while also encouraging peace between 
the Israelis and their Arab neighbors.  Finally, the churches needed to reject the false 
teaching that God had abandoned the Jews, recognizing that Jews and Christians were 
both the people of God.85 
This public declaration was not as radical as some workgroup members would 
have liked, representing basic ideas upon which all could agree.  Even so, its publication, 
like the activities of the workgroup more generally, stirred up significant controversy 
inside and outside of the Protestant churches.  On the level of party politics, this 
controversy surrounded the workgroup’s demands that all public officials who had been 
involved in the persecution of the Jews should lose their positions.  In particular, 
members of the CDU took umbrage at the comments of workgroup member Dietrich 
Goldschmidt, who explicitly directed this statement at Hans Globke, one of Adenauer’s 
closest advisors who, during the Third Reich, had written the official commentary on the 
Nuremburg Racial Laws.86  More theologically conservative Protestants, on the other 
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hand, took issue with the theological implications of the workgroup’s main assertions 
about Jewish-Christian relations.  In particular, many objected to the claim that Jews 
were still part of the people of God, whether or not they accepted Jesus as the Messiah.87  
More worrying for the Kirchentag leadership, the leaders of the Kirchentag’s own state 
committees [Landesausschüsse] had similar objections.  In a meeting several months 
later, several members of these state committees argued that the Jewish-Christian 
workgroup was a “misuse of the Kirchentag.”  They cynically wrote off Gollwitzer’s 
involvement as an attempt by the Protestant Left to find a new controversial issue after 
failing in their anti-nuclear weapons campaign.  More substantively, they objected that 
the workgroup had failed to “look at all of the facts of the last several decades in 
Germany,” that it had implied that the church and the synagogue were basically the same, 
and that its leaders had stifled any theological disagreement by accusing their opponents 
of racism.88 
The Kirchentag leadership responded to these objections by trying to downplay 
the radicalism of the workgroup, arguing for the most conservative possible interpretation 
of its statements.  At the same time, members of the Jewish-Christian workgroup pushed 
ahead with their activities.  Meeting directly after the conclusion of the 1961 Kirchentag, 
they reorganized themselves as a broad umbrella organization designed to promote 
Jewish-Christian dialogue within the Protestant churches.  Besides reaching out to other, 
similar groups, they began making plans to publish their workgroup speeches.  They also 
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distanced themselves somewhat from the Kirchentag leadership, reorganizing themselves 
as a semi-autonomous group that met during the Kirchentag, but was not subordinate to 
the Präsidium.89  Over the next several years, they would return to the themes and 
questions that they had pioneered in 1961, working to convince a skeptical public to 
reconsider its assumptions about Jews and Jewish-Christian relations.  This work would 
remain controversial, especially when it addressed controversial theological areas such as 
Jesus’ Messianic claims and Jewish “salvation.”  But it would also play a formative role 
in changing church teachings and theological assumptions. 
 
CONCLUSION 
For German Protestants the years from 1959 to 1961 marked an important turning 
point, especially with regard to their understanding of their own history and identity.  
While discussions at Kirchentag gatherings of the early 1950s had not ignored questions 
of German guilt for the Second World War and Holocaust, these ideas had rarely been a 
central focus of attention.  By the early 1960s this had changed dramatically as these 
discussions became some of the most publicized and best attended Kirchentag meetings.  
The late 1950s and early 1960s also saw an important change in the way that German 
Protestants thought about the burdens of the German past.  When speakers had addressed 
these topics at earlier Kirchentage, they had usually skipped over the concrete details of 
what had happened, focusing instead on more immediate theological and political 
implications.  Nazism and the events of the war and Holocaust were mined for examples 
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of human sinfulness, of every person’s need for God.  But the churches themselves were 
often portrayed in a heroic light, not implicated in these events.  Even when speakers 
looked at the guilt of church leaders and members, they focused on the theological and 
personal dimensions of these failings.  More self-critical Protestant speakers, such as 
Gustav Heinemann and Martin Niemöller, were more direct in addressing the guilt of 
German Christians themselves, even in the Confessing Church and other resistance 
circles.  But they too had a tendency to politicize these events, identifying repentance and 
contrition exclusively with their own political stances against West German rearmament. 
In the late 1950s and early 1960s this began to change.  Members of the younger 
generation, who had not personally experienced the Nazi dictatorship or war, began to 
ask questions about what had actually happened.  And, as the events faded into memory, 
some members of the older generation sought to “normalize” the German past, to 
downplay the crimes of the Nazis or of ordinary Germans, or to minimize their 
importance.  These developments led some (though certainly not all) in the Kirchentag 
leadership to see the need for more direct, fact based discussions of German history and 
Jewish-Christian relations. 
These discussions, taking place in meetings of the political workgroup and the 
newly formed Workgroup on Jews and Christians, did not try to offer easy answers or 
simple theological and political lessons.  Instead they worked to confront audience 
members with the unvarnished truth about their own past, forcing them to consider 
uncomfortable questions about their own behavior and beliefs.  In doing so, they laid the 
groundwork for more sophisticated and controversial discussions that would come in the 
future.  This did not represent the last word on the subject, only a new opening.  But it 
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made it much harder for German Protestants to avoid difficult questions of German and 
Christian guilt, elevating these questions to a place of central importance for German 
Protestant identity. 
 
 
 
 
 
PART THREE 
 
1961-1969 
 

 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 8  
 
EXPERIMENTAL CHURCH 
 
 
The Kirchentag first gained its national reputation in 1951 with the massive all-
German gathering in the divided city of Berlin.  Ten years later, in vastly different 
circumstances, many church and Kirchentag leaders hoped to reprise this role.  The 
Kirchentag had always been one of the most visible symbols of German Protestant unity, 
despite German division.  Already by the late 1950s, however, this unity was getting 
harder to maintain.  On the one hand, many members of the Kirchentag leadership felt 
that a focus on the symbolism of German unity was a distraction from critically looking 
at the social and political problems of the West.  This was especially true as hopes for 
German reunification became increasingly remote.  On the other hand, Kirchentag 
gatherings in Berlin in 1951 and in Leipzig in 1954 had disappointed East German 
leaders, who had hoped to use them as a propaganda platform against the rearmament 
policies of the West German government.  Some members of the East German 
government, such as Otto Nuschke of the CDU-East, continued to believe that the 
churches could be useful to the East German cause.  But the East German politburo had 
already abandoned these hopes in favor of a new strategy of divide and conquer.  This 
involved sowing divisions within the East German Landeskirchen and working for the 
permanent separation between the Protestant churches in the East and West.1 
In this vastly different environment, the Berlin Kirchentag of 1961 could not hope 
to meet peoples’ high expectations.  Indeed, from the earliest planning stages, it was 
surrounded by controversy.  In the midst of a major international crisis over the status of 
Berlin, the SED regime adamantly opposed any all-German gathering within the city.  In 
numerous pronouncements, it made it clear that an all-Berlin Kirchentag would be 
impossible and that a gathering held only in West Berlin would be seen as a major 
provocation.  Desperate to avoid this, GDR officials even offered the possibility of 
meeting again in Leipzig, or in some other city entirely within the East.  Kirchentag 
leaders ultimately rejected these offers, since a handful of vehemently anti-Communist 
church leaders, principally Bishop Otto Dibelius of Berlin, would not be allowed to 
attend.  They argued that this decision was necessary to defend the intellectual freedom 
and independence of the Kirchentag.  Critics such as Martin Niemöller, however, argued 
that the Kirchentag was sacrificing church unity for the sake of the vanity of a few church 
leaders, thereby betraying its true subordination to the institutional church and to an anti-
Communist political ideology.2   
Despite a few problems—most notably the inability of several East German 
speakers to obtain travel documents, throwing several workgroups into disarray—the 
1961 Berlin Kirchentag was basically successful.  Although it was not nearly as large as 
its 1951 predecessor, it still attracted large numbers of Protestants from both German 
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states.  It also pioneered several new and provocative topics of discussion, including the 
historical causes of the Third Reich and Christian-Jewish relations.  Just months later, 
however, with the construction of the Berlin Wall, it became clear that the Kirchentag 
had outlived its usefulness as a symbol of German unity.  The Protestant churches might 
take a decade to finally accept their institutional division, but division was an 
unavoidable fact.  As a result, the very existence of the Kirchentag was called into 
question.  As Carola Wolf, who became the Kirchentag’s press secretary in 1962, later 
reported: “Because of the now almost unbridgeable division of Germany, many observers 
thought the Kirchentag had lost its most important function: namely as a meeting point 
for people of one faith, forced to live in two different political worlds.”3  The Kirchentag 
faced the task of reinventing itself, finding a way to maintain its political and social 
importance, without the excitement and interest that had always been generated by its all-
German dimension.   
If the Kirchentag was to maintain its relevance, it would need to look more 
critically at the problems of West German society.  But what did the Kirchentag, or the 
churches themselves for that matter, have to offer the increasingly secular society of the 
Federal Republic?  Already in the middle of the 1950s, Kirchentag leaders had begun to 
grapple with this question, responding with two divergent impulses.  First, recognizing 
that many Protestants were increasingly ignorant of essential Christian teachings, they 
had redoubled their efforts to educate the Protestant public in the basics of the Christian 
faith.  Second, recognizing that theological principles and evangelistic appeals were not 
enough to solve the complex problems of a modern society, they began a process of more 
concrete, academic engagement with these problems themselves.  By the early 1960s, 
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however, this dual response had become problematic.  Neither of these tasks—Christian 
education and academic problem solving—were unique to the Kirchentag.  Arguably, 
there were other groups within the churches that were better suited to each.  And neither, 
by itself, was likely to draw the large crowds of the 1950s meetings.  In addition, these 
two tasks often pulled the Kirchentag in opposite directions.  Although they were not 
inherently incompatible, they assumed very different audiences, themes, and stylistic 
approaches.  These tensions became more acute after the 1961 Kirchentag.  Without the 
all-German symbolism as a public drawing point, Kirchentag leaders found themselves 
confronted by a series of difficult choices.  What was the role of the Kirchentag in the 
church and in West German society?  How could it draw crowds and generate 
excitement?  And how could it engage in such divergent tasks without watering down its 
program and losing its relevance?  For the Kirchentag, the 1960s was a decade of 
constant experimentation, as its leaders worked to address these problems. 
 
A DELICATE BALANCE 
Already in the mid-1950s, the Kirchentag had begun to reinvent itself.  Members 
of the Kirchentag leadership had welcomed the symbolic all-German function, but they 
had never seen this as the Kirchentag’s primary purpose.  Instead, from the very 
beginning, Reinold von Thadden-Trieglaff had created the Kirchentag as an organization 
devoted to the building up the faith and public responsibility of Protestant laity, helping 
them to develop into mature and effective leaders in the church and in society.  At the 
Kirchentage of the 1950s, one aspect of this impulse was apparent in evangelistic, 
missions, and bible-study gatherings.  However, another aspect found expression in 
academic presentations and discussions of pressing social and political issues.  In the 
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middle of the 1950s, these discussions became more organized and better planned.  At the 
same time, they became less dominated by theological perspectives, as subject matter 
experts from the Protestant Academies and from the universities were brought into the 
Kirchentag planning process.  This led to the development of several new themes by the 
late 1950s, especially in the 1957 Themenkonvent in Arnoldshain and in the follow-up 
Kirchentag Congress of 1958. 
Under the rubric of “Reality Today,” these gatherings worked to overcome the 
dominance of political, social, and theological “illusions,” attempting to bring the 
intellectual content of the Kirchentag into line with the realities of the modern world.  
These meetings succeeded in developing numerous new themes, as seen in the rapid 
multiplication of new workgroups for the Munich Kirchentag of 1959.  They also began 
to establish the importance of dialogue and diversity of opinion as important guiding 
values for the Kirchentag movement, hinting at things to come.  However, the Kirchentag 
meetings of 1959 and 1961 never fully incorporated these new topics or approaches.  
Instead, according to numerous observers, they often seemed like an incoherent and 
confusing mixture of the old and the new.4  Too provocative and controversial for the 
pious, these gatherings did not go nearly far enough in the eyes many progressives inside 
and outside of the church.  In a similar way, they incorporated unprecedented numbers of 
youth, who were especially active in the question and answer periods following speeches; 
but these youth continued to feel unappreciated and marginalized.  And critics from all 
sides complained that the Kirchentag had become too abstract and academic, that it was 
losing its connection to ordinary people. 
                                                 
4 See, for example, Friedelbert Lorenz, Press Report, 26 November 1959, EZA 71/86/113. 
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Kirchentag leaders were already well aware of these problems by the end of the 
1950s, but they disagreed about how to solve them.  Already in 1959, some critics were 
pushing for a radical reform of the Kirchentag structure and content.  In a meeting shortly 
after the 1959 Kirchentag in Munich, for example, the Christian Press Academy devoted 
considerable attention to complaints about the Kirchentag.  Summarizing their findings, 
they argued that the Kirchentag had become too “institutionalized” and “conformist.”  
Rather than limiting itself to the needs and interests of the local congregations, it needed 
to reach out to those on the margins of the church.  Rather than serving as a platform for 
the theological ideas of the host Landeskirchen, it needed to develop its own critical 
theological perspectives.  Finally, rather than serving as a top-down educational meeting, 
where church leaders presented their ideas in well-polished speeches, the Kirchentag 
needed to serve a meeting place where multiple perspectives were welcomed.5 
The Christian Press Academy also recommended several changes to the format 
and style of Kirchentag meetings.  Instead of merely providing listeners with information, 
speakers needed to be more provocative, to leave things more open to discussion, and to 
be more willing to disagree with one another.  “Certainly,” they argued, “it is 
understandable to not want to let the unavoidable internal disagreements in the speeches 
and discussions explode in front of the public.  But if one wants a truly honest and 
animated discussion, one has to trust that the church is strong enough to risk the 
occasional breakdown.”  They also recommended that the Kirchentag adopt the American 
practice of breaking large audiences into small groups for discussion, allowing more 
people the opportunity to speak.  Finally, they drew attention to the large number of 
                                                 
5 Uta von Zahn, Meeting Minutes, Christlichen Presse-Akademie, 17-18 August 1959, EZA 
71/86/113.  
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youth at the Kirchentag, who were asking very basic, foundational questions after the 
speeches.  These youth, they argued, were genuinely working to bridge the divide 
between “God’s Word” and “everyday life.”  The Kirchentag needed to aid them in this 
practice by taking their questions seriously and by offering them not only information, 
but intellectual authority and expert guidance.6 
Many of the same criticisms came up again several months later in a meeting 
between members of the Kirchentag staff and the editorial board of the Sonntagsblatt 
newspaper.  The Sonntagsblatt editors began by pointing to the unique position of the 
Kirchentag as a major Protestant organization outside of the hierarchical structure of the 
institutional churches.  This position gave the Kirchentag an important “critical function” 
with regard to the churches.  Rather than following the lead of institutional church and 
the local congregations, the Kirchentag had the opportunity to break new ground.  It was 
especially well placed to look at the questions and problems of young people and those 
on the margins of the church, helping them in their struggle to reconcile Christianity with 
their increasingly secular surroundings.  This, however, meant making room in their 
program for the questions and doubts that these people had.  “At the Kirchentag,” argued 
the Sonntagsblatt theological director Heinz Zahrnt, “there must be space for the courage 
to really doubt, the doubts of the laity must become loud, questions of belief must be 
discussed critically and without a safety net.”  This meant going back to even the most 
basic questions in order to reexamine them in the light of the “practical atheism” of the 
modern world.7 
                                                 
6 Ibid. 
 
7 Fridelbert Lorenz, Report on the October 21, 1959 Meeting with the Sonntagsblatt Editorial 
Board, 19 November 1959, EZA 71/86/113. 
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At the same time, the Kirchentag needed to deal with a world that was becoming 
more indifferent to Christianity.  The workgroups would have little resonance in the 
broader public if they began from the standpoint of Christian faith, only then moving on 
to address the problems of the world.  Instead they needed to begin from the standpoint of 
contemporary questions, problems, and controversies.  Preachers and bible teachers, too, 
needed to anticipate critical questions and objections, building them in to their 
presentations.  Finally, the Kirchentag needed to take advantage of its independence from 
the churches, to take more risks and to engage in experimentation.  This would require 
livelier discussions that drew in ordinary people, not just experts.  It would also require 
workgroups to engage with the real problems that people faced, including controversial 
topics such as changing sexual morals.  Finally, the Kirchentag needed to allow real 
discussion of these controversial topics, even when there was no possibility of coming to 
an agreement.8  
Progressive critics were not the only ones putting pressure on the Kirchentag to 
alter its program.  After the academic meetings of the late 1950s, many traditional 
Protestants, too, complained of the divide between the Kirchentag program and the 
concerns of ordinary people.  Rather than advocating new experiments, however, many 
of these critics urged the Kirchentag to return to an emphasis on the task of building up 
and supporting the local congregations.  While this task might include some engagement 
with “worldly” problems, it would be more populist and devotional in its approach.  First 
and foremost, it would involve helping Protestants to maintain their traditional faith 
despite the challenges posed by modern society.  As a secondary emphasis, it would be 
about offering Christian solutions to the problems of the world.  
                                                 
8 Ibid. 
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These concerns were apparent in a meeting of workgroup leaders, shortly after the 
1959 Kirchentag.  Here numerous leaders from both the West and East criticized the last 
Kirchentag’s abstract, academic focus, complaining that it was cold and lacking in true 
fellowship.  East German leaders complained especially about the Kirchentag’s West 
German orientation and the lack of East German involvement.  But many West Germans 
also argued that the Munich Kirchentag had drawn too heavily on the ideas of the 
Kirchentag Congress and that they had not had sufficient time to modify its program.  
While several of those present defended the new academic approach, arguing that the 
Kirchentag needed to remain engaged with the problems of the world, many others 
missed the greater emphasis of earlier Kirchentage on singing, worship, and bible study.  
Even defenders of the new approach were forced to acknowledge the gulf between 
speakers and audience.  Reacting to these complaints, even Hans Herman Walz conceded 
that the workgroups needed to include more non-experts, who could better gauge the 
accessibility of the material for the broader public.9 
Workgroup leaders also strongly rejected the notion that the Kirchentag should 
focus more on marginal Protestants and those outside the churches.  The Kirchentag’s 
primary audience, Heinrich Giesen argued, was the church’s active core membership.  
These were the people the Kirchentag was supposed to serve.  This did not mean that the 
Kirchentag needed to avoid innovative and critical approaches.  It had a duty to look at 
critical questions and contemporary topics, but it had to approach these from the 
standpoint of belief.10  As members of the workgroup leadership concluded at another 
meeting, shortly thereafter: “The suggestions of the publicists for a fundamental 
                                                 
9 Workgroup Leadership Meeting Minutes, 5-7 November 1959, EZA 71/86/112. 
 
10 Ibid. 
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restructuring of the Kirchentag were rejected.  The idea of the Kirchentag as a Kirchentag 
for the local congregations was affirmed, in the sense that it has specific and important 
contributions to make to the renewal and reformation of the church.  If it does this 
correctly . . . then it will also have an effect on those on the margins and the outside.”11 
The same approach was clear in a meeting with prominent Westphalian 
Protestants to discuss potential themes for the Dortmund Kirchentag, originally planned 
for 1961.  Already in early 1959, those attending this meeting recognized that the 
Kirchentag was losing any real ability to bridge the divide between the East and West.  If 
the Kirchentag was to remain relevant in these circumstances, they argued, it would have 
to return to Reinold von Thadden-Trieglaff’s original vision.  The Kirchentag should be 
an independent organization working under the aegis of the Protestant church to empower 
and educate the laity, an especially important task given the growing secularization of 
German society.  This would involve basic evangelistic and missionary work.  But it 
would also involve the work of strengthening and reforming the church from within, 
starting with individual members in the local congregation.12  
In another 1959 planning meeting, at the Protestant Study Center at Haus Villigst, 
several prominent Westphalian Protestants offered some indication of the topics and 
themes that a Kirchentag in Dortmund might include.  Suggestions ranged across such 
diverse topics as race relations in Germany, “youth,” the influence of jazz, film, and mass 
media, loss of meaning and purpose in the modern world, consumer society, alienation 
from the churches, and the relationship between the churches and modern society.  Klaus 
                                                 
11 Friedelbert Lorenz, “Report. Meeting of the leaders of Workgroups 1-3 on 12 January 1960,” 3 
February 1960, EZA 71/86/119, 2. 
 
12 Friedelbert Lorenz, “Minutes of a meeting at the House of Graf von der Schulenburg on 22 
April 1959,” 15 May 1959, EZA 71/86/118.  
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von Bismarck, who moderated the discussion, brought these elements together under the 
theme: “The church as a minority in secular society.”  Under this broad rubric, he 
grouped suggested topics into four general categories to be addressed at the next 
Kirchentag: youth, social politics, the “new type of human being in industrial society,” 
and the church.13 
This focus on “wordly” problems depended largely, however, on the Kirchentag’s 
proposed location in Dortmund, in the industrial Ruhr basin where the church felt most 
threatened by the forces of modernity.  These plans were called into question when 
several members of the Präsidium began to push, instead, for a gathering in Berlin.  The 
advocates of a Berlin Kirchentag wanted to play on the symbolic importance of 1961 as 
the tenth anniversary of the Kirchentag’s first truly all-German gathering.  They argued 
that, despite recent difficulties, the Kirchentag retained an important function as a bridge 
between the churches in the East and West.  And they argued that even a Kirchentag 
limited to West Berlin would draw large numbers of attendees from the East.  Those in 
favor of Dortmund argued that, without the cooperation of the GDR, any Berlin 
Kirchentag was bound to be difficult and disappointing.  And they argued that Dortmund 
would be a better location for continuing their engagement with the new ideas pioneered 
in 1958.14  Ultimately, however, Berlin was chosen in an 8 to 4 vote of the Präsidium, 
against the wishes of Thadden and the rest of the full time Kirchentag staff.  Thadden, 
who was absent for health reasons, was called on phone and given the opportunity to 
                                                 
13 Klaus von Bismarck, “Memo: Meeting in Haus Villigst on 6 January 1960,” 28 January 1960, 
EZA 71/96/349. 
 
14 “Zur Frage des Kirchentagsortes 1961: Dortmund oder Berlin,” prepared for the Präsidium 
Meeting of 17-18 January 1960, EZA 71/86/686. 
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exercise his presidential veto.  Recognizing, however, than a veto would permanently 
fragment the Kirchentag leadership, he reluctantly deferred to the majority.15   
Despite this decision, the location of the Kirchentag remained up in the air for 
almost a year as various church and Kirchentag leaders attempted to gain the approval of 
the GDR regime.  Unlike previous all-German and East German Kirchentag gatherings, 
the intellectual content of the 1961 Kirchentag remained largely West German in its 
emphasis.  Having already begun their planning with Dortmund in mind, the leaders in 
charge of thematic planning were reluctant to make drastic changes.  They were 
supported in this by the Präsidium, which agreed “not to let the vote for Berlin prejudice 
the Kirchentag thematic structure and, especially, not to allow the thematic structure of a 
potential Berlin Kirchentag to be one-sidedly evangelistic or inner-church oriented.”16  
As a result, the 1961 Kirchentag continued along the moderately reformist lines of the 
1958 Kirchentag Congress and the Munich Kirchentag of 1959.  Planners continued to 
reject arguments that they needed to reach out more strongly to those alienated from the 
churches, arguing that this would distract them too much from the core of their program.  
However they did continue to hope that a more concrete program—although directed 
primarily at church people—would help to draw outsiders in.17 
Reform impulses at the 1961 Kirchentag were most apparent in new workgroup 
sessions on topics like Jewish-Christian relations and the historical developments that led 
to the Third Reich.  To a lesser extent, other workgroups also began to move in new 
                                                 
15 Präsidium Meeting Minutes, 17-18 January 1960, EZA 71/86/159. 
 
16 Report on the Special Meeting of the Präsidium, 2 February 1960, EZA 71/86/27, 5; emphasis 
in original. 
 
17 Klaus, Lefringhausen, “Minutes. Meeting on 2 March 1960 in the ‘Haus der Begegnung’ in 
Mülheim,” EZA 71/86/119. 
 304
directions, although this was more apparent in the planning meetings than in the final 
Kirchentag program.  In the early planning stages, for example, younger Kirchentag 
leaders such as Klaus von Bismarck hoped to address new topics such as “gender 
relations” and the growing “generational problem” in Germany.  Ultimately, however, 
they entirely avoided the topic of gender, while subordinating the generational problem to 
the existing and very conservative workgroup on the family and education.18  The 
workgroup on the church also began to consider the need to address growing questions 
about the authority of the bible and about the historical Jesus.  Since looking at both of 
these controversial issues was deemed too much for one workgroup, planners decided to 
focus on questions about the bible, leaving the historical Jesus debate for a future 
gathering.19  While more progressive theologians, such as Heinz Zahrnt, now a member 
of the Präsidium, had argued that the Kirchentag should plunge directly into this 
controversy, the “Bible” workgroup took a more cautious approach.  Rather than directly 
engaging in the debates between traditional and “historical-critical” theologians about 
how to interpret the bible, they aimed their speeches at the practical questions that pious 
church members might have, presenting a moderate consensus viewpoint on the human 
and divine aspects of the bible’s provenance.20  
This moderate approach was not enough to satisfy critics, who pushed for much 
more radical changes.  Already during the Berlin Kirchentag itself, delegates from the 
youth division [Jugendkammer] of the EKD and from the Protestant Youth in Germany 
                                                 
18 Präsidium Meeting Minutes, 8-9 April 1960, EZA 71/86/159; Friedelbert Lorenz, Memo: 
“Thematik und Struktur der Arbeitsgruppen 1961,” 31 May 1960, EZA 71/86/120, 4. 
 
19 “Friedelbert Lorenz, Memo: “Zu Thematik und Struktur des Kirchentages 1961 in Berlin,” 7 
April 1960, EZA 71/86/120, 1-2; Friedelbert Lorenz, Memo: “Thematik und Struktur des Kirchentages 
1961, ” 31 May 1961, EZA 71/86/120, 1. 
 
20 See DEKT 1961. 
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[Evangelischen Jugend in Deutschland] met to voice their criticisms and suggestions.  
While these youth appreciated the larger role that they had been given during the last 
several years, they complained that they were still ignored by many of the speakers.  
Echoing a common criticism, they also argued that the Kirchentag had become too 
abstract and intellectual, lacking lively discussion or real human interaction.  Rather than 
trying to appease all of the different factions within the church, they urged the Kirchentag 
leadership to rise above these squabbles.  Instead, the Kirchentag should work to create 
truly spontaneous communal worship, experimenting with new approaches and styles.  
The bible study should become more concrete and practical and less academic.21   
Finally, they offered qualified praise for the new topics of several workgroups, 
urging the leadership to continue to address topics of contemporary relevance.  However, 
they argued, these workgroups had still been too dry and factual.  Rather than merely 
offering information on controversial contemporary issues, they urged the Kirchentag to 
become more active, working to generate “impulse and excitement.”  For the “church” 
workgroup they suggested a return to practical questions of belief and life, looking at the 
role of communion, baptism, and confirmation.  For the other workgroups, they urged the 
speakers to move beyond factual analysis toward action, calling on audiences to donate 
money to good causes, adopting resolutions, suggesting further readings, and providing 
contact information for organizations audience members might want to join.22  
Meeting with Heinrich Giesen immediately following the Berlin gathering, 
members of the Friends of the Christian Press Academy offered similar criticism.  First 
                                                 
21 “Stellungnahme der Delegation der Evangelischen Jugend in Deutschland zum 10. Deutschen 
Evangelischen Kirchentag in Berlin vom 19.-23. Juli 1961,” EZA 71/86/120. 
 
22 Ibid. 
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and foremost, they argued that the Kirchentag was trying to do too much at once.  As a 
result, there was a lack of coordination between the Kirchentag staff, the various planning 
committees, and local officials.  The workgroups had also gone too far in emphasizing 
quantity over quality.  Instead of trying to cover every important issue, they needed to 
focus more closely on a few contemporary topics.  And they needed to approach these 
topics with more spontaneity, rather than planning them out far in advance.  They also 
needed to expand the size of the workgroup leadership, brining in new voices, and they 
needed to offer more opportunities for real discussion.  They argued: “It was obvious, for 
example that any doubters who may have attended the “Bible” workgroup, were not 
drawn in or given any satisfactory answers.”  Finally, they argued that the Kirchentag 
needed to be more radical and more provocative in its basic approach to contemporary 
issues.  Looking again at the “bible” meetings, they criticized boring sessions with titles 
like “Our Questions about the Bible,” which could be much more provocatively 
reformulated as “Does the Bible contain errors?”23 
 
THE CENTER OF CONFLICT 
This conflict over the structure and content of the Kirchentag became even more 
acute as the construction of the Berlin Wall, in August 1961, precipitated a major identity 
crisis within the Kirchentag leadership.  The Kirchentag had always been more than just a 
symbol of Protestant and German unity.  But its role as an organization that brought 
together Germans from both sides of the Iron Curtain had given it a special political and 
social importance.  No longer able to fulfill this function, its very existence was called 
into question.  Many conservative Protestants, frustrated by the critical political and 
                                                 
23 Christian Press Academy, “Strukturprobleme des Kirchentages,” 23-25 July 1961, EZA 
71/86/120. 
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theological direction of recent gatherings, argued that the Kirchentag had lost its only 
reason to exist.  After all, the churches already had more reliable evangelistic and 
missions organizations.  And the Protestant Academies and Study Centers were far better 
suited to careful academic analysis than were large Kirchentag gatherings.  At the same 
time, many progressive Protestant leaders, upset about the breakdown in negotiations 
between the Kirchentag and the GDR regime and frustrated by the inner-church focus of 
the last several gatherings, argued that the Kirchentag had lost its critical capacity.  To 
these critics, the Munich and Berlin meetings demonstrated that the organization had 
become fully subordinate to the institutional church hierarchy and to the conservative 
politics of the Bonn government. 
Hans Hermann Walz, who had been largely responsible for the much-maligned 
academic turn of the late 1950s, responded to these criticisms in a short paper on the 
“Clericalization and Politicization of the Kirchentag,” circulated to the Präsidium in 
October 1961.  Taking issue with charges that the Kirchentag had become subordinate to 
the institutional church hierarchy, he argued that the Kirchentag was “dependent not upon 
the church leadership, but on the ‘climate’ in the churches and in the local 
congregations.”  When the Kirchentag seemed to promote the views of the church 
leadership or to take a political position with regard to German division, it was not 
speaking for itself, but merely reflecting the views of most German Protestants.  With 
recent criticism, however, he admitted that this situation had become problematic.  But 
the solution was not to cut off ties with the church hierarchy or to withdraw from the 
political sphere.  On the contrary, Walz wrote: “The danger of clericalization and 
politicization has not grown out the fact that the Kirchentag has too often taken issue with 
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the church and political authorities, but from the fact that it has done this too little.”  The 
Kirchentag was itself a “political phenomenon” and it needed to recognize this fact.  It 
needed to continue its involvement in political questions, but it needed to do so more 
intentionally and self-consciously.24   
In order to achieve this, Walz proposed two somewhat contradictory changes in 
the Kirchentag’s approach.  First, the Kirchentag needed to open its planning process to 
the outside more than in had the past, meeting with representatives from all of the various 
organizations and institutions of the church.  Second, however, the Kirchentag needed to 
be bolder in developing its own positions on controversial issues, not simply reflecting 
the full spectrum of Protestant thought.  This was not just true for theological divisions, 
but also for politics.  The Kirchentag needed to seek out more ties with political groups 
and figures.  “In its leadership and advisory bodies,” he argued, “it does not need the least 
colorful people available, who will never excite new impulses, but instead the boldest and 
most potent representatives of the various existing powers.”  These people should not be 
limited to leading Protestant, or even Christian, intellectuals.  Instead, the Kirchentag 
needed to open itself up to people on the cutting edge of contemporary social and 
political developments, regardless of their religious views.  Only by openly embracing 
controversies, Walz concluded, could the Kirchentag avoid being unconsciously dragged 
into them, as it had in the past.25 
On a more practical level, Walz also began to see the need for a thorough 
structural reform.  Writing up his assessment of the Berlin gathering, he argued: “The 
                                                 
24 Hans Hermann Walz, “Klerikalisierung und Politisierung des Kirchentages,” attached to a 
Circular Letter from 22 October 1961, EZA 71/86/27. 
 
25 Ibid. 
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Kirchentag has reached a stage in its development where it needs to seriously consider its 
further course, looking at approaching, as-yet-unresolved or newly-formulated tasks, and 
at new structures and forms for its larger gatherings.”  The main problem here was that 
Kirchentag had become too large and diffuse, with its activities spread across countless 
workgroups, cultural presentations, and mass assemblies.  As a result, it had lost the 
ability to present a unified message, to offer a coherent perspective on the contributions 
that the church and Christian theology could make to the world.  In order to regain this 
influence, Walz argued for a new, more concentrated format with fewer workgroups.  
Taking note of the rising numbers of single-day visitors, he also called for self-contained 
daily themes that would not presuppose attendance at previous meetings.  And he 
suggested that the Kirchentag needed to make use of a wider variety of media in order to 
better communicate its message in the language of modern people.  Finally, in order to 
better engage the public, he acknowledged, the Kirchentag needed to create more and 
better opportunities for discussion.  This was especially true for the Kirchentag’s bible 
studies, which had evolved into full-fledged sermons.  He also recognized the need for 
more provocative approaches to the workgroup topics, especially in the group on the 
bible, where young people were looking for answers to difficult questions.26 
As the Kirchentag leadership began the planning process for 1963, this new 
direction was given further impetus by major personnel changes.  Heinrich Giesen, 
always one of the strongest advocates of the Kirchentag’s inner-church role, retired from 
the full time staff in October 1961.27  Although Giesen had been responsible for 
                                                 
26 Hans Hermann Walz, “Rückblick auf die Thematische Arbeit 1961, 24 November 1961, EZA 
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27 Präsidium Minutes, 22 October 1961, EZA 71/86/27. 
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coordinating most of the content for the first several Kirchentage, his role had become 
progressively smaller with the addition of Walz to the staff in 1955.  Especially after 
1959, when Friedelbert Lorenz joined the staff as a full time academic director, Giesen’s 
role had been reduced to coordinating the preaching and bible study groups.  His 
replacement by the younger and more progressive theologian Gerhard Schnath, in the 
newly created position of Kirchentag Pastor, opened the door more widely to progressive 
theological perspectives and new, experimental worship styles.  Since he was 69 years 
old and in poor health, Reinold von Thadden-Trieglaff had also begun to make plans for 
his retirement from the office of Kirchentag President.  In a Präsidium meeting shortly 
before Berlin, his hand-picked successor, Klaus von Bismarck, was chosen to replace him 
as Kirchentag President.  In the end, this change never went into effect.   Shortly after his 
selection, Bismarck was offered a position as the director of West German Radio [WDR].  
Unable to balance both positions, he felt compelled to decline the position of Kirchentag 
president, although he remained active in the Präsidium.28  Thadden was forced to 
continue in office until 1964, while the Präsidium undertook a lengthy search for another 
replacement.  In practice, however, he became less and less involved in day-to-day 
matters. 
This generational shift also began to be reflected in the membership of the 
Kirchentag Präsidium.  In the period from 1957 to 1963, the Präsidium lost many of its 
longtime members.  Many others in the East—although still technically members of the 
Präsidium even after the construction of the Berlin Wall—were no longer able to play an 
active leadership role.  The former included such leading members as Gustav Heinemann, 
                                                 
28 Präsidium Minutes, 27 July 1960, EZA 71/86/159; Präsidium Minutes, 22 June 1961, EZA 
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Marie Krüger, Friedrich Lahusen, Eberhard Müller, and Heinrich Troeger.  The latter 
included leading East German Protestants such as Lothar Kreyssig, Reinhold 
Hildebrandt, Helga Krummacher, and Reiner Mager.  These older members were 
gradually replaced in the early and mid-1960s by a growing cohort of younger, more 
progressive Protestant leaders.  These included future Federal Presidents Richard von 
Weizsäcker and Johannes Rau, more progressive theologians such as Heinz Zahrnt, and 
younger journalists and academics such as Hans Jürgen Schultz and Rudolf von Thadden.  
Following Walz’ advice, the Kirchentag leadership began to open the planning 
process to outside perspectives as they worked on their ideas for Dortmund.  Between 
1961 and 1963, they held countless meetings with groups and individuals across the full 
spectrum of the Protestant church, in search of new impulses and ideas.  They also began 
to much more carefully and systematically keep track of press reports and other criticism.  
Friedelbert Lorenz, who had joined the Kirchentag staff in 1959 in the newly created 
position of Academic Director [Studienleiter], played an especially important role in 
integrating the ideas of critics into the Kirchentag program.  From the beginning, 
however, this was a difficult and contradictory task.  Drastically expanding the number 
and diversity of people involved in planning the next Kirchentag only made it harder for 
the leadership to speak with a strong and decisive voice.  Now, even more than before, 
the Kirchentag found itself caught in the crossfire between the young and old, the pious 
and the modern, between conservatives and progressives. 
Planning for a Dortmund Kirchentag had already been underway since early 1959, 
before the decision to move the 1961 Kirchentag to Berlin.  As they began to make plans 
for the Kirchentag in 1963, these earlier plans served as a starting point.  These original 
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plans, centered on the problems of social life in industrial society, found considerable 
approval among the church leadership in Dortmund.  A November 1961 meeting with the 
directors of the Dortmund Preachers’ Seminar, for example, focused on the need to 
engage more directly with the changing role of the church in modern society.  People in 
the modern world, these church leaders argued, had lost any sense of moral standards or 
values.  The Kirchentag’s task was to help people discover anew the importance of 
Christian faith for everyday, community life.  However, this was not simply a matter of 
going back to an earlier time.  Addressing these problems would require more than just 
reiterating the church’s traditional social teachings, with their emphasis on the 
community and congregation.  It would also demand an engagement with the pressing 
social issues that troubled people’s lives today.  These issues included peace, the fear of 
nuclear war, problems of human interaction on all levels, and relations between Germans 
and foreigners.29 
In other meetings, however, critics pushed for the Kirchentag to move in radical 
new directions.  This was especially apparent in a November 1961 meeting with the 
younger, more radical academic directors of the Protestant Study Center at Haus Villigst.  
Rather than focusing, like older academics, on the loss of tradition and community in 
modern society, these young academics urged the Kirchentag to focus on the 
“discomfort” of the younger generation with West German society, taking bold critical 
positions against social and political “taboos.”  These taboo subjects included the need to 
accept German division, “creeping totalitarianism” in West German politics, the 
promotion of true freedom and peace, problems of social inequality, the need for an 
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“extra-parliamentary opposition,” and criticisms of the postwar “bourgeois restoration.”  
With regard to the church itself, these younger academics argued that Kirchentag bible 
study sessions needed to be more practical and needed to engage with the controversy 
over new critical methods of reading the bible.30 
In early drafts for the 1963 program, Lorenz struggled to integrate these 
competing perspectives.  This process of integration was easiest in workgroups that 
focused on the church and its teachings.  Here, even many moderates and conservatives 
saw the need for rethinking basic questions, if only to draw the youth back into the 
church.  For concrete themes, Lorenz suggested that the Kirchentag examine the 
changing nature of the Christian congregation in the present-day, especially in its 
troubled relationship with secular society.  Social problems like mass consumption, the 
loss of common values, isolation, and alienation in modern society were also relatively 
unproblematic, connected as they were to traditional Protestant social teachings.  
However, Lorenz had more difficulty giving concrete, factual expression to topics like 
“discomfort” with the West German system or the question of political “taboos,” 
complaining that they seemed too abstract and vague.31 
The task of forging a common theme for Dortmund was further complicated as 
more conservative and traditionalist Protestants raised their objections to the proposed 
changes.  In a letter to the Kirchentag leadership, written in early 1962, Hans Thimme, 
the Vice President of the Church of Westphalia urged a return to the Kirchentag’s 
                                                 
30 Friedelbert Lorenz, Memo: Discussion with the Studienleitern of the Ev. Studienwerks on 15 
November 1961, EZA 71/96/349. 
 
31 Friedelbert Lorenz, Memo: “Thematik Dortmund,” 9 December 1961, EZA 71/96/349. 
 
 314
original focus on evangelism and missions.32  And in a meeting between Lorenz and 
several Westphalian church leaders, he argued: “No experiments!  Comprehensive 
structural changes will only confuse Kirchentag visitors.”  At the most, he conceded, the 
Kirchentag might include one “experimental” workgroup.  The bulk of the Kirchentag, he 
argued, should instead look at the problems of isolation and individualism in modern 
industrial society, focusing on the role of the churches in creating a renewed sense of 
community and belonging.  The Kirchentag could help different social groups to 
overcome their differences, focusing on divisions between the church and the world, the 
young and the old, Protestant and Catholic, German and foreign, government and 
opposition, pro- and anti-nuclear, under an overarching motto such as “Serve one 
another.”  However, despite this emphasis on points of division, Thimme opposed any 
attempt to directly address the controversy surrounding “modern theology.”33 
In another meeting in early 1962 a group of older former academic directors from 
Haus Villigst also objected to the ideas of their younger colleagues.  In fact, they urged 
the Kirchentag to avoid getting tangled up in controversial issues.  As one of these older 
academics argued: “The Kirchentag should avoid getting into debates where the walls of 
prejudices between social groups are too high and too strong.  The Kirchentag cannot 
break through these walls.  The Kirchentag is not a place for quarreling with each other.”  
And in response to the idea that the next Kirchentag should address “the question of a 
free, democratic socialism,” another argued that the Kirchentag was in danger of “doing 
the SPDs work for it.”  Such provocative suggestions, they argued, came only from small, 
                                                 
32 Hans Thimme to Kirchentag Leadership, 27 January 1962, EZA 71/96/349. 
 
33 Friedelbert Lorenz, Memo: Leadership Meeting on 11 January 1962 in Dortmund, 16 January 
1962, EZA 71/96/349. 
 315
isolated intellectual circles within the church.  The Kirchentag’s task, however, was to 
appeal to the masses, who were looking for a positive subjective experience, not 
academic debate.  In line with this approach, they approved plans for slightly more 
critical bible study meetings and they strongly supported a thematic focus, like that 
suggested by Thimme, on the divisions between different groups in society.34  
These ideas were further developed in a series of meetings with Protestant social-
policy experts.  Even here, however, there was disagreement about where the Kirchentag 
should devote its energy.  Eberhard Müller, a former Präsidium member and the director 
of the Protestant Academy at Bad Boll, for example, pushed for a return to the 
Kirchentag’s older social program.  As key focal points, he suggested the dangers 
threatening rural and village life, the struggle between those who produced goods and 
those who served their fellow man, and danger of industrial workers losing their 
individuality and becoming slaves to the machine.  Müller opposed any focus on conflict 
or on modern, progressive theological movements.35 
Most other social policy experts rejected Müller’s ideas as out of touch and old-
fashioned.  These leaders generally approved existing plans, while several pushed the 
Kirchentag to move in a more radical, self-critical direction.36  Arguing that the 
Kirchentag had too long been focused narrowly on problems within the church, the 
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leaders of the Protestant Social Academy in Friedewald, for example, argued that the 
Kirchentag needed to “renew” itself.  In particular, they argued that the Kirchentag had 
an important role in reaching out to those on the margins of the church.  These people had 
no interest in religious and theological hair-splitting, but they were very interested in the 
role of the church and faith in the modern world.  Drawing on their experiences at 
Friedewald, they argued that these people responded especially well to theologians who 
“started with the concrete situation or with questions of worldly life, correlating these 
with modern interpretations of the bible.”  At Friedewald, they observed, such 
approaches to theology had sometimes angered the pious, but they had also generated 
considerable enthusiasm among outsiders, who would rally to the defense of the modern 
theologians.37  
Another meeting with a group of leading Protestant academics was even more 
radical in its suggestions.  Here, the philosopher and educational reformer, Georg Picht 
argued that the Kirchentag had no less of a task than to rescue the churches from a 
position of social and political irrelevance.  Up until 1918, he argued, the churches in 
Germany had relied on the state to put their ideas and beliefs into practice.  As a result, 
they had never developed any effective lay-movement.  Since 1918 and the end of the 
Prussian monarchy, the church had simply existed “without a body.” Without a strong 
lay-movement it was unable to make positive contributions to society.  This was 
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reinforced by the churches’ views of themselves as something in opposition to society, 
rather than as one of its constituent parts.38 
It was time, he continued, for the churches to stop criticizing the modern world 
and to start becoming part of it.   
This incorporation can only be realized within the constraints of the pluralist and 
functionalist industrial-, production-, welfare- and consumer-society of our 
democratic state.  This state is, itself, a dynamic process, not suited to being the 
body of the church in the old way.  If the church, then, does not take part in the 
process of political actualization, it will fail both to develop a body and also fail to 
maintain its traditions. 
 
On the other hand, if the Protestant churches were willing to play a positive role in 
modern German society, they were uniquely positioned to do so.  While the Catholic 
church was tied to one political party, there were Protestants in each of the three major 
West German parties.  This put Protestants in a unique position to work for social and 
political integration.  Indeed, they had no choice.  As Picht argued, “The Protestant 
church must integrate, or else it will be torn apart in the competition between interest 
groups.”39   
This was where the Kirchentag entered his plans.  In order to carry out this social 
task, the church needed to develop a cadre of politically responsible and active members.  
But it had proven unable to do this.  The individual Landeskirchen were too provincial in 
their focus, while the Council of the EKD was out of touch with political realities.  Only 
the Kirchentag could “[offer] coordination, counsel, motivation, momentum, etc. for the 
construction of this body.”  In doing so, the Kirchentag would essentially supplant the 
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Landeskirchen and the EKD as the real church in Germany.  The Kirchentag, as a new 
kind of the church, would circumvent the state church model, adapting itself fully to 
modern consumer society.  In this model, it would be financed entirely by the financial 
contributions of free “consumers” to whom it would offer “life help” and spiritual 
counsel in return.40 
Speaking on behalf of the Kirchentag leadership, Hans Hermann Walz, greeted 
the specific details of this plan with considerable skepticism, but he concurred with much 
of the broader outline.  In fact, he pointed out, the Kirchentag had long informally 
occupied just such a position, serving in the eyes of many as the outward, social and 
political manifestation of the Protestant church.  In their comments, others at the meeting 
also seemed taken aback by the enormity of Picht’s suggestions, but they did not dismiss 
them outright.  As Günther Howe commented: “These suggestions imply a theology and 
an understanding of the church that has never before existed in the four-hundred year 
history of Protestantism.”  And Hans Dombois questioned whether a new cadre of core 
church leaders could really be fashioned out of modern consumers.  But those in 
attendance could all agree that the church lacked any public rallying point for those who 
wanted to live out their faith in society.  As the progressive theologian Heinz-Eduard 
Tödt pointed out, drawing on his experiences working with the church’s student 
congregations [Studentengemeinden], the church was in danger of losing the whole 
cohort of 20- and 30-year-olds if it did not offer them a meaningful place in the church.41 
Turning to more practical matters, several of those present strongly criticized the 
existing plans for Dortmund.  Günther Howe took issue, in particular, with the vagueness 
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and ambiguity with which the churches approached modern social problems, mocking 
their treatment at previous gatherings as “dancing around the social calf.”  “If we proceed 
this way, with all of this talk of ‘social problems, social problems,’ we run the risk at 
Dortmund, of simply combining the errors of the theologians with the errors of the 
sociologists.”  If the church wanted to address these problems in a meaningful way, he 
argued, they would need to do more than recite a well-worn litany clichés, instead 
delving deeper into the actual problems and issues.  Despite his radical views of the 
church, Georg Picht reserved his strongest criticism for proposed discussions of “the 
historical Jesus” and for debates about modern critical theology.  Calling for an end to 
“the eternal blithering on about the bible,” he proposed that the sacraments, instead, were 
at the center of modern faith.  He also called for the Kirchentag’s political discussions to 
center on the need for honesty in politics and on bridging the gulf of mistrust between the 
German people and their government.  Finally, he argued that the Kirchentag needed to 
do more to “awake” the “ecumenical consciousness” of the church.42 
Amid all of these divergent suggestions for the Dortmund Kirchentag, there was 
one point of agreement.  Regardless of their other views, everyone to whom the 
Kirchentag leadership talked could agree that German society, inside and outside of the 
churches, was torn by conflict and disagreement.  When the Kirchentag finally held its 
theme selection meeting [Themenkonvent] the idea of conflict itself became the major 
focal point.  Rather than simply rehashing existing debates about the problems of the 
social world, the plans of the Kirchentag staff called for a special focus on most 
controversial hot button issues of modern life.  It also called for major innovations to the 
Kirchentag structure.  Since Dortmund lacked large central halls for mass meetings, the 
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Kirchentag would be more decentralized than those of the past.  Since the leadership 
expected a larger number of single-day visitors from the local area, each day was to have 
a self-contained theme.  These themes would progress and build on each other across the 
three days of the Kirchentag.43  While these plans—with their emphasis on controversy 
and topicality—contained the potential for real innovation, early drafts remained quite 
traditional.  The first draft of plans for the Themenkonvent called for the Kirchentag to 
begin its first day with the theme of “difference, opposition, and conflict,” looking at 
their social and psychological impact on the modern individual.  On the second day, the 
Kirchentag would turn to Jesus Christ, the only person who could overcome these 
conflicts.  Finally, on the third day, they would turn to the need to “serve one another.”44   
Hans Hermann Walz elaborated upon this theme, while also hinting at some of its 
more radical potential, in a speech to the Themenkonvent entitled “Jesus Christ: 
Integrator.”  Walz began his speech by looking at the major changes in German society 
since 1945 and the changing role of the Kirchentag.  In the immediate postwar years, he 
argued, excited by their newfound freedom, German Protestants had sensed new 
opportunities for the renewal of the church and of society through the Christian faith.  
And they had also expected that their own religious unity could lead to the reunification 
of Germany.  Both of these impulses had been strong at the Kirchentag meetings of the 
early 1950s, contributing greatly to the large crowds and the festive atmosphere of those 
gatherings.  However, both of these impulses had faded with the passage of time, making 
the Kirchentag’s task far more difficult.  Nevertheless, the Kirchentag retained an 
important function.  It did not just exist to “preach the Gospel” and to spread the 
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Christian faith—although these were indeed among its tasks.  On a more fundamental 
level, the Kirchentag existed to “bear witness and serve” in the “broadest sense of these 
words.”  In order to do this, it needed to recognize that practical meaning of these words 
was constantly changing as society itself underwent changes.45 
The greatest challenge of German society since the middle of the 1950s had been 
social integration.  The church could not avoid this task, but there were different ways to 
carry it out in practice.  To many theologians, this was simply a matter of providing 
theological principles and guidelines for social life.  But, more recently, Protestant 
intellectuals such as Hans Dombois, Trutz Rendtorff, and Heinz-Eduard Tödt had 
questioned this perspective, arguing that theology needed to be engaged with (even 
subordinate to) external social realities.  This, Walz argued, was a false dichotomy.  The 
church did not have to choose between claiming to have all of the answers and admitting 
that it didn’t have any.  Rather, one could start from the perspective that faith was already 
vitally connected to modern reality, to “the world and history, nature and technology.”  
This connection was to be found in the person of Jesus Christ, whom each era needed to 
rediscover for itself.  This was not just a matter of putting “the beloved formulations of 
the old Gospel in new words,” but of truly rediscovering Christ’s presence in the world 
today.   It was not just a matter of accepting Christ as the savior of souls, of escaping 
from the problems of the world through faith.  This other-worldliness was, in fact, just 
another form of secularism.  Instead, the task of the church—and of the Kirchentag—was 
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to see Christ as the one who had already reconciled the world to God through his death 
and resurrection, participating actively in this process.46 
In practice, this meant that the church was called to the task of integration and 
reconciliation in the world.  It was called to a form of solidarity “enlightened by the truth 
of pluralism” but also tied to principles of the Christian faith.  This solidarity meant that, 
instead of complaining about the “disintegration” and dysfunction” of society, the church 
was called to find ways to change this.  It meant boldly stepping into the fissures and 
ruptures of modern society, offering help and service to those in need.  Finally, it meant 
recognizing that unity was not something the church created by rallying around any one 
theology or movement, or by reducing the plurality of perspectives in the world.  Instead, 
it was a gift of God, experienced in the service of society.47 
Walz’ speech to the Themenkonvent was itself an attempt at integration, at 
bridging the divide between traditional theology and self-critical progressive 
perspectives.  The church, in essence, could afford to be humble toward outsiders 
precisely because of its confidence in the unfolding of God’s plan.  It could stand in 
solidarity with the world, not by giving up its traditional mission and traditional claims, 
but by reconceptualizing this mission as a form of service to the world.  This formulation 
postulated a positive relationship between the claims of the Christian faith and the lived 
realities of the modern world.  But it left the details of this relationship vague and 
undefined.  The practice of actually working out this agenda fell to the Themenkonvent 
and the leaders of the Kirchentag workgroups, where things were much less clear-cut. 
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One area where Kirchentag planners could agree was on the need for structural 
reforms.  In keeping with their hope to integrate ordinary people and everyday 
experiences into the Kirchentag program, Themenkonvent members approved of Walz’ 
and Lorenz’ plans for a new decentralized structure.  Rather than beginning each day 
with a bible study seminar, essentially with a programmatic sermon, they decided to 
introduce each day’s theme with a short, provocative film.  Rather than offering any 
answers, this film was intended to provoke questions as Kirchentag visitors thought about 
the intersection between their own lives and the day’s larger themes.  After seeing these 
films, Kirchentag visitors would be invited to participate in small group discussions, held 
in more than fifty different locations.  Here, under the direction of a trained facilitator, 
they would be encouraged to talk about their own experiences and questions.  Only in the 
afternoon would the Kirchentag hold its usual presentations, offering answers to the 
questions posed in the morning. 
In the same vein, the topics chosen for the daily themes were broadened 
somewhat from Lorenz’ original proposal, while the progression from one theme to the 
next was loosened.  The Kirchentag would still have conflict as its overarching theme.  
But, where earlier program drafts called for moving from conflict to resolution to service 
over the course of three days, new drafts called for a more careful examination of conflict 
itself.  The first day would examine interpersonal conflict.  The second would look at 
conflict between societal interest groups.  And only on the third day would the 
Kirchentag consider the role of the church—both in causing and in resolving these 
conflicts.  Many of the concrete topics addressed under the rubric of these themes 
remained traditional, but several also moved the Kirchentag in a newly critical direction, 
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especially with regard to the situation within the churches themselves.  On the second 
day, proposed sessions included structural problems within the German church and the 
churches’ contributions to Germany’s educational crisis.  The final day included a session 
on Protestant-Catholic relations, especially in light of the meetings of the Second Vatican 
Council.  And it also included a panel on the ways in which the church could model 
reconciliation and on the ways in which it fell short of this ideal.48 
However, it was the Dortmund Kirchentag’s provocative slogan “Living with 
Conflict” that generated the most controversy.  As the first Kirchentag slogan since 1950 
not to be drawn directly from a passage of scripture, this slogan was a clear signal of a 
new, more worldly orientation.  Unlike alternative slogans suggested by church leaders 
and Kirchentag planners, it also remained open to the fact that some conflicts could not 
be resolved.  While initial suggestions had included such possibilities as “Jesus brings us 
together,” “Christ is our peace,” and “Christ - the Bridge,” the motto “Living with 
Conflict” implied that the church might not be able fully reconcile every controversy or 
conflict.  Instead, it might have to resign itself to living with them.49   
The provocative nature of this slogan was not an accident.  In his defense against 
critics, Walz made it clear that this theme intentionally reflected the new function of the 
Kirchentag in a society no longer characterized by widespread political consensus.  The 
Kirchentag leaders, he argued, had intentionally avoided a slogan that could serve as 
some kind of rallying cry.  Instead, he argued, “It would be dangerous to offer some 
typical Christian slogan here, in the social situation of our Federal Republic, where there 
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is so much official Christian-ness [Christlichkeit] and so little Christian substance.”  In 
the midst of all of this public Christianity, the Christian message had been lost.  If the 
church wanted to regain its purpose in the modern world, he agreed with the American 
sociologist Peter Berger, it would need to do so wholly outside the boundaries of 
conventional Christianity.  “The most important prerequisite for breaking out of these 
expectations,” he continued, “is that the word of the church is not heard merely as a 
pronouncement of the church, in which one simply believes, but as the word of God, who 
has not abandoned this world full of perplexity.”  The church had gotten into this 
predicament, losing any social relevance, because it had failed to listen to the prophetic 
voices of its theologians, who had constantly warned against retreating into pious church 
language.  “The proclamation of the Gospel,” he went on, “is a many layered event.”  It 
was not limited to evangelism as traditionally understood, but also included “service” to 
humanity.  The Kirchentag was not called to be a massive evangelistic gathering or to 
offer easy answers.  “’Living with Conflict,’” he concluded, “—this is a slogan that does 
not conform to any expectations, that does not proceed smoothly.  People will shake their 
heads at it, they will take offence [Anstoss] at it, and, hopefully, they will reflect on it.”50 
In the final Kirchentag program, this new direction was clearest in several self-
critical speeches directed at the churches themselves.  In a presentation entitled “Always 
Irritation with the Christians,” for example, the Dutch theologian Cornelius Dippel 
argued that the church deserved the scorn it received from people in modern society.  
This was because the church had too closely conformed itself to the patterns of the world, 
failing to live out the task to which God had called it.  Instead of actually obeying God’s 
commands, the churches, he argued, “use the Gospel as a religious background against 
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which we assert our foregrounded reality.”  “We leave the church,” he continued, “the 
same as when we entered.  We have become accustomed to the Gospel and the 
Communion table.  But on Monday we rely on our own worldly experiences.”  This had 
led the churches to play a tragi-comic role in history.  As Dippel argued: 
There is something in this Christianity, whereby Christian people, including their 
leaders, are always trailing behind the course of world history; always sanctifying 
the stupidity of the world powers with Christian words; always blocking progress 
and then, fifty years later, going along with it; honoring their seers, prophets, and 
martyrs too late, after their deaths, and then fifty years later crowning themselves 
with the martyr’s crown. 
 
In this way, the churches had become complicit in “all of the suffering of history”  
“Slavery, racial hatred, hunger, colonialism, nationalism, war, the evils of the industrial 
revolution, and so on,” he continued, “all were approved by the churches of their time.”51 
The scandal here was not that Christians had been involved in the activities of the 
world.  Withdrawal from the world was just as bad, a form of defeatism that enabled the 
same crimes and atrocities.  The problem was that the churches failed to understand their 
true calling to involvement in the world.  They were not there to affirm the ways of the 
world or to impose their own rule or authority.  Instead, they were called to true Christian 
service on behalf the helpless, the sick, the lonely and the oppressed.  This service would 
also be a scandal—like the scandal of the Gospel—since it would pit Christians against 
prevailing cultural, political, social norms, with widespread and popular “views of 
humanity and of society.”  But in this process, they would be bringing the true gospel to 
the world.52 
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The journalist Hans Jürgen Schultz followed up on this speech by bringing these 
criticisms to bear directly on the Protestant churches in Germany.  In West Germany, 
after the war, he argued, the churches had reversed their passivity toward the state, 
embracing their public responsibility like never before.  But they had become so caught 
up in their public leadership role that they had lost their soul.  The Christian churches 
wielded influence in all areas of West German society, but they lacked the true strength, 
hope, and impetus of the minority churches of the Third World.  This was not some 
coincidence, but was the direct result of their misunderstanding of the true structure and 
function of the church.  Stuck in the past, Christian congregations in Germany had gone 
from the “vanguard” to the “rearguard” of society.  “From of the ‘light,’” he went on, 
“they have become the ‘tail lights’ of the world.”  In essence, they had fully lost touch 
with everyday life.  But the true Christian congregation existed where there was 
dynamism and service, where belief transformed daily experience.  Today, this was just 
as likely to be found in secular society as in the churches themselves.  And so, the task of 
the church was not to build up and defend itself as an institution, but to find and develop 
true community in whatever forms it might take in the modern world.53 
These problems were addressed even more concretely in another session entitled 
“Does our church need to be reformed?”  The church historian Rudolf von Thadden, son 
of the Kirchentag president, argued that the answer to this question was a self-evident 
“yes.”  Everyday church practice demonstrated this clearly.  But so did church history.  
Luther and the other great reformers had always intended the church to exist in a state of 
constant reformation.  But the churches in modern Germany had abandoned this task, 
working to defend their institutions and traditions against any change.  For all of the 
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massive upheavals of twentieth century Germany history, for example—across such 
important turning points as 1918, 1933, and 1945—the German Protestant churches had 
retained their traditional structure and church law.  They were still stuck in the era of 
“Princely Absolutism” that had followed and corrupted the reformation.  As a result, the 
institutional churches had lost any real popular basis.  Ninety-six percent of Germans 
belonged to a church and paid their church taxes, but only six percent were actively 
involved.  The Landeskirchen and the lay-church had clearly gone their separate ways.  
The church today, he concluded, was badly in need of reformation, not just in its 
institutions, but in its everyday practices.  This task could begin with discussion among 
the church leaders, but, if it was to be effective, it would require everyone’s active 
participation.   This work would not be easy, for the German churches were heavily 
burdened by history and tradition, but with God’s help, they would return to their true 
task.54   
Gerhard Heintze, a Church Superintendent from Hildesheim, followed Thadden’s 
appeal by arguing that the true church was not an institution or organization that needed 
to be preserved, but something that flowed out of the work of Jesus Christ in the world.  
The work of church reform then, was not simply a matter of changing the institution or 
holding more elections, but of making ordinary church members take responsibility for 
their church.  If the Protestant churches in Germany were to truly reform themselves, this 
would have three implications.  First, Protestants would need to recognize that the church 
was not an end in itself, but an organization designed to serve the world.  Church renewal 
meant taking this obligation seriously by supporting missions and social aid programs 
throughout the world.  Second, the church was not an institution run by functionaries, but 
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an institution based on the “priesthood of all believers.”  The true church did not require 
church taxes, buildings, and organizations.  What it required was true human interaction 
and community.  Finally, the true church was an open and honest community.  Whether 
or not it was strictly democratic, it had to be a place without taboos, where differences 
could be openly discussed.  This meant that the churches had to accept the importance of 
disagreement and opposition. 
 
THE KIRCHENTAG AS SELF-CRITICAL CHURCH 
With its thorough structural reforms and increasingly self-critical content, 
Dortmund modeled a new experimental attitude for the Kirchentag.  This experiment was 
successful in many ways.  The Protestant magazine Evangelische Welt, for example, 
christened the Dortmund gathering a “Kirchentag for everyday life” [Alltagskirchentag], 
praising its open discussion groups where ordinary Protestants could talk to one 
another.55  In a letter to Reinold von Thadden, Klaus von Bismarck praised the central 
role that had been given to the Protestant youth and the excitement that had been 
generated by several of the Kirchentag’s new topics of discussion.56  And in a survey of 
young Kirchentag attendees, given by the Youth Ministry Office of the Westphalian 
church, overwhelming majorities approved of the new structure and format and the new, 
more worldly slogan “Living with Conflict.”57   Summarizing assessments of the 
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Kirchentag in the popular and church press, Carola Wolf concluded: “At base, when we 
draw up the balance sheet, it went astonishingly well.”58 
Yet there was also a strong sense, among both critics and Kirchentag leaders, that 
the Kirchentag could not rest on its laurels.  Dortmund was not so much the model of a 
new kind of Kirchentag, as an impulse to further experimentation.  While greeting this 
meeting as a step in the right direction, many critics argued that it did not go far enough.  
Writing in the Westphalian Kirchenblatt, Eberhard Stammler described Dortmund as 
“two steps forward” and “one step back,” as an “unsatisfying mixture of traditional 
concerns and contemporary statements, of conventional church practice [Kirchlichkeit] 
and up-to-date theology.”  In Kirche in der Zeit, Eberhard Roterberg complained that the 
Kirchentag was still too focused on problems inside the churches.  And Hans Jürgen 
Schultz, writing in the magazine Radius, argued that the Kirchentag was “so pluralist that 
one can no longer grasp the whole.”  Instead of letting everyone speak, he argued, the 
Kirchentag needed develop its own strong voice.  Finally, Heinz Zahrnt praised the 
Kirchentag in Sonntagsblatt, arguing that it had finally developed into an independent 
voice for Protestants outside of and over against the institutional churches.  But there was 
still a great deal of work to do.  “Now,” he argued, “the Kirchentag comes to the next big 
step: the new form demands new content.  This doesn’t mean that the Kirchentag should 
bring a new gospel, but it does mean that it must lay out the old gospel in new ways 
suited to our time.”59 
In his preliminary assessment of the Dortmund Kirchentag, Friedelbert Lorenz 
worked to make sense of these arguments, while admitting that he had not yet had time to 
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work through the more than 300 critical assessments that the Kirchentag leadership had 
collected.  In his report, Lorenz drew a few basic conclusions.  Despite attempts to reach 
out beyond traditional church circles, most Kirchentag attendees still came from the local 
congregations.  These people had appreciated the greater opportunity for discussion—
indeed, nearly one-third of all attendees had gotten to voice their opinions.  This 
demonstrated that ordinary church people were “equipped and ready for discussion.” But 
the Kirchentag program had never really succeeded in integrating the perspectives of 
these ordinary church people with the Kirchentag’s larger themes.  While the afternoon 
presentations had been intended to answer the questions raised in the morning’s 
decentralized discussions, the two parts of the Kirchentag had each gone their own way.  
In part, this was because presentations remained too academic and abstract.  But it was 
also because Kirchentag visitors were much more interested in the problems of the 
church and in theology than they were in discussions of politics and society.60 
To address these problems, Lorenz argued that the Kirchentag would have to find 
a way to transition more smoothly from small-group discussions to its central overarching 
themes.  Perhaps discussion groups could start small, getting larger over the course of the 
week.  At the same time, rather than trying to go in so many directions at once, the 
Kirchentag program needed to focus on a smaller number of precise, concrete problems 
of issues.  These should be chosen for their ability to “disquiet the Kirchentag 
congregation and to set it in motion.”  Finally, Lorenz argued, if the Kirchentag wanted to 
do its work through discussion and conversation, instead of top-down presentations, this 
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would require more planning than before, not less.  Perhaps it would even require another 
Kirchentag congress, where the groundwork for future meetings could be laid.61  
The new Kirchentag Pastor, Gerhard Schnath, drew similar conclusions.  In his 
assessment of Dortmund, he argued that the role of the Kirchentag was to overcome the 
dichotomy between “Sunday” and “Everyday Life” [Alltag].  This meant that the 
Kirchentag needed to encourage church people to take part in Germany’s “pluralistic 
society,” “confronting the conflicts of the world.”  But it also required them to reconsider 
the churches themselves in the light of the world outside.  Quoting Hans Jürgen Schultz, 
Schnath argued: “Faith does not live out of self assertion, but presupposes unbelief and 
exists in dialogue with it. . . . For the believer—today more than ever—is himself a 
potential unbeliever.”  According to Schnath, there were several ways to for the 
Kirchentag live out this faith in dialogue with the world.  For one, the Kirchentag needed 
to fully integrate the practices of modern, critical theology, helping people in the local 
congregations to overcome their exaggerated fear of these approaches.  For another, the 
Kirchentag needed to continue to experiment with new forms of worship, such as “jazz 
services.”  This was not about being sensationalistic or modern for its own sake, but 
about working to express genuine faith in a contemporary context.62  
Richard von Weizsäcker—who would shortly be elected as the new Kirchentag 
president—laid out his own critical assessment of the Dortmund Kirchentag in a letter to 
his fellow Präsidium members.  There were three main groups, Weizsäcker argued, that 
were interested in the activities of the Kirchentag.  These were ordinary people from the 
                                                 
61 Ibid., 5-11. 
 
62 Gerhard Schnath, “Erfahrungsbericht,” attached to the Minutes of the Präsidium Meeting, 9 
September 1963, EZA 71/86/28. 
 333
local city where the Kirchentag took place, the Kirchentag’s own community of regular 
attendees, and leading Protestant intellectuals who were preoccupied with the future of 
the church.  In a thinly veiled criticism of Dortmund, Weizsäcker argued that it was a 
mistake to focus too much on the first of these groups.  Until the Kirchentag was able to 
address the problems and questions of those at least nominally within the church, it 
would have little success reaching out to those outside.  Too much emphasis on missions 
and evangelism might even get in the way of putting the church’s own house in order.  
Instead, the Kirchentag needed to serve the latter two groups, looking more closely at 
questions of belief and church reform.  “It is not the task of the Kirchentag,” he 
elaborated, “to find a new theology.  But the Kirchentag cannot avoid this theme, if it 
wants to treat its visitors as subjects.”  Only when the church had worked through its 
theological and organizational problems, would its members be in a position to address 
the problems of the world from a Christian perspective.  At this point Weizsäcker turned 
to the role of the Kirchentag within German Protestantism and within German society.  It 
was naïve, he argued, to suppose that the Kirchentag could solve the church’s problems.  
It did not have any easy answers.  But the Kirchentag could serve as a “focal point” for 
this discussion, bringing together the “administrative church and the core congregation, 
but also, above all, those laity who are far-removed from work of the congregations.”  
Taking up the mantle of church reform would create difficulties with some of the existing 
Landeskirchen, but it was the only way to avoid greater difficulties down the road.63 
In the next meeting of the large Präsidialversammlung, which included many 
more representatives from the local Landeskirchen and the church’s missions and social 
organizations, new plans generated considerable discussion.  Many of those present were 
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critical of the Kirchentag’s new direction.  Against those who wanted the Kirchentag to 
champion progressive theology, the vast majority of Präsidialversammlung members 
defended the Kirchentag’s theological neutrality.  Some argued that critical theologians 
like Zahrnt, in their zeal to foster dialogue between the church and world, had embraced a 
form of pantheism that reduced God to the level of nature.  However, even in this more 
conservative body, there was a real desire for the Kirchentag to adopt a more self-critical 
role.  Arguing that many criticisms of the Kirchentag were really directed at the 
institutional churches, which the press was afraid to attack directly, some went so far as 
to argue that the Kirchentag had become the real church.  “It is not a critic of the church,” 
they argued, “but a critical church, and, to be open, a church that does not repel criticism, 
but invites it.”64  
Several months later, Hans Hermann Walz gave fuller formulation to these ideas 
in speech to the leaders of the Kirchentag State Committees [Landesausschüsse].  Walz 
began his speech by looking at the relationship between the Kirchentag and the local 
Protestant congregation [Gemeinde].  In the early 1950s, he argued, many leaders in the 
German Protestant churches had promoted a view of the church in which the local 
congregation was central, while other church organs such as youth ministries, social 
missions, evangelistic organizations, and others, were of distinctly secondary importance.  
At best, the adherents of this view saw other church bodies as “temporary para-
congregations” that lacked any real significance for the church.  This extreme perspective 
had elicited an equally extreme reaction, in which some theologians, such as Hans 
Hoekendijk, had come to see the congregations as parochial, bourgeois institutions that 
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obstructed the mission of the church in modern society.  This latter view had begun to 
spread in Germany, where the congregations were often seen as out of touch with the real 
world.65 
What was needed, Walz argued, was a critical congregation that was active in the 
world.  And this is what the Kirchentag had always been.  It was the “critical church,” a 
movement devoted to pushing the church in new directions.  Now it needed to move 
beyond its childhood, fully embracing this task.  Depending on their point of view, critics 
of the Kichentag argued either that it was too worldly, leaving the congregations behind, 
or that it was too focused on the church.  But both of these criticisms were based on a 
misunderstanding of the true nature of the church.  The church was not supposed to be a 
well-defined, carefully self-contained organization.  It was supposed to be a dynamic 
substance that expanded into the world.  As Walz argued: “Everywhere that the 
congregation is defined from its boundaries inward—that is, according to the question of 
who belongs and who doesn’t—that is where it loses the true essence of Christian 
community [Gemeinde].”  Instead, Walz offered a model of the church that was 
diametrically opposed to both the German state church model and the American free 
church model.  It did not just democratize church government—it radically questioned 
the very distinction between the inside and outside.  The best model for this kind of 
church, Walz said, was an explosion.  In its center was a relationship with Jesus Christ.  
But this was not a “static, peaceful center, but an immense movement.”  “It is like the 
middle of an explosion,” Walz continued, “The results of this explosion, the message, the 
Kerygma, or whatever comes out, that is the congregation.  Its borders are relative, like 
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the edge of an explosion.”  Outsider status was not determined by some boundary 
imposed by the church, but by a lack of connection with Jesus Christ, the center.66  
The task of the Kirchentag, Walz continued, was to work out this model of the 
church in the world.  Naturally, the Kirchentag would rely heavily on the existing 
congregations in this task, and especially on its forward-looking elements.  People in the 
existing churches would remain as the Kirchentag’s primary audience.  But the 
Kirchentag would be devoted to opposing those forces that worked to draw the church 
inward into itself.  The Kirchentag was not “anti-clerical.”  But it recognized the basic 
fact that, “the church, in its institutions, its officials, its closed congregations” was “to a 
large extent, no longer present” in the modern world.  Its primary task was not to reform 
the institutional church, but to be the true church in the middle of secular society.67 
 
CONCLUSION 
Ever since its foundation in 1949, the Kirchentag had been intended to gather 
Protestant laity, to strengthen them in their faith, and to equip them for service in society.  
In many ways, despite major changes in its self-understanding, the Kirchentag of the 
mid-1960s continued to pursue these goals.  However, dramatic changes within the 
churches and, especially, in the rest of German society, created the need for radical new 
approaches to this task.  When German Protestants gathered at the Kirchentage of the 
1950s, they did so assured of the relevance of their faith and its power to fully transform 
the world.  German society might have been plagued by political, social, and 
geographical divisions; many Germans might have faced the temptation of despair in the 
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postwar struggle to find new lives for themselves; social changes might be challenging 
and transforming traditional forms of life; but individual and communal faith offered 
hope for a better future.   
By the late 1950s, this optimism was being called into question.  Despite gestures 
of religious and all-German unity, the German people remained divided into two 
opposing states.  Despite their efforts to unite under some form of Protestant political 
ideology, German Protestants found themselves more and more divided.  Despite their 
efforts at Cold War reconciliation, the world remained divided into two hostile camps.  
These developments led to disillusionment among younger and more progressive 
Germans both inside and outside of the churches.  At the same time, new theological 
impulses within the universities challenged traditional forms piety.  Changing social 
mores raised questions about church teachings.  And the rise of new political 
constellations—especially within the younger generation—challenged earlier points of 
consensus.  If the Protestant churches—and the Kirchentag itself—could not solve these 
problems, then what did they have to offer the German people? 
In many ways, the Kirchentag was in a unique position to address this crisis.  
Formally independent of the EKD and the Landeskirchen, it was free to experiment and 
innovate with new forms of theology and politics outside of the churches’ hierarchical 
structure.  But even so, the Kirchentag was slow to embrace this task.  As long as its own 
relevance was undisputed, as long as its all-German gatherings drew massive crowds and 
generated political excitement, the Kirchentag had no need to engage in such 
experiments.  But after the construction of the Berlin Wall—having lost its all-German 
function—the Kirchentag sought new relevance as a self-critical Protestant organization 
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that would boldly address the difficult questions of faith and modern life.  This was not 
simply a matter of shifting its emphasis from church concerns to matters of “worldly” 
importance.  In many ways, it was precisely the opposite, involving a redefinition of the 
nature of the church itself.  The church would no longer be seen as a self-evident entity, 
promoting the continued existence of a self-evident tradition.  Instead, the church itself 
would be defined by its external function.  The true test of its legitimacy was its ability to 
make a difference in the outside world.   
This was a dangerous and risky step for the Kirchentag to take.  On the one hand, 
it opened the door for more explicit and direct engagement with contemporary problems, 
allowing these problems to interrogate and transform the church’s own tradition and 
theology.  This freed the Kirchentag to explore new ideas without being burdened down 
by the weight of tradition and bureaucracy.  But would people who had been alienated 
from the church return in significant numbers, or was their disillusionment too complete?  
On the other hand, by adopting this test of legitimacy, the Kirchentag called into question 
the legitimacy of existing church institutions.  How would the pious respond to having 
their own faith doubted?  How would the hierarchy react to claims that the true church 
was “outside the church?”  Would the Kirchentag retain its ability to bridge the divide 
between the young and old, progressive and conservative, pious and modern?  Or, as 
some critics of the new directions feared, would the Kirchentag itself be torn apart in the 
struggle between competing factions? 

 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 9 
 
WAGING PEACE 
 
 
In the first half of the 1960s the Kirchentag took on the task of rethinking the 
place of the Christian churches in modern society.  Rather than seeing its activity 
primarily as an expression of the interests and agendas of the institutional churches, its 
leaders began to view the Kirchentag as the forum for a new, radically open theology that 
defied the traditional division between the church and the world.  In the second half of 
the decade, this new theological orientation led to renewed practical engagement with the 
problems of the political sphere and to the formation of a new form of Protestant politics. 
While the 1963 Kirchentag had touched only intermittently on broader social 
issues, the next several meetings signaled a new political orientation.  The 1965 
Kirchentag, centered on the theme of “freedom,” served as an extended call for German 
Protestants to re-engage with the problems and conflicts of the modern world.  This 
“freedom” was not primarily political, although it included the political obligations of the 
democratic citizen.  Instead, growing out of biblical and Lutheran concepts of “Christian 
freedom,” it referred, on the broadest level, to the obligation of the Christian to engage 
maturely and responsibly with the problems and conflicts of the world, rather than 
retreating into the realm of personal piety.   Amid the social ferment of the 1960s, 
Christians were called not to protect their own privileges, or to defend the status quo, but 
to play an active, positive role in their rapidly changing society.  By the time of the 1967 
and 1969 Kirchentag meetings, with their themes of “Peace” and “Justice,” this vision 
had broadened still further, to encompass the problems of the entire world. 
This shift was the product of a gradual evolution in Protestant attitudes, with roots 
going back as far as the early 1950s.  Protestants of all political perspectives had long 
emphasized the importance of faith-inspired political activity.  Especially on the 
Protestant Left, themes like peace and reconciliation had long had a central place.  The 
worldwide church [Die Ökumene]—and not just the church in Germany—had been a 
growing area of emphasis at Kirchentag meetings since the mid-1950s.  And at 
Kirchentag meetings in the late 1950s and early 1960s, German Protestants had begun to 
look more critically at their own national past and at their present-day national politics.  
By the mid-1960s, these diverse strands had begun to come together as parts of a new, 
more systematic whole.   
This can be most clearly seen in the gradual convergence of the inter-German 
political priorities of the Protestant Right and Left.  The 1961 Tübingen Memorandum, 
issued by a small group of relatively conservative Protestant intellectuals, had clearly 
demonstrated the growing frustration of the Protestant public with the Cold War 
posturing of the Adenauer government.1  By 1965, disgruntled Protestant conservatives 
elaborated on these ideas in cooperation with more left-wing Protestant theologians like 
Helmut Gollwitzer, to create the Protestant Church’s first official public study 
[Denkschrift] on a major political subject.  This document, titled “The Status of the 
Expellees and the Relationship of the German People to its Eastern Neighbors”—known 
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more colloquially as the Ostdenkschrift—argued that the problem of German division 
would not be resolved through Cold War antagonism, but though reconciliation between 
Germany and its Eastern neighbors and through more generous social policies at home.2  
This document did not represent any final consensus; indeed it elicited sharp criticisms 
from both inside and outside of the churches.  But it demonstrated a new coming 
together, a new opportunity for dialogue and agreement, between practitioners of foreign 
policy Realpolitik, who wanted to bring West Germany’s foreign policy into line with the 
emerging American politics of détente, and members of the Protestant Left, with their 
more idealistic, theologically-motivated emphasis on peace and reconciliation. 
This shift in political thought was further reinforced by new theological trends 
within the Protestant churches.  Beginning in the early 1960s, prominent younger 
theologians, such as Jürgen Moltmann and Wolfhart Pannenberg, began to argue for the 
centrality of eschatology to any proper understanding of Christian faith.  Rather than 
remaining fixated on history—the history of the bible, the historical Jesus, or a one-time 
historical act of redemption—these theologians argued that Christianity needed to be 
oriented toward the future, toward the unfolding of the Kingdom of God.  Christians, as 
Moltmann put it, were a people of hope, dissatisfied with the shortcomings of the present, 
looking forward to the future peace and justice that God had promised.  This hope in 
God’s final victory did not lead to resignation or passivity, but to renewed activity in the 
world.  As Moltmann argued: “The man of hope who leaves behind the corrupt reality 
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and launches out on the sea of divine possibilities, thereby radically sets this reality of his 
at stake—staking it on the hope that the promise of God will win the day.”3 
Drawing on these diverse sources, Kirchentag participants began in the late 1960s 
to work out a distinct new form of Christian political praxis.  No longer satisfied to 
engage only in abstract problem solving and academic study, they increasingly worked to 
bring together factual information and ethical teachings with calls to concrete 
engagement and activity.  At the same time, they expanded the scope of their political 
activity beyond the domestic politics of the Federal Republic and questions of German 
division, carrying the lessons of their own political experience over into the realm of 
world politics at the broadest level.  Rather then thinking of themselves as Germans or as 
citizens of the Federal Republic, they began to see themselves more and more as citizens 
of Europe and of the world.  Their self-proclaimed political task, by the end of the 1960s, 
was no less than to foster world peace through the resolution of concrete conflicts and the 
creation of a new, socially-just world order. 
 
LOOKING BEYOND THE NATION 
Starting in the middle of the 1950s, the Kirchentag program began to move 
beyond an exclusive focus on German and inter-German questions.  This interest in the 
world outside of Germany did not begin with political or diplomatic considerations, but 
with a new emphasis on the German Protestantism as part of the worldwide Christian 
church, or Ökumene.  Many of the Kirchentag’s most important early leaders and 
supporters—including Reinold von Thadden-Trieglaff and Bishop Hanns Lilje—had 
worked in close cooperation with Protestant ecumenical organizations since the 1920s 
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and had been active in the foundation of the World Council of Churches in the 1940s.  
Their ecumenical perspective had implicitly shaped the program and organization of the 
Kirchentag since the beginning, and important ecumenical leaders such as Willem 
Visser’t Hooft, the founder of the World Council of Churches, had often appeared on its 
program.  But in the late 1940s and early 1950s, this ecumenical perspective was pushed 
into the background by more pressing and immediate questions about the fate of the 
German nation. 
This began to change in the middle of the 1950s.  Shortly after joining the 
Kirchentag staff, after serving as the director of the Ecumenical Institute in Bossey, Hans 
Hermann Walz identified ecumenicalism and events in the ecumenical world as one of 
two themes that had received insufficient attention at previous Kirchentag gatherings.4  
And at the 1956 Kirchentag in Stuttgart, ecumenical relations became a major area of 
emphasis, with the creation of a new Kirchentag Ecumenical Committee by the American 
pastor Franklin Littell, the greater inclusion of foreign speakers at the Kirchentag’s large 
worship services and assemblies, and the addition of special “ecumenical” gatherings in 
the Kirchentag program.5  At the next two major Kirchentag gatherings, in 1959 and 
1961, the program even included a dedicated Ecumenical Workgroup, which featured 
reports and presentations on the church around the world.6 
This new ecumenical and international perspective was slow to penetrate the 
Kirchentag’s political program.  While some members of the political workgroup 
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leadership had argued as early as 1958 that their program needed to “move away from 
national self-centeredness” and “de-provincialize,” the group maintained its emphasis on 
German problems and questions well into the 1960s.  However, these discussions did 
begin to adopt a more critical attitude toward German history and the German nation.7  
And problems such as German division were increasingly framed as part the larger 
political complex of the Cold War, incapable of being resolved by German activity alone.  
This shift in perspective accelerated after 1961, as the construction of the Berlin Wall 
added to the seeming permanence of German division.  This new perspective could be 
seen in early planning meetings for the 1963 Kirchentag in Dortmund.  While the plans 
for the Dortmund Kirchentag focused on conflict and social interaction within West 
Germany, several church leaders suggested that these themes might also apply to German 
relations with the rest of the world.  In late 1961, for example, the leaders of the 
Dortmund Preachers’ Seminar identified “peace,” “human interaction” in the broadest 
sense, and relations between Germans and foreigners as the three biggest problems facing 
Germany.8  And several of the younger academic directors of the Protestant Study Center 
at Haus Villigst, suggested to Friedelbert Lorenz that the Kirchentag should focus on the 
problem of how to promote freedom and peace, looking especially at ways in which the 
two German states might cooperate in the creation of a better world.9 
Despite these suggestions, the emphasis of the Dortmund Kirchentag was firmly 
centered on social divisions within the Federal Republic.  The major exception to this 
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rule was in a series of presentations by the SPD politician Adolf Arndt and the theologian 
Heinz Zahrnt on the topic: “In the World You Will Have Fear.”10 Here Arndt argued that 
fear and anxiety were the results of social tensions between individuals, groups, and even 
nations.  “The innermost cause of this fear . . .,” he continued, “is our lack of justice.”  
What people feared most was that they would not receive what they deserved, and this 
led to conflict and tension between the political parties, between employers and unions, 
and between the forces of the East and West in the sphere of world politics.  These 
tensions were an unavoidable part of life.  When people tried to ignore them or pretend 
they would simply go away, this only made them worse.  But attempts to bring about a 
one-sided resolution were even more dangerous.  As German history had shown, fear 
could lead to aggression, and one-sided attempts to resolve a conflict could lead to an 
escalating cycle of violence.11 
Tensions and conflicts in everyday social life could not be resolved by withdrawal 
from the world or through one-sided activity.  Instead, they needed to be managed 
through dialogue and compromise.  This, Arndt argued, was the cornerstone of West 
Germany’s democratic system.  In an open and free society, this dialogue could rebuild 
trust between hostile groups.  And concrete compromises could redress injustices and 
resolve longstanding tensions.  In West German political life, Arndt argued, this could be 
seen clearly in recent interactions between trade unions and employers.  By breaking their 
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longstanding cycle of hostility and working to resolve their tensions, these groups had 
turned a source of conflict into the foundation of a more just society.12 
But, Arndt continued in a thinly veiled reference to German division, there were 
other conflicts that were not as easy to resolve, at least for the present time.  These 
problems were especially prevalent in foreign policy.  Here, the only solution was to 
soberly accept that such conflicts existed and to take them seriously.  Instead of being 
blinded by fear, the parties involved in this kind of conflict needed to “be patient with 
one another and do everything within our power so that this problem, unsolvable today, 
can, through our cooperation, grow into a future solution.”  In practice, this meant 
“working out the pre-conditions for agreements that can lead to a tolerable compromise, 
where nothing essential is relinquished, but, instead, where both sides receive more in the 
way of justice than they have staked on their conflict.”  This attitude was difficult to 
adopt because of the deep-seated mistrust of those on both sides of any conflict.  But 
some of this mistrust could be overcome by recognizing the guilt of one’s own side and 
the contributions that it had made to this state of affairs.  Most of all, however, this 
activity would only be possible if people maintained their hope in a better future and 
were willing to work to make that future a reality.13 
Heinz Zahrnt followed up on this speech by arguing that social and world 
conflicts had their theological roots in the alienation of humanity from God.  Yet 
Christians knew that this alienation had been overcome in the reconciliation and 
“reunification” that had been accomplished through the work of Christ.  Christ’s death 
and resurrection had laid the foundation for a whole new reality.  Now, since Christ had 
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laid this foundation, Christians were called to take an active part in the construction of 
this new world.  In earlier times, Christians had focused too much on the past, and this 
had led them to adopt a passive stance toward present-day problems.  “What the 
Christianity of today needs more than anything else,” Zahrnt argued, “is to reverse the 
polarity of its consciousness from the past toward the future.”  “If we really have hope in 
the in the arrival of God’s new world,” he continued,  “then even here in this old, 
decaying world, we must believe in the possibility for new beginnings.  If we really 
believe that Jesus Christ has confronted and healed the great rift that runs through all of 
existence, then we must confront the assorted smaller rifts that run through the world, 
endeavoring to heal them.”  This was not a form of utopianism.  Zahrnt made it clear that 
human beings could not fully or finally resolve the problems of the world.  But it was a 
call to active involvement in the practical tasks of making the world a better place.14  At 
the same time, this call represented the emergence of a new Protestant perspective toward 
social and political problems.  It was not enough to study the problems of the world and 
to work to understand them; instead, ordinary Christians—and not just policy experts and 
politicians—were also called to participate actively in the process of finding solutions. 
This new approach continued over the next several years.  Starting at the 1965 
Kirchentag in Cologne this new perspective was also complemented by a shift away from 
the German question toward the political problems of the world outside of Germany.  
This new, more international focus emerged gradually in the Kirchentag planning 
sessions.  Immediately after the Dortmund gathering, Klaus von Bismarck complained in 
a letter to Thadden about the national focus of the previous Kirchentag’s workgroups, 
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arguing in favor of a more “ecumenical” perspective.15  And several other critics 
complained about the relative lack of attention to East-West politics in general.16  But, in 
his assessment of responses to the Dortmund Kirchentag, Friedelbert Lorenz concluded 
that most attendees had not minded the relative lack of political discussion.  Instead, 
Lorenz reported, they had been most interested in sessions devoted to questions of 
personal belief, rather than in discussions of the problems within society more broadly.17 
Nevertheless, Kirchentag leaders resolved that the 1965 Kirchentag in Cologne 
would have a broader focus than the church-oriented Dortmund gathering.  Indeed, in 
choosing the theme of “Freedom” for their next gathering, they asserted that questions of 
Christian life could not be separated from social and political life.  Christians had not 
been freed from the world, but freed for the world; they were specifically called to 
exercise their Christian freedom by taking responsibility for the problems of the world 
around them.18  In their early plans for the next political workgroup, drafted in the 
beginning of 1964, Kirchentag leaders continued with two well-worn themes.  The first 
proposed topic was, broadly, political pluralism: the role of Protestant Christians in “each 
of the three parties in the Bundestag.”  The second involved the continued discussion of 
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German division under the rubric: “The Church in Divided Germany: What Aspects of 
this Unity are Illusion and What Aspects are Reality?”19 
Later in the same meeting, however, Kirchentag leaders also raised the possibility 
of further broadening the scope of the political workgroup, suggesting as a potential 
topic: “The Church in the Ecumenical World” [“Kirche in der Ökumene”].  Ironically, 
this topic seems to have grown directly out of their existing pre-occupation with German 
unity and division.  Finding it increasingly difficult to justify the inter-German unity of 
the Protestant church by appealing to some underlying national unity, church leaders had 
begun to re-conceptualize this relationship as a form of ecumenicalism.  Thus, their 
proposals for “ecumenical” discussion topics included not just traditional theological 
reflections on the nature of the worldwide church, or tasks such as “the transformation of 
the introverted church into a world-encompassing church,” they also included a proposal 
to examine “ecumenical relations [Ökumene] within the EKiD, from the standpoint of 
‘the church in divided Germany.’”20   
The connection between the traditional topic of German unity and the new 
ecumenical theme becomes even more apparent in subsequent planning meetings.  In a 
discussion of the upcoming Kirchentag with the leaders of the Volksmission committee of 
the Church of the Rhineland, church president Joachim Beckmann informed Lorenz: 
“The Theme: ‘The Church in Divided Germany,’ along with the theme ‘Unity of the 
EKiD,’ is obsolete.  A much more important theme would be something related to the 
question: What does the task of the church look like in relation to the current situation 
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between East and West?”  Beckmann went on to explain that the pressing issue was not 
the political or diplomatic resolution of the problem of German division, but the spiritual 
and ethical questions of unity and mutual responsibility between Christians in “different, 
separated socio-political systems.”21  Summarizing his discussions with Beckmann and 
with the State Kirchentag Committee of Bavaria, Lorenz concluded: “If we look at the 
role of the church in the larger East-West division, then we need to do so under the rubric 
of ecumenicalism.”22 
This approach was confirmed at the Kirchentag’s Theme Selection meeting in 
April 1964, when the workgroup on politics and society chose as their topic the problem 
of “Christian Service in divided Germany.”  In discussing this theme, they began with a 
recognition of German division.  But they argued that German Christians in the East and 
West were united by “a common past, history, and guilt” and, thus, by a common duty of 
service to each other and to the world.  Equating the problem of German division with the 
larger division of the world into Cold War antagonists (“German division = the Division 
of the World”), they argued that ecumenical, Christian unity in Germany was a model for 
the resolution of global geo-political problems (“Christian Unity in Germany = Unity in 
the World.”)23   
In a series of meetings over the next several months, Kirchentag leaders continued 
to refine these ideas, planning for a discussion of inter-German relations within the larger 
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context of Europe and the “world-political horizon.”24  This formulation was 
intentionally chosen as a way to avoid an overly narrow focus on the questions of the 
contested Oder-Neisse border between Poland and Germany and the relationship between 
West Germany and the communist states of Eastern Europe.  While Kirchentag leaders 
generally agreed on the need to accept the Oder-Neisse line, they argued that this was a 
fruitless topic for discussion, since politicians refused to admit their real opinions for f
of offending interest groups.  They also agreed that any future reunification of Germany 
would require reconciliation with the Soviet satellites in Eastern Europe and they 
admitted that Germany was responsible for the present-day suffering of the Poles under 
Communism.  But they argued that this topic would best be examined under the bro
rubric of Europe-wide reconciliation and unity.
ear 
ader 
ide 
ing 
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The first of these forums, with the theme “Germany and Europe” was ultimately 
dominated by expellee politics, and by the question of Germany’s relations with its 
eastern neighbors.  Including prominent representatives of the expellee groups, such as 
Philipp von Bismarck (Klaus von Bismarck’s brother), in its leadership, this group began 
with an extensive discussion of the current status of expellees in the Federal Republic as 
well as the process and problems of their integration into West German society.27   
In its second half, however, this discussion turned to more pressing political 
topics such as German guilt, reconciliation between West Germany and Poland, and the 
prospects for a new German Ostpolitik.  Here, Ludwig Landsberg set the tone for a free 
ranging political discussion, calling on his listeners to look beyond controversial issues 
such as the Oder-Neisse Line, German reunification, and the national self-determination 
rights of German expellees.  Rather than focusing on these narrow points of conflict, he 
urged them to look at the larger, overarching questions of German identity and East-West 
reconciliation.  In the debate that followed, some discussion participants like Kurt 
Schebesch of Düsseldorf argued that the central question governing German-Eastern 
European reconciliation was not guilt but justice.  Guilt, he argued, was not and could not 
be a solid foundation for restoring political and diplomatic contact.  But others, like the 
Hanover Oberkirchenrat Erwin Wilkens, argued that German misdeeds and German guilt 
were central to the issue at hand.  The politics of reconciliation, he conceded, could not 
proceed “purely out of the guilt complex of the German people.”  And it could not be 
based on any one-sided conception of guilt that denied the suffering and injustice 
inflicted on German expellees.  Any reconciliation efforts needed to be politically 
sustainable, based on the real concerns of both sides.  However, he continued: “We need 
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political negotiations rooted in the willingness to reconcile with one another, with the 
goal of creating a new just order.  This needs to be made concrete in our relations with 
our eastern neighbors.”  While this could not be a form of political activity rooted solely 
in guilt, it also could not be “de-coupled from the entire guilt question.”28  
The Freiburg historian Gottfried Schramm also acknowledged the pressing need 
for East-West reconciliation, but he argued that the expellee organizations did not pose a 
major barrier to reconciliation, as was often supposed.  Instead, he claimed, the expellee 
community, with their particular expertise and interest, was ideally situated to take the 
lead in “building bridges” between West Germans and the people of Eastern Europe.  
Klaus von Bismarck, on the other hard, argued that the prejudice and resentment of the 
expellees was one of many important stumbling blocks in this process.  He also 
acknowledged the complexity of the problem, and the barriers that the Soviet Union had 
also erected against East-West reconciliation.  Reconciliation, he conceded, could not be 
a one-sided process.  But, he argued, many of the political positions and arguments of the 
expellee organizations only exacerbated this conflict, making the Soviet Union less likely 
to come to the negotiating table.29 
The forum’s other political discussion was devoted to the issue of German and 
European responsibility for the plight of the developing world.  In keeping with the 
Kirchentag’s new approach to such problems, this discussion forum was more about 
creating awareness and spurring activity that it was about finding academic or technical 
solutions.  As Axel von dem Bussche, the group’s chair, argued: “It is a matter of shaking 
people up.  No one should be able to say he didn’t know that he had a neighbor in 
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need.”30  Like the Expellee Forum, this discussion was also intended to address a broad 
spectrum of specific political and social problems, including the need for a voluntary 
social service in Germany, the problems facing guest workers and foreign students, and 
the need for individual, church, and state-sponsored aid to those in the developing 
world.31  Its format incorporated several short speeches by a series of politicians, 
academics, and church workers, followed by a short question and answer period and an 
extended round table discussion. 
At the 1965 Kirchentag, Axel von dem Bussche began this evening session by 
examining the fundamental reasons why Germans needed to be concerned with the 
developing world.  Holding up a small, transparent globe, he proclaimed to the audience 
that the real globe was just as transparent and just as fragile.  “Just in our lifetimes,” he 
continued, “although this is perhaps still concealed from us, it has become evident that, 
for the first time in human history, we in fact hold the fate of this fragile earth in our 
collective hands.  The world will become very dangerous, if we do not realize this and 
reach out to those in need.”  He went on to argue that if Germans could only see the big 
picture, they would realize that all of the parts of the world were interdependent.  
Suffering—even suffering on the other side of the world—presented Germans with an 
imperative to act.32 
Even more than this, though, the shrinking size of the world required Germans to 
reorder their whole way of thinking.  Rather than seeing themselves at the center of all 
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things, they needed to see that they were just one small part of the larger whole. Their 
actions and priorities could no longer be based purely on national self-interest, but needed 
to be based on the interests of others.  This change would begin at home.  As von dem 
Bussche continued: “We might become desperate when we look at the smallness of our 
land in the middle of Europe, but we can and we need to ask: even if we can’t change the 
world, why don’t we change ourselves?”  Christians, especially, were called to learn to 
truly love their neighbors.  As a starting point, this meant promoting reconciliation in 
European politics.  But, as the world continued to shrink, this task would soon come to 
encompass the entire globe.33 
Paul Lücke, the Federal Housing Minister, followed von dem Bussche with some 
thoughts he had previously delivered at the 1962 Katholikentag.  Speaking as a Catholic 
and a member of the CDU, Lücke began by looking at the success of postwar German 
reconstruction.  Having embraced Christian responsibility and the values of the free 
world, the Germans had successfully rebuilt their nation and had experienced tremendous 
progress in every area of life.  But now they needed to address the needs of those left 
behind by this progress and prosperity, creating a society that was better equipped to take 
care of those in need.  To accomplish this, he proposed that all German youth be 
encouraged to spend a year working in voluntary social service.34 
This, however, was only the beginning.  Germans needed to apply the same 
principles of solidarity to Europe and to the wider world.  They might begin by 
addressing the needs of Germany’s 1.2 Million guest workers.  But they would also need 
to offer help to those abroad.  As Lücke argued:  
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The young nations [jungen Völker] are in need, they require our help, and they 
especially require our humanitarian aid.  I do not mean that we should go to these 
people as adventurers or as businessmen.  Instead, we go because we see that they 
are made in God’s image, because we see these people in Tanganyika, in Kenya, 
in Asia and Africa as our neighbors—this is how small the world has become.  
We do not go because we are worried about communism and not because we 
Germans think we are capable of anything, that we know so much, and so much 
better.  No!  We are required—and there is no vacation from this task—to offer 
humanitarian, Christian help within the Fatherland, in Europe, and in the World.35 
 
The only question that remained was how best to go about this task.  Here Lücke 
was optimistic about the chances for success.  If Europeans could recover from their own 
disastrous past, and if humans could land a man on the moon, then surely they had the 
economic and technical capacity to meet the needs of the developing world.  To Lücke, 
however, this was not primarily a task for the government, but for the churches and for 
individuals.  The state might encourage and coordinate these efforts, and it might provide 
some financial help, but what the world needed was the active involvement of German 
volunteers, German “legions of good will” analogous to Kennedy’s Peace Corps.36   
Lücke’s presentation was followed Gabriele Wülker, a third-world development 
expert from the Ruhr University in Bochum.  Like the previous speakers, Wülker began 
by reminding her audience of how small the world had become and by addressing the 
implications of this development.  “If there is fighting today in Vietnam,” she argued, 
“this concerns us here in Cologne.  If famine reigns in central Africa, this touches us 
directly.  This is to say that the social question is no longer a question within our borders, 
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but has much more become an intercontinental question that involves the entire world 
and compels us to responsibility.”37 
Unlike Lücke, however, Wülker did not believe that this responsibility could be 
reduced to financial and humanitarian aid.  Instead, it was a matter of fostering 
international cooperation between the people of the developed and developing worlds.  
This was an area where the churches, and individual Christians, had an especially 
important role to play.  It was only natural that governments would see social and 
economic aid in political terms.  But, in order to foster true international cooperation 
between Europeans and the people of the developing world, it was vital that European aid 
be offered without any political conditions.  It was, then, the task of Christians in 
Germany, and in all of the nations of the world, to correct their governments’ one-sided 
approaches to development aid.  In this way, they would help to break down the barriers 
of mistrust that stood between the peoples of the developed and developing worlds.  If 
they wanted to contribute to true international cooperation and trust, German Christians 
also needed to work to break down the barriers of cynicism and mistrust within Germany 
that prevented Germans from fully embracing the task of development.  And, finally, 
Christians had the important task of fostering intellectual and spiritual cooperation.  This 
meant humbly working to understand other cultures and other ways of thinking, learning 
to respect them, and learning from them.38 
Finally, Willem Visser’t Hooft, the General Secretary of the World Council of 
Churches, argued that the task of helping the developing world could not be limited to 
charity and voluntary aid.  Instead, it was a matter of social justice.  Over the last hundred 
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years, he argued, Europeans had developed a form of social politics based on the value of 
solidarity, the idea that every person in society was responsible for the good of the whole.  
This idea had to come to Europe through the socialist and communist traditions, but it 
also had deeper Christian roots.  Now it was time for Europeans to embrace this value in 
their dealings with those in other parts of the world.  In a world where the divide between 
the rich and poor was widening, where economic and racial divisions even threatened to 
eclipse the East-West division of the Cold War, Europeans were called to do more than 
simply offer their voluntary aid.  They were called to provide real, constructive help.  As 
Visser’t Hooft argued: “From the church outward, we must learn to think much more in 
terms of structures, and less in terms of the individual.”  This meant reorganizing the 
entire system of world trade that was set up to the disadvantage of the developing world.  
To Visser’t Hooft, however, there was also a spiritual dimension to this task.  As nations 
around the world modernized and industrialized, they confronted the same spiritual 
vacuum that threatened modern Europe.  Christian missions and evangelism were needed 
alongside of social aid, for only the gospel could fill this vacuum in modern society.39 
In the podium discussion that followed, the forum’s speakers and other 
workgroup members elaborated on many of these ideas.  Axel von dem Bussche and 
Wolfgang Winckler spoke in more detail about the difficulties facing foreign students in 
Germany, especially those who were in the country illegally.  The Oberkirchenrat Heinz 
Kloppenberg spoke on the importance of personal action, endorsing ideas for the creation 
of a social alternative to mandatory military service.  And he endorsed the need for more 
regulation and fairness in the global market.  Responding to Visser’t Hooft’s comments 
on the importance of missions, Kloppenberg also argued for a redefinition of this term.  
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Missions, he said, was not about bringing a “higher religion” to people from another 
culture, but of opening a responsible dialogue with non-Christian brothers and sisters 
around the world.  Visser’t Hooft, in response, defended the need for the proclamation of 
the gospel, and not just inter-faith dialogue, but he argued that this was the task first and 
foremost of the local church and not of European missionaries.40   
Finally, at the end of the evening, the discussion turned to the problem of 
motivating Germans to look more seriously at the needs of the larger world.  This, argued 
the pastor Eberhard Stammler, was not just a problem of the individual, but was rooted in 
the “contemporary political consciousness” of the West German citizen.  “If this is the 
case,” he continued, “then we must regard it as a catastrophe, for it shows that we 
Germans, despite all of the bitter and significant experiences that we have had, have not 
been able to find our place in the world.  We have been prevented by our provincialism, 
or, in German, our Kirchenturmshorizont, or the sense that we are the center of the world 
[der Nabel der Welt].” What Germans needed, he continued, was more creativity, 
imagination, and fantasy: the ability to learn to think in wholly new ways that were not 
limited by their narrow daily experiences.41  Speaking on behalf of the younger 
generation, Wolfgang Winckler expressed the same idea in more apocalyptic terms: “If 
we only worry about the area beneath our own church tower, about our own internal 
problems, then, in our busyness with out own small matters, we may be surprised one day 
to find that the world has gone under in a flood of terror.”42  In his final remarks, Lücke, 
tied engagement in the wider world back to the central issue of German politics.  If 
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individual West Germans were active in changing the world, he argued, they might even 
bring about the preconditions for an eventual, peaceful reunification of Germany.  
Finally, Heinz Kloppenberg closed the meeting by calling on the Kirchentag itself to take 
these problems more seriously.  “It is alarming,” he concluded, “that this question has not 
more strongly disturbed the Kirchentag as a whole.”43 
 
WORLD PEACE 
In assessing the 1965 Kirchentag in Cologne, Präsidium members concluded that 
their more worldly focus had been a success.  But they also found many of the 
workgroups to have been too academic and too divorced from everyday life.  And some 
complained that the overall program was too diffuse.  As they began to plan for the next 
Kirchentag gathering, Präsidium leaders found themselves looking for a new overarching, 
unifying theme that would be forward-looking in its perspective while still appealing to 
the broader public.  Among the topics they found most promising were “peace” and 
“justice.”44 
The author and journalist Hans Jürgen Schultz, who had recently joined the 
Präsidium, was the driving force behind the selection of “peace” as the theme for 1967.  
Writing to the new Kirchentag president, Richard von Weizsäcker, several months before 
the 1965 Kirchentag in Cologne, he argued that peace was the ideal theme to bring 
together the diverse elements of the Kirchentag program.  Peace, he argued, did not just 
refer to the prevention of war, but expressed an attitude and a way of living in relation to 
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the personal, political, ideological, religious, and even technological “borders” of modern 
life.  This topic, which Schultz hoped could be developed further in a possible Kirchentag 
Congress, had the additional advantage that it took the recent thinking of Protestant 
intellectuals like Hans Schmidt, Wolfhart Pannenberg, and Carl Friedrich von 
Weizsäcker, connecting these ideas to a set of problems of immediate relevance to 
ordinary people.45 
After the 1965 Kirchentag, Schultz elaborated these views in a short internal 
document titled “Keywords on Peace.”  He began his analysis with a short assessment of 
the changing role of the Kirchentag in German society.  Over the last several years, he 
argued, the Kirchentag had begun to move from its institutional childhood to a new level 
of maturity.  But this process was not yet complete.  The Kirchentag no longer served 
primarily as a celebratory gathering for core members of the Protestant congregations, 
but it had yet to really engage with the problems of the outside world.  Politically, too, it 
was in transition.  It had reacted to the political divisions within German Protestantism by 
trying to remain neutral, but, in the process, it had only succeeded in disappointing those 
on every side.  The Kirchentag in Cologne, however, had hinted at the way out of this 
dilemma.  Cologne had demonstrated that the Protestant public was itself maturing, 
becoming more capable of engaging in dialogue and seriously confronting the important 
issues of the day.  Rather than seeing itself exclusively as an academic forum set apart 
from the Protestant public or, on the other extreme, only as a celebratory gathering of 
active church members, the Kirchentag’s task was to promote the continuing maturation 
of the Protestant congregations.  This new approach would require the Kirchentag to go 
into more depth on a smaller number of themes and to provide more opportunities for 
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open dialogue and discussion.  Referring to the ideas of the American theologian Harvey 
Cox, Schultz argued that this would help to move the Protestant churches away from their 
“metaphysical theology” toward “a theology that promotes and facilitates world-
responsibility”46 
The Kirchentag, Schultz continued, was ideally suited to this task.  As a body that 
brought together Protestants from a wide variety of different perspectives, it was a natural 
forum for the discussion and promotion of new ideas.  If it adopted “peace” as its 
overarching theme for 1967, the Kirchentag could offer a sort of “social therapy” to 
German Protestants, helping them to work through their traditions and their history and to 
develop wholly new ideas and strategies for the promotion of peace.  In the process, the 
Kirchentag would contribute to the creation of a “active peace-consciousness” in 
Germany.47 
This “social therapy” consisted of three distinct steps.  First, the Kirchentag would 
need to examine and work through “hindrances to peace.”  These included the defeatism 
and cynicism of those who refused to believe that peace was attainable.  They also 
included the very idea of just war, which had so often been used to legitimize force and 
violence.  Finally, they included human psychological tendencies toward aggression, 
military and economic structures that served to promote warfare, and the unequal division 
of wealth that led to conflict between peoples and nations.48   
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As a second step, the Kirchentag would need to examine the “inherent necessity 
of peace” [“Sachzwänge zum Frieden”] in the present era of world history.  Drawing on 
the work of Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker, Schultz explained that the development of 
nuclear weapons, with their ability to destroy all of life, had made peace a necessity in the 
modern world.  “World peace,” he argued, “is no longer the object of a utopia, but is 
instead a matter of the indispensable promotion of political reason.  Six thousand years of 
ideas about war and peace have been ‘antiquated’ in one stroke.  Peace is the categorical 
way of life of a thoroughly industrialized society.”  Still, despite this necessity, human 
beings had the responsibility to actualize this imperative, giving it concrete form in a new 
system of “obligation, new tolerance, scientific responsibility . . . , strategies of 
disarmament, etc.”49   
Finally, this led to the third stage, the “planning of peace.”  Peace was not a 
matter of preventing war, it was the “foundational concept and way of life of future world 
culture.”  The task of German Christians in the present day was to build on this 
foundation.  This required a new way of thinking about the problem of peace.  As Schultz 
argued: “Developmental help is not enough any more; instead the problem is one of 
ecumenical world democracy.”  The goal was the creation of an egalitarian and just world 
that transcended every political, ideological, and religious boundary.50 
Meeting in late 1965 with members of the Protestant Studiengemeinschaft, 
Schultz and several members of the Kirchentag staff continued to explore and refine 
these ideas.  On the broadest level, the prominent academics in this organization agreed 
with Schultz that the Kirchentag needed to rethink its function in German society.  While 
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Hans Hermann Walz argued that dialogue was the Kirchentag’s most important task, 
others like Georg Picht and Heinz-Eduard Tödt promoted a vision of the Kirchentag as 
place for the “creation of public consciousness,” a place where church members would be 
confronted with provocative new ideas.  More narrowly, they also agreed with Schultz’s 
promotion of peace as the overarching topic for the next Kirchentag gathering.  But they 
made it clear that this was no small task.  As Tödt argued, the church had thus far failed 
in its attempts to create a “theology of hope” that was still engaged in a dialectical 
relationship with reality.  Picht agreed that currently existing theologies of peace were 
little more than re-appropriations of older romantic and Hegelian-Marxist philosophy.  
Existing theological works, like Jürgen Moltmann’s Theology of Hope, he continued, 
were not the right place from which to approach this topic.  Instead of beginning with 
emotional appeals, the Kirchentag needed to begin from the standpoint of concrete, 
technical problems in fields as far ranging as religion, economics, education, the military, 
and science.51  In addition to these more traditional themes, Walz also suggested that the 
Kirchentag would need to explore the complex of psychological questions involving the 
relationship between peace, sexuality, and aggression.52 
Looking more closely at the potential Kirchentag program, meeting attendees 
agreed that the core of the next Kirchentag would have to be a series of foundational 
programmatic speeches addressing the current state of peace research and laying the 
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groundwork for the rest of the gathering.  In order to create the broadest possible 
dialogue, and to work against the rising tide of political extremism in Germany, they also 
agreed on the need to incorporate politicians and military leaders into their program.  The 
biggest disagreement emerged on the question of how to conduct the Kirchentag’s bible 
study work.  Here some like Günther Howe argued for provocative sermons based on 
prophetic biblical passages, while others like Hans Dombois preferred a more academic 
and sober approach.53 
At their next meeting in March 1966, the Kirchentag Präsidium made the final 
decision to go ahead with these plans.  But they did so fully aware that they were taking a 
big risk.  As Lorenz reported in his meeting minutes: “The Kirchentag must push itself, in 
the sense that Schultz suggests, into areas where there is no theological safety net.  It is 
precisely in these areas that consciousness is shaped.”  Given the scarcity of existing 
work on peace, the lack of a developed peace theology, and the short time interval before 
the next Kirchentag, this meant that the Kirchentag staff would receive little formal help 
in addressing this massive subject.  As a result, the Kirchentag planning process and the 
final program would have to be more self-consciously open to outside influences than in 
the past.  Rather than offering well-thought-out answers to the complicated question of 
world peace, the Kirchentag would only be able to initiate and guide an open-ended 
discussion.  Loosening their control of the program would also change the tone of the 
meeting, opening the door to more conflict and a more aggressive style.  In sharp contrast 
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to earlier Kirchentag meetings, Präsidium members went into the planning process for the 
1967 expecting to generate controversy.54 
Since the subject of peace was so new and so multifaceted, the Kirchentag 
leadership decided that the 1967 gathering would require more than the usual amount of 
planning.  Instead of holding their usual theme selection meeting, attended by a small 
number of representatives from the various workgroups, they decided to hold a larger 
“Thematic Conference” with more than one hundred attendees.  This conference would 
have two tasks.  First, it would serve to lay the theological and philosophical foundations 
for the rest of the Kirchentag’s activity.  Second, and more difficult, would be the 
challange of finding the organic connections between the diverse elements of the 
Kirchentag program and the overarching theme of “peace.”  Peace might be a 
straightforward concept in world politics, but what was its relevance, for example, to the 
internal life of the church?55 
This last question seems to have particularly bothered Hans Hermann Walz, who 
spent much of the time leading up to the “Thematic Conference” attempting to work out 
this relationship.  As Walz saw it, this problem had two different dimensions.  On the 
level of theology, it was clear that the biblical concept of peace was something very 
different from the world peace that the Kirchentag sought to address.  It was not 
theologically responsible to simply equate these two concepts; their underlying 
relationship had to be discovered.  On a more practical level, Walz worried about the 
public response to the Kirchentag’s new peace theme.  Looking at the last several 
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Kirchentag meetings, he concluded that the Kirchentag’s primary audience was much less 
interested in social and political problems than they were in questions of faith in the 
modern world and church reform.  In order to draw these people in, Walz argued that the 
theme of “peace” needed to be organically tied to these other concerns.56  
The underlying problem was stark: Christianity had indirectly contributed to the 
Enlightenment, with its goal of eternal peace, but the Christian churches themselves had 
been generally hostile to this tradition throughout history.  This put the churches in a 
difficult position in the present day. 
The present-day ‘Necessity of Peace’ is a direct result of the ‘achievements’ of 
modernity.  World peace will not come by way of any kind of supernatural God; 
and it is not the privilege of hearts converted by the message of the messianic 
Prince of Peace.  Instead, if we achieve this peace, it will grow out of science and 
technology that operate on the basis of ‘atheistic’ principles, and as the result of a 
corresponding enlightened consciousness.57 
 
While Walz acknowledged that Christian faith had played a role in the development of 
the natural sciences and the Enlightenment, and that many Christians were active in these 
fields, the fact remained that the church had never really reconciled itself with this 
tradition.  This, he argued, was the biggest contribution that the churches themselves 
could make to world peace.  He concluded: “It is clear, among other things, that the 
question of the Christian contribution to world peace ties back into the structure of 
Christian belief itself.”  The churches needed to overcome the problematic aspects of 
their own tradition: the “crusade mentality” and dogmatic formulation of their beliefs that 
could lead to “a Christian variant of the totalitarian-imperialistic concept of peace.”  In 
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practice, this meant that the church itself needed to become more open to the outside, to 
the pluralism of beliefs and “truths” in modern society.  It needed to transform itself from 
a militant force in society into a force that worked in the service of others.  Finally, in the 
same way that inter-German and world peace might require the sacrifice of certain 
privileges, peace between the churches and their rival belief systems would also require 
the sacrifice of privileges that the churches had long enjoyed.58  In this sense, Walz 
concluded, the tasks of church reform and modern theology were directly relevant to the 
question of world peace. 
Speakers at the “Thematic Conference” in July 1966 took a more positive view of 
the relationship between Christianity and peace.  In the opening speech of the conference, 
Richard von Weizsäcker explained that the idea of “peace” as the theme for the 1967 
Kirchentag had grown directly out of the 1965 theme of “freedom.”  Christian freedom 
compelled believers to take responsibility for the problems of the world, and the most 
pressing need in the present-day world was peace.  But how, he asked, could Christians 
reconcile the biblical promise of peace with their present day reality, where the best they 
seemed able to achieve was the prevention of outright war?  Here, Weizsäcker argued 
that the Christian concept of peace and the problem of world peace were dialectically 
related.  “We are responsible,” he argued, “for the task of peace in this world, and it does 
little good if we merely invoke God’s plan in our perceptions and measures for peace.  
But, if we keep God’s promised peace in sight, do we not have the confidence, despite all 
of our conflicts and errors, to begin each day anew and to keep moving forward?”  Faith, 
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he continued, was not something separate from life.  It was something that enabled the 
believer to actively work for a better world.59 
In the present-day world, Weizsäcker continued, where the prevention of war was 
a necessary condition for the very survival of the human race, the churches had to work 
alongside the rest of society to prevent and manage world conflicts.  But this was only 
one part of their task.  They also had the responsibility to enlighten people about the need 
for peace and to help them to work together for its realization.  This was a multifaceted 
task that involved the provision of information, the development of science and 
technology, and the promotion of new moral values.  This last task, especially, was an 
area where the churches could make a major contribution.  The idea of reconciliation was 
at the center of the Christian message.  Now, in a variety of groups and organizations, 
Christians were called to join the task of promoting reconciliation and cooperation 
between “different-believing groups of people” toward the creation of “the initial stages 
of a world society.”  The next Kirchentag, he concluded, would contribute to this task by 
mobilizing Protestants, educating them about the problems and tasks at hand, and 
fostering dialogue that could lead to reforms in the churches and new attitudes in 
Germany.60 
Following Weizsäcker’s opening, a series of other speakers addressed the 
different subject areas where the Kirchentag could contribute to the development of 
world peace.  Wolf Häfele, a nuclear engineer, began by examining the ways in which 
modern scientific research could both threaten and promote peace.  Looking at the 
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American Manhattan Project that had developed the first atom bomb, and at the ongoing 
“scientific aggression” between the Americans and the Soviets, he argued that scientific 
research in the superpowers had far surpassed the scope of scientific activity in the rest of 
the world.  European scientists, he argued, needed to learn from the scientific 
advancements of the superpowers, adopting similar system of science education and 
fostering similar cooperation between the state, private industry, and the science 
community.  But, he argued, this shift needed to also be accompanied by a new form of 
scientific ethics.  While the superpowers sought to dominate one another, Europeans 
needed to apply the same effort and dedication toward the problems of peace and human 
survival.61 
Next, the political scientist Klaus Ritter, argued that world peace would require a 
fundamental change in political attitudes.  Politics itself, he argued, could not solve the 
problems of the world, but the way that it was practiced could make them more or less 
acute.  Looking at the problems of nuclear proliferation and German division, he went on 
to show how new ways of thinking could set the stage for eventual solutions.  For the first 
of these problems, he argued that the way forward would involve a shift from the bipolar 
model of the Cold War toward a multi-polar world in which non-aligned nations worked 
to maintain the fragile peace.  Within this model, small cooperative steps could lay the 
groundwork for larger ones, leading to the creation of a safer world and, even, an 
eventual “world state.”  With regard to the second problem, he argued that no political or 
diplomatic measures could lead to any near-term German reunification.  The GDR had 
been fully integrated into the Soviet sphere of influence.  West Germans needed to accept 
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this and to realize that only “much broader structural changes in the Eastern Bloc—and 
also in the West” could make any eventual reunification possible.  Rather than focusing 
on reunification on the basis of national unity, or grudgingly accepting the need for 
peaceful coexistence, West Germans needed to work for a whole new political 
“architecture” in Europe.  This would require the German people to move away from 
national categories of thinking, recognizing the interdependence of all people in the 
modern world.  And it would require them to develop a new, carefully thought out 
strategy for political rapprochement [Annäherung] between the Eastern and Western 
blocs.62 
Finally, the theologian Hans Schmidt examined the history and future of peace 
theology within the German churches.  In the past, he argued, Protestants had been 
divided between those who embraced romantic, utopian visions of peace, but were 
ineffectual in the real world, and those whose political realism had led them to accept the 
necessity of war.  But now, in the postwar world, they found themselves searching for 
new alternatives.  Christians needed to begin this process by understanding that conflict 
grew out of powerful social forces.  “War and revolutionary activity,” he argued, “are 
expressions of a historical crisis . . . that comes in the wake of a growing and changing 
society.”  War would only be eliminated if these necessary conflicts could be managed in 
some other way.  World peace would only be the result of careful, long-term social 
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planning, the creation and promotion of international law, developmental aid, and 
common security structures.63 
The Christian churches could best contribute to these changes by examining and 
overcoming their own reluctance to embrace world peace.  This reluctance, Schmidt 
argued, grew out of the Augustinian separation of the world into the City of God and the 
City of Man.  Following Augustine, Christians had for too long accepted that the only 
peace possible in the secular world was the peace imposed by the force of some strong 
ruler.  And they had concluded that the “heavenly peace” promised by God was entirely 
otherworldly.  Schmidt went on to argue that this traditional view was flawed.  Recent 
scholarship on the prophetic books of the Old Testament demonstrated that God’s peace 
was not utopian; it was instead a real, tangible promise, a “militant slogan” [Kampfwort] 
against oppressors and a “word of comfort” to the oppressed.  This promise was not 
limited to spiritual peace, but made a claim upon the entire social world.  In the New 
Testament, too, Schmidt argued, Christ had come to bridge the gap between God and 
humanity and to destroy the powers of evil that worked against peace.  The task of the 
churches was to continue this work of reconciliation between all races, classes, and other 
hostile groups.  This task was made possible by Christ’s prior work of reconciliation and 
was motivated by the knowledge of Christ’s ultimate victory.64 
These speeches served as the basic framework for the entire 1967 Kirchentag and, 
especially, as the foundation for its evening lecture program.  The lectures in this series 
had originally been planned to follow the three levels of Hans Jürgen Schultz’s 
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“Keywords for Peace,” looking in turn at “hindrances,” the “inherent necessity,” and the 
process of “planning” for peace.  However, drawing on the work of the Thematic 
Conference, the final plans called instead for discussion of the relationship between peace 
and subjects such as politics, education, and theology.  In order to address the topic of 
peace more broadly, and to clarify its necessity in the modern world, the Kirchentag 
leadership also decided to ask Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker, the brother of the 
Kirchentag president and a prominent public intellectual, to present his work on the 
subject of  “Peace and Truth.”65   
They had more difficulty in selecting the remaining speakers.  In a series of letters 
sent to the Kirchentag president in late 1966, Hans Jürgen Schultz argued that the 
Kirchentag program was too safe, lacking high profile speakers from the avant-garde.  
Against the dry, factual approach of the Kirchentag leadership, he suggested more 
provocative speakers such as Golo Mann, Alexander Mitscherlisch, Martin Luther King, 
Jr., and Harvey Cox.   Richard von Weizsäcker, on the other hand, insisted that the 
Kirchentag should focus on careful, thoughtful work, and not on provocation.  In 
particular, he objected to Mitscherlich and others who sought to understand social 
problems from the standpoint of psychology.66  In the end, besides Carl Friedrich von 
Weizsäcker, the Kirchentag settled on Alva Myrdal, the Swedish Minister for 
Disarmament Questions, for the political speech, Professor Hartmut von Hentig of 
Göttingen, on education, and the rising theological star Wolfhart Pannenberg, on the 
relationship between theology and peace. 
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Alva Myrdal opened this lecture series on the first night of the Kirchentag, 
speaking on the “Political Problem of Peace.”  She began by laying out the fundamental 
problem at hand: 
Somehow or other, we need to all cooperate in the task of forging a new path, 
seeking out a balance between the desire for peace, that all people self-evidently 
carry inside themselves, and the world community that humanity has created, that 
seems like a diabolical machine for the sabotage of peace.  Equipped with reason, 
as we human creatures are, we cannot tolerate the fact that our collective activity, 
and especially our international activity, must be so crazy, so self-destructive.67 
 
The problem, in a nutshell, was that people wanted peace, but didn’t know how to realize 
this goal.  The task at had, then, was to move beyond the level of desires, looking at real 
concrete measures. 
The road from present-day conflicts to future world peace would be a long one.  It 
could only be traversed through a series of smaller, more specific steps.  The first of these 
was to prevent the further proliferation of nuclear and conventional weapons, and to work 
toward eventual disarmament.  This task was already underway in the form of recent 
international agreements to the stop the proliferation of nuclear arms beyond those 
nations that already possessed them.  Next, the nations of the world needed to work to 
arrest the process of ongoing arms research and to reduce the quantity of weapons in 
current stockpiles.68   
The second step was to delegitimize the use of force as a means of solving local 
and international conflicts.  This would begin with a commitment to keeping local 
conflicts local.  The conflicts of the Third World grew out of the legacy of colonialism.  
Now, they were escalating beyond their original causes, as they were pulled into the Cold 
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War.  Rather than using these conflicts as Cold War proxies, the nations of the world 
needed to cooperate in the pursuit of non-violent solutions.  Recent UN sanctions against 
the racist regime in South Africa were a test case for this new approach.  So was the work 
of groups like the World Council of Churches to condemn racism in all of its forms.  But 
this task involved a difficult balancing act.  On the one hand, it was important for 
international organizations to prevent the spread and escalation of these conflicts, through 
arms embargoes and the creation of “nuclear free zones.”  On the other hand, it was 
equally important to let these problems be resolved locally, without outside interference.  
Even interference that was designed to help make things better was ultimately 
destructive, since it prevented the development of local solutions.69 
The third step was the constructive counterpart to the de-escalation of conflict: the 
ongoing work of fostering international cooperation.  On a fundamental level, this was a 
matter of changing people’s basic ways of thinking about the world.  In a world where 
the gap between the rich and the poor was rapidly expanding, people needed to recognize 
their own responsibility for the well-being of all people, everywhere in the world.  This 
might begin with various kinds of charitable and humanitarian aid.  But this was only the 
start.  Developmental aid had to be directed toward real international equality.  For the 
immediate future, this meant developing a plan to address the expected population 
explosion in the Third World.  For the longer-term future, it would require financial and 
technological aid for Third World industry, responsible investment and trade instead of 
expropriation, and the creation of better educational institutions.70 
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The final, and most difficult, step was to forge a future world governed by 
“international law” and directed toward the promotion of “peace, order, and progress.”  
This was not a matter of “pious resolutions” but of real, tangible integration.  It was 
already beginning in the area of international economic cooperation.  The next step would 
be to equip the UN with the economic and military resources to enforce world order.  
This process would require a shift away from the present-day power blocs that dominated 
international politics, toward some kind of true equality between the world’s nations.  
This task seemed distant.  But there were many steps that could help to make it possible.  
Groups and individuals that truly desired peace needed to work to spread enlightenment 
and progressive thought.  And they needed to influence politicians by changing the 
attitudes and ideas of voters.  Finally, they needed to tirelessly oppose the spread of hate 
and propaganda, helping people to realize that peace was attainable.71 
Speaking the following evening, the education professor Hartmut von Hentig 
elaborated on the need for “Education for Peace.”  Drawing on the UNESCO preamble, 
he began by reminding his listeners that war was a product of the “human mind” and its 
prevention was a matter of changing people’s ways of thinking.  The underlying causes 
of war were many: confusion and the inability to see the world truthfully, the human 
tendency to separate into groups of self and other, the underlying psychological drive 
toward aggression, and a loss of hope that things might ever be better.  These causes 
could only be overcome by changing people’s basic ways of thinking, starting in early 
childhood.  In order to promote peace, children needed to be trained from an early age to 
empathize with others, to viscerally reject injustice, disrespect, and indifference.  They 
also needed to be inculcated with a basic antipathy toward the use of force.  They needed 
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to learn what war was really like, overcoming their romantic illusions.  And they had to 
realize that peace was not a utopia; it might involve real sacrifices and compromises.  
Finally, children needed to be taught to accept uncertainty and doubt and to question 
authority.  They needed to be able to tolerate a certain amount of social unrest, conflict, 
and disorder, rather then blindly following their elders.72 
Adults also needed to change their ways of thinking.  In the political world, 
people had to accept the inevitability of disagreement and conflict.  Rather than working 
to suppress this conflict, they needed to take it seriously, to understand it, and finally, to 
let it go.  It was this last step that was most problematic in the Federal Republic.  “The 
Federal Republic,” Hentig argued, “is a master at not being able to let any conflict go.”  
In order to overcome this problem, West Germans would need to learn to accept their 
own guilt, without expecting or demanding forgiveness.  They also needed a basic 
political re-education.  They were still too quick to accept authoritarian ways of thinking, 
instead of embracing the ideals and institutions of democracy.  Finally, re-education was 
also necessary in the personal sphere.  People had to recognize that any change in the 
world could only begin with their own action.  They needed to learn to take personal 
responsibility for the problems of the world.  These problems were not limited to 
America, with its ongoing conflict over the Vietnam War.  German youth saw the same 
errors and the same tendencies in their own politicians, especially in their pre-occupation 
with German reunification, the Oder-Neisse border, and the non-recognition of the GDR.  
But in the end there was hope.  Not, as some argued, because of any inherent compulsion 
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to peace.  But because people could be educated to think in new ways and to act on these 
beliefs.73 
Finally, in the third evening session, Wolfhart Pannenberg spoke on “The Peace 
of God and World Peace” while Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker followed with a 
presentation of “Peace and Truth.”  Pannenberg began by admitting that the “peace of 
God” might not seem as relevant as the previous speeches on the problems of the world.  
But, he argued, in the end it was in fact bigger, more fundamental, and more 
encompassing.  World peace was only provisional, involving the prevention of war and 
the management of conflict.  God’s peace was eternal and final, the reconciliation 
between God and humanity, but also between all human beings.  It also had an important 
practical relevance, for it was a source of power “that equips the ordinary citizen for ever-
new endeavors for peace, preventing the resignation that arises in the thought that only 
earthy powers are in a position to defend it or put it at risk.”74   
Jesus death and resurrection, he continued, were both the ultimate foundation and 
the source of true world peace.  This was a peace that transcended human categories, but 
it was not something that should lead to indifference toward the human dimensions of 
peace. 
For the Christian there is, then, a “compulsion to peace” not only in the sense that 
human survival in the present age of technological progress requires us to forego 
the use of nuclear weapons and to anchor this refusal in institutions.  For the 
Christian, the commitment to peace is much more a matter of fidelity to the spirit 
of the Gospel.75 
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As the history of Christianity demonstrated, the churches had not always done a good job 
of embodying this ideal.  Too often Christians had interpreted God’s peace as an excuse 
for an otherworldly pacifism, for a rejection of their social responsibilities.  Or, on the 
other extreme, they been arrogant enough to think that they could bring about God’s 
kingdom through their own military and political might.  As was apparent in recent 
German history, they had made the mistake of thinking that the gospel did not apply to 
the state, of elevating the nation to the highest good.  This had made both the nation and 
the churches guilty before God.  Even more recently, in the early 1950s, they had been 
tempted to see the fight against atheistic communism as another form of holy war.76 
Now the churches in Germany needed to overcome this past, learning how they 
could contribute to the promotion of peace on earth.  Among other things, they could 
work at forums like the Kirchentag to create pubic awareness of the need for world peace.  
And they could contribute to its creation, not through direct political activity, but by 
offering spiritual counsel and guidance.  This influence could already be seen in the 
church’s work for a new West German Ostpolitik.  Here, the church was contributing to 
world peace by pushing Germans to overcome their political illusions and by urging them 
to reconcile with their eastern neighbors.  The church’s influence also needed to be 
brought to bear on the work of overcoming nationalism.  As Pannenberg argued: “We do 
not need a new sense of nation, as we have recently begun to hear more often; instead we 
need a consciousness of the task of our people within the framework of the European 
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community of peoples and within the framework of a humanity, where the majority of 
people, unlike ourselves, still lack the economic conditions of a humane existence.”77 
German Christians also needed to learn the painful lessons of the Vietnam War, 
namely that the neither of the world’s superpowers served the best interests of humanity.  
Instead of seeing themselves as part of any one world-political bloc, they needed to work 
on behalf of all of humanity for a new, peaceful international order.  This ambitious goal 
was a long way off, but Christians could help to bring it about by working in the present 
day for arms reductions, by giving up their own national illusions, by exposing 
psychological tendencies toward aggression, and by working to displace this aggression 
with love, respect, justice, and solidarity.  The churches could also contribute by 
developing a new anti-war theology.  This did not necessarily need to be a theology of 
pacifism, but it needed to recognize that there was no such thing as a just war.  People 
might have certain rights to self-defense, but war was still always an evil.  Ordinary 
Christians could also stand side by side with non-Christians in anti-war protests, and they 
could work with them toward the development of a more tolerant, pluralist society.78 
In the final programmatic speech on “Peace and Truth,” the physicist and public 
intellectual Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker presented his work on the nature and necessity 
of peace in the modern age.  He began by looking at the conditions for modern world 
peace.  World peace, he argued, was not an automatic result of progress.  Instead it was 
something that people had to create, not a product of technology, but of politics.  Indeed, 
technological progress was a constantly destabilizing force in the world.  If people 
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wanted peace, they would have to learn to understand and control this process.  World 
peace was also not some utopian condition.  Instead, it was the practical result of “World 
Domestic Politics” [Weltinnenpolitik], of working to provide all people in the world with 
the same social benefits available to citizens in rich western nations.  Finally, world peace 
was something that would only be possible through the development of new ethical ways 
of thinking, suited to the modern, technological age.79 
This peace was only attainable if it could be derived from underlying truths about 
the nature of reality.  Weizsäcker went on to show that this was, in fact, the case.  Peace 
was, first of all, a natural result of the application of reason to all areas of life.  In the 
realm of ethics, as Kant had already demonstrated, reason was simply a matter of seeing 
the implications of one’s own actions on the larger whole.  The categorical imperative 
was the simplest and purest expression of this reason.  If people would only follow this 
imperative, becoming mature and learning to overcome their irrational drives, then they 
would have peace.  Running parallel with the truth of reason was the truth of faith.  In the 
Sermon on the Mount, Jesus had demonstrated that morality was not just a matter of 
one’s actions, but of one’s underlying character.  But faith worked to transform the 
individual and the larger world, making peace possible.  Finally, peace was an outgrowth 
of the human orientation toward the future.  This inherent future-orientation—embodied 
in the activity of planning—was precisely the aspect of human existence that made peace 
possible.  Peace would not be the result of reason alone, nor of faith, but only of 
programmatic human activity.80 
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Finally, Weizsäcker turned to the practical steps that could lead to the realization 
of world peace.  First, he argued that peace would not come through the strict adherence 
to one model or plan.  Instead, like progress in the natural sciences, it would arise out of 
the work of multiple competing groups working according to many different models. 
These models did not even need to be compatible.  Instead, in the same way that the idea 
of complementarity in quantum theory allowed physicists to simultaneously apply wholly 
different models to the same physical phenomena, antagonistic ideologies such as 
communism and capitalism might also be seen as directed toward the same goal of peace, 
even if they operated on entirely different principles.  The world, Weizsäcker argued, was 
moving away from the competitive bipolar division of the Cold War, toward a world 
marked by polycentrism, and by cooperative bipolarity.  As problems such as the spread 
of nuclear technology and the threat of world hunger loomed larger, communists and 
capitalists had more and more reason to cooperate for the common good.  Finally, world 
peace would be the result of a new peace ethic, based not on the right to self-defense but 
on the principle of love for one’s neighbor.  The churches could help to bring this about 
by rejecting the concept of just war and calling on Christians to instead reject all recourse 
to force.81 
In the meetings of the Kirchentag political workgroup, speakers addressed the 
same set of overarching questions, looking more specifically at their implications for 
West German foreign and domestic politics.  The workgroup opened with speeches by 
Herbert Wehner, the SPD Minister for All-German Questions, and the conservative 
historian Karl-Dietrich Erdmann in a session entitled “What is our purpose as 
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Germans?”82  Wehner began this presentation by arguing that recent conflicts in Asia and 
the Middle East clearly demonstrated the willingness of both of world’s superpowers to 
wage war.  What was needed in the world, however, was people who were willing to 
wage peace.  Given their special circumstances as a nation divided between the two 
world power blocs, the Germans were in a unique position to fill this void.  But this 
would require them to genuinely commit themselves, not just to the prevention of war, 
but to the larger tasks of de-escalating conflict and fostering cooperation.  This was the 
common task of the German people on both sides of the iron curtain.  Although they were 
required to live divided into separate states, they could demonstrate their national unity 
by cooperating in the promotion of peace.  This task had four concrete components.  
First, Germans needed to work together for greater European cooperation and unity.  
Second, they needed to promote convergence [Annäherung] between the nations in the 
West and East.  Third, they needed to work together to offer humanitarian and 
development aid to the Third World.  Finally, they needed to forge common structures of 
peace and security.83 
Erdmann was even less equivocal in his assertion that peace was the task of the 
German nation.  This was not, he clarified, a special German mission or calling.  “After 
all that we have experienced . . . ,” he conceded, “any appeal to a mission or calling must 
be rejected.”  Instead, it was a matter of the German people finding their own national 
purpose and identity in their common commitment to the “universal human mission” of 
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peace.84  This task operated on three different levels: the world, Europe, and Germany 
itself.  On the first of these levels, peace was threatened by ongoing wars of 
decolonization.  These wars all had their own immediate causes, but their underlying 
causes were the same.  They resulted from rapid population growth in the developing 
world and from the shortage of food and other vital resources.  In their own ways, both 
Marxists and Capitalists recognized the need to address these problems.  And this made 
the crises of the Third World an ideal arena for East-West cooperation.  Indeed, Erdmann 
suggested that this cooperation should become the focus of the June 17 “Day of German 
Unity.”  Here, he argued: “What a day it would be for the Germans, if our self-
consciousness as a nation were to manifest itself, directly as a result of our position in the 
world, in voluntary help to heal the wounds of war, to end hunger, and to do our part to 
contribute to the softening of opposition.”85 
On the level of European politics, Germans were called to work to build trust and 
reconciliation between the East and the West.  This would require them to rethink their 
own foreign policy goals, recognizing that whatever legal rights they might have, there 
was no realistic possibility for peace as long as they maintained their claims to the 
territories across the Oder-Neisse border.  They were also called to promote the continued 
integration of Western Europe, expanding the European Community to encompass the 
United Kingdom, Scandinavia, and, eventually, even the eastern European countries.  
And they were called to work against the resurgence of nationalism, making it clear that 
the future of the nation state was only possible as part of a larger international 
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community.  Finally, inside their own borders, Germans had the task of working for 
peaceful national unity.  This unity was not based on any kind of national self-assertion, 
but on the mutual responsibility of the German people for the well being of one another.  
It was a matter of building cultural and institutional bridges between the two German 
states and of finding common tasks and goals.86 
On the second day of the Kirchentag, the political workgroup addressed the topic 
of “Peace Service with and without Weapons.”  Here, as approximately 600 anti-Vietnam 
War protestors rallied outside of the meeting, Klaus von Bismarck moderated a 
discussion between conscientious objectors and representatives of the Bundeswehr in the 
hopes of demonstrating that each of these groups was working—in its own way—for the 
promotion of world peace.87  This workgroup was also intended to serve as a model for 
the rational discussion of controversial issues, demonstrating ways that political 
opponents could sit down together and find common ground.  Bismarck argued that, 
although they disagreed about means, both of these groups shared a common goal.  Yet 
their work was ultimately complementary.  The military promoted peace by working to 
deter aggression.  But the civilian service work of conscientious objectors was just as 
important.  It was not simply a way to avoid military service, but was instead a wholly 
different form of service, engaged in the alleviation of the underlying causes of war.  In 
the discussion that followed, Brigadier General Rolf Juergens defended the need for 
military deterrence in Europe, and the importance of self-critical citizen soldiers.  But he 
also recognized the rights of German youth to serve their country without weapons.  
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Pastor Martin Schröter of Dortmund argued that the civilian alternatives to military 
service were also honorable and important.  And he called for this alternative service to 
be more directed toward underlying Third World problems such as hunger, the lack of 
economic development, population growth, illiteracy and education, and racial 
intolerance and discrimination.  As might be expected, given the protests outside, the 
question period that followed the podium discussion was dominated by anti-war 
protesters.  In their questions, these protestors decried the workgroup’s moderate tone and 
failure to adopt any resolutions, while calling on the churches to take a stronger stance 
against the legitimacy of military force.88 
Finally, the political workgroup devoted the last day of the Kirchentag to the 
question of “Investments for Peace.”  Here Wolf Häfele reprised his presentation from 
the Thematic Conference, looking at the ways in which education and technology were 
drafted into the service of war, and the ways in which they could be redirected toward the 
promotion of peace.  The United States and the Soviet Union might have considerable 
scientific might, he argued, but this was directed toward fighting the Cold War.  It was up 
to the people of Europe to show the world a different way.  “In civil-technology 
projects,” he argued, “Germany and Europe have an immediate task and an opportunity 
to protect the future and to secure peace.  And unlike the situation in America, German 
efforts can be aimed directly at finding solutions in civil-technology projects, without 
taking a detour through military armament projects.”  However, the success of these 
projects depended heavily on the reform of the German educational system and on better 
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cooperation between the state, private industry, and science.89  Gerhard Stoltenberg, the 
Federal Minister for Scientific Research, made the same arguments in the following 
speech, laying out in greater detail the specific crises of the developing world and calling 
on the developed nations of the West to dedicate their resources to finding solutions.90 
 
SOCIAL JUSTICE AND REVOLUTION 
As the political discussion of “Peace Service with and without Weapons” most 
clearly demonstrated, the 1967 Kirchentag in Hanover was marked by the rapidly 
growing divergence between the liberal (and often quite abstract) perspectives of its 
leadership and the much more radical and critical views of many younger attendees.  
Meeting just days after the 1967 Kirchentag, members of the Christian Press Academy 
brought many of these criticisms to the attention Kirchentag leadership.  The Hanover 
Kirchentag, they argued, had lacked true spontaneity and flexibility.  And it had given 
insufficient attention to the most important, pressing issues and concerns of the present 
day.  For example, given the ongoing protests outside of its meetings, the formal 
Kirchentag program had dealt surprisingly little with the war in Vietnam.  Indeed, 
Christian Press Academy members suspected that discussion topics had been chosen 
based on the potential for practical discussion and cooperation, rather than for their 
contemporary relevance.  And they argued that the Kirchentag program needed to convey 
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a greater sense of urgency in its discussions of peace, making it clear that “there is no 
time to lose.”91 
In their own post-Kirchentag assessment, the leaders of the political workgroup 
were much more equivocal.  On the one hand, group members were pleased that they had 
succeeded in providing such objective, factual information to their audience.  And they 
praised the sober, balanced tone of their discussions.  Some even went as far as to argue 
that these podium discussions had served an important pedagogical role, providing the 
audience with a model for mature political discussion.  But they also acknowledged the 
many complaints about the lack of conflict, the failure to adopt any resolutions, and the 
general unrest among the younger members of the audience.  Part of the problem here, 
they argued, was that they had tried to address far too many different topics in their 
limited time, leaving insufficient room for thorough discussion of many controversial 
issues.  Another underlying problem, though, was that, in their youthful enthusiasm, 
many audience members refused to acknowledge the complexity of political issues.  To 
address this problem, they concluded, the leadership would have to work harder to draw 
these people in, including more representatives from the younger generation and from 
more radical political perspectives on their panels.  They hoped that if audience members 
could better identify with one or more discussion participants, this would help them to 
engage with the ideas under discussion and would limit disruptive interruptions.92 
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When they met to begin their planning for the next Kirchentag, members of the 
Präsidium expressed an interest in revisiting the theme of “Peace.”  But they also hoped 
to avoid any simple repetition of their previous work.  Drawing once again on the ideas 
of Hans Jürgen Schultz, the Präsidium ultimately decided to look more closely at the 
spiritual underpinnings of social action, focusing their next gathering on “The Sermon on 
the Mount as an eminent political text.”93  As Schultz argued, this approach would allow 
the Kirchentag to overcome the growing divide between its theological and political 
discussions, bringing together the urgent need for world peace, the insights of critical 
theology, and questions of religious and political praxis.94  This approach remained 
somewhat controversial.  Hans Hermann Walz worried that it would encourage naïve 
theology and simplistic political formulations, neither of which would be rooted in proper 
understandings of the underlying material.95  And Richard von Weizsäcker, while 
accepting the basic idea, expressed concern that this topic would lend itself to superficial 
formulations with little practical application.96 
Despite these concerns, however, the Kirchentag leadership decided to go ahead 
with these plans, making the concept of “social world peace” [“soziale Weltfrieden”] the 
central emphasis for 1969.  As this new theme implied, the emphasis of the 1969 
Kirchentag would not be on peace as a whole, but on its foundation in a socially just 
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world order.  To further emphasize this perspective, the Kirchentag leadership chose 
“Hungering for Justice” as their motto for 1969.  And, in their discussions of the 
problems of the Third World, they began to shift their perspective away from the 
problems of development aid, toward the issues of social and political revolution.97 
This new, more revolutionary perspective was most apparent at the 1969 
Kirchentag in the workgroup titled “Justice in a Revolutionary World.”  This workgroup 
was sharply divided between those who continued to look at the problems of the Third 
World from the standpoint of development aid and those who advocated a more 
aggressive, revolutionary approach.  Representatives of the latter position asserted that 
development aid was simply an alibi for continued economic exploitation.  And they 
argued that the Third World did not need “peace” but “revolution.”98   
At the Kirchentag itself, the first of these approaches was represented in speeches 
by the CDU Bundestag member Walther Leisler Kiep and the German economic 
development expert Hans Ruthenberg.   Kiep argued that Germans needed to be more 
generous in their foreign aid to the developing world.  But, amid whistles and catcalls 
from the audience, he categorically rejected Marxist and revolutionary perspectives.  
Many Third World nations, he acknowledged, needed more democracy and not just a 
stronger economy.  But these goals had to be pursued in ways that respected the value of 
the individual human being.   By spreading hatred, resentment, and revolution he 
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continued, Western intellectuals only exacerbated the humanitarian crisis.99  Ruthenberg 
also called for a more coordinated policy of humanitarian and development aid, 
suggesting the Marshall plan as a useful model.  Addressing the structural economic 
hindrances to Third World development, he argued for fairer trade policies and the 
encouragement of economic diversification.  But he also argued that there were local 
hindrances to development, including inefficient and corrupt government, backward tax 
and property laws, and political shortsightedness.100   
Speaking from a more critical perspective were the Afghan economist Heider 
Dawar and the student pastor Dieter Brezger.  While Dawar acknowledged the 
considerable role of local political corruption in preventing economic development in the 
Third World, he spent the bulk of his time talking about the inequalities of the 
international trade regime.  Poverty in the Third World, he argued, was the direct result of 
the exploitative policies of colonial governments.  In order to better control their 
colonies, colonial rulers had created the corrupt class of native government officials that 
were currently exploiting their people.  And, in their economic policies, they had 
encouraged their colonies to develop narrow, undiversified economies based solely on the 
export of raw materials.  They had also used their colonies as dumping grounds for 
excess industrial production, preventing the development of any local industry.  Even 
after colonial rulers left, these problems continued to plague Third World countries, while 
trade barriers and indirect economic exploitation continued to prevent development.101   
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Finally, Brezger opened his speech with a sustained personal attack on Kiep.  
Defending protesters who had repeatedly interrupted Kiep’s presentation, he argued that 
it was Kiep and the CDU who were responsible for the present-day crises.  They had 
been in power for decades and had done little to solve the problems of the Third World.  
And, although Kiep claimed to support development aid, his actions and words in other 
forums called this into question.  Moving on to his main focus, Brezger argued that the 
problems of the Third World were the result of exploitative capitalism.  Private firms, he 
asserted, were only interested in trading with and investing in the Third World in order to 
make a profit.  Whatever investment they offered was far outweighed by their 
exploitative policies.  In the same way, the West German government might claim to 
offer humanitarian and development aid, but this was little more than propaganda.  Their 
real goal was simply to support the activities of German business interests, funneling 
money from German taxpayers into the hands of private capitalists.  The same 
exploitative relations also dominated within West Germany, where a small political and 
economic elite worked to impoverish and disenfranchise the masses.  If Germans wanted 
to help people in the Third World, he concluded, they would not export this system, but 
work to overthrow it at home.102 
Speaking the following day on “Development and Solidarity,” Erhard Eppler, the 
SPD Minister for Economic Cooperation, sought to find a middle ground between these 
perspectives.  Acknowledging that the process of Third World development was painfully 
slow, he cautioned the youth against impatience and ideological rigidity.  “Reality,” he 
argued, “does not conform itself to our formulas or ideologies.”  Neither the problems of 
Third World poverty, nor their solutions were black and white.  Some Third World 
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countries had made great progress in the last twenty years, while others had gotten worse.  
Modernization and industrialization were, themselves, highly ambivalent developments, 
leading to progress but also initiating new suffering and new crises.  Part of the blame for 
slow development in the Third World could be laid on the unfair trade practices of 
developed nations.  But developing nations were also hindered by local economic and 
political policies.  And, as could be seen on the Korean peninsula and in the two Chinas, 
both Capitalism and Marxism could offer viable models for modernization.  The solution, 
then, was not to embrace any one ideology, whether Marxist or Capitalist.  Instead, 
solving these problems would require cooperation and coordination from people of all 
political perspectives.  People needed to learn to think of the world as a whole.  And they 
needed to develop rational cooperative strategies for the betterment of humanity.103 
Finally, following Eppler, Axel von dem Bussche moderated a discussion on the 
opportunities and limits of private capital investment in the Third World.  This discussion 
quickly devolved into an argument between the panel’s business leaders and economists, 
on the one side, and the representatives of the radical youth movement, on the other, over 
the basic legitimacy of the capitalist system.104 
 
CONCLUSION 
By the late 1960s, political discussions at the Kirchentag were dominated by a 
wholly different set of topics and perspectives than at the beginning of the decade.  This 
represented a significant change in both the substance and style of Protestant political 
thought.  Political discussions in the late 1950s and early 1960s had usually consisted of 
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fact-based exploration of contentious political issues, under the careful guidance of 
academically trained subject-matter experts.  But over the course of the 1960s, the focus 
of political workgroups—and of the Kirchentag as a whole—shifted away from academic 
study toward tasks like “raising awareness,” “building consciousness,” and inspiring 
political activism.  The themes and topics that dominated political discussions at the 
Kirchentag also underwent a gradual, but significant shift.  Geo-political discussions 
since the early 1950s had focused on questions of German national identity, including 
German division and reunification, inter-German relations, and the legacies of German 
history and guilt.  But, starting in the early 1960s, these themes began to give way to a 
newer, more ecumenical and international perspective. 
To a certain extent, both of these changes had roots in the earlier history of the 
Kirchentag, and German Protestantism as a whole.  Despite their very different 
intellectual and political contexts, the activism of the late-1960s Kirchentag shared many 
similarities with the activism of the early 1950s.  In both of these eras, Protestants placed 
a strong emphasis on the direct relevance of moral and theological principles to everyday 
political life.  And they focused on the personal moral accountability of every individual 
for the problems of the world.  But, by the late 1960s, the theological and moral 
framework that guided this activism was very different in its particulars from the 
Christian Democratic ideology that had dominated early 1950s politics.  Speakers in both 
eras affirmed the importance of faith-inspired political activity.  But, drawing on the 
legacy of the more academic period in the late 1950s and early 1960s, speakers in the 
1960s drew their inspiration from a faith that was much more self-critical and much more 
actively engaged in dialogue with other beliefs, ideologies, and traditions. 
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The new, more international political perspective of the late 1960s was a more 
substantial departure from the German Protestant tradition.  But it, too, had roots in the 
earlier history of the Kirchentag.  On a theological and church-political level, this new 
perspective was clearly an outgrowth of the ecumenical interests of many of the 
Kirchentag’s founders and early supporters.  Even when their geo-political interests were 
fully absorbed with questions of German national identity, their ecumenical contacts and 
perspective helped prevent the Kirchentag leadership from entirely losing sight of the 
world outside of Germany.  This was, itself, a significant departure from the dominant 
National Protestantism of the 1920s and 1930s.  The emphasis on peace and 
reconciliation at Kirchentag meetings of the late 1960s was also clearly an outgrowth of 
the earlier Barthian theological and political tradition prevalent on the Protestant Left.  
Already at the very first Kirchentag gatherings, representatives of this tradition were 
promoting a vision of German identity based on the unique geographical and ideological 
location of the German people between the East and West.  And they were active in 
pushing German Protestants to examine their own guilt for the crimes of the Nazis, 
working for reconciliation with all of those they had wronged. 
Finally, and perhaps most decisively, the new international orientation of the 
Kirchentag meetings of the 1960s grew out of the changing perspective of moderately 
conservative and liberal Protestants as they struggled to overcome national illusions and 
face the uncomfortable geo-political realities of the world in which they lived.  By the 
middle of the 1950s, even many conservative Protestants had become dissatisfied with 
the Cold War politics of the Adenauer government, without necessarily seeing the 
positions of the Protestant Left as a viable alternative.  In the decade between 1955 and 
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1965, in a variety of forums including but not limited to the Kirchentag, these Protestants 
worked to find a new approach to the German question that recognized the need for 
coexistence and détente, but was still rooted in political realism.  These attempts can be 
seen in the political discussions of the 1958 Kirchentag Congress, in the 1961 Tübingen 
Memorandum, Egon Bahr’s well known 1963 speech at the Protestant Academy in 
Tutzing, and the work of the 1965 Ostdenkschrift of the Protestant Church in Germany 
(EKD).  While the ideas that grew out of this work did not enjoy anything approaching 
full consensus in the churches, they did provide a solid foundation for positive political 
cooperation between Barthian-influenced members of the Protestant Left and disgruntled 
conservatives and liberals.   
At first this work remained solidly focused on Germany.  But, as it became clearer 
that the German question would not be solved in isolation from the rest of the world, it 
became necessary to adopt a more international perspective.  This can be seen in the 
planning meetings for the 1965 Kirchentag, where the topics of ecumenical and 
international relations grew directly out of inter-German concerns.  For some, this seems 
to have been a smokescreen, a way of legitimizing an ongoing pre-occupation with 
German division by providing German issues with a superficial sheen of internationalism.  
For others, it was based on the recognition that the German problem really was 
irresolvable without the creation of better relations between the superpowers.  This could 
only be accomplished through the resolution of conflicts all around the world, and 
particularly in developing nations.  Finally, for some, it involved a revival of the earlier 
Barthian notions that inter-German relations were a microcosm of the larger Cold War 
and that inter-German cooperation could serve as a model for world peace.  From this 
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standpoint, Third World development was one of the most obvious theaters for practical 
cooperation between the Marxist and Capitalist worlds.  And this cooperation would 
serve to rebuild trust and changing political attitudes on both sides of the iron curtain, 
making the ultimate realization of world peace much more likely.   
These ideas led directly to the “peace” theme of the 1967 Kirchentag, which was 
only possible because of the newfound opportunities for consensus and dialogue between 
the erstwhile representatives of the Protestant Left and Right.  Yet this new consensus 
quickly came under attack.  Some members of the younger generation accepted its major 
points, but pushed for more radical formulations and a more aggressive style.  At the 
same time, others questioned its most basic foundational concepts, including the very 
desirability of peace in light of Marxist notions of revolutionary justice.  Protestants at 
the Kirchentag had spent two decades forging a broad liberal consensus while 
simultaneously promoting the values of dialogue and pluralism.  The fact that these 
values were now under attack not from the Right but from the Left is a testament to how 
successful they had been in these endeavors.  But it also demonstrated the need for their 
work to continue.  For the Kirchentag, the new challenge would be to find ways to draw 
the younger generation into dialogue, without endangering the foundations upon which 
this dialogue was based.  

 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 10  
 
DIALOGUE AND DEMOCRACY 
 
 
In May 1964 the Kirchentag Präsidium accepted the long-planned retirement of 
Reinold von Thadden-Trieglaff from the position of Kirchentag President, electing 
Richard von Weizsäcker as his successor.  As he handed over control of the organization 
that he had created and led for the past fifteen years, Thadden reflected on its past and 
future.  He had founded the Kirchentag, he explained, as an expression of a new vitality 
in German Protestantism that emerged out of the experiences of the Nazi dictatorship and 
the Second World War.  It had served the desire of postwar Protestants to affirm their 
faith and their social responsibility in the midst of a rapidly changing world.  Now, as the 
founding generation faded away, the responsibility for the Kirchentag’s future course lay 
in the hands of a new generation of Protestants who—thankfully—had not shared in the 
experiences that had shaped their elders.  The world had changed dramatically since 
1949.  And the new Kirchentag leadership had the responsibility to guide its course into 
uncharted waters.  Many tasks remained the same: to assemble the Protestant laity in 
Germany and to equip them for service in the church and in the world.  But, in order to 
effectively carry out these tasks, the Kirchentag needed to look forward to the future, 
“freeing itself, to a certain extent, from its past operating procedures,” experimenting 
with “as-yet untested solutions,” and seeking to carry out its task in ways better suited to 
present-day realities.  “This step from yesterday into an unknown Kirchentag future,” he 
continued, “will be no less risky than the steps that I had to take in 1949/50.”1 
By the time that Weizsäcker officially assumed his new duties, with the close of 
the 1965 Kirchentag in Cologne, this process was already well underway.  After several 
years of intense scrutiny and criticism, the Cologne Kirchentag, with its emphasis on 
Christian responsibility in the unsettling modern world, made quite a favorable 
impression on observers.  As Carola Wolf reported in her analysis of the press 
commentary, this Kirchentag had been especially well received by the generation of 
Protestants in their thirties, who had appreciated its sober, objective engagement with 
controversial political and social issues.  And, as the Protestant publicist Eberhard 
Stammler commented, the Kirchentag had presented “an image of mature [mündig] 
people who took their maturity [Mündigkeit] seriously.”  In the same vein, Heinz Zahrnt 
proclaimed that the Kirchentag had “demonstrated that our congregations are more 
mature than many of their shepherds want to believe.”2 
By 1965, as these comments demonstrated, the Kirchentag was firmly in the 
hands of a younger generation of leaders and participants—many in their thirties and 
forties—who were committed to liberalizing the churches and the rest of German 
society.3  They contrasted their own sobriety and maturity with the emotional political 
                                                 
1 RvTT, “Ansprache von President D. Dr. von Thadden-Trieglaff,” Attachment 1 to the Report on 
the Präsidium Meeting of 13 May 1964, EZA 71/86/29. 
 
2 Carola Wolf, “Der Kölner Kirchentag ist noch im Gespräch.  Auszüge aus Kommentaren und 
Versuch einer Presseanalyse,” Attachment 1 to the Report on the Präsidium Meeting of 17-18 November 
1965, EZA 71/96/159, 4-6. 
 
3 As seen, for example, in the concerns of the Council of the EKD that the Kirchentag was 
becoming less overtly religious and more theologically and socially liberal.  The council also complained 
that the Kirchentag was too intellectually close to RADIUS, the journal of the Evangelische 
Akademikerschaft in Deutchland, which reflected the critical views of young-to-middle-aged professors 
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and religious style of their elders, priding themselves on their open-mindedness on issues 
such as German division and their willingness to engage in dialogue across social, 
political, and ideological boundaries.  This shift can be seen clearly in the “provocative” 
program of the 1967 Kirchentag, with its emphasis on peace.  And it is equally apparent 
in the negative reaction of the nascent fundamentalist movement in Germany, the 
emergence of which was, in part, a direct response to the more liberal direction of the 
Kirchentag.4  Ironically, however, this new generation of younger Kirchentag leaders 
hardly had time to consolidate their position before coming under attack from an even 
younger, more radical, and less patient generation, frustrated by the slow pace of change 
in West German society. 
In the midst of the “youth revolt,” that erupted in the summer of 1967 with riots in 
Berlin and that lasted until the elections in the fall of 1969, the new Kirchentag leadership 
found their commitment to liberal democratic principles such as dialogue and tolerance 
severely tested.  While they rejected the violent methods and the ideological rigidity of 
certain elements in the student movement, the new generation of Kirchentag leadership 
sympathized with the students’ frustrations.  And—though the students would have 
doubtless disputed this—they considered themselves to be part of the same broad 
movement to reform the outmoded structures and cultural values of West German 
society.  Taken by surprise by the radicalism of the youth at the 1967 Kirchentag in 
Hanover—a radicalism that made their own intentionally “provocative” program seem 
                                                                                                                                                 
such as Georg Picht.  Adolf Wischmann to Richard von Weizsäcker (on behalf of the Council of the EKD), 
18 August 1965, EZA 71/96/159. 
 
4 “Abschrift Bekenntnisbewegung ‘Kein anderes Evangelium’ an das Präsidium des DEKTs und 
an die Kirchenleitung der Ev. Luth. Landeskirche Hannovers, Betr. Grundentscheidung zum Kirchentag 
1967 in Hannover,” 29 April 1966, EZA 71/86/29; see also Hartmut Stratmann, Kein anderes Evangelium.  
Geist und Geschichte der neuen Bekenntnisbewegung  (Hamburg: Fürche Verlag, 1970). 
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tame—Kirchentag leaders were determined not to repeat this mistake in 1969.  Instead, 
they welcomed the youth to the next Kirchentag in Stuttgart, giving them an 
unprecedented role in the planning process.  Following the lead of the new president, 
Richard von Weizsäcker, they worked to make the Stuttgart Kirchentag an experiment in 
open communication and direct democracy. 
It is hard to exaggerate the degree to which Stuttgart represented a major change 
in the content and, especially, the style of the Kirchentag.  As recently as early 1967, 
fearing the reactions of conservative Protestants, the Präsidium had severely limited the 
plans of the Youth Committee to hold evening dance and “Beat-Music” performances.5  
A year later they were making plans to accommodate sit-ins and protest marches, and 
inviting avowed Marxists and leaders of the SDS [Sozialistischer Deutscher 
Studentenbund] to participate in their panel discussions.  Through their own tolerance and 
willingness to engage in dialogue, the Kirchentag leaders hoped to set a good example for 
the German youth, channeling their boundless energy into more productive political 
activity.  In these efforts, they tested the limits of their own political liberalism and their 
own commitment to a more democratic society.  Could the political and social values that 
German Protestants had developed since the end of the Second World War survive what 
many saw as the greatest political crisis since the 1930s? 
 
FIRST RUMBLINGS 
To the leaders of the Kirchentag, the selection of “Peace” as the overarching 
theme for 1967 had involved a great deal of risk.  While previous Kirchentag topics had 
been firmly rooted in scripture and in well-established theological precedent, peace 
                                                 
5 Hans Hermann Walz, Report on the Präsidium Meeting of 24 February 1967, EZA 71/86/29, 7. 
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theology was a new and undeveloped field.6  It involved new ways of thinking and 
opened the door to new political ideas, the practical implications of which had yet to be 
tested.  To older Kirchentag attendees, it was radical enough when several speakers in the 
political workgroup called for Polish-German reconciliation and the West German 
recognition of the Oder-Neisse boundary.  When the Berlin Pastor Erich Müller-Gangloff 
used the workgroup’s round table discussion to call for formal recognition of the GDR, 
even more progressive politicians—such as Conrad Ahlers—responded with near-
disbelief.7  The shock of more conservative attendees was compounded when the news of 
these comments reached the crowd of several hundred students, protesting the Vietnam 
War outside of the hall, who promptly added “Peace with the GDR” to their collection of 
slogans.8 
As radical as some aspects of the 1967 Kirchentag were, however, they reflected 
the style and priorities of liberal, middle aged Protestants, not the rebellious youth.  
Young people in their teens and twenties made up significant portions of the Kirchentag 
audience, but rarely appeared on the podium.  And, since the Kirchentag program had 
been planned out well in advance, the recent explosion in student uprisings and 
demonstrations had no formal place on the agenda.  Still, in political workgroup 
discussions only weeks after the student protestor Benno Ohnesorg had been killed by the 
Berlin police during protests against the Shah of Iran, some treatment of the “youth 
revolt” was inevitable.  Indeed, it was hardly surprising that the left-wing pastor Erich 
                                                 
6 See Friedelbert Lorenz’s report on the discussion between the Kirchentag and the Evangelischer 
Studiengemeinschaft on 10-11 December 1965, 11 December 1965, EZA 71/96/730; also see Lorenz’s 
Report on the Präsidium Meeting on 18-19 March 1966, 20 April 1966, EZA 71/86/29 and its attachments. 
 
7 DEKT 1967, 145-147. 
 
8 Hans Horn, “Bericht über den evangelischen Kirchentag” undated, EZA 71/96/117. 
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Müller-Gangloff took advantage of the workgroup’s podium discussion to rally to the 
defense of the Berlin students, accusing the press of misrepresenting their actions.  What 
was surprising was the degree of unanimity between the panel members on this point.  
Discussing the underlying causes of this student radicalism, the SPD Minister Herbert 
Wehner criticized the lack of openness and transparency in German politics and the 
growing power of private interest groups.  And he defended student demonstrations, 
while arguing that some of their actions crossed the line into illegitimate provocation.  
Günther Berndt, a youth pastor from Wolfenbüttel in Lower Saxony, conceded that the 
students ought to be more engaged in the existing political parties, rather than taking their 
complaints to the streets.  But, he argued, the more pressing problem was the failure of 
the rest of German society to take the students’ complaints seriously.  Even the more 
conservative members of the panel, such as Karl-Dietrich Erdmann and Philipp von 
Bismarck came to the students’ defense.  On the broadest level, Erdmann blamed the 
demonstrations in Berlin, and the death of Benno Ohnesorg, on the pervasive breakdown 
of communication in German society.  But, on a more immediate level, he faulted the 
Berlin police for using student demonstrations as a justification for violence.  Relating his 
own recent experiences at a demonstration on Berlin’s Kurfürstendamm, Philipp von 
Bismarck, too, reported that the students had been non-violent until provoked by the 
police.9 
However, this sympathy did not translate into any real engagement with the 
youth.  Despite occasional references, speakers and panel members rarely addressed 
important youth issues such as the Vietnam War, the “danger” posed to democracy by the 
Grand Coalition, and the need for greater student involvement in the governance of the 
                                                 
9 DEKT 1967, 140-162. 
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universities.  When topics such as Germany’s educational crisis did arise, their focus 
remained firmly centered on issues like curriculum reform that were important to 
progressive members of the professorate, not on issues of administrative transparency or 
democratic governance that were important to the students.10  Other panels such as 
“Peace Service with and without Weapons” were far too balanced and consensus-oriented 
to engage students.  This panel was intended to provoke both sides of the political 
spectrum, arguing that military service was honorable, while also defending the rights of 
conscientious objectors.  And it was intended as a model for civil discourse between 
people of opposing viewpoints.  To its critics, however, it was a bland and inoffensive 
venture that avoided any issues of real controversy.11 
In their assessments of the Hanover Kirchentag, conservative critics complained 
that the organization was now wholly dominated by the Left.12  Indeed, several more 
conservative groups in the churches, such as the fundamentalist Bekenntnis Bewegung 
“Kein anderes Evangelium” urged their members to boycott the gathering entirely.13  But 
many other critics in the Center and on the Left, argued that the Kirchentag leadership 
needed to do more to integrate student perspectives.  Meeting shortly after the 1967 
gathering, the Christian Press Academy complained that the Kirchentag had tried too 
hard to avoid controversy.  Because the program had barely addressed issues such as 
Vietnam, and had provided insufficient opportunities for the students to speak from the 
                                                 
10 See, for example, Wolf Häfele’s speech on “Investionen für den Frieden,” DEKT 1967, 216-
237. 
 
11 See DEKT 1967, 169-215 and Friedelbert Lorenz, Bericht über die Auswertungssitzung der 
Gruppenleitung Politik , 19 July 1967, EZA 71/96/730, 2-3. 
 
12 See Hans Horn, “Bericht über den evangelischen Kirchentag” undated, EZA 71/96/117. 
 
13 See Hartmut Stratmann, Kein anderes Evangelium.  Geist und Geschichte der neuen 
Bekenntnisbewegung  (Hamburg: Fürche Verlag, 1970). 
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podium, the youth had had no choice but to take their protests to the streets.  Offering 
advice for the next Kirchentag, they suggested: “One needs to consider what there is to 
offer a young person, like those in Berlin, who stand against the establishment as a whole 
and advocate for ‘a new understanding of the world.’  The Kirchentag must create a 
platform where the youth can formulate their ideas.”14  
In their own assessments, Kirchentag leaders agreed with the main lines of this 
critique.  While they continued to hope that relations with more conservative and 
fundamentalist Protestants could be restored, they also saw the inclusion of the youth as 
an urgent task.15  In their post-Kirchentag assessment, members of the political 
workgroup defended their objective, factual approach, even arguing that they had 
provided their audience with a model for effective political communication.  But they 
also devoted considerable discussion to “the problem of the ‘young generation.’”  As the 
workgroup concluded: 
The aggressiveness of the young generation is an opportunity for the church and 
for democracy.  This is a first-order task for the Kirchentag.  But the opportunities 
of the Kirchentag with regard to the younger generation are temporally limited.  If 
they get the impression that they will be manipulated, they will react negatively.  
If we represent the establishment, then, from the outset, this will severely limit the 
interest of the youth in the Kirchentag.  It would be best, then, through 
confrontation with reality, to run the “risk of uncertainty.”16 
 
                                                 
14 “Protokoll der Mänoverkritik über den Kirchentag anläßlich des CPA-Treffens in Hildesheim 
am 26.6.1967,” EZA 71/96/117, 3-5. 
 
15 For more on the ongoing negotiations between the Kirchentag Präsidium and the German 
fundamentalist movement, see Hans Hermann Walz, Report on the Präsidium Meeting of 22 March 1968, 
30 April 1968, EZA 71/96/159, 8-9; Walz, Report on the Präsidium Meeting of 6 September 1968, 27 
September 1968, EZA 71/96/159, 6-9; Friedelbert Lorenz, Memo: Discussion with the “Notgemeinschaft 
Evangelischer Deutscher” on 14 November 1968, 21 November 1968, EZA 71/96/910; Hartig and Bäumer 
to Richard von Weizsäcker, 28 October 1968, EZA 71/96/159; and Richard von Weizsäcker to Rudolf 
Bäumer, 11 December 1968, EZA 71/96/159. 
 
16 Friedelbert Lorenz, “Bericht über die Auswertungssitzung der Gruppenleitung Politik ,” 19 July 
1967, EZA 71/96/730, 6. 
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At the next meeting of the Kirchentag Präsidium, Reinold von Thadden-Trieglaff 
praised Hanover as a model of balance that “offered the younger Generation an 
impression of what Christian faith can be today,” but did so in a way that was acceptable 
to the sensibilities of the older generation.17  And Richard von Weizsäcker and Hans 
Hermann Walz defended the Kirchentag as an important and progressive forum for 
political dialogue.  But they too acknowledged the frustration of the youth and the 
pressing need to address their concerns.  As Walz noted in his meeting report, the 
members of the Präsidium appreciated the involvement of the young generation in the 
Kirchentag, but, beyond the categorical rejection of the status quo, they weren’t exactly 
sure what the students stood for.  “In connection with this,” Walz continued, “the 
observation was made that, only with the Hanover Kirchentag had many even realized 
that this was not just a matter of unrest caused by a few student rioters, but was instead a 
society-wide phenomenon.”18   
While this new form of youth activity represented a challenge, Kirchentag leaders 
were largely optimistic about its implications.  As Walz reported: “This discomfort with 
West German society, considerably strengthened by the creation of the Grand Coalition, 
has asserted itself in the young generation in a spirit beyond the ‘without me’ slogan for 
the first time in post-war history.”  The very fact that the youth were channeling their 
frustrations into political activity rather than resignation, seemed to be a positive sign.  
Kirchentag leaders went on to acknowledge that the “extra-parliamentary opposition” of 
                                                 
17 While Thadden was sympathetic to many of the Bekenntnisbewegung’s theological concerns, he 
dismissed their boycott of the 1967 Kirchentag as a form of political self-justification, not truly based on 
theological difference; see the Report on the Präsidium Meeting of 15-16 September 1967, EZA 71/96/159. 
 
18 Hans Hermann Walz, Report on the Präsidium Meeting of 15-16 September 1967, EZA 
71/96/159, 3-9. 
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the youth had its basis in legitimate “weaknesses in classical democratic ideology.”   The 
youth revolt was an understandable, if misguided, outgrowth of the dominance asserted 
by “technological and technocratic structures” over all aspects of modern life.  
Concluding their discussion of the generation problem, Kirchentag leaders agreed “that it 
would be good for the Kirchentag to take this into consideration in its future planning.”19 
While the Kirchentag leadership acknowledged the legitimacy of many of the 
younger generation’s complaints and remained upbeat about the effects of their activity, 
this optimism was ultimately based in their hope that the youth could be “tamed” and 
brought into dialogue with their opponents.  In a post-Hanover report on the social and 
political role of the Kirchentag, Walz made this clear, arguing that the Kirchentag was 
firmly rooted in the “pluralist-dialogical structure” of modern society.  It had the task of 
bringing together representatives from every side of the political spectrum, holding all of 
these groups to the standards of “rational” argumentation that made society possible.  
“This kind of dialogue,” he continued, “is the way to experience truth and to come to 
terms with reality.”  In a functioning democracy, it was important for political and social 
responsibility to grow from the ground up, not to be the privileged sphere of any existing 
elite.  But direct democracy in the purest sense, was also not realistic.  The next 
Kirchentag needed to examine “questions of democratization in the church and in 
society” and “the responsibility of all types of ‘extra-parliamentary opposition.’”  But it 
also had to look at “the responsibility of the establishment that will always and must 
always exist.”  Walz hoped that, in its structure and practice, the next Kirchentag would 
embody a form of spontaneous, but also civil and rational discussion.  This could begin 
with the selection of speakers who represented opposite sides of important political 
                                                 
19 Ibid. 
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issues.  However, in the discussion that followed these presentations, Walz expected that 
new political alliances would spontaneously emerge, electing their own representatives, 
who would then have the opportunity to speak from the podium.20 
Richard von Weizsäcker expressed similar hopes for the Stuttgart Kirchentag, 
although he exhibited a bit more skepticism.  “The theme youth,” he cautioned in his 
official report to the Präsidialversammlung, “requires a great deal of care and patience.  
The youth themselves don’t need to have patience; they have recently had partial success 
in also causing their elders to lose patience.”  But he went on to acknowledged the need 
to address the criticisms of groups like the “Protestant Youth in Germany” who argued 
that Hanover had been too abstract and had worked too hard to maintain political balance 
and neutrality.  He also responded to the criticism that the Kirchentag had been marked 
by the conspicuous “absence” of “the GDR, the youth, Marxism, and the Third World.”  
The youth, he argued, had clearly been present in large numbers, but they had felt that 
they were not taken seriously enough by the Kirchentag organization.  To address this, he 
argued: “We need to struggle for an openness that does not just allow their activity (silent 
protests, leaflet distributions, street discussions, etc.) outside, but brings it inside.”  But 
he took issue with complaints that topics like “relations with the GDR” had not been 
openly discussed.  In fact, he asserted, they had been discussed quite candidly, but critics 
were upset because their own views had not dominated the discussion.  The next 
Kirchentag in Stuttgart, he concluded, would not be any easier to run than the Kirchentag 
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in Hanover had been, but he hoped it would provide an opportunity to follow up on the 
Hanover themes and to correct those things that had gone badly.21 
As they began preparations for 1969, the Kirchentag leadership worked hard to 
address these concerns.  Although they saw the Stuttgart Kirchentag, with its overarching 
theme of “hungering for justice,” as a direct follow-up to the “peace” work of the 
previous gathering, Kirchentag planners went out of their way to more fully “open” the 
program to the concerns of youth.  Some topics like Third World poverty and the 
relevance of faith in modern society, which were intended to build directly on the work of 
Hanover, were reformulated to make room for more radical, Marxist perspectives.22  And 
a number of new themes—such as democratization and the psychology of aggression—
grew directly out of the experiences of the youth revolt.  Finally, in their plans for 
Stuttgart, the Kirchentag planned for an unprecedented degree of spontaneous activity 
and direct democracy.  While their rules had previously prohibited the distribution of 
pamphlets and other literature on the Kirchentag grounds, the Präsidium agreed to allow 
this activity in Stuttgart as long as it didn’t disturb the public order.  They also made 
provisions to permit Kirchentag attendees to submit their own resolutions to any 
workgroup, to be accepted or defeated in a direct public vote.  Finally, in sharp contrast 
to the rigid control that they had previously exercised over the direction of Kirchentag 
discussions, the leadership agreed to give the audience full sovereignty over the direction 
and course of each workgroup.  While Präsidium members and workgroup chairs were 
given the task of ensuring that democratic procedures were followed, they were also 
instructed to defer completely to the will of the audience, no matter how much this might 
                                                 
21 Report on the Präsidialversammlung Meeting on 23 March 1968, EZA 71/96/281, 5-6. 
 
22 Ibid., 9-10; DEKT 1969. 
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disrupt their plans.  They were also instructed to respond to provocations with rational 
arguments and to avoid involving the police unless the life or health of audience members 
was endangered.23 
 
DEMOCRACY IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 
The new workgroup on “Democracy” that premiered in 1969 provides one of the 
best examples of the attempts of the Kirchentag leadership to address the concerns of the 
younger generation.  In the earliest formulations of this topic, drafted shortly after 
Hanover, Kirchentag leaders had approached democracy as one important element in the 
promotion of peace, alongside “World Domestic Politics,” the Cold War, and the 
“German Question.”  Peace, after all, did not just apply to relations between nations, it 
also applied to domestic turmoil, including the ongoing student demonstrations that were 
disrupting German society.  As the physicist Günther Howe, a frequent contributor to the 
political workgroup, argued: “We Germans still have to fill a major democratic backlog; 
this theme is an indispensable condition for peace work.”24   
This topic began to grow as Kirchentag leaders considered the many concrete 
areas to which the “democracy” problem applied.  In one ambitious early draft, 
Friedelbert Lorenz hoped to explore four very broad sub-topics as part of this discussion.  
First, the “Democracy” group would address the structural barriers to further West 
German democratization.  This meant looking at the “impenetrable” social and political 
structures of the Federal Republic, the “discomfort” of the youth with this system, the 
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 413
role of parliamentary and extra-parliamentary opposition, and the more theoretical 
question “What is genuine democratization?”  Second, the group would look at 
democratization in higher education.  Third, it would address the ongoing topic of 
“democracy in the work world.”  Finally, under the rubric of “Ideological Critique as 
Peace Work,” it would examine the errors of the nationalism of the far-right NPD and 
fundamentalist Protestant groups, on the one hand, and the “Maoism” of the SDS, on the 
other.25  In another early suggestion, Heinz Zahrnt focused on the tensions between 
“technocracy” and democracy, looking at the alienation of the individual citizen in the 
face of an ever-more specialized society.  And, alongside several other political and 
social topics, Hans Dieter Bastian proposed that the Kirchentag examine the “rebellion of 
the youth,” the problem of “restoration” in postwar society, and the problem of “conflict 
tolerance.”  Lorenz also reported some interest in the role of authority in a democratic 
system.  And in a somewhat less academic vein, Richard von Weizsäcker suggested a 
more concrete, forward-looking focus on the challenges of ongoing democratization in 
Germany.26   
These ideas were not without controversy.  Several members of the Präsidium—
hoping to engage the younger generation in dialogue—wanted any discussion of 
democracy to focus on the present-day crisis and the concerns and fears of the youth.  But 
others opposed this contemporary focus, with its inherent controversy, preferring a more 
abstract and theoretical discussion of democratic principles.  In their evaluation of 
Bastian’s proposals, for example, several Präsidium members urged the workgroup to 
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avoid such direct discussion of the contemporary youth revolt, focusing instead on its 
theoretical goals and underlying causes, which were shared by many liberals.27  And in 
another, later planning session, the Präsidium member Wolf Häfele urged a continued 
focus on peace issues and on broad concepts such as “responsibility, power, authority, 
and justice,” rather than a narrow focus on democracy.  But other members of the 
Kirchentag leadership criticized this approach as too abstract and out of touch with 
current events.  As Rudolf von Thadden argued, the emphasis of these plans on the 
generic issue of political power was “suited to the state of the discussion in 1961, not 
1968/69.”  At the very least, he argued, the democracy workgroup needed to address the 
differences between representative democracy and the more direct, plebiscitary 
approaches advocated by many student radicals.  And the constitutional court judge Ernst 
Gottfried Mahrenholz defended the importance of looking at democracy itself, arguing 
for a broader understanding of the word. “The problem of democracy is a social 
problem,” he argued, “a matter of process, not a matter of a fixed, static legal structure.  
The problem of democratization is present in many different areas of society, in different 
variations.  So, we need to talk about democracy, not some other vocabulary.”28 
This conflict was partially resolved by the decision to divide the Kirchentag’s 
political topics between two separate workgroups, one devoted specifically to democracy, 
while the other looked more broadly at “revolution,” peace, and justice in the world.  In 
contrast to the doubts of some Präsidium members, the leaders of the democracy 
workgroup were in broad agreement about the need to begin from the standpoint of the 
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28 Friedelbert Lorenz, “Notizen zum ‘Demokratie,’” 6 September 1968, EZA 71/96/788. 
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present-day generational crisis.  Klaus Reblin of the Protestant Academy in Bad Boll, for 
example, urged the workgroup to focus its efforts on student concerns about the 
deficiencies of parliamentary democracy and the problems inherent in the Grand 
Coalition.  “If the topic ‘Grand Coalition’ is not addressed,” he contended, “we will have 
to deal with the sit-ins and go-ins of the young generation.”  The publicist Eberhard 
Stammler agreed, arguing that the best starting point was “the fact of extra-parliamentary 
opposition.”  And Herbert Rösener, a youth pastor from Bethel, went even further, calling 
from the workgroup to practice the democracy it preached, inviting the direct 
participation of the radical students. 29   
The question, then, was how to move from contemporary events to underlying 
political issues.  Here Stammler argued that the very existence of the extra-parliamentary 
opposition raised fundamental questions about West Germany’s parliamentary 
democracy.  He proceeded to pose several of these underlying questions.  “How do things 
stand,” he asked, “with our democratic habitus?  Have we already arrived or are there too 
many authoritarian structures?”  Had democracy “perhaps promised more than it can 
deliver?”  Did Germany’s liberal democratic parliamentary system suite the needs of the 
modern “technical world?”  Or were there other, better ways—perhaps the democratic 
“council” system of the student movement—for enabling citizens to exercise their 
democratic responsibility?  The group, he insisted, also needed to deal with the 
“conformist mentality” in German political life, which was out of touch with liberal ideas 
about the positive functions of social conflict.  And they needed to address concerns 
about the new “majority” election law that would severely limit the influence of the 
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minor parties.  Was it better, Stammler asked with regard to these plans, to have a 
smoothly functioning system, or to offer citizens as many choices as possible?  Finally, 
he argued that the workgroup should address the urgent need for democratization in the 
church itself.30 
In response to these suggestions, Johannes Rau, the leader of the SPD faction in 
the North Rhine-Westphalian Landtag, warned against diluting the program with too 
many different, broadly-formulated questions.  Instead of looking primarily at the 
concerns of the younger generation or at democratic theory, Rau advocated a focus on the 
concrete political issues that divided the parties in the upcoming Bundestag elections. 
These issues included the new “majority” election law, the benefits and problems of 
expanding democratic “co-determination” into all areas of society, and the inherent 
tensions between private capitalism and the new “World Domestic Politics.”  On a more 
theoretical level, Friedelbert Lorenz suggested that the workgroup should address the 
general question of “authority.”  And, looking at the contemporary political crisis, Reblin 
suggested the question of “tolerance and intolerance in a democratic society.”31 
Another important issue, raised by Rösener, was the question of provocation?  
Did the group really want to get into heated discussions about the basic nature of 
democracy, or was it better and safer to work more modestly on the elimination of the 
worst abuses?  All of the workgroup members rejected radical revolutionary approaches 
in favor of evolutionary reforms, but they disagreed about the extent to which the 
workgroup should include more radical perspectives.  Johannes Rau defended the 
existing political system, while blaming its flaws on the corruption of profit-seeking 
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interest groups.  But he reserved his sharpest criticisms for the self-serving language of 
the student Left.  These groups, he argued, praised “spontaneous” action, while accusing 
their opponents of political “manipulation.”  But weren’t they the ones engaged in 
manipulation?  “Everything that doesn’t fit with the trend to the Left,” he argued, “is 
called manipulation; everything that fits is consciousness-raising.  Where is the line?  
Who sets the norms?”  Continuing his defense of the parliamentary democracy against 
those who longed for a Marxist system, he added: “At least, it seems to belong to the 
nature of parliamentary democracies to avoid bypassing norms such as human dignity.”  
And he defended the importance of planning and delegation in democracy.  On many 
social and political issues, he argued, the public lacked the necessary information to make 
good decisions.  Existing decision-making hierarchies did not need to be eliminated, but 
they needed to become more flexible and more democratic in order to regain the people’s 
trust.32   
Addressing the same basic question, Stammler contended that the root of the 
problem lay in the misconception that democracy was merely a “value-free” mechanism 
of social regulation.  In fact, he countered, democracy was always tied up with other 
cultural values.  When these values changed, the democratic system needed to change as 
well.  For nineteenth century liberals, democracy had been closely tied to the idea of the 
nation.  The painful experiences of the German “catastrophe” had discredited this set of 
values, but now they needed to be replaced.   Perhaps, he suggested, their place could be 
filled by a new set of community values rooted in “socialist democracy,” where the good 
of society was valued more than the autonomy of the individual.  Here Stammler agreed 
with Rau that private capital posed certain threats to democracy, but he weighed this 
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against the importance of enabling individuals and groups to initiate political change.  
The present danger to democracy was not rooted in the empowerment of individuals and 
groups, but in the way that some of these groups—such as the powerful, right-wing 
Springer Press—abused their political rights.  “Our democracy,” he argued, “provides no 
means of defense against the discrediting of democracy that occurs there.”33 
Temporarily leaving aside these theoretical concerns, the workgroup next turned 
to the task of formulating a practical program.  After long deliberation, they agreed on 
three basic elements that their program would have to include.  First, the workgroup 
would need to address the concrete doubts that the youth were expressing about the West 
German democracy.  Second, it needed to go into more theoretical detail about the nature 
and function of democratic systems.  And, third, it needed to look at the concrete question 
of future developments.  How could Germany overcome the present-day crisis, creating a 
more democratic society?34   
Despite their agreement on this overarching framework, however, the workgroup 
ended its first meeting with as many questions as answers.  Within this broad framework, 
what narrower topics should they address?  And how should they order these topics?  
Was is better to begin with controversy, immediately drawing in the youth, but risking an 
immediate breakdown in communication?  Or was it better to begin with theory, setting a 
moderate and dialogical tone for the rest of the gathering?  Another practical problem 
concerned the concrete difficulties of actually running such a contentious workgroup.  
Should the workgroup make room for total spontaneity, running the risk that a small 
group of students might shut down the entire meeting?  Or should it have a more ordered 
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structure, where the focus remained on the podium, rather than the audience?  And, if the 
workgroup leaders chose spontaneity, how could they ensure that conservative and liberal 
audience members were not drowned out by more aggressive and radical voices?35  
Over the next several months, concrete plans for the workgroup program began to 
take shape.  Deciding to minimize their direct discussion of the specific complaints, fears, 
and worries of the youth, the workgroup leaders proposed instead that the first day should 
be devoted to the need for democratization of West German society and culture on the 
broadest level.  One focus here would be on the tensions between human values and 
values of the technocratic, “bureaucratic world” of the Federal Republic.  The other 
major point of emphasis would be on the persistence of illiberal and undemocratic values 
in broad segments of the West German population.  On the second day the workgroup 
would explore the tensions between authority and direct democracy in politics.  And the 
workgroup’s final day would focus broadly on the importance of democratic 
participation.36 
As for the difficult question of spontaneity versus order, this was taken out of 
their hands when the Präsidium decided to allow for direct democracy in all of the 
Kirchentag workgroups.  But this decision created a new set of difficulties for the 
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workgroup leaders, forcing them to contend with the independent work of various 
unofficial Kirchentag committees that had formed in the Protestant Student 
Congregations.  These committees of students formulated their own plans for the 
Kirchentag.  Since the coordinated action of these groups could shut down the entire 
gathering, they retained an effective veto power over the program.  Ultimately, this led to 
only one major change in workgroup’s plans.  After receiving veiled threats of disruption 
from their contacts in the Student Congregations, the workgroup leadership agreed to 
begin the first day’s program with a critical psychoanalytic assessment of modern 
German politics.  Since Alexander Mitscherlich, their first choice for this task, was 
already speaking in a another workgroup on the roots of aggression, the social 
psychologist Klaus Horn of the Sigmund Freud Institute in Frankfurt was selected to fill 
this role.37  Yet the influence that the student movement exercised over the workgroup 
went far beyond this minor change in plans.  Having spent months preparing resolutions 
and learning the complexities of the new procedural rules, the students were ready to 
fully dominate the course of the Kirchentag itself.  When the workgroup actually met at 
the Stuttgart Kirchentag, the challenges it faced would be less theoretical and academic, 
and more practical.  Rather than laying out their ideas before a passive audience, the 
workgroup leadership would have to contend with the difficulties of direct democratic 
practice.  As the conservative Protestant newspaper Christ und Welt would sardonically 
report on these endeavors: “The life course of this workgroup . . . was like one of the 
                                                 
37 Lorenz, Report on the Meeting of the Democracy Workgroup on 31 January-1 February 1969, 
21 February 1969, EZA 71/96/788, 1. 
 421
Federal Republic’s cyclical business crises: upwards—ever higher—and then the plunge.  
But by that time the brakes were gone.”38 
The workgroup’s activity began smoothly enough with a speech by Klaus Horn 
on the “Hindrances to Democracy” in West Germany.  Horn began his assessment of the 
sickness of West German democracy with a side-by-side examination of its 
manifestations in the older generation and in the youth.  On one side stood people like the 
CSU politician Franz Josef Strauß, who “defined his opponents as animals” and wanted 
to force them out of the country.  Then there was the elderly pensioner in Berlin’s 
Gedächtniskirche who had assaulted the student leader Rudi Dutschke with his cane.  Or, 
finally, the actions of the pistol-wielding Joseph Bachmann, who had critically wounded 
Dutschke in a failed assassination attempt.  “This is all the same political style,” Horn 
explained, “only in different degrees of escalation.”  On the other side, however, were the 
student protestors who blocked traffic with their demonstrations, disrupted gatherings and 
speeches, harassed their professors, and plotted to burn down department stores.  On both 
sides the problem was the same.  The Germans had not learned how to live together in 
civil public life. Instead they viewed their political opponents as enemies to be violently 
eliminated.  And this cycle only escalated as despair and helplessness drove both sides to 
harden their stances against each other.  “Every successive violent attempt to maintain an 
obsolete form of social order,” he continued, “sows the seeds for its own radical 
negation.”  “The stupid self-assuredness of the powerful,” their “moral indifference, 
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intellectual rigidity,” and “political intransigence” were the very causes of the chaos that 
they sought to quell.39 
This political “incapacity,” Horn argued, was not natural, but learned.  At root, it 
was a product of long-term historical developments in Germany, in particular the 
uncritical deference of Germans to tradition.  As the rest of the world had industrialized 
and modernized, Germany had been dominated by a backward-looking feudal elite.  Even 
the German middle class, rather than taking a progressive stance, had ultimately allied 
themselves with the old elite in the defense of traditional values.  This had also been the 
reaction of the Protestant churches.  And this tradition of passivity and deference to 
authority had led directly to the present-day crisis.  How else could one explain the fact 
that only 53 percent of citizens over the age of 18 accepted the basic right of the student 
protestors to demonstrate?  And how else could Dutschke’s attacker imagine that he was 
simply carrying out the will of the people?  “From within this undemocratic, state-
devoted political tradition,” he argued, “political initiative looks to the ruling classes like 
insubordination and disturbance.”40 
This historical inheritance was compounded by a second problem: the 
technocratic approach of modern West Germans to all areas of life.  Rather than seeing 
democracy as a continually changing process, Germans saw it as a static “closed system,” 
governed by eternally-fixed rules.  Instead of approaching democracy as a way of 
organizing human relations, they looked at it as an impersonal administrative task.  This 
system of government led to the alienation of citizens from their own society.  And it led 
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the established authorities to see any political initiative as a threat to their “technical 
regiment.”41 
The symptoms of these problems were apparent in many areas of public life: from 
the impersonal administration of the German university system to the authoritarian 
patterns of education in the schools.  They were also obvious in Chancellor Kiesinger’s 
adulation of the inherently undemocratic military as the “school of the nation” and in the 
failure of Germany’s elites to face the lessons of the Nazi past.  Finally, they were 
apparent in the debased political language of the lower classes and their inability to grasp 
any complexity or nuance in political discussions.  Rather than seeking to understand the 
complex roots of society’s problems, modern Germans were trained to seek out 
scapegoats.  In this regard, he argued, with its constant attacks upon the student Left, the 
Springer Press was the heir to Joseph Goebbels propaganda ministry.  In its manipulation 
of public opinion, it had turned “the parliamentary system of our democracy” into “a 
hypocritical mantle” behind which was the rule of powerful interest groups.42 
These problems could only be overcome through a thorough reform of the goals 
and means of the educational system, through concerted efforts to oppose the 
manipulation of the “politically helpless,” and the direct transformation of the prevailing 
political style.  Instead of violence and confrontation, Germany needed a politics that was 
rooted in dialogue and genuine communication.  And this was especially true for relations 
between the generations.  While the political attitudes of both the young and the old were 
a barrier to real democracy, the older generation held all of the political power.  As a 
result, the burden of change fell hardest on their shoulders.  The transformation of 
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German society would require the older generation to learn to tolerate criticism, and even 
to make this an institutionalized part of the political system itself.43 
Following Horn’s assessment, the sociologist Willy Strzelewicz elaborated on the 
ways that West Germany’s bureaucratic and technocratic society impeded further 
democratization.  Democracy, he argued, was not a “fixed condition of state 
organization” but a “far reaching process” that connected to “all areas of life.”  As a 
result, true political democracy was not attainable unless it was rooted in social and 
economic structures.  “A democratic state organization based on the rule of law but 
without democratization” he argued, “is insufficient and absurd.”   In earlier history, this 
social and economic democratization had been stymied by old feudal elites and by private 
capitalists who worked to defend their own narrow interests.  In modern society, 
however, the problem was far more complex.  Ordinary citizens were still disempowered.  
But this was less the result of narrow class interests, than a product of the complex 
hierarchical character of the modern social world.  In modern business and industry, 
managers made every important decision, limiting the opportunities of those on the lower 
levels of the hierarchy.  As a result of this system, those on the bottom lost their capacity 
to think for themselves or to make decisions.  And this led to the undemocratic rule of an 
elite class of experts and specialists.44  
But this was not the end of the story.  There were still ways to work against these 
developments.  The “administrative world” of German society, dominated by the “narrow 
expertise of the specialists,” could still be reformed.  In order to become more fully 
democratic, West Germans needed to rein in the power of the bureaucracy, creating a 
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more open and transparent system that was subject to criticism.  Mid-level bureaucrats 
needed to be trained to think for themselves, not to simply follow orders.  And they had 
to be given more opportunities to take individual initiative, to hold real responsibility, 
and to seek out and solve problems.  To a large extent, this would be the outcome of 
necessary educational reforms.  By expanding access to higher education, the pool of 
experts and specialists would grow beyond its current narrow base.  Similarly, new, less 
authoritarian teaching styles would ensure that ordinary citizens had the capacity to hold 
their leaders accountable for their actions.45 
On the second day of the Kirchentag, the democracy workgroup set out to address 
the place of authority in a democratic society.  But, while the previous day’s discussions 
had proceeded more or less according to plan, the second day saw the evolution of the 
workgroup from political theory to anti-authoritarian practice.  The program started out 
with a presentation by Helmut Ridder, a professor of law and politics at the University of 
Gießen and a leading campaigner against the “Emergency Law” recently passed by the 
Bundestag.  He was followed by the more conservative legal scholar Kurt Biedenkopf, 
the rector of the University of Bochum.  Ridder began by arguing that the question of 
“authority” was not just some abstract legal concept or a problem for political scientists.  
It was an immediate and pressing issue in present-day Germany, rooted in the concrete 
facts of Germany’s recent history.  While many Germans experienced this problem only 
as some kind of “indistinct ‘discomfort’” with the present-day political system, it had in 
fact developed into “a chronic constitutional crisis.”  This, he added, was most clear to 
members of the younger generation who would no longer tolerate the “evasions,” 
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“maneuvers,” and “appeasement”-attempts of their elders.  This crisis was rooted in three 
common misunderstandings or political fallacies.46 
The first of these was the common belief that the democratic ideals of universal 
freedom and equality were merely a form of “noble, foolish, or criminal sentimentality.”  
In fact, these ideals were the necessary foundation for any democratic system.  And while 
they might never be fully realizable, they were worth defending and promoting.  Instead, 
however, West German democracy was being corrupted by the uncritical acceptance of 
private capital.  This capitalist system undermined the foundations of democracy by 
serving the interests of the privileged few at the expense of the majority.  And this was 
supported and legitimized by the self-serving work of scholars, who argued that 
capitalism was a necessary and unavoidable condition for modern industrial society.  This 
way of thinking, Ridder argued, was the present-day equivalent of the national liberal 
ideals of an earlier generation of scholars, ideas that had led to the disaster of the two 
world wars.  It was a dangerous misuse use of academic authority to legitimize existing 
power structures, and it went against the proper role of scholarship in a healthy 
democracy.  Rather than affirming the existing system, scholars were obligated to hold it 
up to critical scrutiny, working for its continual improvement.  This, Ridder concluded, 
highlighted the urgent need for educational reform in Germany.  Rather than working to 
pacify the students, it was the role of the educational system to train them to be critical 
democratic citizens.47  
This undemocratic educational system was supported by another common fallacy: 
a misunderstanding of the lessons of recent German history.  “Undemocratic education 
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policy,” Ridder argued, “begins in the history books of our students.”  Rather than 
viewing the Nazi dictatorship as the result of democratic deficiencies in German society, 
Ridder contended, these textbooks advanced the idea that fascism had been an 
understandable reaction to the legitimate dangers of democratic mass politics.  The true 
lesson of the Nazi dictatorship, by contrast, was that Germans needed to be educated into 
democratic ways of thinking.  Instead of addressing this problem, however, West German 
society had worked to transform its citizens into unthinking consumers.  In their fear of 
the masses and their desire for security, Germany’s leaders refused to recognize the mass 
demonstrations of the students as a defense of democratic principles, or to even consider 
the need for a more direct, plebiscitary form of democratic governance.48 
The final anti-democratic fallacy prevalent in West Germany was the belief that 
authoritarian social structures merely reflected the unavoidable rule of impersonal forces 
in modern life.  In fact, Ridder argued, no matter how they might work to hide it, this 
authoritarianism was always the rule of people over other people.  While its advocates 
might claim that the West German social market economy empowered the workers, this 
was only smokescreen for authoritarian rule.  And the Grand Coalition’s attempts to 
reform this system from within only reinforced these underlying problems.  Biedenkopf 
might argue, as he recently had, that the economic policies of the CDU/CSU were merely 
the “realization” of a value free “economic positivism.”  More accurately, Ridder 
countered, “this ‘new economic policy’ is in fact the positivism of undemocratic 
economic opportunism.”  It was not the rule of value-free economic and social principles, 
but the rule of “property owners,” in which “all of the most important and life-affecting 
decisions” were made on the basis of an “authority which can have only the most distant 
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and formal relationship with democracy.”  Indeed, he continued, this “total absence of the 
capacity for democratization in the jails, in educational facilities, in the Bundeswehr, the 
church, and the ‘economy’” reflected a society like that of the Third Reich, in which the 
parliament had a merely decorative function.49 
Responding to these arguments, Biedenkopf conceded the existence of many 
unresolved social and political problems in the Federal Republic.  But he argued that 
these problems needed to be addressed from within the existing political system.  “Unlike 
Herr Ridder,” he stated, “I am not of the opinion that one should abandon the potential of 
the constitution to those who now control it.  I am much more of the opinion that the 
constitution applies equally to us all, that it is not the constitution of the ruling classes, 
but belongs to us all and that we are in a position, at least in many areas, to restore the 
constitutional possibilities that they have artificially limited.”  The contemporary crisis, 
he continued, was not the result of some flaw in West Germany’s constitutional system.  
This system already required those in power to seek democratic legitimacy from the 
public.  The problem was that some of those in power failed to take this responsibility 
seriously, refusing to publicly defend or justify their decisions.  This, in turn, discredited 
the entire system.  The ruling classes had grown too comfortable.  But there were already 
ways to democratize this system from within.  This was simply a matter of electing new 
representatives who were less self-satisfied or of re-organizing the Bundestag to allow for 
greater transparency.  On a more fundamental level, the solution to Germany’s political 
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crisis was not a new constitution, but rather increased democratic initiative on the part of 
ordinary citizens.50  
Much to the consternation of conservative commentators, the students in the 
audience resolved to immediately put this advice into practice.  As Martin Bernstorf 
reported in Christ und Welt: “The day before, [Workgroup Chair, Siegfried von] 
Kortzfleisch had declared, ‘The Hall is sovereign.’  Now it was so sovereign that it 
dissolved itself.”51  Taking advantage of the Kirchentag’s new, fully democratic 
operating procedures, a group from the Protestant Student Congregations proposed that 
the workgroup dispense with its planned program, reconvening outside the North Rhine-
Westphalian Landtag for a protest against the new university Ordnungsrecht, a law that 
would limit the rights of students to hold public protests, that was set for a vote that day.  
In the ensuing controversy, Kortzfleisch was voted out of his position as workgroup 
chair.  And, after a democratic vote by the audience (dominated by members of the 
Student Congregations), the workgroup meeting was dissolved.  Before the students left, 
as Bernstorf indignantly noted, one group raised a banner above the podium on which 
they had written: “While you listen to this prattle, the Landtag is abolishing democracy 
and adopting the Ordnungsrecht. Heil.”52 
When the workgroup reconvened in the late afternoon—now under the direction 
of Klaus Reblin of the Protestant Academy at Bad Boll—Otto Herz, the leader of the 
protest action, provided a report.  After apologizing for any inconvenience caused to 
those who had opposed the morning’s actions, he explained how a large body of students 
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had proceeded from the Kirchentag to the area outside the Landtag, where “perhaps it is 
not just the windows that are brown.”  When they arrived, they had held a sit-in, making 
declarations against the proposed law and demanding that its supporters come talk to 
them.  It was indicative of the state of democracy in Germany, Herz explained, that 
although the universities opposed this law, and although no Landtag members would 
publicly defend it, the law had nevertheless been passed.  Only a handful of deputies, 
notably Karl Schröder of the SPD and Ralf Dahrendorf of the FDP, had been willing to 
talk to the protestors.  And they had both spoken against the new law.  Now that this law 
had passed, Herz continued, the students needed to consider ways that they could protect 
themselves against this abuse of power.  He proposed that the workgroup forego its 
planned question and answer session with leaders from the major political parties—who 
would only manipulate the audience with their “mock arguments,” while working 
together to defend their own power.  Instead, he suggested that they discuss the ways that 
the church could promote social justice, providing financial assistance to oppressed 
minorities in their struggles against the government.53 
This time the audience rejected Herz’s proposal and the political discussion went 
forward.  Since the leaders of the CDU and SPD had pulled out at the last minute, the two 
major parties were represented in the ensuing discussion by the CDU Bundestag deputy 
Arved Deringer and the SPD Justice Minister Horst Ehmke.  The FDP was represented 
by its parliamentary leader Wolfgang Mischnick.  And the pastor Heinrich Werner spoke 
as a representative of the Aktion Demokratischer Fortschritt [ADF], a new left-wing 
party that had formed in opposition to the passage of the Emergency Law.  This panel 
was intended to be an open discussion of the question: “How can we improve our control 
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of power?”  But it almost immediately abandoned this topic, as both the moderators and 
members of the audience took advantage of this opportunity to directly confront party 
leaders with their wide-ranging political frustrations.54  As the centrist Sontagsblatt 
reported: “Young activists sought to turn this scene into a tribunal.  Leaders of the party 
establishment chose to stay away, or to speak ‘election campaign German.’  Student 
Congregations avidly fed the revolutionary machinery.  And if anyone at all listened to 
anyone else, they heard only the sounds of intolerance.”  While the first day of the 
“democracy” workgroup had been an effective exercise in communication, the 
Sontagsblatt continued, the afternoon of the second day was dominated by bearded, 
megaphone wielding students, who shouted down their opponents.55 
This disorderly gathering—more free-for-all than discussion—was dominated by 
a handful of recurring themes.  The first of these revolved around the revulsion of many 
audience members toward the CDU.  In response to an ongoing barrage of questions, a 
stuttering Deringer struggled to defend the party’s claims to be a Christian party and to 
fend off accusations that it stood for the dominance of the churches over all aspects of 
society and the disenfranchisement of all others.  Several of the same audience members 
also questioned the CDU’s commitment to the true principles of Christianity.  How, they 
asked, was simplistic anti-communism or the refusal to contemplate political 
“experiments” Christian?  Later in the meeting, amid accusations that he was only 
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speaking “election campaign German,” another audience member, accused Deringer of 
manipulation and called for a (failed) vote to force him off the stage.56 
The questions addressed to Horst Ehmke of the SPD were only slightly less 
hostile.  Ehmke was repeatedly asked to clarify his position on the Grand Coalition and 
was urged to categorically oppose its renewal after the next election.  He admitted that 
the coalition was not his preferred political outcome.  But, amid angry shouts and 
catcalls, he refused to rule it out on pragmatic political grounds.  This refusal led into a 
long discussion of the origins of the far-right NPD as audience members accused the 
Grand Coalition of creating the climate that led to its rise and of failing to take any action 
against its continued growth.  Here, to the vehement denial of the other party 
representatives, Heinrich Werner of the ADF, accused the all of the established parties of 
keeping the door open to a potential coalition with the NPD.  In response, Deringer and 
Mischnick contended that they had, indeed, campaigned against the NPD, while a 
frustrated Ehmke simply accused the audience of political ignorance.  Another audience 
member accused the CDU of containing its own neo-Nazi tendencies, forcing Deringer—
in the midst of an overtly hostile audience—to try to explain the important ideological 
differences between his party and the NPD.57 
In another major thread, several podium and audience members—including the 
left-wing politics professor Wolf-Dieter Narr—attacked the West German parliament as a 
façade for the rule of bureaucrats and private interest groups.  According to Narr, the 
Bundestag was too busy pursuing “Wirtschaftsdemokratie” and promoting economic 
growth to care about popular opinion or the public good.  Narr also attacked the recently 
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passed Emergency Law, accusing the government of trying to intimidate its opponents by 
fostering a climate of fear.  Here, Werner enthusiastically endorsed this assessment, 
arguing that the German state was returning to Nazism and arguing for the need to 
counter-balance the dangerous forces of capitalism.  Mischnick agreed in a more limited 
sense that there was a lack of public transparency in West German government, 
advocating a better dissemination of information.  Deringer, while admitting some 
problems, argued that reform needed to take place within the existing system.  And 
Johannes Rau, who had replaced Ehmke on the podium, agreed with his colleagues in the 
FDP and CDU, defending the existing parliamentary system and rejecting plebiscitary 
alternatives as too open to manipulation and abuse.   Next, the discussion turned to the 
university Ordnungsrecht, against which the students had protested that morning.  Here 
Rau, the SPD leader in the North-Rhine Westphalian Landtag, made it clear that no SPD 
deputy had voted for this provision.  Deringer, asked to defend the actions of his CDU 
colleagues, simply asserted that he was not a member of that body and he did not know 
their reasoning.  Finally, all of the major-party politicians found themselves defending the 
need for a West German military.  Here, responding to the suggestions of the audience, 
Rau argued that it was naïve to simply argue that all military funding should be 
channeled into education.58 
After this tumultuous session, the final day of the workgroup was much more 
subdued.  According to press reports, this was largely because the student activists, 
having accomplished their goals, had moved elsewhere.  They would only return at the 
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end of the day, to provide enough votes for the passage of their political resolutions.59  
This moderate tone was also apparent in the theme for the workgroup’s third day: the 
concrete, practical steps that could lead to a more democratic Germany.  The theologian 
Dietrich von Oppen began this examination, calling attention to the tension between the 
facts of everyday life and the ideals expressed in the Sermon on the Mount.  This tension, 
he argued, could not be overcome through radical revolutionary gestures.  Instead, it 
would be accomplished through the small steps of individuals, working together for a 
better world.  In the midst of the major social upheaval in present-day Germany, the most 
important first step toward this goal was dialogue.  What Germany needed was “no more 
and no less,” he argued, than “talking with each other, no matter what the circumstances, 
as fundamentally equal partners, no matter how unequal our life conditions.” The 
Kirchentag had worked to promote this capacity for dialogue.  Now, with the 
Kirchentag’s end, these values needed to spread to family and school life, to political and 
social organizations, to relations in the workplace, and to the existing conflicts between 
all the generations, races, and peoples.60   
Drawing on the teachings of the Sermon on the Mount, Oppen explained how the 
changes needed in German society would begin with changes in individual attitudes.  
Accepting Jesus’ injunction not to worry about tomorrow, the older generation in 
Germany needed to find the courage to take new risks, and to give up some of their 
security.  They needed to learn how to accept and tolerate criticism.  Likewise, the 
younger generation had to learn that criticism did not automatically lead to a better 
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society, but could instead lead to social chaos.  And, if they accepted Jesus’ call to “judge 
not lest you be judged,” then Germans of all ages would look to their own flaws, before 
turning to the failings of their neighbors.  Finally, however, Oppen conceded that 
individual changes were not enough.  If the churches took the crisis situation in Germany 
seriously, then they would also see the need for underlying structural reforms.  This had 
to start in the churches themselves, as they critically examined their own traditions and 
structures.61 
This theological presentation was followed by a speech by the radical political 
theorist Fritz Vilmar, who addressed the disempowerment of workers within German 
industry.  Vilmar admitted that some of the pressures workers faced were rooted in the 
basic technical requirements of modern industry.  But, he argued, many of the worst 
aspects of modern industrial work resulted from the persistence of older authoritarian 
traditions or they grew out of capitalist attitudes in which workers were seen merely as a 
commodity.  This dehumanization of workers could only be overcome, he argued, 
through the implementation of several concrete reforms.  First, workers’ co-determination 
rights needed to be expanded and extending into all areas of industry.  Second, in order to 
ensure that their needs were taken seriously, workers needed to be given more influence 
in the industrial lobbying organizations.  And, finally, the Federal Government itself had 
an obligation to protect the working classes through better economic planning and the 
implementation of a stronger social welfare system.62 
Alfred Krause, the chair of the German Official’s League (DBB), a civil service 
union, followed this speech with a defense of government bureaucrats against the 
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accusation that they remained entrenched an older authoritarian social models.  In sharp 
contrast to these claims, he argued, most bureaucrats saw themselves as public servants.  
They were often at the forefront of calls for government reform, but were stymied by 
political leaders.  Indeed, he argued that government bureaucrats, as a class, were among 
the most open segments of German society when it came to the criticisms of the youth.  
They were not the agents of the government against the people, but were, instead, the 
representatives of both sides to one other.  On the other hand, he took issue with the idea 
that hierarchical structures were always authoritarian.  Hierarchies were often legitimate, 
rational forms of organization.  The real danger, he concluded, was not in bureaucracy 
itself, but only arose when bureaucrats became unaccountable for their actions.63 
Finally, as the Kirchentag drew to a close, student activists moved from hall to 
hall, ensuring that there would be enough votes to adopt the resolutions that they had 
prepared in advance.  In the “democracy” workgroup, they pushed through several such 
resolutions.  The first called on the government to grant a full amnesty to all activists who 
had engaged in politically-motivated demonstrations and uprisings since the summer of 
1967.  In another series of resolutions, they called on the Protestant churches and all of 
their affiliated organizations to work for “the implementation of social, political, and 
economic equality and co-responsibility of all citizens” by helping the student movement 
in their formation of citizens’ committees.  Another urged the Federal Republic to work 
for reconciliation and friendship with the Polish people, recognizing its past atrocities and 
accepting the finality of the Oder-Neiße border.  And another demanded that the CDU 
stop misusing the Christian name by withholding co-determination rights from workers, 
adopting emergency laws against the rights of opposition groups, by sabotaging anti-
                                                 
63 Ibid., 474-481. 
 437
nuclear treaties, spending billions of marks on arms, and cooperating with the fascist 
regimes in Greece, Spain, Portugal, and South Africa.  Still others called on the UN 
Human Rights Commission to recognize conscientious objection to military service as a 
basic human right, and called on the Bundestag to eliminate screening procedures for 
those who claimed to be objectors.  Finally, a resolution suggested by the Stuttgart 
Student Pastor Peter Klimm condemned the injustice of the Federal Republic’s 
“Foreigner Law” [Ausländergesetz].64 
Looking back at the democracy workgroup, observers offered decidedly mixed 
assessments, largely dependent on their own ideological leanings.  While Heinrich 
Werner of the ADF praised the workgroup as “a big step toward democratization,” 
liberals and conservatives were much more critical.65  Indeed, the chaos of the 
workgroup’s second day prompted Strzelewicz to characterize the student activists as 
“left-radical psycho-terrorists,” while the moderate political science professor Waldemar 
Besson branded the entire gathering a “children’s crusade.”66 
 
DISCOVERING DIALOGUE 
The democracy workgroup clearly illustrated the gulf between the democratic 
theory of older liberals and the radical direct-democratic practice of the student 
movement.  But it offered few suggestions for overcoming this divide.  Instead, it fell to 
another, more experimental workgroup to point the way forward.  This workgroup—
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somewhat clumsily named “The Tribunal for the Discovery of Bliss”—was the brainchild 
of the journalist Hans Jürgen Schultz.67  At the most basic level, it reflected his desire 
that the Kirchentag’s religious focus—the Sermon on the Mount—not be addressed
separate bible study sessions, but instead be organically integrated into the more 
“worldly” Kirchentag forums.  While most workgroups ultimately chose to adopt a more 
traditional approach to the religious instruction at the Kirchentag, Schultz continued with 
his plan, making it the core of a new workgroup idea.  The workgroup’s basic task, as 
originally conceived, was to discover the “correlation between reality and the Sermon on 
the Mount.”  But rather than featuring presentations by theologians and subject matter 
experts, it adopted an experimental new discussion-centered format.  Starting with the 
everyday experiences of the audience, it would work inductively and dialectically, to 
discover new, more complex truths.  According to the workgroup’s plan:  
 in 
                                                
Speeches will grow out of the exigencies of information and discussion.  This way 
the Sermon on the Mount and reality will not be seen as two opposite, rigidly-
defined blocs.  The task is much more to express the existing pluralistic 
understandings of each so that, in this way, not only is it possible to have a 
coming together, an integration, but both sides will also relativize and criticize 
their own previous understandings.68 
 
As Schultz and a small group of friends worked to further develop this idea, their 
emphasis continued to evolve.  While many had reservations about the workgroup’s 
specific content, they were intrigued by its innovative approach.  As Eberhard Stammler 
argued, summarizing the group’s perspective: “What is special in this attempt is the 
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method.”69 Rather than focusing solely on working out the principles of the Sermon on 
the Mount, the workgroup became a forum where Kirchentag attendees could work 
together dialectically to try to resolve their personal, social, and political problems.  
While the Sermon on the Mount was still intended to provide underlying guidance for the 
group’s proceedings, each day of the workgroup was also devoted to a more concrete and 
tangible set of problems.  On the first day, the tribunal would address the problem of 
private property.  On the second, it would examine marriage and sexual relations.  And 
on the third, it would turn to the subject of violence and non-violence. 70 
Every aspect of this workgroup was designed to promote dialogue.  Rather than 
taking place in a lecture hall, where the audience was clearly separated from the podium, 
it was held in a large amphitheater, where the audience surrounded a central stage.  Ten 
open microphones were spaced throughout the room, and audience members were 
welcomed to come to the microphones at any time to interject their own experiences and 
opinions.71  Instead of featuring designated speakers, the workgroup assembled political 
opponents who would start off each meeting by briefly presenting their opposite views.  
And, to facilitate discussion, it gathered a group of subject-matter experts who would be 
available for consultation with the assembly.  Rather than guiding the discussion, 
however, these experts were there to help answer audience questions and to provide more 
detailed technical information.  The course of the tribunal itself was left intentionally 
open ended.  While each day’s discussion would begin with conflict between the 
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representatives of different views, it was hoped that through the evolution of constantly 
shifting alliances, the workgroup would work toward some kind of consensus, or at least 
some mutual understanding.  The difficult task of moderating this endeavor was given to 
the federal judge Helmut Simon.72 
This experiment in open dialogue started out slowly.  After Schultz explained the 
gathering’s purpose and ground rules, the audience was shown a short introductory film 
on the subject of private property, and the meeting turned to the reading of various 
statements of thesis and antithesis.  However, the ideal of open dialogue came under 
almost immediate threat from those on both sides of the political spectrum.  Speaking for 
the Left, Frank von Auer, announced to the audience that the tribunal was not a game (as 
implied by Schultz’s reference to its Spielregeln), but a deadly serious matter.  The 
openness of the Kirchentag could not compensate for the fact that hundreds of students 
were on trial for their protest actions or erase the other injustices of the West German 
system.  And he announced that the Left reserved the right to break the meeting’s ground 
rules at any time, if they thought it was necessary to do so.  Rainer Tross, a representative 
for the Right, complained that the prepared theses did not accurately represent his views.  
And the progressive psychologist Peter Brückner, called upon to offer his expertise to the 
group, began by questioning the very idea of scientific “objectivity” on which the 
enterprise was based.  When an audience member later tried to enlist Brückner’s 
expertise on behalf of the Left, another objected, introducing a resolution to forbid the 
“expert” panelists from offering their personal political opinions.  Going still further, this 
person suggested that members of the radical SDS should only be allowed to speak when 
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they were ready to “talk about the matter at hand and not school strikes and similar things 
that don’t belong to the topic.”  When Simon, in his role as chair, defended the ability to 
the experts to distinguish between their personal opinions and their professional 
expertise, the discussion entered a long digression on the meaning and value of 
“objectivity.”  Finally, at the end of the first morning’s session, the Tribunal was able to 
agree that “Private property ought not to lead to dominance over people.”  But almost 
immediately thereafter, the workgroup again returned to dissent, as podium speakers and 
audience members argued about what this actually meant.73   
The afternoon continued in this fashion as Helmut Simon worked to defend the 
tenuous dialogue between the Right and Left.  While reminding the students in the 
audience of the importance of respecting minority rights—the importance of which, he 
argued, they ought to have been intimately familiar with—he also continued to defend the 
importance of discussion against those who wanted the group to defer to expert 
opinion.74  As one of the workgroup’s organizers reported in the conservative newspaper 
Christ und Welt, the first day of the Tribunal continued to “be disturbed by endless and
pointless procedural debates and technical questions.  Because the young people in the 
hall were filled with such a deep distrust of the podium, they could not comprehend that 
they were not here to be manipul
 
ated.”75   
                                                
On the second day, however, things began to function more smoothly.  Almost 
immediately after the end of the day’s introductory film—on the tensions and difficulties 
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in changing gender relations—a member of the audience introduced a resolution to open 
the workgroup to discussion from the floor.  Simon agreed with this request, and the 
tribunal turned directly to the audiences’ own experiences and thoughts on marriage and 
gender.  While some audience members still refused to follow the workgroup’s 
guidelines—taking over the microphone reserved for procedural resolutions in order to 
try to dominate the discussion—this problem was quickly resolved.  Rather than taking 
any official action to silence these attempts, Simon simply urged them to stop, informing 
them that their anti-social behavior was turning the entire hall against them.  For the 
remainder of the day, without adopting any resolutions, the workgroup held an open 
discussion of the problems women faced in the workplace, the fair division of domestic 
labor, the rights of women in the church, and the respective advantages and 
disadvantages of the commune as an alternative to the traditional middle-class family.76 
On its final day, the Tribunal addressed the controversial topic of violent and non-
violent social change.  This time, the group returned to its original format, starting with 
short presentations from the podium.  First, Thilo Koch, a well-known German Radio 
(ARD) correspondent in Washington, DC spoke on Martin Luther King, jr., the American 
civil rights movements, and the prevalence of violence in American society.  Next, 
Hildegard Luening gave a short presentation contrasting the revolutionary Marxism of 
Che Guevara with the more evolutionary style of Camillo Torres.  And, finally—in the 
speech that would dominate the entire rest of the forum—Frank von Auer spoke on the 
danger of capitalism, calling for solidarity between the German Left and the liberation 
movements in the “Two-Thirds World.”  Arguing that parliamentary democracy in 
Germany was a sham that existed only to protect the interests of “late stage capitalism,” 
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Auer defended the need for the Extra-Parliamentary Opposition.  While the CDU was 
virtually indistinguishable from the neo-Nazi NPD, he argued, the SPD had also betrayed 
the interests of the working class, abandoning Marxist ideology, joining the Grand 
Coalition, and voting to pass the Emergency Law.  As a result, the Left had no alternative 
but revolution.  This did not necessarily mean violence, but, on the other hand, violent 
revolt was completely justified.  In fact, it was merely a response to the violence that 
West German society visited upon the youth.  This violence was everywhere.  “The daily 
content of the Bild newspaper,” he argued, “is more violent than one thousand eggs 
thrown at the heads of police officers.”  “The necessity to be sold for money as a worker, 
in order to be able to live,” he continued, “is violence.”  So were the lack of more 
extensive co-determination laws in Germany, the fact that private individuals owned the 
means of industrial production, parental upbringing in the home and discipline at school, 
and compulsory military service.  Finally, the violence of West German society was 
made explicit in the repression of student demonstrators.  Humanity itself, Auer asserted, 
was being destroyed by this capitalist rule.  Against this destructive tide, he concluded, 
the church had a special duty to rediscover its revolutionary roots, reinventing itself as a 
subversive social and political force.77 
Any semblance of dialogue quickly disappeared, when more conservative 
panelists, such as Manfred Wörner, a CDU Landtag deputy in Baden-Württemberg (and 
future defense minister), responded to these charges.  Arguing that Auer had “bypassed 
reality a little bit” in his assessments, Wörner mocked any comparison between the 
conditions in Germany and those in Latin America.  The problems in Germany, he 
continued, were typical for any highly developed society and they would not be solved by 
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revolution.  Amid uproar from the audience, he continued by arguing that society simply 
could not function at all if industrial labor was defined as some kind of violence.  And, 
when his co-panelist Peter Brückner tried to silence him—arguing that it would be 
“repressive tolerance” to let him finish—he responded that he hoped his opponents could 
at least support the right to free speech.  Finally, he asked, how would Auer organize 
society, so that this kind of “violence” could be avoided?78 
This exchange set the tone for the remainder of the meeting.  While a few more 
moderate members of the Left attempted to mediate between Auer’s “utopianism” and 
Wörner’s conservative views, the discussion quickly devolved into a running argument 
between those on the extremes.  While Wörner continually pressed his opponents to 
explain how their system could actually work, Auer pointed to the “council” democracy 
of the Student Movement as a model for democratic practice.  And Brückner, responding 
to the same challenge, argued that new communicative strategies would allow for an 
effective dictatorship of the proletariat that could avoid any recourse to repression or 
violence.  A few more moderate voices tried to find a middle ground in this discussion.  
Theodor Ebert, a leading German pacifist, for example, warned of the violence 
perpetrated by well-meaning socialists in the past, and advocated the non-violent reform 
of German society.  But the time for compromises was past.  Conservatives in the 
audience rejected the tribunal as a platform for the SDS, while student radicals began to 
work on plans to fully democratize the Kirchentag itself.  Although there was no existing 
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provision for them to do so, they proceeded to spend the remainder of the workgroup 
electing their own representatives to the Präsidium.79 
 
THE WAY FORWARD 
In her report on press responses to the 1969 Kirchentag, Carola Wolf observed 
that few previous gatherings could claim to have generated such a vast quantity or such 
an astonishing diversity of responses.  Many of these, she argued, had little to do with the 
actual events of the Kirchentag meeting, consisting instead of ideologically-driven 
projections onto the Kirchentag and the churches.  Commentary in the various vehicles of 
the Springer Press, other right-wing organs, and in the newspapers of the fundamentalist 
movement, for example, characterized Stuttgart as a perfect expression of the utter failure 
of the church’s modernization efforts.  The divisions and demonstrations at the 
Kirchentag, according to this narrative, were the expressions of a deep crisis of faith that 
was shaking German Protestantism to the core.  The implication of this commentary, 
even if not directly stated, was that attempts to modernize the church had been 
wrongheaded and self-destructive.  Rather than giving rise to a new, more vibrant 
religious life, they had taken an axe to church’s roots.  This interpretation was also shared 
by some commentators on the extreme Left, who believed that church reform was 
impossible and cheered this self-destruction as the necessary precondition for a better 
future society.80   
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To many other observers, however, the Kirchentag of 1969—while fraught with 
difficulties and problems—was sign of hope and new life for the Protestant churches.  
The churches—and the Kirchentag—had not yet arrived where they needed to be, but 
they had found the right path.  Heinz Zahrnt praised Stuttgart as the beginning of a long, 
ongoing “learning process” for the churches.  And Karl-Werner Bühner wrote in the 
Deutsche Pfarrerblatt: “The Kirchentag was a new beginning for a forgotten history.”  
Along the same lines, the Süddeutsche Zeitung editorialized: “The Kirchentag has 
demonstrated that the Christians have an opportunity to advance beyond the burden of 
their two-thousand year old history of mistaking law for justice, freedom for privilege, 
and confession for faith-based life.”  And it went on to suggest that this offered some 
hope that the new church Left might be spared the authoritarian and violent experiences 
that had shaped their more conservative elders.81 
Commentators were especially optimistic when it came to the Kirchentag’s direct 
democratic and dialogical style.  Praising this new approach, the Deutche Pfarrerblatt 
lauded the “direct democracy of the so-called base” which was no longer relegated to the 
role of passive “consumer.”  And the Frankfurter Rundschau optimistically asserted: 
“Stuttgart exemplified the fact that democracy is not a state, but a process—a process of 
overcoming slander, privilege, and authority through the collaborative work of many 
individuals who are conscious of their human rights and their equality.  Out of this 
emerged a hopeful union of Liberals and Socialists.  The example of this Kirchentag will 
have after-effects.”82  
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Within the Präsidium, too, the Stuttgart Kirchnetag was seen as a confirmation of 
the organization’s risky new direction.  Discussing the effects of their experiments in 
direct democracy, Präsidium members concluded: “The practices of fully open discussion 
at the Stuttgart Kirchentag were not only practically indispensable in order to prevent any 
escalation into a riot; they are also the right methods for the mission of the Kirchentag.”  
And, while they admitted that many things had not gone as well as they had planned, they 
praised the gathering as “a big step forward in the direction of better communication.”  
While a few members of the leadership worried that the communicative style to which 
the Kirchentag aspired was simply not attainable amid the current social tumult, most 
defended its mission as a place for open discussion, pointing especially to the Tribunal as 
a model for the future.83 
Rather than using the chaos of the Stuttgart Kirchentag—or the provocation of the 
younger generation—as an excuse to retreat from their liberal democratic ideals, 
Kirchentag leaders saw these events as a sign that they needed to continue along the road 
of democratic practice.  Following up on the experiences of Stuttgart over the next 
several years, they worked to democratize the Kirchentag’s own leadership structure and 
to establish better ground rules for discussion and debate.  And, instead of trying to 
prevent such disruptions, demonstrations, and public actions in the future, they worked to 
improve their own organizational “planning for spontaneity.”84 
At least when it came to the Kirchentag, the youth revolt of the late 1960s did not 
begin the process of liberalization and democratization in West German society.  In fact, 
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as the history of the Kirchentag clearly demonstrates, each successive generation of 
German Protestants pursued these two ideals on different levels and in very different 
ways.  But the youth revolt—however misguided or utopian at its extremes—did serve as 
a constructive challenge to the work an older generation of committed liberals, who were 
acclimated to a slower pace of social change.  Putting the older generation’s liberal 
democratic beliefs to the test, members of the student movement pushed their elders to 
more self-consciously and boldly promote the ideals of a fully democratic and just 
society.  This confluence of different generations and different political styles—itself 
embodied in the dialogue and debate of the Stuttgart Kirchentag—would pave the way 
for a thorough and long-lasting reform of the West German political and social system. 

 
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
In 1945 German Protestantism found itself at a crossroads.  Amid the physical 
ruin and social collapse that accompanied German defeat, Protestant leaders saw an 
opportunity for the churches to take the lead in Germany’s spiritual and social renewal.  
Indeed, outside observers, such as the American occupation authorities, expected no less.  
But the churches were also weighed down by the burden of their own past.  Postwar 
Protestants had inherited the legacy of a rigidly hierarchical, heavily-clericalized church 
structure that afforded little opportunity for lay-leadership.  They were burdened by a 
National Protestant tradition that had led them into complicity in two world wars, the 
Nazi dictatorship, and the Holocaust.  They were deeply divided over the experiences and 
lessons of the “church struggle” during the Third Reich.  And they struggled to overcome 
a political tradition steeped in authoritarian and conservative attitudes, a tradition that—at 
least implicitly—had preached unquestioning obedience to political authority. 
By 1969 German Protestantism was characterized by a very different set of 
values.  In contrast to prior deference to political authority, the dominant liberal 
consensus at the Kirchentag meetings of the 1960s was firmly rooted in the importance of 
democratic political participation, political and ideological self-criticism, and dialogue.  
Younger radicals at the late 1960s Kirchentag went even further in their rejection of 
authority and their calls for direct-democratic action.  The nationalism that had led the 
churches to support two world wars had been virtually banished from mainstream 
Protestantism.  In its place, both liberal and radical Protestants promoted a sense of 
national identity founded on the promotion of social justice and world peace.  And, 
although the Protestant churches retained their rigid hierarchical structure, Protestant 
organizations that existed outside of the institutional church, or on its margins—groups 
like the Protestant Academies, the Student Congregations, and the Kirchentag itself—
were empowering the laity to take control of their own religious identity. 
 Over the course of just twenty-five years, in other words, German Protestants had 
reinvented themselves and transformed their tradition to an almost unbelievable degree.  
No longer the reactionary social force that they had been in the 1920s, the Protestant 
churches after 1945 had become active contributors to the stability of West German 
Democracy.  Indeed, at the Kirchentag, they had become leading proponents of a variety 
of liberal and progressive political causes.  While there were—of course—still many 
continuities with the past, the differences were far-reaching and profound.  This 
dissertation has attempted to gauge the extent of this transformation and to chart its 
course, explaining how such radical change was possible in such a short time.  And it has 
attempted to offer some insight into the significance of this change for the rest of German 
society.  In conclusion, I want to return to these underlying questions.  How did 
Protestant attitudes and values change over this short period of time?  What forces were 
behind these changes?  And what was their broader significance? 
 
THE TRANSFORMATION OF GERMAN PROTESTANTISM 
Until very recently, studies of the Protestant churches in postwar West Germany 
have been dominated by the conceptual dichotomy of “restoration” and “new 
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beginning.”1  According to the dominant narrative, the immediate postwar years were a 
lost opportunity for the churches.  For a brief period of time, after the collapse of the 
Third Reich, there had been the real possibility of radical theological and structural 
reform.  But the efforts of those who promoted these changes—principally members of 
the radical wing of the confessing church—were beaten back by the power of vested 
interests and hindered by the sheer weight of tradition.  By the mid-1950s, according to 
this model, the forces of “restoration” had largely triumphed in rebuilding the traditional 
church order and reasserting the dominance of traditional theological perspectives.  
Moreover, the conservative political leanings of these restorationists and their uncritical 
attitudes toward the German past were leading the churches, and the German people, 
down the same dangerous path that had led already to the Nazi dictatorship and the two 
world wars.  This impending disaster was only averted because of the work of small, non-
conformist groups on the Protestant Left, who offered a radically new and different 
model of the church, the nation, and the role of faith in public political life.  According to 
this model, it was only in the 1960s and 1970s, with the rise of a new generation of 
younger Protestant leaders, that these progressive ideas began to overtake the dangerous 
“restorationist” trends of the early postwar period.2 
This view of postwar church history is deeply rooted in the experiences and self-
understandings of the Protestant Left in the 1950s and 1960s.  To Protestant victims of 
                                                 
1 See Martin Greschat, “Weder Neuanfang noch Restauration” in Protestanten in der Zeit, ed. 
Jochen-Christoph Kaiser (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1994) and Thomas Sauer, Westorientierung im 
deutschen Protestantismus?  Vorstellungen und Tätigkeit des Kronberger Kreises (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 
1999). 
 
2 For an overview of recent historiography, see Thomas Sauer, “Die Geschichte der evangelischen 
Kirchen in der Bundesrepublik – Schwerpunkte und Perspektiven der Forschung” in Evangelische Kirche 
im geteilten Deutschland (1945-1989/90), ed. Claudia Lepp and Kurt Nowak (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and 
Ruprecht, 2001), 295-309. 
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the Nazis, radical members of the confessing church, and those with strong Barthian 
theological convictions, it was painful to see the numerous continuities in the churches 
and in German society that persisted across the so-called “zero hour” of 1945.  Further 
angered by the westernization policies of the CDU, which seemed to prioritize 
reconstruction and economic stability over national unity, these figures harshly criticized 
the desire of most Protestants—and most Germans—for a return to a relatively normal 
life.  Over the next several decades, members of the Protestant Left worked tirelessly 
against this perceived restoration, repeatedly calling for a new sense of German 
Protestant identity rooted in the recognition of German guilt for the crimes of the Third 
Reich and the Christian obligation to repent and seek reconciliation with those who had 
been wronged.3  It would be difficult to overstate the importance of these activists in 
keeping such inconvenient truths alive and in forcing the rest of society to take them 
seriously.  Indeed, the transformation of German Protestant theology, politics, and 
national identity that took place in the decades after World War II would not have been 
possible without their efforts.  It is with good reason, then, that experiences and self-
perceptions of this group have so strongly dominated historical interpretations, especially 
since the late 1960s. 
Yet this historical narrative tells only one part of the story.  It is unquestionably 
true—as progressive contemporaries and modern scholars have both observed—that there 
were many intellectual and personal continuities between the Protestant churches before 
                                                 
3 See Matthew D. Hockenos, A Church Divided: German Protestants Confront the Nazi Past 
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2004). 
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and after 1945.4  The end of the war was not a “zero hour” for the Protestant churches or 
for the rest of German society.  Instead, as Jeffrey Herf has perceptively argued, the 
immediate postwar years were marked by “multiple restorations,” as nearly every 
ideological or political faction turned to its own past in search of future direction.5  Yet 
the converse is also true.  The decades after World War II were not only shaped by 
continuities with the past, but also by multiple, imperfect, and gradual departures from it.  
The decades after the war gave rise to not just one but multiple new beginnings.   
For historians of postwar West Germany, then, it is not enough to identify 
“reactionary” and “progressive” forces and to chart the triumph of the latter over the 
former.  Instead, the study of the postwar period requires the historian to examine the 
ways that different groups and different generations reacted to the Nazi legacy, to analyze 
the ideas and motivations that lay behind these different responses, and to chart the 
complex interplay between these different—and often opposite—reactions over time.  In 
order to explain this transformation, this dissertation has looked in turn at the Christian 
Democratic new beginning that emerged in the late 1940s and early 1950s, at the 
moderate conservative and liberal challenges to this tradition in the late 1950s and early 
1960s, and at the Left Liberal consensus that emerged in the middle of the 1960s.  
Finally, it has examined the challenge posed to this consensus by the “youth revolt” and 
the rise of the New Left at the end of the decade.  Each of these ideologies, in its own 
                                                 
4 See, for example, Robert P. Ericksen, Theologians under Hitler: Gerhard Kittel, Paul Althaus, 
and Emanuel Hirsch (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1985); Robert P. Ericksen and Susannah 
Heschel, Betrayal: German Churches and the Holocaust (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1999); Clemens 
Vollnhalls, Evangelische Kirche und Entnazifizierung 1945-1949.  Die Last der nationalsozialistischen 
Vergangenheit, Studien zur Zeitgeschichte, Vol. 36 (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1989) and Norbert Frei, 
Adenauer’s Germany and the Nazi Past: the Politics of Amnesty and Integration, trans. Joel Golb (New 
York: Columbia, 2002). 
 
5 Jeffrey Herf, Divided Memory: The Nazi Past in the Two Germanys (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1997). 
 455
way, was a reaction to the Nazi past, and an attempt to overcome its legacy.  However, 
each of these movements understood Nazism differently, emphasizing different aspects 
of Nazi thought and practice.  As a result, each adopted its own unique approach to the 
task of overcoming the past and creating a new and better German society.   
These movements also existed in a dialectical relationship with one another.  Both 
the liberal, modernizing impulses of the late 1950s and early 1960s and the more radical 
left-wing ideology of the late-1960s student movement were reactions to the excesses of 
Christian Democracy.  The emphasis of late-1950s liberalism on “sober,” “factual” 
politics, for example, was both an outgrowth of the CDU’s foreign policy “realism” and 
an attempt to further divorce this realism from emotionally- and ideologically-driven 
approaches.  And the ideas of the late 1960s New Left—while ostensibly directed against 
the “fascism” of the older generation—were in many ways a reaction against both the 
rigid religious conservatism of Christian Democracy and against the impersonal 
technocratic style of late 1950s modernizers.  While late-1960s radicals saw the 
conservative social values of West German society and the emphasis on law and order as 
direct continuities with the Nazi past, older Christian Democrats and liberals saw these 
values as a necessary response to the socially and politically subversive aspects of 
Nazism.6   And, while older conservatives and liberals associated the tactics of student 
protestors with the subversive activities of Nazi “brownshirts,” students viewed the forces 
of the “establishment” as part of the continuing legacy of the Nazi police state.   
                                                 
6 For this observation, I am indebted to Dagmar Herzog’s arguments in “Post-War Ideologies and 
the Body Politics of 1968,” in Jan-Werner Müller, ed., German Ideologies since 1945: Studies in the 
Political Thought and Culture of the Bonn Republic (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003) and Sex after 
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Rather than adopting the sometimes-polemical rhetoric of any one of these 
movements, a balanced historical analysis of West Germany’s postwar transformation 
needs to recognize the complex relationship between the Nazi past and the multiple 
responses it engendered.  And it has to recognize the ways in which these different 
movements—while often hostile to each other—were also complementary in their 
approaches.  In many ways, each successive movement built on the foundation laid by its 
predecessors.  And, each of these movements—each with its own distinct political 
ideology—appealed to and transformed the ideas and practices of different groups in 
German society.  While the conventional narrative is correct, then, in calling attention to 
the important role of progressives and non-conformists in the transformation of West 
German society, it is wrong in assuming that other groups simply resisted this movement 
or were unwillingly dragged along.  Instead, each made contributions to the ultimate 
democratization of West Germany.  Each played a role—albeit to widely varying 
degrees—in the long, painful process of confronting the Nazi past and overcoming the 
legacy of German nationalism.  And, within the churches, each was engaged in the same 
basic task of mediating between a centuries-old religious and theological tradition and the 
demands of a rapidly-changing world. 
 
CHRISTIAN DEMOCRACY 
To many Germans in the 1950s, in both the Catholic and Protestant churches, the 
lesson of Nazism was clear.  As Hans Meiser, the Protestant Bishop of Bavaria, argued 
succinctly at the Kirchentag of 1952: “Where Christ does not reign, things cannot help 
but fall apart.”7  While historians have only recently rediscovered the “modern” aspects 
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of Nazism—having long focused largely on its romantic, irrational, and traditional 
elements—many Christian Democrats in the 1950s were firmly convinced that it was a 
perfect expression of the pathologies of modern life.8  It had arisen out of the destruction 
of traditional social structures, appealing to the desire of rootless modern individuals to 
return to some form of community.  It had taken advantage of the dangerous freedoms 
offered by liberal democracy to mobilize the masses in a social and political revolution 
against traditional elites.  And while it had hidden its true agenda behind a veil of 
religiosity, disillusioned Christian leaders in the postwar period had gradually come to 
see it as a form of atheism and neo-paganism. 
After the destructive experiences of Nazism and of the Second World War, 
leaders in both the Protestant and Catholic churches saw religious renewal as the only 
hope for a new beginning.  And, in the midst of the social collapse that followed national 
defeat, the churches took on a leading role in the multi-faceted process of reconstruction.  
While Protestants came out of the war deeply divided on questions of theology and 
church government, nearly every faction within the churches could agree on the centrality 
of Christian faith to the postwar rebuilding effort and to the future course of German 
society.  Many remained ambivalent toward the Catholic dominated CDU and CSU.  And 
many on the Protestant Left quickly rejected the policies of the Adenauer government, 
particularly its prioritization of Western European integration over German reunification.  
But they continued to share many of the same foundational assumptions, especially when 
it came to relationship between faith and politics.  Indeed, much of the activity of the 
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Protestant Left during the 1950s can be seen as part of an ongoing effort to create 
ideological and political space between the unacceptable alternatives of the Christian but 
conservative CDU and the left-leaning but formally atheist SPD. 
At the Kirchentag, this broad “Christian Democratic” consensus—encompassing 
the views of most Protestants both inside and outside of the CDU—found its clearest 
expression in repeated calls to “public responsibility.”  While many Germans responded 
to the experiences of dictatorship, war, and defeat with political resignation, Protestant 
leaders worked throughout the 1950s to draw them back into public life.  These efforts 
operated on many different levels.  Sermons and bible studies at the Kirchentag 
repeatedly reminded German Protestants of their duty to participate in the Christian task 
of “saving humanity.”  Some sermons on this topic focused on the supernatural work of 
Christ beyond all human effort, and others looked more directly at the activities of the 
church and its institutions.  But all could agree that Christian faith was the starting point 
for any lasting social and political renewal.  Building on this foundation, Protestant 
leaders promoted the work of missions and evangelism, acts of charity and social 
assistance, and the concrete tasks of rebuilding local churches and communities.  Little of 
this work was overtly “political” in nature, but it played an important underlying role in 
the reconstruction of civil society. 
Community was an especially important value to postwar Protestants.  Indeed, 
most viewed community as a fundamental human necessity.  And they blamed the 
breakdown of traditional community structures for the success of the Nazis, who had 
filled this vacuum with their own ideas of nation and race.  Now that the exclusionary 
Volksgemeinschaft of the Nazis had been discredited by war and defeat, and now that its 
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murderous logic had been exposed, Protestants turned to local and church community to 
fill the void.  At the Kirchentag meetings of the early 1950s, speakers from across the 
political and theological spectrum condemned the idolatry of race and nation that had 
dominated in the Third Reich.  And they offered the church itself, and the Christian faith, 
as alternative sources of belonging.  This emphasis permeated a wide variety of different 
Kirchentag discussions.  Sermons directed at returning soldiers and POWs urged them to 
seek comfort in faith and in the church community.  And many speeches called on the 
local churches to welcome these soldiers back, rather than shunning them as a reminder 
of a past that people wanted to forget.  This theme was also apparent in the many 
speeches and discussions devoted to the refugee crisis in West Germany.  Again, refugees 
and expellees who had lost their homes were urged to look to the churches for a new 
“homeland.”  And speakers repeatedly called on the churches, local communities, and the 
state and federal governments to work to address the refugees’ myriad spiritual, 
psychological, and material needs. 
Beneath this broad agreement on the nature of Nazism, and on the centrality of 
faith to postwar rebuilding and renewal, however, lay many important differences.  These 
became increasingly apparent over the course of the 1950s, as Protestant leaders moved 
beyond vague generalities to address specific national and political questions.  For 
example, nearly every Protestant leader or speaker at the Kirchentag promoted the 
importance of “public responsibility.”  To more conservative Protestants, this meant 
joining the CDU and working to advance its conservative social agenda.  To the nascent 
Protestant Left, on the other hand, the CDU’s concepts of “Christian society” and “the 
Christian West,” were just other forms of self-affirming idolatry.  In part, this rejection of 
 460
CDU politics reflected the deep-seated suspicions that many Protestants harbored toward 
the Catholic church, especially since Catholics had attained numerical parity with 
Protestants in the Federal Republic.  Theologically, it was rooted in Karl Barth’s rejection 
of all forms of “natural theology,” broadly defined as any theological system that went 
beyond the basic message of the gospels.  However, it also grew out of specific 
objections to the political actions of the CDU.  This was especially true when it came to 
questions of postwar German identity. 
The major national political priorities of the early CDU were the material 
reconstruction, social stability, and military security of the new West German state.  To 
Konrad Adenauer, the chancellor and leader of the CDU, these goals would be best 
attained through the integration of West Germany in Western Europe and through a 
political and military alliance with the United States.  While Adenauer—like most 
Germans—wanted national reunification, he was not willing to have this at the expense 
of political or ideological compromises with the Soviet Union.  Instead, he argued that a 
strong and prosperous West Germany would be able to attain reunification on its own 
terms.  Leading members of the Protestant Left raised several objections to this approach.  
For one thing, they opposed this prioritization of reconstruction and material prosperity 
over soul-searching and repentance.  In his desire to reconstruct German society and to 
heal the internal divisions of the war, they argued, Adenauer was minimizing the guilt of 
ordinary Germans for the atrocities of the Third Reich and was allowing many former 
Nazis to return to positions of social and political importance.  This, they argued, 
represented a failure to learn the moral lessons of the Third Reich. 
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Members of the Protestant Left also raised a variety of objections to Adenauer’s 
pursuit of West German autonomy and security.  On a theological level, leaders such as 
Martin Niemöller argued that Germans had sinned against the peoples of both the West 
and the East.  As a result, they needed to humbly seek reconciliation with both sides in 
the emerging Cold War, instead of allying themselves with only the West.  In the rhetoric 
of the Protestant Left, such high-minded moral arguments were also often accompanied 
by naïve moral equivocation between capitalism and communism, between western 
liberal democracy and East German “democracy.”  Indeed, using the categories of 
Barthian theology, it was easy to label both of these systems as forms of sinful idolatry, 
and to gloss over their rather considerable differences. 
The Protestant Left enjoyed the greatest success when its ideas aligned with 
popular sentiment.  It was not only idealistic Protestants and left-wing intellectuals that 
objected to Adenauer’s policies of western integration.  Many ordinary Germans resisted 
these policies for much more nationalistic reasons, objecting to the tacit acceptance of 
German division and decrying the abandonment of Germans in the east.  Since the 
historical and demographic center of German Protestantism lay in the East, these 
objections were especially strong within the Protestant churches.  Left-wing Protestants 
were not above appealing to this sentiment in order to gain popular support for their own 
political priorities.  This is most apparent on the issue of West German military 
rearmament.  Viewed by Adenauer and the CDU as an important step toward national 
sovereignty and as a necessary defense against communist aggression, the creation of a 
new German army generated considerable fear on the Protestant Left.  In numerous 
Kirchentag speeches, anti-rearmament crusaders such as Martin Niemöller, Gustav 
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Heinemann, and Helmut Gollwitzer argued that, after the two world wars, the Germans 
could not be trusted with a military.  Yet they also couched their concerns in nationalist 
sentiment, arguing that remilitarization raised a barrier to any near-term reunification.  
Instead, they advocated Cold War neutralism and called for a German “Third Way” 
between the West and the East.  Even after the formal remilitarization of West Germany, 
and its entry into NATO in 1956, these debates continued.  Now, however, the focus 
shifted to the campaign against nuclear armament that emerged under the slogan “fight 
atomic death.”9 
These divisions within the Protestant churches, and at the Kirchentag, were 
important for at least two reasons.  First, they prevented Protestant leaders from forging a 
unified political ideology like that created by the Catholic Church.  While Protestants 
agreed on the basics of “Christian democracy,” this agreement did not translate into 
political unanimity.  As a result, they were forced to come to terms with the irreducible 
fact of political pluralism.  If they did not want to tear the churches apart, Protestants 
needed to learn to accept a multiplicity of perspectives and viewpoints.  This tolerance 
for diversity and pluralism, in turn, created space for a variety of intermediary 
perspectives between the extremes of the Right and Left.  While most Protestants 
remained in the CDU, at least in the early 1950s, they did not simply toe the party line.  
Instead, forced to defend themselves against the sometimes-harsh attacks of the 
Protestant Left, Protestant conservatives learned to refine and critique their own political 
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ideas.  Indeed, in the process of defending their own political views, many conservative 
Protestants became especially strong defenders of democratic values and freedoms. 
Second, these disagreements within the Protestant churches laid the groundwork 
for future cooperation between the churches and the SPD.  While even most members of 
the Protestant Left did not view the SPD of the 1950s—with its formally atheist 
program—as a viable political alternative, their cooperation in the anti-rearmament and 
anti-nuclear campaigns forged personal contacts and overcame longstanding prejudices.  
By the late 1950s, members of the Protestant Left were beginning to enter the SPD in 
greater numbers.  And, in order to accommodate this entry, SPD leaders began to push 
for the new non-atheist, non-Marxist party program finally adopted at Bad Godesberg in 
1959. 
 
LIVING WITH MODERNITY 
By the middle of the 1950s, it was not just members of the Protestant Left who 
were pushing for reforms.  While many conservative Protestants remained staunch 
supporters of the CDU, and some on the Left began their migration toward the SPD, 
other liberals and moderate conservatives worked to develop their own critical 
perspectives.  To many of these critics, from across a fairly wide spectrum of political 
views, the Christian democratic ideology of the early 1950s had become ineffectual and 
had lost touch with the changing realities of modern life.  Many of these critics also 
rejected the emotional and moralistic style of the Protestant Left, branding its neutralist 
and pacifist leanings unrealistic.  Within this movement, different figures had different 
motivations and goals.  Some were conservatives who simply wanted a more adaptable 
form of Christian democracy, better suited to the modern world.  Others raised stronger 
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objections to the ideological rigidity and emotional religiosity of Christian democracy.  
Whatever their concerns, these moderate Protestants were united in their desire to 
modernize the churches and the rest of West German society.10 
Some of these modernizing impulses had been present since the very first 
Kirchentag meetings.  However, it was not until the middle of the 1950s that they began 
to have a major impact on the program.  There were several reasons for this delay.  The 
first several Kirchentag gatherings were more spontaneous and less thoroughly planned 
than later meetings.  As the Kirchentag rapidly grew in size and importance, its woefully 
overburdened staff struggled to stay on top of even basic logistical concerns.  While the 
provisional leadership and the office staff might set the meeting’s overall tone and select 
its overarching themes, individual speeches and sermons were rarely as well coordinated 
or well vetted as in later years.  As a result, the program tended to focus on general 
theological and political principles on which nearly all Protestants could agree.  Leaders 
did not plan for controversy or disagreement.  And when opinions clashed—as in the 
debates over rearmament—the role of the Kirchentag leadership was reactive, 
emphasizing damage control over open debate.  It took time for German Protestants to 
overcome this aversion, learning how to manage disagreement. 
Another important reason why the early Kirchentag meetings emphasized broad 
generalities over nuanced debate had to do with the Kirchentag’s role as a major meeting 
place for Protestants from the West and East.  In the early 1950s, the Kirchentag became 
a symbol of German Protestant and all-German unity.  This—much more than the 
intellectual or theological program—was what attracted such massive crowds.  And this 
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im deutschen Protestantismus?  
 465
was also the element that received the most thorough coverage in the press.  Although the 
Kirchentag leaders had not anticipated this role, and were sometimes frustrated when 
such symbolism eclipsed the meeting’s intellectual content, they ultimately came to 
embrace it.  But there was a definite tension between the Kirchentag’s role as a symbol of 
unity, on the one hand, and its role as an intellectual forum dedicated to refining the 
perspectives of the Protestant laity, on the other.  While broad theological and political 
generalities might apply to Protestants in both German states, narrower social and 
political arguments rarely did.  East Germans at the first several Kirchentage frequently 
complained that discussions of democratic politics—and even of “public responsibility” 
more generally—did not apply to the circumstances in the East.  More intellectually- and 
politically-oriented West Germans complained that vague discussions of “power,” 
“authority,” and ideological “idolatry” failed to address the real problems and issues in 
the West.  This tension was never really resolved as long as all-German gatherings 
remained a possibility.   
By the mid-1950s, as the possibility of reunification became more remote, those 
who wanted more nuanced political and social discussion began to reassert themselves.  
While Kirchentag leaders were exhilarated by the outward success of gatherings such as 
the 1954 meeting in Leipzig—entirely within the GDR—they were also wary of 
becoming too “politicized,” of having their intellectual and theological program eclipsed 
by national enthusiasm.  Structural and organizational reforms implemented between 
1953 and 1955 also made it easier to plan a more complex program.  Finally, more and 
more Protestants were becoming dissatisfied with the static, predictable political debates 
between the Protestant Right and Left.  Both self-critical conservatives and liberals 
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wanted to move beyond these ideologically-driven perspectives, engaging more directly 
with the complexities of modern life.  Within the Kirchentag organization, the new 
general secretary Hans Hermann Walz became the champion of this new perspective, 
working to forge stronger ties between the Kirchentag and the Protestant Academies and 
with social and political policy experts in the universities.  By the time of the Kirchentag 
Congress of 1958, these efforts were beginning to pay off.  This smaller academic 
gathering, devoted to no less a topic than “reality today,” saw the emergence of a new set 
of ideas and topics that the Kirchentag would explore over the course of the next decade. 
Among other things, the Kirchentag Congress gave voice to a more liberal 
political orientation that was emerging within German Protestantism.  This new 
perspective was founded on the conviction of Protestant academics and intellectuals that 
political decisions should be based on an objective analysis of the “facts,” on “objective” 
reality, not on ideological or theological first principles.  This approach was often 
described by its practitioners as the process of “overcoming illusions.”  While this 
movement was often critical of the policies of the CDU, it was not a direct outgrowth of 
the work of the Protestant Left.  In fact, its adherents tended to be just as dismissive of 
the “enthusiasm” and utopianism of those around Niemöller and Heinemann, as they 
were of the political and social rigidity of the CDU.  At Kirchentag meetings in the late 
1950s and early 1960s, this new perspective asserted itself in two major areas.  First, 
because of its emphasis on sober analysis over emotion and enthusiasm, this movement 
promoted the virtues of political pluralism, discussion, and dialogue. Second, it 
championed a new “realist” perspective on the German question and the Cold War, based 
on the acceptance of German division and the need for coexistence. 
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The first of these new emphases—on pluralism and dialogue—was largely an 
outgrowth of the political circumstances within the Protestant churches.  Attempts to 
paper over the differences between the CDU and Protestant Left had failed, and this had 
thwarted efforts to create any unifying Protestant political ideology.  Leading Protestant 
theologians, pastors, and lay-persons found themselves on opposite sides of the political 
fence.  Now they had to reconcile this real diversity with the often-universal claims of 
their separate ideologies.  In short: if they wanted to maintain any semblance of 
Protestant unity and fellowship, they had to learn how to coexist.  While many 
Protestants in the mid-to-late 1950s were still quite uncomfortable with political 
disagreements, they had no choice but to learn to live with them.  Kirchentag speakers in 
the early 1950s had frequently railed against the selfishness of private interest groups, 
blaming them for the divisiveness of German politics and the breakdown of community.  
And they had pushed for a return to some older, more organic form of social 
organization.  But by the mid-to-late 1950s these arguments were gradually giving way to 
principled defenses of intellectual and political conflict.  The mere existence of “interest 
groups” was no longer blamed as for every social and political ill.  Instead, although they 
continued to fault them for their disproportionate influence and political myopia, most 
Kirchentag speakers—at least in the political workgroup—began to see them as a 
necessary form of democratic political expression.  Kirchentag speakers did not just 
preach the virtues of pluralism and dialogue; the Kirchentag itself also began to better 
embody these ideals.  Social Democratic speakers, for example, started to appear much 
more frequently on the Kirchentag program.  And, in the leadership of the political 
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workgroup, moderate social democrats and liberals began to even outnumber defenders 
of the CDU. 
Kirchentag speakers also began to promote a new, more liberal understanding of 
the relationship between faith and politics.  Political debates at the Kirchentage of the 
early 1950s had broken down along the divide between advocates of theologically-driven, 
faith-based politics, on the one hand, and, the “negative politics” of the Protestant Left, 
where faith was seen purely as a source of opposition against every political ideology, on 
the other.  By the late 1950s, moderates and liberals on both sides of the spectrum were 
working out a more sophisticated understanding of the place of religious belief in a 
liberal democracy.  Speakers from all of the major parties continued to promote political 
engagement and activity.  But they also began to better delineate the rights and 
responsibilities of the churches, of individual Christian citizens, and non-believers.  
According to this new perspective, the churches had an important indirect role to play in 
the political process.  But they did not have the right to simply impose their beliefs on 
others.  Christian faith was an important source of political values and of political 
inspiration, but this did not correspond to any one political program or agenda.   
Kirchentag leaders and speakers also began to develop a new perspective on the 
“German question,” criticizing the views of both the CDU and those of the Protestant 
Left as out of touch with reality.   This emerging view—which eventually culminated in 
the 1963 Ostdenkschrift of the Protestant Church in Germany—grew out of the 
conviction that the Cold War division of Germany was a fixed, unchangeable geo-
political fact.11  According to this perspective, neither aggressive Cold War posturing, 
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nor appeasement, was likely to dramatically alter the status quo.   As a result, Germans 
would simply have to learn to live with division.  As in Kirchentag discussions of 
domestic disagreements, the central concept here was “coexistence.”  This did not mean 
accepting the legitimacy of East German communism or overlooking its flaws.  
Advocates of this new perspective prided themselves on their realism and clear-
mindedness.  But it did mean working to de-escalate specific conflicts and points of 
tension, insofar as this was possible within the framework of existing geopolitical 
realities.  Advocates of this perspective pushed especially hard for the reconciliation
the eastern European victims of Nazism—such as the Poles.  And they argued that 
political realism—and not just moral obligation—required the West German state to 
acknowledge the legitimate int
 with 
erests of the Soviet Union. 
                                                                                                                                                
This realist focus on overcoming political illusions also led some German 
Protestants to redouble their efforts to deal with the legacies of the Third Reich and 
Second World War.  This meant objectively and unemotionally facing uncomfortable 
“realities” about the German past—looking beyond the illusions and myths they had 
constructed to exonerate themselves and downplay their own responsibility.  Since the 
late 1940s small groups of Protestants—mostly on the Left—had pushed for a closer 
examination of German guilt.  And they had promoted a program of reconciliation with 
Germany’s victims, especially Poles and Jews.  But such voices were in the minority, as 
most Protestants focused on their own suffering and on rebuilding their own disrupted 
lives.  Kirchentag leaders such as Reinold von Thadden-Trieglaff were sympathetic to the 
need to confront the German past, but did not go out of their way to push this agenda.  
 
Die 60er Jahre in den beiden deutschen Gesellschaften (Hamburg: Hans Christian, 2001); see also Martin 
Greschat, “‘Mehr Wahrheit in der Politik!’ Das Tübinger Memorandum von 1961” in Vierteljahrshefte für 
Zeitgeschichte 48 (2000): 491-513; and Thomas Sauer, Westorientierung  im deutschen Protestantismus? 
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When German guilt appeared on the Kirchentag program in the early 1950s, it was 
usually in the context of the anti-rearmament arguments of the Protestant Left.  Only in 
the small gatherings of the German Protestant Committee for Service to Israel did 
Kirchentag attendees look more closely at the persecution and murder of the Jews.   
This reticence only changed in the late 1950s as more liberal Kirchentag leaders 
like Hans Hermann Walz and Klaus von Bismarck began to push for a more self-critical 
examination of German guilt.  Starting in 1959 with the “Israel Evening,” Kirchentag 
speakers began to confront the legacy of the Holocaust more directly, working to 
overcome lingering anti-Semitism in the churches and in German society at large.  These 
activities were expanded in 1961, when the political workgroup devoted its meetings to 
the question of what went wrong in the German past.  The 1961 Kirchentag also saw the 
first meetings of a new workgroup on “Jews and Christians,” dominated by veterans of 
the Protestant Left such as Helmut Gollwitzer, who had long been at the forefront on this 
issue.  Speakers in this workgroup pushed tirelessly for a greater recognition of Protestant 
guilt for the persecution of the Jews.  And they called on all Germans, and especially 
German Protestants, to repent for their sins and seek forgiveness and reconciliation.  
While earlier discussions of this sort had been conducted from the perspective of 
Christians or converted Jews, the workgroup “Jews and Christians” began to change this 
as well.  Realizing that real reconciliation required personal contact and concrete 
dialogue, workgroup leaders worked to ensure the presence of Jewish speakers.  And they 
encouraged wide-ranging discussion and argument on the many cultural and religious 
issues that still divided Jews and Christians.  Not only did speakers work to break down 
longstanding prejudices about the Jews in Germany, many also promoted a new more 
 471
inclusive theological perspective that recognized both Jews and Christians as the people 
of God.  By the mid-1960s, the workgroup began to bog down in theological controversy 
as traditional theologians and their liberal counterparts sparred over the messianic claims 
of Jesus and the question of whether Jews were “saved.”  But despite these problems, the 
group had already accomplished a great deal.  It had opened the door to extended, 
mainstream discussions of German guilt within the Protestant churches.  And it had 
presented a major challenge to the anti-Jewish and anti-Semitic prejudices that persisted 
in postwar German society. 
 
LIBERAL CONSENSUS AND RADICAL CHALLENGE 
The liberalizing and modernizing trends of the late 1950s gained strength after the 
construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961.  Until this point, the Kirchentag had remained 
divided in its emphasis between the issues facing West German society, on the one hand, 
and the problems of German unity and division, on the other.  With the construction of 
the Berlin Wall, and the ensuing crackdown on inter-German contact, however, the East 
German government made it clear that all-German activities, like those of the Kirchentag, 
would no longer be tolerated.  Since the Kirchentag had been so strongly associated in the 
popular mind with Protestant and all-German unity, many believed that these 
developments heralded its end.  Members of the Protestant Left, who prioritized German 
unity, blamed the West German government and conservative Protestants for the inter-
German breakdown, arguing that it could have been prevented if groups like the 
Kirchentag had been more accommodating to the SED. And West German conservatives, 
who had become irritated with the emergence of critical liberal and Social Democratic 
perspectives at the Kirchentag, concluded that the gathering had outlived its usefulness.  
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Kirchentag leaders, on the other hand, viewed these developments as an opportunity to 
expand their critical examination of West German politics and society. 
This critical turn began with a self-critical assessment of the role of the 
Kirchentag—and the churches more broadly—in the changing society of the Federal 
Republic.  In consultations in the early 1960s with Protestants from across the theological 
and political spectrum, Kirchentag leaders came to the conclusion that the churches were 
losing touch with the German people, including many of their own members.  In order to 
combat this tendency, some urged the Kirchentag to return to its origins as a gathering 
devoted to evangelism, church building, and community life.  Others argued for a more 
direct engagement with modern theological, social, and political trends.  But nearly all 
agreed that the Kirchentag needed to find new ways to connect with ordinary members of 
the Protestant public.  Embracing this advice, Kirchentag leaders turned the gatherings of 
the early 1960s into an experiment field for new kinds of organization, new styles and 
approaches, and—to a lesser extent—for new theological and political ideas.  This 
process began somewhat slowly, with structural and stylistic reforms.  However, as the 
Kirchentag leadership worked to integrate new voices and perspectives, and to generally 
broaden its intellectual and political base, the tone became more radical.  By the middle 
of the 1960s, leaders like Hans Hermann Walz were arguing that the Kirchentag did not 
exist to serve the agenda of the institutional churches, but instead to function as a more 
democratic, more open, and more progressive alternative.  The Kirchentag existed to 
push for the reform of the existing church structure, to be sure, but also to serve as the 
“church in the world” in a way that the Protestant Church in Germany (EKD) could not. 
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As the Kirchentag evolved into a more progressive forum, it generated 
considerable criticism and opposition.  But it also saw the emergence of a new Left-
Liberal Protestant consensus.  By the middle of the 1960s both older members of the 
Protestant Left and younger, more principled liberals had come to embrace similar 
positions on a variety of issues.  Members of the old Protestant Left may have 
approached politics from a moral and theological standpoint, while their younger, more 
liberal counterparts did so from the “sober,” “realistic” perspective that had emerged in 
the late 1950s.  But, despite their differences in style and emphasis, both could agree on 
the need for internal reforms in the Federal Republic and for new approaches to the 
“German question” and West German foreign policy.  The Kirchentag served as an 
important meeting place for these groups, a place where they could explore and build 
upon their agreement, creating a new intellectual tone for German Protestantism.   
These efforts culminated in the 1967 Kirchentag devoted to the topic of peace.  
This Kirchentag program brought together the ideas of more “utopian” theologians like 
Jürgen Moltmann, the enlightenment-liberal philosophy of intellectuals like Carl 
Friedrich von Weizsäcker, and the practical insights of peace and development experts in 
a collaborative effort to overcome conflict in the world.  Within the Federal Republic, 
this meant working for political tolerance, dialogue, and understanding between opposing 
groups.  For the “German Question,” it implied moving beyond mere coexistence, finding 
new points of contact and cooperation between the two German states.  It required better 
political and economic cooperation in Western Europe.  And, finally, it meant drawing on 
the lessons of the German past, and applying them to the issues of poverty, hunger, and 
violence in the developing world.   
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While the “German question” and the problems of political tolerance and dialogue 
had long been prominent themes for the Kirchentag, the issue of Third World 
development was new, representing an emerging international perspective among 
German Protestants.  Though this new emphasis clearly had some roots in earlier 
discussions of world missions and ecumenicalism, it also seems to have grown out of the 
lessons that liberal and socialist Protestants were drawing from recent German history.  
The experiences of the two world wars had demonstrated the devastation of modern 
warfare.  And the experiences of the Cold War, of living under the constant threat of 
nuclear annihilation, had impressed upon them the urgent need for peace, if humanity 
itself was to survive.  While many people contributed to this developing consensus, it was 
Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker who provided these new ideas with the coherent 
integrative framework of “World Domestic Politics.”12  As the world became smaller and 
smaller, Weizäcker argued, new tensions and conflicts were emerging.  And these could 
only be overcome through a fundamental shift in political perspective.  Problems that had 
traditionally been relegated to foreign policy now had to be seen as central to the lives of 
all people everywhere in the world.  The German people, by implication, had to 
overcome their self-centeredness—even their laudable focus on German guilt and 
German crimes—in order see themselves as part of the larger world outside of Germany.  
In the years that have followed, this position—with its conspicuous internationalism—
has become one of the major pillars of German Protestant thought. 
The Left Liberal consensus of the mid-to-late 1960s did not go unchallenged.  On 
the one hand, the leftward shift of the Kirchentag during the 1960s spurred the creation of 
                                                 
12 For more background, see Ulrich Bartosch, Weltinnenpolitik.  Zur Theorie des Friedens von 
Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker, Beiträge zur Politischen Wissenschaft 86 (Berlin: Duncker and Humblot, 
1995). 
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more theologically and politically conservative alternatives in the German fundamentalist 
movement.    On the other hand—and of more significance to the Kirchentag’s future 
development—the “rational” and “modern” perspective of Protestant liberals also came 
under attack from younger radicals in the New Left.  Rejecting the moderation of their 
elders—and enamored with popular Marxist and psychoanalytic theories—these young 
radicals pushed for a more substantial break with the German past.  Although they 
couched this agenda in the language of overcoming fascism, much of what they rejected 
had grown out of earlier postwar ideologies such as Christian Democracy of the early 
1950s and the modernizing liberalism of the late 1950s and early 1960s.  In place of 
strong, traditional community values, they pushed for the freedom to experiment with 
new lifestyles and new forms of social organization.  In place of Germany’s “social 
market” capitalism, they pushed for Marxist alternatives.  And, in place of principled 
liberalism and parliamentary democracy, they advocated new, more direct forms of 
democratic participation. 
The protests of the youth posed a significant challenge to older liberals at the 
Kirchentag.  While many agreed with the students’ tangible criticisms of West German 
society, especially the need for greater bureaucratic transparency and for the broad-based 
democratization of cultural attitudes and norms, they rejected the emotionalism and 
intolerance of the student movement itself.  However, instead of ignoring the student 
protestors or rejecting them out of hand, Kirchentag leaders in the late 1960s took the risk 
of trying to engage them in dialogue.  At the 1969 Kirchentag, they made considerable 
concessions to the youth, basing the entire gathering on the issues of the protest 
movement, and giving the youth-dominated audience nearly complete control.  Rather 
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than abandoning their own commitment to tolerance, pluralism, and dialogue, they 
demonstrated the sincerity of their liberal democratic beliefs.  In their willingness to 
listen and to dialogue, they helped to lay the groundwork for future cooperation.   
The emergence of the New Left in the late 1960s, then, was not the first step in 
the liberalization or democratization of West German Protestant attitudes.   But it was an 
important test and a defining moment.  It served as a source of provocation, spurring 
older, established liberals to work more quickly and decisively for social change.  And it 
provided a new source of popular enthusiasm and energy to drive this movement.  It did 
not overturn the Left Liberal consensus that had already begun to emerge.  Instead, it 
reinforced this perspective against the views of more conservative Protestants.  And it 
helped to color and shape this movement’s continued development over the course of the 
next several decades. 
 
PROTESTANTISM IN POSTWAR WEST GERMAN SOCIETY 
The transformation of West German Protestantism between 1949 and 1969 did 
not occur in isolation from changes in the rest of West German society.  While 
discussions in the churches and at Kirchentag meetings were colored by many 
specifically Protestant concerns and preoccupations, they were also strongly shaped by 
the problems facing German society at large.  Devoted to strengthening the spiritual 
maturity and political responsibility of Protestant laity, the Kirchentag was created to be a 
bridge between the churches and the “world.”  And, as its course over the period between 
1949 and 1969 clearly demonstrates, a sizable number of West German citizens did not 
see faith and politics or faith and national identity as entirely separate spheres of life.  
This is most apparent in the politics of the early 1950s, dominated by a Christian 
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democratic ideology (or set of ideologies) specifically founded on the centrality of 
Christian faith to every political and social question.  In more subtle ways, however, faith 
was also an important inspiration for the work of many later liberals and progressives.  At 
gatherings like the Kirchentag, German Protestant beliefs and attitudes were themselves 
transformed through contact with ideas and social forces from outside of the churches.  
But, as the meetings of the Kirchentag suggest, these changes within German 
Protestantism also played a part in the transformation of the rest of West German society. 
A comprehensive examination of the influence of the churches in German society 
goes beyond the scope of this dissertation.  Kirchentag documents tell us more about the 
ways that Protestants appropriated and reacted to larger social and cultural changes than 
about the effects that changes in the churches had on the outside world.  But it is possible 
to suggest some conclusions about this influence by examining the developments at the 
Kirchentag—and in the Protestant churches—in the context of postwar German history.  
Protestants at the Kirchentag had many of the same concerns as West Germans outside 
the Protestant churches.  And the Kirchentag program offered many points of contact—
and comparison—with political and social issues that were of importance to West 
German society as a whole.  This dissertation has focused on three major themes: 
changing understandings of the place of religious belief in society, questions of national 
identity, and the transformation of political attitudes and values.  Each of these themes 
can be examined in its relation to broader social and cultural trends. 
 
RELIGION AND SECULARIZATION 
It is clear from the Kirchentag that German Protestant attitudes toward Christian 
belief and toward the churches underwent significant changes over the course of the 
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1950s and 1960s.  This study has focused most closely on their relation to questions 
about the broader relevance of religious belief in West German society.  German 
Protestant attitudes in this area were relatively straightforward in the early 1950s.  In 
keeping with the ideology of Christian Democracy, most Protestants believed that the 
churches—and religious faith—needed to be at the center of any social and political 
renewal.  Christian faith was the only secure foundation for a healthy future society.  
Indeed, even Protestants who were critical of Christian Democratic politics adhered to 
their own variations on this theme.  This emphasis on the centrality of faith seems to have 
played an important role in convincing German Christians—in both the Protestant and 
Catholic churches—to accept the legitimacy of the Federal Republic.  If, to paraphrase 
Bishop Meiser, Christ was to rule West Germany, then naturally German Protestants had 
an obligation to support and defend his reign.   
In the late 1940s and early 1950s, German Protestants looked forward to a 
society-wide religious revival.  While the social influence of the churches had been 
declining since at least the late nineteenth century, they believed that the postwar period 
would see a reversal of this trend.  This belief was not entirely unfounded.  In the 
immediate postwar years, amid the nearly total collapse of German society, the churches 
did see an influx of new members.  But, as church leaders began to realize in the late 
1940s, this interest declined again as social conditions normalized.  In fact, the 
Kirchentag was founded, in part, to address this decline.  The work of Reinold von 
Thadden-Trieglaff, and the other Kirchentag leaders, was based on the belief the postwar 
revival could only be sustained if the Protestant laity were given a larger role in the 
churches.  The disappointment of the Protestant Left with the “restoration” of the 
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churches’ prewar institutional structure also needs to be viewed in this light.  Already by 
the early 1950s, the opportunity for wholesale revival and religious renewal seemed to be 
slipping away.  Over the next two decades, many Protestants revised their attitudes 
toward the role of the churches in society.  While most continued to believe that Christian 
faith had an important social and political role to play, they began to interpret this role 
much less directly.  Healthy political and social life still needed to be rooted in Christian 
faith, but faith was not enough, by itself, to solve the problems of the world. 
It is tempting to view this transformation under the rubric of “secularization.”  
Religious belief, one could argue, came to play a smaller role in the lives of most 
Germans, making the Christian-democratic optimism of the early 1950s unsustainable.  
However, this explanation is problematic for several reasons.  On the most basic level, at 
least according to demographic data, the period between 1949 and 1969 was not 
characterized by any rapid secularization.  The percentage of West German citizens who 
identified themselves as Protestants held steadily around 50 percent until the 1970s.  And 
the proportion of West Germans who claimed to be without religious affiliation only 
grew from 4 to 6 percent over the same period.  The number of West Germans choosing 
to formally leave the Protestant churches also remained steady at around 2 people each 
year per thousand, only rising to four in the mid-1960s and hovering between six and 
seven during the 1970s.  On the other hand, regular church attendance was quite low 
among Protestant church members, certainly no higher than 10 percent.  But this was not 
a new development.  Church attendance numbers were already quite low in the 1940s and 
1950s and they remained low in the 1960s.13 
                                                 
13 Karl Schmitt, Konfession und Wahlverhalten in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Ordo 
Politicus 27, ed. Dieter Oberndörfer (Berlin: Duncker and Humblot, 1989), 310-11; See also Christoph 
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Studies of West German voting patterns offer an additional reason to be cautious 
about attributing postwar changes in attitude to secularization.  Over the course of the 
1950s and 1960s, Protestants who regularly attended religious services exhibited similar 
political behavior to those who did not.  While Protestants who regularly attended church 
were slightly more likely to vote for the CDU during the 1950s than those who did not, 
this factor had only about one-third of the weight that it did among Catholic voters.  And 
by the end of the 1950s, this difference had shrunk to insignificance.  Around half of the 
Protestants who regularly attended church voted for the CDU in the early 1950s.  And 
around half continued to vote for the CDU until the mid-to-late 1960s.  While the SPD 
did gain religious voters during the same period, these gains came from the ranks of the 
politically inactive and from the supporters of the smaller political parties.14 
Anecdotal evidence from the Kirchentag also suggests the limitations of 
“secularization” as an explanation for changing attitudes on the role faith in society.   
Kirchentag leaders like Reinold von Thadden-Trieglaff and Bishop Hanns Lilje of 
Hanover, for example, were strong supporters of the CDU—and of the Christianization of 
West German society more broadly—but they also argued for a relatively nuanced 
understanding of the relationship between faith and politics.  And members of the 
Protestant Left, like Martin Niemöller and Gustav Heinemann, were just as likely to 
make exclusive faith-political claims as Protestant conservatives—especially on the issue 
of rearmament.  By the mid-1960s, in fact, it was Protestants on the Left who were 
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making moral and theological arguments for peace and social justice, while liberals and 
moderate conservatives prided themselves on their “rational,” “fact-based” approach. 
If secularization does not explain the shift in Protestant attitudes on the role of 
religion in society, then what does?  Rather than looking only at the social behavior of 
German Protestants, an adequate answer to this question needs to consider cultural and 
intellectual factors.  German Protestants did not necessarily become more “secular”—
depending, of course, on how one defines secularization—but their religious beliefs and 
cultural expectations underwent a significant transformation.  This transformation was 
doubtless the result of many different factors.  But one obvious explanation would be the 
gradual development of a more democratic habitus among German Protestants.  As the 
evolution of the Kirchentag program strongly suggests, the experience of living under a 
liberal democratic state system had a gradual but cumulative effect on the way that 
Protestants thought about political and social life.  While faith remained an important 
source of values and an inspiration for political activity, the available, socially-acceptable 
outlets for this activity changed.  Though Protestants continued to want to “live out” their 
faith, this impulse found very different expressions in 1969 than it did in 1949.  From this 
perspective, the changing views of religious belief at the Kirchentage of the 1950s and 
1960s, were a matter of affirming and reinterpreting the Protestant religious tradition, not 
of leaving it behind.  
 
NATIONAL IDENTITY 
The Protestant churches also played a crucial role in overcoming the legacy of 
German nationalism.  German Protestantism had long been closely associated with the 
idea of the German nation.  Indeed, this connection goes back at least as far as the 
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creation of the modern German state under the auspices of Protestant Prussia.  Part of 
being a good Protestant—according to this longstanding tradition—was being loyal to the 
German nation.  Indeed, some Protestants went further, defining German-ness in ways 
that excluded Catholics, Jews, liberals, or socialists.  Even the experiences of the “church 
struggle” during the Third Reich were not enough to immediately overturn this legacy.  
While a few theologians, most notably the Swiss citizen Karl Barth, rejected nationalism 
as a form of idolatry, even most confessing church leaders prided themselves on their 
patriotism and willingness to serve the nation.  At the outbreak of World War II, for 
example, even Martin Niemöller, one of the most radical leaders of the confessing 
church, volunteered for military service from his cell in the Sachsenhausen concentration 
camp.15  Only as the campaign against the churches and against religious instruction in 
the schools continued, as Nazi atrocities began to come to light, and as the war turned 
against Germany, did Protestant leaders begin to question these automatic ties between 
the church and the nation.   
After the war, members of the Protestant Left embraced Karl Barth’s position.  
Protestants who had belonged to the radical faction of the confessing church, in 
particular, came to see the nation as a dangerous idol.  Building on this foundation, left-
wing Protestants, like Martin Niemöller and Gustav Heinemann, argued for a new 
national understanding rooted in the acknowledgement of German guilt.  This position, 
almost the mirror-image of earlier nationalist ideas, remained focused on the unique place 
of Germany among the nations of the world.  Rather than championing German 
superiority, however, it emphasized Germany’s unique guilt and the burden this placed 
upon the German people.  While other nations might pursue their own national interests, 
                                                 
15 James Bentley, Martin Niemöller (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), 146-147. 
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left-wing Protestants argued, Germany had a special obligation to pursue repentance and 
reconciliation.  At least during the 1950s, these ideas appealed to a relatively limited 
audience.  Most Protestants—and most Germans—were more interested in getting their 
own lives back on track than they were in self-critical reflection.  But, as one of the 
first—and most strident—groups to look systematically at German guilt, the Protestant 
Left did lay an important philosophical and theological foundation for the future.  
Of more immediate significance to most ordinary Germans, the experiences of 
defeat and division also had a profound impact on national attitudes.  This was 
particularly true for German Protestants—who felt national division especially deeply.  
While members of the Protestant Left accepted West Germany as the heir of the German 
Reich—and called for national repentance—many other Germans were reluctant to 
accept the legitimacy of the West German rump state.  Their national loyalty was to a 
state that no longer existed.  And their political priority was reunification at any cost.16  
This position had adherents from across the theological and political spectrum.  Some, 
working within the conceptual framework of the Protestant Left, accepted that division 
was God’s punishment against Germany.  But they believed that repentance might lead to 
reunification and national renewal.  Others came to this position from a more traditionally 
conservative perspective.  But—whatever their motivations—adherents of this viewpoint 
shared a common rejection of German division and a strong desire for renewed national 
unity.  Although the Kirchentag leadership was uncomfortable with this perspective, this 
attitude was responsible for much of the gathering’s early success.  As a popular forum 
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for Germans from both the East and West, the Kirchentag meetings of the early 1950s 
were powerful symbols of all-German unity.  On a more practical level, these meetings 
were also an important point of actual contact for Protestants from the two German states.  
While Reinold von Thadden-Trieglaff emphasized the importance of the Kirchentag as a 
forum devoted to strengthening the religious and political maturity of the Protestant laity, 
most press reports focused the East-West reunions it hosted, or on the awkward, non-
political meetings between East and West German politicians.   
Over time, however, as the prospects for reunification became more remote, this 
national enthusiasm turned into national disappointment.  Gradually, during the late 
1950s and early 1960s, Protestants at the Kirchentag began to come to terms with the 
seeming permanence of division.  Discussions shifted from reunification and unity to 
East-West coexistence and cooperation.  This national disillusionment created a new 
opening for the ideas of the Protestant Left.  Starting in the mid-1950s, workgroup 
speakers began to address the need for Polish-German reconciliation, a position that 
brought together the “realist” and “moralist” concerns of different Protestant factions.  
And, starting in 1959, workgroups at the Kirchentag began to systematically address the 
legacy of the Nazi dictatorship, the war, and the Holocaust.  This confluence of left-wing 
moralism and liberal Realpolitik, in turn, helped to lay the foundation for a new, more 
“international” German identity.  The principles of reconciliation were no longer applied 
only to relations the two German states or between the two sides of the Cold War, but, as 
seen in Carl Friedrich Weizsäcker’s concept of “world domestic politics,” to geo-political 
relations at the broadest level.  Certainly, German Protestants were not alone developing 
these new ideas.  But they were consistently at the forefront of the West German debate.  
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As one of the groups in German society most implicated in the destructive nationalism of 
the past, they were also among the most disillusioned by German defeat.  And this led 
them, over time, to thoroughly reject nationalism in favor of a much more “international” 
sense of German identity. 
 
DEMOCRATIZATION 
The postwar transformation of Protestant political attitudes also made an 
important contribution to the ultimate democratization of West German society.  
Protestants, after all, made up approximately half of the West German population in the 
1950s. And they were among the groups most disillusioned by defeat and most inclined 
toward political resignation.  By constantly promoting “public responsibility” Protestant 
leaders worked against these tendencies.  This was true across the theological and 
political spectrum.  At Kirchentag gatherings in the early 1950s both supporters and 
opponents of the CDU argued for some form of faith-inspired political activity.  And they 
promoted the idea that political activity—whether positive or negative—was a Christian 
duty.  This advocacy succeeded in drawing large numbers of Protestants back into civil 
society and into the democratic political process on all levels, laying the foundation for a 
healthy democratic system. 
Many Protestant leaders feared that the deep political divisions within the 
churches—especially on the issue of West German rearmament—might contribute to 
renewed disillusionment.  And they worked at first to avoid or minimize open conflict at 
the Kirchentag.  However, these fears appear to have been unfounded, at least over the 
long term.  Rather than causing Protestant voters to turn their backs on political activity, 
these disagreements seem to have further politicized the Protestant public.  
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Approximately half of the most religiously active segment of German Protestants (those 
who regularly attended church services) voted consistently for the CDU during the 1950s.  
This support remained steady until the late 1960s.  But nearly a third of these Protestants 
voted for a minor party or did not vote at all in the early1950s.  By the early 1960s most 
of these voters appear to have shifted their allegiance to the SPD.17  Rather than causing 
Protestants to reject politics, it appears that the emergence of multiple, competing 
political perspectives within the Protestant churches—and, thus, the availability of more 
political options—further contributed to the politicization of West German Protestants. 
On the level of political attitudes, the emergence of competing forms of Protestant 
politics also helped to acclimatize West German Protestants to political pluralism and 
dialogue.  Much of the Christian democratic enthusiasm of the early 1950s (on both the 
Protestant Right and Left) had been premised on universal political and theological 
claims and on the importance of political agreement.  Over time, however, West German 
Protestants became more comfortable with their disagreements and political differences.  
In the process of learning how to coexist with one another, Protestants on the Left and 
Right gained a new appreciation for the liberal values of tolerance, pluralism, and 
dialogue.  By the late 1950s and early 1960s they were self-consciously promoting these 
values as important tenets of democratic society.  Of course, German Protestants were not 
the only group to promote liberal democratic values in West Germany.  Nor were they the 
first.  But, because the size of West Germany’s Protestant population and because of their 
long history of illiberal attitudes, this transformation played an important role in 
stabilizing the West German system.  This liberalism and commitment to self-criticism 
and dialogue was strong enough to withstand the challenges posed by radical youth 
                                                 
17 Karl Schmitt, Konfession und Wahlverhalten, Table A19b, 322. 
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politics in the late 1960s.  As the 1969 Kirchentag demonstrates, liberal Protestants were 
among the segments of the West German population most willing to engage in dialogue 
with the radical youth.  In working with, rather than against, the youth protestors, 
Protestants at the Kirchentag demonstrated the sincerity of their liberal democratic 
beliefs.  And, just as important, they helped to draw youth back into the political process, 
channeling their energy into positive political activity and laying the groundwork for 
future political and social reform. 
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